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Summary 
Endogenous institutional change has proven to be a long-standing open question in new 
institutionalism. To attempt to move beyond this problem and add to the attempts of 
explaining endogenous institutional change, the theoretical strategy of this thesis revolves 
around the inclusion of relevant drivers of institutional change in the analysis. We suggest that 
the traditional focus on national institutions represents a significant obstacle to explaining 
exogenous institutional change, and that the relevant drivers of national-level change are often 
found in global processes. The systemic cycle theory is chosen to predict these global 
processes as it enables a long-term historical lens and a theory of cyclical shifts in power 
resources. The method of the dialogue between the systemic cycle and institutional theory is 
the construction of a new metatheoretical framework (taking a cue from Elinor Ostrom). 
Within this framework, we identify three interacting channels of institutional change: path 
dependence, systemic cycle driven power relations and institutional design via formal politics. 
The central hypothesis of this thesis states that the changes in labor institutions are influenced 
by the systemic cycle. The systemic cycle is operationalized as three interconnected drivers of 
institutional change: phase of the systemic cycle (material or financial expansion), trade 
relations and developmental strategies. This thesis is theoretical in nature, but it will use three 
illustrative empirical chapters showing the change of labor institutions since 1980 in the USA, 
Germany and PR China. In the USA, the lack of path deviating tendencies (through a power 
resources reshuffling or radical political reforms) led to the most prominent role for path 
dependence, securing the continuation of labor market deregulation. Germany started the 
observed period with relatively well protected labor institutions, but has since increased the 
dualization of labor markets, which we interpret as a shift towards an extensive 
developmental strategy. In China, a distinct context of a one-party rule permeates politics, but 
decades of low-wage regime and low labor protection have given way to an increase in labor 
protection and coordination, which we interpret as a shift towards an intensive developmental 
strategy. 
 
KEY WORDS: systemic cycle, endogenous institutional change, labor market, power, 
developmental strategy 
  
  
Sažetak (hrvatski jezik) 
U kontekstu novog institucionalizma, ali i suvremenog izučavanja institucija općenito, često 
se ističu analitički nedostatci nedovoljnog fokusa na makroekonomska pitanja te ignoriranja 
koncepta moći. Posebno se tvrdokornim pokazao problem endogene institucionalne promjene 
budući da mainstream pristupi najčešće interpretiraju institucionalnu promjenu kao egzogenu. 
Inzistiranje na egzogenoj promjeni znači da uzroci i značaj same promjene nisu obuhvaćeni u 
konceptualizaciji institucija, već se institucije nastavljaju prešutno shvaćati kao stabilne. 
Empirijski očita konstantnost samih institucionalnih promjena objašnjava se pak kroz eksterni 
događaj, odnosno ne kao proizvod prirode samih institucija, već samo neizvjesnosti njihovog 
okoliša. Takvo je stanje rezultat ozbiljnih konceptualnih promašaja koji su literaturi 
institucionalne analize već poznati, iako s njima do danas nije uspješno raskrstila.  
Ova je disertacija u svojoj osnovi pokušaj suočavanja s tim problemom te svrstavanja uz bok s 
drugim pokušajima objašnjavanja endogenih institucionalnih promjena. Teorijska strategija 
vrti se oko uključivanja relevantnih pokretača institucionalnih promjena u analizu kako bi se 
postigao dovoljno širok obuhvat da se egzogenost promjena svede na minimalnu razinu. Kroz 
širenje takvog obuhvata brzo postaje jasno da je nacionalna razina kao uobičajena jedinica 
analize institucija zapravo nedostatna budući da se u globalnim procesima često nalaze 
relevantni pokretači promjene na nacionalnoj razini. Samim time bi primjerice deregulacija 
određenog tržišta u odazivu na zahtjeve globalizacije, ekonomskih integracija ili 
financijalizacije svjetskih tržišta nužno bila svedena na egzogenu promjenu. Dakle potraga za 
endogenosti logički nas dovodi do nadnacionalne jedinice analize, a za nošenje s istom 
potrebna nam je teorija koja na nadnacionalnoj jedinici analize može ponuditi objašnjenje i 
predviđanje osnovnih globalnih ekonomskih procesa, njihovu interakciju s procesima na 
nacionalnim razinama te s konceptom moći (kako bismo ispravno identificirali aktere koji 
mogu utjecati na promjenu). Teorija sustavskoga ciklusa odabrana je za predviđanje tih 
globalnih procesa jer omogućuje dugoročnu povijesnu leću i teoriju cikličkih pomaka u 
izvorima moći.  
Osnovna je metoda s kojom se ova dva obuhvata literature (sustavski ciklus i institucionalna 
teorija) dovode u dijalog izgradnja novog metateorijskog okvira po uzoru na Elinor Ostrom, 
dakle okvira koji kroz metateorijski jezik podrazumijeva i obuhvaća više teorija koje pak 
mogu obuhvaćati više modela, tj. više specifičnih setova kauzalnih objašnjenja.  
  
Unutar tog novog okvira identificiramo tri međusobno povezana kanala institucionalne 
promjene: ovisnost o prijeđenom putu, odnose moći definirane kroz sustavski ciklus te 
institucionalni dizajn putem formalne politike. Središnja je hipoteza ovog doktorskog rada 
kako su promjene u radnim institucijama pod utjecajem sustavskoga ciklusa. Sustavski je 
ciklus pak operacionaliziran kao tri međusobno povezana pokretača institucionalne promjene: 
faza sustavskoga ciklusa (materijalna ili financijska ekspanzija), trgovinski odnosi i razvojne 
strategije. Ova je teza teorijske prirode, ali će koristiti tri ilustrativna empirijska poglavlja koja 
prikazuju promjenu institucija povezanih s radom od 1980. godine u SAD-u, Njemačkoj i NR 
Kini.  
Institucije koje se odnose na rad odabrane su iz nekoliko razloga. Kao prvo, rad je ključan 
element u logičkoj globalno-lokalnoj tenziji shvaćenoj kao tenziji između mobilnog, 
globalnog kapitala te teže pokretnog, lokalnog rada. U tom je kontekstu sustavski ciklus 
proces koji se bavi profitabilnošću i investicijama (globalnim dijelom jednadžbe), dok je rad 
manje mobilan faktor i više pripada nacionalnoj razini (nacionalni/lokalni dio jednadžbe). 
Logički, oba faktora potrebna su u proizvodnji, no u spekulativnim pomacima kapitala rad 
može postati sve bliži suvišnosti, pa se u posljednjim desetljećima znatno pogoršava odnos 
moći između rada i kapitala u korist potonjega. Kao drugo, rad zauzima ključno mjesto i u 
političko-ekonomskim sustavima na nacionalnoj razini. Budući da radnička prava 
(formalizirana zakonom ili uspostavljena kroz kolektivne pregovore) imaju značajan učinak 
na distribuciju dohotka, ona su također važan dio upravljanja agregatnom potražnjom. Samim 
time utječu na nejednakost dohotka i sposobnost upravljanja ekonomskim krizama. Kao treće, 
zastupanje radničkih interesa omogućava jasan uvid u političku moć implicitnu u 
ekonomskim pitanjima, prvenstveno kroz praćenje sindikalne gustoće i pokrivenosti 
kolektivnim ugovorima. Tradicionalna zastupanja radničkih interesa kroz stranački sustav u 
posljednjim desetljećima zakazala su budući da se uz pomoć napretka tehnologije promijenila 
i struktura zaposlenja, pa manje glasača pripada sindikalno usmjerenim aktivnostima poput 
industrije. No tzv. electoral turn u institucionalnoj literaturi posljednjih godina omogućava i 
nove uvide u povezanost ostataka klasnog sustava i stranačke politike u suvremenom svijetu. 
Kao četvrto i konačno, modeli rasta (tj. razvojne strategije) nerazdvojno su povezani s radnim 
institucijama – pa je model rasta koji se oslanja na izvoz kompatibilniji s fleksibilnim 
formatima zaposlenja, a model rasta koji se oslanja na domaću potražnju kompatibilniji sa 
zaštićenim tržištem rada. Iz svih su ovih razloga institucije povezane s radom osobito podesne 
  
za demonstraciju novog okvira. No i obratno je točno budući da je novi okvir osmišljen 
upravo oko uloge institucija rada u suvremenom kapitalizmu. 
Poglavlje 1 prikazuje globalni proces kapitalizma unutar svjetsko-sustavske jedinice analize i 
kroz teoriju svjetskog sustava, koja je izgrađena na logici alternirajućih faza financijske i 
materijalne ekspanzije. Stoga se fokusira na Arrighijev pristup svjetsko-sustavskom 
istraživanju koji kulminira u teoriji sustavskoga ciklusa te nudi kritiku Arrighijevog pristupa 
kao nedovoljno osjetljivog na faktore povezane s ekonomijom potražnje te nedovoljno 
opremljenog za analizu nacionalnih iteracija kapitalizma. No interpretacija sustavskoga 
ciklusa Beverly Silver nudi ključne uvide u učinke sustavskoga ciklusa na raspodjelu moći, pa 
se u njezinoj misli može tražiti ishodište za povezivanje sustavskoga ciklusa s institucijama. 
Njezin pristup moći rada (po uzoru na Wrighta) razlikuje strukturnu i asocijativnu moć, s tim 
da se strukturna moć odnosi na sposobnost pregovaranja koja je rezultat položaja i uloge u 
gospodarskom sustavu, a asocijativna moć kapacitet organizacije rada. Teorija sustavskog 
ciklusa omogućava i predikcije kretanja moći rada. Poglavlje 1 identificira tri relevantna 
elementa: fazu sustavskoga ciklusa (materijalna ili financijska ekspanzija, pri čemu koristimo 
pristup Beverly Silver), položaj u međunarodnoj trgovini (prema analogiji sa Silver) te, uz 
potrebnu dodatnu makroekonomsku reinterpretaciju, ekstenzivnu/intenzivnu razvojnu 
strategiju.  
Poglavlje 2 prikazuje suvremene pristupe proučavanju institucija i institucionalnih promjena 
(povijesni institucionalizam, sociološki institucionalizam i institucionalizam racionalnog 
izbora kao tri „nova institucionalizma“ te njihov konačni oblik u komparativnom istraživanju 
kapitalizma) kako bi se identificirali elementi korisni za konstrukciju novog okvira 
institucionalne promjene koji se može primijeniti na institucije nacionalne razine. Poglavlje 2 
također iznosi kritiku velikog dijela pristupa unutar novog institucionalizma zbog 
konceptualne ovisnosti o egzogenim šokovima u interpretacijama institucionalne promjene – 
što im omogućava zadržavanje na očekivanju institucionalne stabilnosti s rezultatom 
prevalentnosti istraživačke agende upućene na tipologije nacionalnih kapitalizama. Poglavlje 
završava definiranjem triju konceptualno korisnih kanala institucionalne promjene: ovisnosti 
o prijeđenom putu, namjernim institucionalnim dizajnom kroz formalne političke procese te 
manje kodificiranim političkim interakcijama vođenim resursima moći. Pristup 
institucionalnoj promjeni koji razvija ova disertacija zahtijeva i teoriju promjene odnosa u 
resursima moći, pa su naredna dva poglavlja posvećena integraciji teorije sustavskog ciklusa 
  
(koja u dovršenom obliku obuhvaća upravo promjene u resursima moći) s konceptima 
institucionalne promjene. 
Poglavlje 3 istražuje kompatibilnost snaga i slabosti ovih dvaju velika teorijskih sklopova – s 
jedne strane teorije sustavskog ciklusa (često fokusirane na globalnu razinu, uz ignoriranje 
uloge i učinka institucija na nacionalnoj razini), a s druge strane suvremenih pristupa 
institucionalnom proučavanju (često fokusiranih na nacionalno i stabilno, uz ignoriranje uloge 
i učinaka globalnih procesa). U pokušaju nadilaženja tih specifičnih ograničenja korisnom se 
pokazuje svjetsko-sustavska jedinica analize koja nadilazi lokalno/nacionalno te se 
usredotočuje na globalnu ekonomsku podjelu rada između razvijenih i podrazvijenih. Analiza 
institucionalnih promjena kroz ovakvu jedinicu analize omogućava nam da obuhvatimo više 
varijabli kao endogenih procesu koji opisujemo. Dugim riječima, ovakvo povećanje jedinice 
analize može nam omogućiti razumijevanje interakcija globalnih ili transnacionalnih 
ekonomskih procesa i nacionalnih institucija. Poglavlje 3 također razvija kejnezijanske 
elemente ekonomije potražnje koji su ključni medijator između arigijanskih kategorija 
sustavskoga ciklusa i institucionalnih teorija. Apstraktne arigijanske kategorije intenzivnog i 
ekstenzivnog kapitalizma tako su interpretirane kroz prizmu ekonomije ponude i ekonomije 
potražnje kao konkretne suvremene razvojne strategije – što predstavlja nužni metateorijski 
iskorak na putu prema integraciji više teorija u zajednički novi okvir. S jedne strane fokus na 
izvoz u ekstenzivnoj strategiji nužnim čini odnos prema tržištu rada primarno kroz trošak 
povezan s proizvodnjom – cilj je tako rad učiniti što konkurentnijim i što fleksibilnijim. S 
druge strane fokus na domaće tržište u intenzivnoj strategiji nužnim čini odnos prema tržištu 
rada primarno kroz osiguranje domaće potražnje – cilj je tako osigurati visoku zaposlenost i 
nužnu razinu dohotka radnika. Ovo poglavlje također definira institucije, institucionalnu 
promjenu i pokretače (drivers) institucionalne promjene, što su elementi potrebni za novi 
okvir. 
Poglavlje 4 operacionalizira centralnu hipotezu ovog doktorskog rada kroz novi okvir 
institucionalne promjene, koji koristi elemente razvijene u Poglavlju 3. Centralna hipoteza 
utvrđuje kako su promjene u institucijama povezanima s radom pod utjecajem sustavskoga 
ciklusa, a novi okvir u Poglavlju 4 razrađuje sedam pokretača u tri isprepletena kanala 
institucionalne promjene. Sustavski ciklus operacionaliziran je kao tri međusobno povezana 
pokretača institucionalne promjene: faza sustavskog ciklusa (materijalna ili financijska 
ekspanzija), trgovinski odnosi i razvojne strategije. Uz dodatna dva pokretača – tehnološke 
  
promjene i pozicije moći – sustavski ciklus tvori kanal koji objašnjava cikličke pomake u 
moći. Druga dva kanala – ovisnost o prijeđenom putu i institucionalni dizajn – pružaju važan 
kontekst, a nešto su bolje identificirana u postojećoj literaturi od sustavskoga ciklusa. 
Centralni konceptualni novum ovoga doktorskoga rada upravo je uključenje sustavskoga 
ciklusa u novi okvir institucionalne promjene – što je moguće isključivo zbog reinterpretacije 
kroz ekonomiju potražnje izvedene u Poglavlju 3. 
Poglavlja 5, 6 i 7 primjenjuju okvir iz Poglavlja 4 na ilustrativne slučajeve tržišta rada u SAD-
u, Njemačkoj i Narodnoj Republici Kini od 1980. Poglavlje 5 propituje dodatnu deregulaciju i 
okretanje slobodnom tržištu na tržištu rada u SAD-u u tom razdoblju. U tom su smislu 
institucije povezane s tržištem rada ušle u 1980-e kao već fleksibilno tržište s ograničenim 
sposobnostima organizacije rada. Taj se trend nastavio kroz naredna četiri desetljeća, a 
Poglavlje 5 otvara osnovne koncepte institucionalne promjene na tržištu rada u SAD-u kroz tri 
aspekta institucija prema Douglassu Northu (formalne – neformalne – izbjegnute). Nisu se 
pojavile značajne zakonske inovacije kako bi se trend promijenio na razini formalnih 
institucija, a moć rada u organizaciji i pregovaranju nastavila je opadati – sa značajnim 
utjecajem na promjenu neformalnih institucija u smjeru fleksibilizacije. Ove su okolnosti 
također pridonijele situaciji u kojoj su marginalizirani radnici prepušteni brojnim nezakonitim 
praksama uključujući nezakonitu uskratu isplate nadnica (izbjegnute institucije). 
Upotrebljavajući okvir iz Poglavlja 4, Poglavlje 5 interpretira institucionalne promjene u 
SAD-u kao rezultat triju identificiranih kanala institucionalne promjene (ovisnost o 
prijeđenom putu – resursi moći/sustavski ciklus – institucionalni dizajn). Za razliku od dva 
slučaja u narednim poglavljima, u SAD-u su sva tri kanala djelovala u istom smjeru. Tako 
ovisnost o prijeđenom putu (prvi kanal) može biti u fokusu interpretacije s obzirom na 
nastavljanje smjera kretanja prema slobodno-tržišno orijentiranom tržištu rada još od kraja 
1940-ih. No uspješnost takve promjene zamisliva je samo u kontekstu izostanka 
institucionalnog dizajna koji bi reformirao takvu strukturu (treći kanal) i nemogućnosti rada 
da aktivno brani svoje interese (drugi kanal) s obzirom na opadajuću strukturnu i asocijativnu 
moć uzrokovanu trgovinskim deficitima, financijskom ekspanzijom i pomakom u 
postindustrijsko društvo.  
Interpretativna logika Poglavlja 5 također nastoji nadići diskrepancije u kontekstu literature 
modusa promjene, u kojoj su se pojavila dva stajališta o tržištu rada u SAD-u. Prema Thelen, 
radi se o displacementu (nadomještanju jednog seta institucija drugim, s fokusom na 
  
deregulaciji), a prema Hackeru i Piersonu, radi se o driftu (napuštanju duha starog seta 
institucija kroz manjak adaptacije novim okolnostima). Okvir koji koristimo služi se 
hijerarhijskom razradom pokretača i kanala prema vremenskom razdoblju potrebnom za 
njihov razvoj te je unutar tog okvira jasno da su obje interpretacije u literaturi plauzibilne 
unutar svojih razdoblja. Tako je displacement dugoročna interpretacija općeg obrasca 
promjene u institucijama povezanima s tržištem rada u SAD-u, a drift je kratkoročni preduvjet 
za njegov razvoj. 
Poglavlje 6 analizira institucije povezane s tržištem rada u Njemačkoj od 1980. One su počele 
na dobro zaštićenoj razini, ali su u međuvremenu povećale dualizaciju tržišta rada kroz 
kombiniranje dobro zaštićene jezgre tržišta rada u proizvodnji i sve više dereguliranog sektora 
usluga. Promatrano kroz nortijansku prizmu, dominiraju formalne i neformalne institucije, 
dok (za razliku od SAD-a i Kine) izbjegnute institucije nisu značajan problem. U smislu 
formalnih institucija, zadržan je visok stupanj zaštite ugovora na neodređeno vrijeme, ali sve 
veći stupanj liberalizacije ugovora na određeno vrijeme i ostalih tipova marginalnog 
zapošljavanja. U smislu neformalnih institucija, prakse u kolektivnim pregovorima također 
reflektiraju sve veću dualizaciju.  
Taj institucionalni rezultat interpretiran je kao učinak interakcije u tri identificirana kanala. 
Ovisnost o prijeđenom putu (prvi kanal) stvorila je ključni kontekst u kojem je 
institucionalizirana suradnja organiziranog rada i organiziranih poslodavaca s državom kao 
medijatorom. No ovaj je tradicionalni tripartitni pristup reformama bio ostatak starijeg stadija 
razvoja odnosa moći u kojima su strukturna i asocijativna moć rada bile na znatno višoj 
razini. Drugi kanal institucionalne promjene u Poglavlju 6 opisuje promjene u odnosima moći 
koje su zadržale bastion u proizvodnji, ali ga nikad nisu izgradile u marginalnom dijelu tržišta 
rada (uvelike u uslužnom sektoru). To je pak stvorilo dualizam moći koji je bio pretpostavka 
institucionalne dualizacije samog tržišta rada. Treći kanal (institucionalni dizajn) u fokus 
stavlja namjerne reforme Schröderove vlade koja je pokušala unaprijediti njemačku 
konkurentnost kroz liberalizaciju modela tržišta rada. Rezultat je bio institucionalizacija 
ekstenzivne razvojne strategije kroz dualizam tržišta rada, što je značajan pomak u odnosu na 
nekadašnju intenzivnu strategiju. Sama dualizacija omogućena je u ovisnosti o prijeđenom 
putu i s visokim stupnjem moći industrijskog rada, koji su štitili jezgru tržišta rada namjernim 
reformama (institucionalnim dizajnom) i niskim stupnjem moći rada u uslužnim djelatnostima 
te proizveli liberalizaciju u marginalnom sektoru tržišta rada. U kontekstu modusa 
  
institucionalne promjene Poglavlje 6 potvrdilo je navode iz literature koji su opisivali 
promjene tržišta rada u Njemačkoj kao drift, ali samo za dva dugoročnija kanala, dok 
kratkoročniji, treći kanal institucionalnog dizajna upućuje na displacement.  
Poglavlje 7 primjenjuje okvir institucionalne promjene na institucionalne promjene tržišta 
rada u Narodnoj Republici Kini od 1980. Kao i u druga dva ilustrativna slučaja, poglavlje 
počinje pregledom institucionalne promjene kroz nortijansku prizmu. Formalne institucije 
pružaju visok stupanj zaštite, no postoji veliki jaz u primjeni (enforcement gap), pa su u Kini 
znatno važnije neformalne i izbjegnute institucije. Sveukupni smjer promjene upućen je na 
pojačavanje zaštite rada, no na način koji ne narušava monopol moći Komunističke partije 
Kine. Utoliko je kanal ovisnosti o prijeđenom putu izuzetno važan jer djeluje u kontekstu 
povratne sprege moći relevantnih aktera – odnosno Partije, koja koristi postojeću moć kako bi 
je zadržala u budućnosti. Najvažniji je aspekt izostanak nezavisnih sindikata koji omogućuje 
jedinstven način kolektivnih pregovora i štrajkova (u kojima su priznati sindikati samo 
medijator između radnika i ostalih zainteresiranih strana, a nikada aktivni provoditelj štrajka). 
Unutar toga konteksta odvijaju se promjene u drugom kanalu (sustavski ciklus/odnosi moći), 
gdje se desetljećima povećavala strukturna moć rada zbog izvozno motivirane materijalne 
ekspanzije i tehnološke dinamike, ali su učinci takvog pomaka presudno ograničeni 
onemogućavanjem izraza asocijativne moći (dakle sposobnosti organizacije). U takvoj 
kombinaciji kanala u Kini najvažnije mjesto zauzima institucionalni dizajn (treći kanal), kroz 
koji su se pojavile reforme u smjeru stvaranja srednje klase, borbe protiv siromaštva, zaštite 
tržišta rada i pojačavanja domaće potrošnje. Ove promjene zapravo sugeriraju pomak u 
razvojnim strategijama. Izniman uspjeh gospodarstva Kine kroz 1990-e i 2000-e bio je 
rezultat ekstenzivne razvojne strategije, koja je zavisila od izvoza i postizanja međunarodne 
konkurentnosti prvenstveno kroz niske nadnice. U dinamici ovih triju kanala institucionalne 
promjene ovisnost o prijeđenom putu tako nameće raspodjelu vidljive (asocijativne) moći 
koja se radu odriče, dok drugi kanal stvara rastuću strukturnu moć rada koja se pokušava 
izraziti i kroz nepoželjne štrajkove. Rješenje donosi treći kanal, koji mimo organiziranog rada 
stvara reforme koje pogoduju samom radu, ne gubeći pritom monopol moći Partije. 
Poglavlje 8 sažima i uspoređuje nalaze ilustrativnih poglavlja 5, 6 i 7 te ih interpretira u 
svjetlu teorijskog dijela rada. U kontekstu modusa promjene, poglavlje podcrtava značenje 
izloženog okvira za interpretacije modusa institucionalne promjene. Tako uspoređuje 
interpretacije iz poglavlja o SAD-u (displacement u prva dva kanala i drift u trećem) i 
  
Njemačkoj (drift u prva dva kanala i displacement u trećem) te argumentira kako 
institucionalne promjene na tržištu rada u Kini predstavljaju primjer za layering (supostojanje 
različitih i konkurentskih institucionalnih rješenja) u sva tri kanala. Poglavlje 8 također 
logički zatvara luk disertacije i tumači izvedene institucionalne promjene u kontekstu 
svjetskoga sustava – dakle Njemačke i Kine kao globalnih konkurenata u privlačenju 
trgovinskih partnera i pozicioniranju svojih gospodarstava u centar svjetske privrede. U tom je 
smislu napose zanimljiva asimetrija promjena u razvojnim strategijama s Njemačkom, koja je 
u posljednja dva desetljeća izvela pomak iz intenzivne u ekstenzivnu strategiju, i Kine, koja 
nastoji izvesti pomak iz ekstenzivne u intenzivnu strategiju. Konačno, zaključak podcrtava 
najvažnije aspekte doktorskoga rada. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: sustavski ciklus, endogena institucionalna promjena, tržište rada, moć, 
razvojna strategija 
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Introduction 
 
Capitalism is a global phenomenon which transforms entire societies after its own image. 
Capitalism is regulated, mediated and modified on a local and national level. Both statements 
hold equally true. Therefore, it is an equally large mistake to either assume that global 
economic phenomena like globalization and financialization impact every location in the 
same way or to assume that “national” capitalism types are completely distinct and 
immutable. However, both mistakes are often implicitly made in literature which tends to 
focus either on the global process or on the national institutional stability1. This thesis will 
deal with two types of research genres which have historically tended to exhibit such mistakes 
– with the goal of locating the compatible synergetic elements to formulating a new 
framework of institutional change. Ultimately, this framework will be used to offer an 
analysis of labor markets in the USA, Germany and China. 
More specifically, endogenous institutional change has proven to be a long-standing open 
question in new institutionalism. This thesis will strive to provide another answer through 
explicit inclusion of overlapping global processes with variegated effects as drivers of 
institutional change. There are several theories available that could be used to this effect and 
they range from the French school of regulation, through the systemic cycle to new economic 
geography. However, these theories have always had severe issues in penetrating into the 
mainstream of social sciences, which tends to prefer theories that do not try to do too much at 
once but focus on the visible, the incremental and often on the local/national. It seems 
plausible that the limits of new institutionalism in explaining endogenous institutional change 
are at least partially caused by this desirable restriction. Specifically, the game-
theoretical/rational choice branch of new institutionalism traditionally focuses on strategic 
interactions and treats the rules that govern these interactions as external with the change of 
these rules necessarily being exogenous. The sociological branch most often deals with the 
interpretation, spreading and internalization of meanings attached to institutions rather than 
their origins or change. Finally, the historical institutionalism branch is concerned with 
 
1 Another problematic area is the blurring of the line between normative and nomothetical which occurs 
wherever the economic laws far divorced from reality are retained in use as assumptions to models for the sake 
of their simplicity and theoretical compatibility. These “laws” of economic behavior therefore reflect the world 
as it should be according to the resulting model rather than that which can be empirically observed. A good 
example is the persistence of perfect competition assumptions in neoclassical economics. 
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predictable and stable change through path dependence, while the unpredictable change of 
critical junctures is treated as exogenous. This thesis will elaborate on these, as well as some 
useful attempts to overcome the broadly recognized issue of insufficiently explained 
institutional change. 
To attempt to move beyond this problem and add to the attempts of explaining endogenous 
institutional change, the theoretical strategy of this thesis revolves around the inclusion of 
relevant drivers of institutional change in the analysis. To do so, it is necessary to use a theory 
which has a broader unit of analysis than is usually the case in new institutionalism – 
specifically one that can handle transnational or global processes but still distinguish their 
national manifestations. This distinction is necessary considering that most political-economic 
institutions, including labor institutions are still formed, interpreted and subverted or upheld 
on the national level, but the economic processes that influence them or even drive the need 
for their change are often global. Arrighi’s systemic cycle theory is chosen rather than new 
economic geography or regulationist school because it enables an explanation and prediction 
of global processes and their effects on national settings through a long-term historical lens 
within the world-system, and even more importantly theorizes cyclical power shifts. The 
world-system itself implies a complex unit of analysis which will enable the observance of 
national processes in their interactions with global processes. However, Arrighi’s theory itself 
is not sufficient for the analysis of national institutional change as it lacks an understanding of 
national institutions as well as institutional variety. We therefore engage in a dialogue with 
theories of institutional stability and change in new institutionalism and the systemic cycle 
theory. 
The method of this dialogue is the construction of a new framework, in which we take our cue 
from Elinor Ostrom who distinguishes between frameworks, theories and models. 
Frameworks utilize a metatheoretical language and a wide set of variables. They can be 
compatible with many theories. In other words, theories can be grouped into a framework. 
Models are at the lowest level, as many models may be grouped into theories, and models 
offer very specific sets of causal relationships (Ostrom, 2005: 27-29). In constructing a new 
framework this thesis seeks to group the systemic theory with several specific theories within 
new institutionalism (which itself is a collection of research genres rather than a single 
theory), including power resource theory, Varieties of Capitalism, Keynesian 
macroeconomics and Northian institutionalism. However, these theories do not yet share a 
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metatheoretical language necessary for a single framework. This is why another prerequisite 
is an adequate reinterpretation of the systemic cycle through the prisms of demand-side 
issues, power and institutionalism. After this reinterpretation, we can construct the framework 
which utilizes these theories as well as a number of drivers of institutional change (or models, 
in keeping with Ostrom’s terminology). Within this framework, we will identify three 
interacting channels of institutional change: path dependence, systemic cycle driven power 
relations and institutional design via formal politics. This thesis is theoretical in nature, but it 
will use three illustrative empirical chapters showing the change of labor institutions since 
1980 in the United States of America, Germany and the People’s Republic of China. In the 
USA, the lack of path deviating tendencies (through a power resources reshuffling or radical 
political reforms) led to the most prominent role for path dependence. In Germany and China, 
the situation is substantially more complex, but dominated by shifts in developmental 
strategies within the logic of the systemic cycle.  
Labor institutions were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, labor is crucial to capitalism as 
such as the logical tension between capitalism as a global/local process could be conceptually 
simplified to a tension between global capital and local labor. In the simplest sense, we can 
observe the systemic cycle as a process dealing with profitability and investments (i.e. the 
global capital part of the equation), while labor is less mobile and therefore more based in the 
national level (i.e. the national/local part of the equation). Logically, both must come together 
to manufacture products. But if capital should move towards speculative activities, labor 
becomes increasingly superfluous to the achievement of profit. Also, the increasing mobility 
of capital suggests its possibility of fleeing the labor-friendly locations and looking to capital-
friendly locations for the organization of manufacturing. Such a low-resolution diagnosis has 
prompted some overly simplistic conclusions concerning the destructive effects of 
globalization on labor-rights. Nevertheless, while the effects were not as stark as initially 
imagined, the dual global/local nature of capitalism has in recent decades certainly shown an 
underlying disbalance of power between the interests representing capital and interests 
representing labor in a large part of the developed world. Secondly, labor also stands at a 
crucial point of national-level political-economic systems. Labor rights have a substantial 
effect on the distribution of income, which makes them an important part of aggregate 
demand management (i.e. macroeconomics). Therefore, they influence both distributional 
inequality and the ability to manage economic crises. Thirdly, labor rights were traditionally 
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under the influence of worker self-organization via trade-unions, which could give a direct 
political voice to a concerned party in any change, and this also allows the relative power of 
the unions to be clearly tracked. While this labor-party identification was clearly subverted by 
the changing nature of employment structure and the focus of political elites, recent years 
have also brought an “electoral turn” of institutional literature, arguing for a certain measure 
of reconnecting of class interests and electoral politics. Finally, growth models (i.e. 
developmental strategies) are interconnected with labor institutions – with an export-led 
model more compatible with flexible employment and a domestic demand-led model more 
compatible with protected labor institutions. A combination of these factors means that labor 
institutions are particularly well suited to show the feasibility of the new framework. The 
inverse is also correct, as the framework is constructed particularly with labor in mind, 
considering the specific position of labor institutions in modern capitalism. 
Chapter 1 will portray Arrighi’s strand of world-systemic research culminating in his systemic 
cycle theory and offer a criticism of Arrighi’s approach as insufficiently sensitive to demand-
side factors and as essentially under-equipped to deal with specific national institutional 
iterations of capitalism. While offering a useful predictive tool, superior to the economic 
mainstream in some respects, Arrighi is nevertheless perhaps overly focused on capitalism as 
a global phenomenon with the institutions supporting it locally assumed to be closely 
associated to the paradigmatic case in the center of the world-system. However, the 
interpretation of the systemic cycle by Beverly Silver offers crucial insights into the power 
related effects of the systemic cycle. Chapter 1 will use them in order to outline the systemic 
cycle through three overlapping aspects of systemic cycle phases, trade relations and 
developmental strategies. The first two aspects can be used to predict shifts in labor power, 
while a demand-side interpretation of the third element is necessary to complete the triangle 
and eventually apply it to institutional change analysis. Chapter 2 will cover the contemporary 
approaches to institutions and institutional change (historical institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism and its definitive form in comparative 
capitalisms research) in order to identify the elements useful in constructing a new framework 
of change – and one useful to deciphering the change of national institutions. It will also offer 
a critique of a large part of new institutionalism as still dependent on exogenous shocks to 
deal with issues of institutional change - enabling it to stick to implicit institutional stability 
and typologies of national capitalisms as the prevalent research agenda. Chapter 2 will finish 
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by defining three channels of institutional change: path dependence, deliberate institutional 
design via formal political channels and the less codified political interactions underscored by 
power resources. This approach to institutional change will require a theory of change in 
power relations to function and the following chapters will attempt to integrate the systemic 
cycle theory with concepts of institutional change. Chapter 3 will explore the compatibility of 
respective strengths and weaknesses of the systemic cycle theory (often focusing on the global 
and ignoring the institutional) and institutional approaches (often focusing on the national and 
stable and ignoring the global processes). Particularly useful is the world-systemic unit of 
analysis which transcends the local and national and finds its contemporary unit in the global 
division of labor among the developed and the underdeveloped. Analyzing institutional 
change on this basis enables us to interpret global processes as endogenous and therefore to 
increase our understanding of interactions of transnational economic processes and national 
institutions. This is the reason for starting with the world-systemic theory and the systemic 
cycle and then entering into the institutional debate rather than the other way around. Chapter 
3 will also develop the Keynesian demand-side elements necessary to meaningfully interpret 
and utilize Arrighi’s categories in the metatheoretical language needed for the interaction with 
institutional theories. This chapter also offers a conceptualization of institutions, their 
relationship to change and the logic of institutional drivers needed for this metatheoretical 
interaction. 
Chapter 4 will operationalize the central hypothesis of this thesis through a new framework of 
institutional change, which utilizes the elements developed in the previous chapter. The 
central hypothesis of this thesis states that the changes in labor institutions are influenced by 
the systemic cycle. The systemic cycle is operationalized as three interconnected drivers of 
institutional change: phase of the systemic cycle (real or financial expansion), trade relations 
and developmental strategies. These drivers of change will be grouped with technological 
advances and power positions as a channel of institutional change producing cyclical power 
shifts and contextualized through the two additional channels of path dependence and 
institutional design (via formal politics or transnational conditionality). While some of these 
seven drivers are traditionally well understood, we will argue for the inclusion of systemic 
cycle drivers – trade relations (a proxy for positions in the world-system), developmental 
strategies and the systemic cycle phase. They are Arrighian rather than Arrighi’s as they are 
all operationalized via demand side considerations – i.e. with the necessary metatheoretical 
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reinterpretation. It is the inclusion of these drivers into a new framework of institutional 
change that represents the central conceptual novum of this thesis.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are illustrative chapters which use the framework from Chapter 4 on the 
changes in labor institutions in the USA, Germany and China since 1980. Chapter 5 will 
examine the US labor market in which all the drivers point in the direction of labor market 
deregulation. In this sense, US labor institutions started relatively deregulated and continued 
on the same path. The next two cases are more challenging. Chapter 6 will analyze labor 
institutions in Germany which started from a relatively well protected position, but have 
increased the dualization of German labor markets with a well-protected manufacturing core 
and a deregulated service sector and in the legal sense – a well-protected permanent 
employment laws and an increasingly liberalized fixed term employment laws. This is 
primarily the result of a history of coordinated market economy, moderately high union 
density rates in manufacturing, the systemic cycle which has enabled the formation and 
strengthening of new global production centers and an increase in trade surplus as a result of a 
move from an intensive to an extensive developmental strategy coinciding with the 
introduction of the euro and the intensifying of the eurozone economy interaction with 
Germany. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will explore the increase in labor protection and coordination in China as a 
result of a recent history of catch-up favoring a continued increase of labor use, a history of a 
planned economy not geared towards labor protection since the 1980s, very little independent 
power of labor, the systemic cycle which has enabled the formation and strengthening of new 
global production centers and increase in trade surplus due to supply-side competitiveness 
until the global crisis of 2009 after which the surplus has significantly declined prompting an 
ongoing move to a wage-led developmental strategy.  
The final chapter, Chapter 8 will summarize the illustrative Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and interpret 
their findings in the light of the theoretical part of the thesis. The period of interest has been 
marked by financial expansion in the USA as the center of the world-system and the growth 
of manufacture elsewhere. In the US, we can observe the labor institutions changing as a 
consequence of a diminishing significance and power of organized labor. Germany and China 
are, on the other hand, two of the possible contenders for future central positions – or in other 
words, alternative developmental strategies, both of which hinge on the role of labor. In 
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Germany, we can see institutional change from a well-protected labor market with a wage-led 
(intensive) strategy towards a dualistic labor market and an export led (extensive) strategy. 
The Chinese shift in labor institutions is showing some signs of movement opposite to the 
German one creating a very interesting global asymmetry. China has had to realign its 
strategy as the possibilities of its catch-up on the labor-intensive path became exhausted, and 
this process was exacerbated by losses caused by the collapse of its export markets in the 
2009 crisis. The result is an incremental shift into some of the labor regulation and 
organization institutions taken for granted in the western developed world. However, in a one-
party setting, these institutions often take a vastly different meaning, particularly as the 
capacity for worker self-organization is fairly low. 
Ultimately, the goal of this theoretical thesis is to meaningfully add to the many voices 
attempting to explain endogenous institutional change. It does so by analyzing Arrighi’s and 
Silver’s theory of the systemic cycle in order to reconcile a global (process-based) and 
national (institutions-based) conception of capitalism. It will attempt to benefit from a 
sufficiently broad unit of analysis and identify and analyze the global and national 
institutional drivers which interact to produce variegated national institutional effects. 
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Chapter 1: World-systems analysis and the systemic cycle 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the theory of institutional change by analyzing changes to 
national institutions under the influence of global processes. To do so we must first develop a 
theory of global capitalist processes which can be used to research institutional change. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the theory of the systemic cycle with the purpose of 
developing a useful interpretation (Chapter 3) necessary to identify Arrighian institutional 
drivers (Chapter 4), and to establish its advantages and failings when compared to mainstream 
social sciences. These further chapters will utilize the critical confrontation of the systemic 
cycle theory in this chapter and the analysis of institutional change in Chapter 2 in order to 
enable its inclusion with elements of institutional theory into a new framework of institutional 
change.  
To enable this, the first section of this chapter looks at the process of capitalism, a subject 
often absent in comparative political economy. We will firstly outline the specific unit of 
analysis at the foundations of world-systemic analysis, as exemplified by Immanuel 
Wallerstein. This will provide us with a basic reading of the relationship of the world-system 
and the national level. Secondly, we will describe the assumptions, models and conclusions of 
the systemic cycle theory, as developed by Giovanni Arrighi. This will provide us with a 
comprehensive model of economic change which focuses on historical (and predictive) 
processes of global capitalism. Although Wallerstein also conducted a historical analysis, 
Arrighi’s reading of the systemic cycle in many ways provides a temporal dimension to 
Wallerstein’s spatial/geographical playing field. Finally, we turn to Arrighi’s frequent co-
author Beverly Silver, who offers an interpretation of the systemic cycle which puts power 
and cycles of labor commodification and decommodification into focus. This will provide us 
with a subtler re-reading of the systemic cycle which accentuates agency on the national level 
alongside the global processes. The result of this section will be a theory of the systemic cycle 
with three defining aspects: the world-system as the spatial unit of analysis and the position of 
national capitalisms within it; the systemic cycle as the theory of global processes and an 
understanding of the role of power and agency in constructing the results of these processes 
on the national level. 
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The second section of this chapter argues for the continued usefulness of the systemic cycle 
theory with noting a number of specific improvements on mainstream social sciences and 
criticizing Arrighi’s approach for several important failings. This critical confrontation of 
Arrighi’s theory in the context of its mainstream alternatives is necessary as we will depend 
on Arrighi to deal with two types of a damaging dual focus of the mainstream on the national 
and the static. Firstly, even when considering this initial step of describing the global process 
of capitalism, mainstream approaches tend to implicitly ignore time and focus on the 
atemporal concept of equilibrium instead – itself often conceptualized in single markets. 
Secondly, we will eventually turn to the analysis of the variegated national-level institutional 
outcomes of this global process. This is another area in which static models prevail, which is 
the reason why change in new institutionalism tends to be understood as exogenously 
induced. As we develop a turn towards an Arrighian approach to endogenous change we must 
first ascertain what it is that the models of systemic cycles have to offer us. This section will 
also utilize Silver’s analysis to further outline the effects of the systemic cycle on labor 
power, pointing to separate, but intertwined effects of (a) phases of the systemic cycle, (b) 
trade positions and (c) arguing for a need to conceptually develop the effects of 
developmental strategies (which will be undertaken in Chapter 3). These three elements give 
us the contours of the systemic cycle theory and clear the way for its uses as a predictor of 
institutional change. 
1.2. The process of capitalism: World-systems analysis and the 
systemic cycle 
Firstly, we will define the unit of analysis in the definition of which Arrighi built on the 
earlier contributions of the world-systemic theory, as exemplified by Wallerstein. This very 
first building block of this thesis is crucial in understanding the relationship between the 
global processes and national institutions. Secondly, we will analyze Arrighi’s approach to 
changes within the world-system dealing with various aspects of the systemic cycle. 
1.2.1. Defining the unit of analysis: Immanuel Wallerstein 
The most influential version of the world-systems analysis surely belongs to Immanuel 
Wallerstein2. It was developed in the 1970s, most obviously through Volume I of The Modern 
 
2 As of late May 2018 and according to Google Scholar, Wallerstein's The Modern World-System I was cited 
16415 times in academic research, compared favorably to other important titles: e.g. Andre Gunder Frank's 
seminal Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1967) at 6265, Arrighi's The Long Twentieth 
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World-System (Wallerstein, 1974a) and an essay titled The Rise and Future Demise of the 
World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis (Wallerstein, 1974b). The 
Modern World-System project has produced three further volumes3 and at the time of the 
publication of the last volume, the author planned to write one or two additional ones 
(Wallerstein, 2011: xvii). 
Wallerstein created an epistemological alternative to mainstream science (as he saw it). He 
insists it is a separate perspective, rather than a theory within mainstream social sciences. It 
was created “as a moral, and in its broadest sense, political, protest” (Wallerstein, 2000: 129). 
The prevailing social science, grounded as it is within the 19th century limits, provides us with 
a limited outlook of which questions to ask and have solved. It is therefore necessary to 
“unthink” these constricting assumptions (Wallerstein, 1991: 2), including the false 
dichotomy between nomothetic and idiographic (Wallerstein, 2000: 149-159). In particular, 
Wallerstein's world-systemic analysis is an attempt to cut through “the intellectual morass” of 
claiming there are four social sciences: anthropology, economics, political science and 
sociology (Wallerstein, 2000: 134), and in response, world-systems analysis encompasses 
them all through a radical opening of a quest for the appropriate unit of analysis of modern 
social activities (see also Wallerstein, 2000: 129-148; 1974a: 8-10). This resulted in world-
systems analysis consciously removing the state as a unit of analysis in favor of the world-
system itself4 (Wallerstein, 1974: 3-11; 2000: xviii). 
In order to explain capitalism/modernity, Wallerstein contrasts two predominant historical 
types of world-systems5: empires and world-economies. Empires are a staple of world history 
and have been occurring for the past 5000 years. They are extractive social systems 
characterized by centralization and political unification of the area controlled. “The political 
centralization [...] guaranteed economic flows from the periphery to the center by force 
(tribute and taxation) and by monopolistic advantages in trade [, however, its] weakness lay in 
 
Century (1994) at 4564, Fernand Braudel's The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II at 4473 and Samir Amin's Unequal Development; An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral 
Capitalism (1976) at 2686. 
3The first volume dealt with Europe in the 16th century, the second volume first published in 1980 dealt with the 
1600-1750 period (Wallerstein, 1980), the third volume was originally published in 1989 and covered the 1730s-
1840s (Wallerstein, 1989), while the fourth was published relatively recently in 2011 and covers 1789-1914 
(Wallerstein, 2011). 
4This is a conscious move by Wallerstein in the attempt of finding an adequate methodology which would allow 
him to “unthink” traditional social sciences and bypass their inherent obstacles (Wallerstein, 2001: vii). 
5 Some authors prefer to write it as world system rather than world-system. For the sake of simplicity, we always 
include the Wallersteinian hyphen. 
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the fact that the bureaucracy made necessary by the political structure tended to absorb too 
much of the profit” (Wallerstein, 1974a: 15). World-economy is a description of modern 
Europe, characterized by the participation of many political units (states) and therefore a 
decentralized nature. This type of a social system has developed in the past (China, Persia, 
Rome), but has invariably transformed into an empire (ibid: 16). The sustainability of a 
world-economy is the great European innovation synonymous with both capitalism and 
modernity. While empires are a primitive mechanism of extracting tribute, capitalism enables 
a more lucrative alternative of vying for monopolistic positions. Political activity is directed at 
achieving this and a state becomes decreasingly an enterprise in its own right and increasingly 
a mechanism of “assuring certain terms of trade” (ibid). 
World-economies have three logical structural positions: core, periphery and semi-periphery6. 
Core areas have a strong state apparatus and peripheral areas have weak states. This enables 
the core to enforce unequal exchange to the periphery. And therefore, “capitalism involves not 
only appropriation of the surplus-value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of 
surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas” (Wallerstein, 1974b: 401). These three 
positions provide a general outline of the modern geographic division of labor between the 
developed and the underdeveloped in the world-systemic approach. 
In this sense, Wallerstein’s Modern World-System was an enquiry into the fundamentals of 
our modernity: which elements combined into the capitalist system which emerged in Europe 
and spilled over to colonize, permeate and eventually encompass the entire planet. There were 
three prerequisites for the success of the capitalist world-economy: “an expansion of the 
geographical size of the world in question, the development of variegated methods of labor 
control for different products and different zones of the world-economy, and the creation of 
relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core-states of this capitalist 
world-economy” (Wallerstein, 1974a: 38). 
The second prerequisite essentially means that the same world-system supports feudalism, 
slavery, sharecropping, wage-labor and self-employment at the same time. It does so because 
each method of control is best suited for a certain type of production. Feudalism and slavery 
are concentrated in the periphery, sharecropping in the semi-periphery and wage-labor and 
 
6 In 1974, Wallerstein already considers core and periphery “widely used concepts” (Wallerstein, 1974b: 402), 
and has attributed them to Raul Prebisch (Wallerstein, 2011: xiii). He did, however, add a category of semi-
periphery to the two earlier concepts. 
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self-employment in the core (ibid: 87). The variegated modes of control of labor tie into 
different types of political organization, with the modes in the core requiring strong states 
(ibid), which was Wallerstein's third prerequisite of modernity. These strong states are a 
function of a coalition of two types of power players: capitalist landowners and merchants 
(Wallerstein, 1974b: 402). The distinction also concerns the skill levels, with lower skill 
levels being compatible with slavery/feudalism and the less complicated economic activities 
in the periphery, and higher skill levels being compatible with wage-labor grounded in the 
market of the more complex core. In fact, this combination is “the essence of capitalism” 
(Wallerstein, 1974a: 127). 
Another essential element of the world-systemic analysis is the immanent possibility of only a 
single state in the center of the core of the world-system. Only one state occupies the most 
competitive position and benefits the most from world trade. This means that that state 
accrues the most trade surplus, and benefits from a larger GDP growth. Those conditions may 
be conveyed into a larger fiscal maneuvering space, and larger military budgets. In this nexus 
of economic and military (and thus political) power lies what is usually understood as a 
hegemony in the world-system. 
According to Wallerstein, hegemony is “a situation wherein the products of a given core state 
are produced so efficiently that they are by and large competitive even in other core states, 
and therefore the given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world 
market. Obviously, to take advantage of this productive superiority, such a state must be 
strong enough to prevent or minimize the erection of internal and external political barriers to 
the free flow of the factors of production; and to preserve their advantage, once ensconced, 
the dominant economic forces find it helpful to encourage certain intellectual and cultural 
thrusts, movements, and ideologies” (Wallerstein, 1980: 38). Here, we can see that 
Wallerstein provides a materialist logic in which the free trade policies depend on the clearly 
historically positioned hegemonic moment. 
Wallerstein identified only three historical hegemonies: “only Holland, Great Britain, and the 
United States have been hegemonic powers [...], and each held the position for a relatively 
brief period, Holland least plausibly because it was least of all the military giant of its era” 
(Wallerstein, 1980: 38). In other words, the materialistically determined free trade policies 
could be found during the British and American hegemonies with the free market ideas of the 
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first globalization (late 19th, early 20th century) being the result of the British supremacy and 
the Bretton-Woods and Washington consensus eras of trade liberalization (or second 
globalization) being the result of the American supremacy. 
The mechanism of hegemony is a succession of superiorities: superiority in agro-industrial 
productive efficiency is followed by superiorities in commercial distribution of world trade, 
financial sectors of banking and investment (ibid). There is only a short moment in time when 
“a given core power can manifest simultaneously productive, commercial, and financial 
superiority over all other core powers. This momentary summit is what we call hegemony” 
(ibid: 39). 
Wallerstein’s analysis shows an understanding not only of static elements suggested by the 
relations of the developed and the underdeveloped, but also a certain logic of change in these 
hegemonic shifts. Building on these concepts, Arrighi developed a more advanced and 
comprehensive model of capitalist change in his systemic cycle. But where Wallerstein saw 
momentary summits of hegemony, Arrighi identified much longer processes hinging on a 
number of elements and describing capitalist change.  
1.2.2. Explaining the process of capitalism: Giovanni Arrighi and the systemic 
cycle 
Building his contribution within the logic of the world-system, Arrighi insists that even as 
there can exist national dynamics of development, the proper unit of analysis is not the 
individual state or the sum of individual states, but a “system of states in which world 
capitalism has been embedded” (Arrighi and Moore, 2001: 56). It is within such a system that 
an economic development of long duration takes place. In other words, the conceptual tension 
between capitalism as a universal, global process and the national state as its specifically 
transforming locus is resolved through the categories described by Wallerstein. 
Within this system, Arrighi has isolated several crucial changes which define the long-term 
functioning of capitalism. Specifically, Giovanni Arrighi brought the process of 
financialization7 into the foreground of world-systems analysis. In the context of Marxian 
 
7 Financialization is an increasingly popular term firmly embedded in several schools of thought. Broadly 
defined, financialization is “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies“ (Epstein, 2005). In 
Financialization and the US Economy Ozgur Orhangazi (2008) offers an overview of approaches to 
financialization. He suggests that there are three relevant veins of research: firstly, the Arrighian perspective 
shown here, which he calls Long Waves of Capitalism (Orhangazi, 2008: 42). Secondly, the perspective on 
14 
 
economics, the pronounced tendency towards financial expansion was recognized time and 
again, most famously by Hilferding (1910/1981), Bukharin (1917/1972) and Lenin 
(1917/1999). Arrighi's approach, however, is quite different from these three authors. While 
they explain the financial expansion as the latest or highest stage of capitalism, Arrighi places 
it into the world-systemic and diachronic framework in which financializations are no more 
than a repetitive phase in global economic development. For this insight, Arrighi was indebted 
to the vastly influential French historian Fernand Braudel, and particularly volumes two and 
three of his Civilisation Matérielle, Économie et Capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe trilogy (Arrighi, 
1994/2010: ix-x), originally published in the 1967-1979 period (see Braudel, 1992a; 1992b; 
1992c). Braudel's description of the world-economy in the 15th-18th century described 
successive phases of capital accumulation which historically tended to finalize through 
notable expansions of financial markets. Arrighi developed this theme primarily through his 
books The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, originally 
published in 1994 and Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century, 
published in 2007, but also several chapters in edited books (Arrighi and Silver, eds., 1999; 
Arrighi and Moore, 2001; Arrighi, Hameshita and Selden, eds., 2003). 
Arrighi's key contribution is the concept of the systemic cycle, which has two phases with 
material expansion being followed by financial expansion (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 88; Arrighi 
and Moore, 2001: 56). In material expansions “money capital sets in motion an increasing 
mass of commodities” (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 6). In this phase, production and trade expand 
through a regime of capital accumulation on a single developmental path (ibid: 9) which 
causes rapid growth (ibid: 170). Such an expansion only takes place through a concentration 
of power in an agency or a coalition of agencies which is able to control the world-economy 
as a new dominant block (ibid: 12-13). However, the specific organizational structure that 
 
neoliberalism (Harvey, Crotty, Dumenil and Levy) emphasizing the deregulations since the 1970s as a result of 
falling demand. Thirdly, a perspective on the impact of financial markets on corporate governance including that 
of the French regulation school (see Orhangazi, 2008: 41-71). This third strand of literature focuses on changes 
towards a greater emphasis of shareholder value in corporations, with the profit for shareholders becoming the 
primary motive. The third group of financialization theories uses the concept of a “finance-led capitalism“ as a 
new growth regime within regulation theory (see Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005: 1). In this vein, a corollary of 
financialization is an increase of debt among wage earners. Similar to regulation theory, Colin Crouch deals with 
financialization without using the term. He identifies two policy regimes, i.e. Keynesianism and Privatised 
Keynesianism, with the distinguishing characteristic of the latter being the consumer demand management 
through greater debt (Crouch, 2009: 12 and passim). Coming to a similar conclusion, but thinking more 
aggregately, Thomas Piketty mentions financialization exactly once in his seminal Capital in the 21st Century as 
a process which changed the global “structure of wealth in the sense that the total amount of financial assets and 
liabilities held by various sectors (households, corporations, government agencies) increased more rapidly than 
net wealth” (Piketty, 2017: 139). 
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each regime of capital accumulation establishes is progressively undermined by its own 
expansion (ibid: 226). The more production expands, the more it enters into a process of 
vicious competition. Diminishing returns in a given production are countered through 
strategies of diversification, but this brings entrepreneurs into a closer proximity to their 
competitors, contributing to the fall of average profit rates (ibid: 222-226). This process 
suggests a necessary exhaustion of material expansion in some point. As “capitalist agencies” 
(entrepreneurs) are by definition profit maximisers, they will attempt to find the most 
profitable venues for their capital (ibid: 228-229). Historically, this exhaustion of profit rates 
in production and trade caused systemic turns towards greater investments in financial 
markets. 
In symbolically explaining the systemic cycle, Arrighi uses Marxian concepts: “Marx's 
general formula of capital (M-C-M') can [...] be interpreted as depicting not just the logic of 
individual capitalist investments, but also a recurrent pattern of historical capitalism as world-
system. The central aspect of this pattern is the alternation of epochs of material expansion 
(MC phases of capital accumulation) with phases of financial rebirth and expansion (CM' 
phases). [...] Together, the two epochs or phases constitute a full systemic cycle of 
accumulation (M-C-M')” (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 6). Through a financial expansion, “an 
increasing mass of money capital “sets itself free” from its commodity form” (ibid: 6). 
Financial expansion is “a system-wide tendency, centered on the leading capitalist economy 
of the epoch, towards the “financialization” of processes of capital accumulation. Integral to 
the transformation of inter-capitalist competition from a positive into a negative-sum game, 
this tendency has also acted as a key mechanism of the restoration of profitability, at least 
temporarily, in the declining but still hegemonic centers of world capitalism” (Arrighi, 2007: 
118).  
Arrighi recognizes Braudel’s economic history as the starting point for his analysis (Arrighi, 
2010: 6-7), but his explanation conceptually and theoretically hinges on Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx. Arrighi’s theory of the systemic cycle in its process of material expansion and its shift 
into financial expansion explicitly follows these authors (ibid: 228). While Adam Smith did 
not develop a theory of crises, he did utilize an important concept at the center of Arrighi’s 
systemic cycle. As he put it, “when the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the 
same trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a 
like increase of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same society, the same 
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competition must produce the same effect in them all” (Smith, 2003/1776: 122). As this 
tendency is a function of development and competition, the lower profit rates are to be 
expected in richer countries and in towns rather than in the countryside (ibid: 122-137; 451). 
This gives us an understanding of the tendency of the profit rate to fall which is dependent on 
increasing competition, which is itself a function of increasing development. 
Karl Marx certainly built upon this concept and involved it in a much broader perspective. 
The economic movements observed by Marx are very historical and therefore time-sensitive, 
but in taking the long view to the classical labor theory of value, Marx foreshadows the future 
long run equilibrium tendencies of the neoclassical school. For him, the fluctuating market 
relations obscure the over-riding law of the socially necessary labour-time which truly 
determines value. It is comparable to “a natural law” like gravity which inescapably asserts 
itself, even as it remains overshadowed by exchange relations (Marx, 1867/1979:77). 
Therefore, the value of commodities is determined by labor in the long run, even if other 
elements seem to determine it in the apparent fluctuations of the short run. 
The crucial element in Marx’s approach to crises, important to this chapter and the 
understanding of Arrighi is the tendency of the profit rate to fall. In Marx, the profit itself is 
derived from surplus value. In Chapter 2 of Capital Vol. 3, he explains surplus value as the 
labor embodied in a commodity in excess of its cost. Of course, this is precisely where we see 
the labor value theory at work – with the value extractable through production and circulation 
necessarily being derived from labor (i.e. variable capital). The profit rate itself differs from 
the rate of surplus value in that it is a ratio of surplus value to total capital while the rate of 
surplus value is a ratio of surplus value to variable capital. Therefore, the root of profit is 
always in unpaid labor and surplus value and profit are “two different measurements of the 
same entity” (Chapter 2). However, the distinction between surplus value and profit is also in 
the crux of the much-vaunted transformation problem (i.e. transformation of value into market 
prices), as the profit rate is discernible on the market surface (ratio of various prices and 
costs), while surplus value is invisible (see also Strpić, 2010: 13-69). Marx interprets the 
gradual and inevitable fall in the profit rate as a result of a reducing variable capital in the 
organic capital composition as a result of capital accumulation (Marx, 1894/1979: 1311-
1329).  
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Accordingly, while both authors subscribe to the idea that continued economic development 
leads to a fall in the rate of profit, Smith views it as a result of increased competition, while 
Marx explains it as a result of capital accumulation. Arrighi needs this notion to explain the 
shift between material and financial expansion as well as a shift towards new centers (into a 
new material expansion). He uses both Smith and Marx’s mechanisms and claims the former 
is “more useful in explaining the inner dynamic of systemic cycle” (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 228), 
while the latter “is more useful in explaining the transition from one cycle to another” (ibid.). 
In other words, Arrighi sees the Smithian dynamics of increasing competition as the primary 
reason for the flight of capital from manufacture into finance and the Marxian dynamics of 
accumulating capital as the primary reason for a shift towards a new geographic center of 
manufacturing. Therefore, Arrighi essentially based the systemic cycle on a tacit composite 
theory of investment according to which increased competition gradually depresses profits 
through the material expansion phase and the crisis of this material expansion result due to 
overaccumulation. The first is a result of a competition between many entrepreneurs, whereas 
the second is a structural tendency of capital as a whole. 
Using this conceptual basis, Arrighi described four distinct (if overlapping) historical phases 
of capital accumulation encompassing our modernity. The four such cycles identified by 
Arrighi are the Genoese cycle, 15th - early 17th centuries; the Dutch cycle, late 16th – most of 
18th; the British cycle, last half of 18th century – early 20th century; and the US cycle, 
beginning in the late 19th century and continuing into the phase of financial expansion Arrighi 
was witnessing in 1994 when he wrote The Long Twentieth Century. 
This suggests another important Arrighian element in the continuous geographic dislocation 
of the primary capital accumulation location (i.e. the center of the world-system). Each 
successive center is necessarily the outgrowth of the old, as it is a by-product of increased 
quest for profit in the financial expansion phase (ibid: 347). The headquarters of the world-
economy is not only the location of “capitalist agency” (ibid: 88) but also the hegemon of the 
international order, which enabled the necessary degree of both political and economic 
control. 
Even though Arrighi uses the categorical apparatus of the world-systemic analysis, his 
approach is somewhat more subtle. In order to underline his unit of analysis Arrighi 
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distinguishes a space-of-places and a space-of-flows8. This dichotomy is used to point out the 
already mentioned inconflatable nature of the system of states (world-system) and specific 
locations within it. Even though it is easier to notice the territorially fixed states (places) than 
it is to take stock of the ever-flowing capital, both elements are unavoidable in explaining 
economic development in its time and space. In Arrighi's analysis, space-of-places 
corresponds to the sequence of hegemonies through modernity and space-of-flows 
corresponds to the regime of accumulation (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 23, 80-84, 212). Here we 
have a fundamental conceptual issue of capitalism, which develops through both tendencies at 
the same time (ibid: 85): the processes that can be discerned on the national unit of analysis 
are located in a space-of-places, while the world-systemic processes are located in a space-of-
flows. These can never be completely mutually exclusive as even a fully global process must 
have some fixed points (accounts, stock-markets, loci of production, regulation and 
distribution…) – they are necessarily two coexisting aspects of capitalism. However, as these 
are distinct tendencies, we may benefit from understanding some processes as more 
dependent on the space-of-flows and others as more dependent on the space-of-places. In the 
example above, hegemony is a trait of a given state (space-of-places), but historical 
hegemonies have always included a fundamental transformative action (ibid: 28), which re-
created the world-system after its own image (space-of-flows). 
The regimes of accumulation in question are strategies and structures employed by a complex 
of governmental and business agencies that lead the world-system through material and 
financial expansions. The strategies and structures are ways of promoting, organizing and 
regulating “the expansion or the restructuring of the capitalist world-economy” (Arrighi and 
Moore, 2001: 60). Therefore, a particular systemic cycle is simultaneous with a particular 
accumulation regime for Arrighi. In order to lead the world-system into material expansion, a 
wider or a deeper division of labor is necessary (ibid; Arrighi, 2007: 231). The Genoese and 
British systemic cycles are examples of a wider division of labor (an extensive accumulation 
regime type) while the Dutch and American systemic cycles are examples of a deeper division 
of labor (an intensive accumulation regime type; Arrighi and Moore, 2001: 73). This 
historical pendulum between extensive regimes focused on cosmopolitan capital widening the 
reach of the world-system and intensive regimes focused on the development of domestic 
 
8Arrighi adopted these two concepts from John Gerard Ruggie (1993: 172). However, both before and after 
Ruggie, these concepts were used by Manuel Castells in a more general sense of a contrast between a space of 
places which describes social activity with meaningful physical proximity and a space of flows which describes 
networked interactive communication (Castells, 1989: 126-171, 348-353; 2000: 696). 
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productive capabilities obscures the cumulative increase of complexity and size of the world-
system itself.  
Each of the last three systemic cycles increased the complexity by internalizing a further type 
of cost in the context of the world-system and the role its center plays with respect to the 
periphery. The starting Genoese cycle was a project of a cosmopolitan capital not bound 
directly to a military power (as the political and military power of Genoa had already faded) 
but seeking an alliance with the Iberic states and funding their global expansion through the 
16th century (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 111-129). Compared to this, the Dutch cycle was the first to 
provide an intimate link between the governmental (state) and the business (capital) agencies 
as both were located in the Netherlands and the military power of the first protected and was 
funded by the second (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 130-162). This means that the radically new 
innovation that propelled the Netherlands into the center of the world-system was in fact the 
internalization of protection costs (ibid: 148). In effect, this particular Dutch organizational 
innovation was a precursor to what will become known as the nation state (Strpić, 2010: 111-
143). The British cycle internalized production costs by focusing and intensifying 
manufacture through the industrial revolution (Arrighi, 1994/2010: 179-218; Arrighi and 
Moore, 2001: 73). Finally, the American cycle internalized transaction costs by enveloping 
the entire world in a nexus of corporations as a new and modern form of organizing capital 
and military power able to intervene globally (ibid; Arrighi, 1994/2010: 247-276). 
These organizational innovations occur in the globally divergent economic context and stable 
strategic responses to this context. Arrighi emphasizes this by paralleling the Western capital-
intensive industrial revolution with the East Asian labor-intensive industrious revolution 
(Arrighi, 2009: 32-34). This is a very old East Asian tendency of organizing production by 
utilizing a combination of labor-intensive and capital saving methods. Arrighi follows Kaoru 
Sugihara (2003) in this parallel. Sugihara traces this development to a 16th - 18th century 
population growth in East Asia enabled by a technological adaptation to the natural resource 
constraints, particularly a scarcity of land compared to the available workforce (ibid: 82).  
We can discern a harmonious aspect of the systemic cycle via organizational innovations and 
the interconnectedness of capital flight from the old center into the fledgling future center. 
However, we can certainly also expect a contentious element as well – with the old center 
using its military might to compensate for the loss of the economic central position, or 
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perhaps with the new pretenders for the central position determining the future hegemon 
through military conflict. Therefore, the hegemonic cycle intertwines with the described 
systemic cycle. It describes the periods of relative peace that accompany the trade expansion. 
The financializations are periods of economic instability that necessitate a competition of 
pretenders on the central world-systemic position. In time, a global conflict may develop to 
resolve the underlying economic competition. However, Arrighi identified the current 
situation as unprecedented. While a financialization historically also meant a race in military 
power, with the new center overtaking the old, we are witnessing “a bifurcation of global 
military and financial resources that has no precedent in earlier transitions” (Arrighi and 
Moore, 2001: 74), which precludes a great power war which would resemble the two world 
wars, Napoleonic Wars or the Thirty Year War. Current trends confirm this bifurcation as 
stable, as the US military still dwarfs the rest of the world in most important naval assets 
necessary for global power projection, and trends in both shipbuilding and fiscal capability 
show that this balance of power is not likely to change in the next 15 years (Lučev, 2014b: 
131-145).  
World-systemic analysis is not alone in predicting cyclical wars. A number of authors have 
researched the cyclical nature of large wars starting with the pioneering work of Quincy 
Wright (1942), and continuing with Toynbee (1954), Modelski (1978), Goldstein (1985; 
1988)9, Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1999), Tausch (2006), etc. While this crucial type of 
analysis is often overlooked, this thesis does not use the war cycle as a predictor of 
institutional change, and the analysis of these theories fall beyond its scope. 
 
 
9 It is pertinent to briefly outline the work of Joshua Goldstein for the sake of its relative similarity to Arrighi. 
Goldstein ties his war-cycle analysis to the 50-year Kondratiev business cycle pointing to following years as the 
peaks of the cycle (or crises): 1529, 1559, 1595, 1650, 1720, 1762, 1814, 1872, 1917, 1968 (Goldstein, 1985: 
417). To these we could now probably add 2008 without a reasonable fear of contradiction. Goldstein theorized 
“the long wave sequence” (1988: 258) as consisting of six elements: prices, wages, production, investment, 
innovation and war. It is probably best to imagine the Goldstein scheme as six overlapping and very segmented 
50-year cycles with their peaks and throughs. Peak refers to the highest level reached, after which there will be a 
downturn (crisis). Through signifies the lowest level reached, after which comes an upswing and recovery. With 
a price peak and a simultaneous real wage through (ideal-typically, as highest prices suggest lowest real wages) 
are followed after successive intervals in duration of approximately five years by a period of stagnation, a 
production through, an investment through, an innovation peak, a war through, a simultaneous price through and 
wage peak, a period of expansion, a production peak, and investment peak, an innovation through and a war 
peak (ibid: 259). In other words, continued economic growth (in its interaction of innovation, investment and 
price levels) tends to result in wars, and a continued war tends to undercut economic growth. In the late 1980s 
Goldstein predicted a great power war in “the period around 2000 to 2030” (Goldstein, 1988: 353), and some 
twenty years later, he still maintained his prediction of a 2020s global war (Goldstein, 2006: 143). 
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1.2.3. Understanding the effects of the process of capitalism on labor power: 
Beverly Silver 
Arrighi’s narrative did not specifically focus on labor when he wrote as a sole author. 
However, he has co-authored several important works with Beverly Silver (Arrighi and 
Silver: 1984, 1999, 2001; Silver and Arrighi: 2003) who did so, and she masterfully continued 
her own approach to the systemic cycle (Silver, 2003; 2009; 2014). Her approach emphasizes 
the cyclical nature of labor power and militancy in describing the global process of capitalism. 
In doing so, Silver created a broad perspective explaining labor movement oscillations, and 
within it she considers Arrighi’s approach to financial expansions to be critical as an 
explanatory factor (Silver, 2003: 176).  Therefore, she continues the work on the systemic 
cycle (or the long waves of capitalism) with a more nuanced approach. She has taken issue 
with a simplistic reading of a world-system according to which social relations on the local or 
national level are deterministically and completely transformed from the level of the world-
system, excluding the possibility of local action significantly impacting local or global 
outcomes (ibid: 29-30). She prefers an approach which would be aware of the real restricting 
nature of the world-system, but still accepts that the system is created through the activities of 
various sub-units of the system (ibid: 30). 
The process of global capitalism as described by Silver is an oscillation between two 
contradictory crisis tendencies (profitability and legitimacy crises) which delimit the process 
of commodification and decommodification of labor. An expansion of production tends to 
create stronger labor movements which are well positioned to force the creation of labor 
friendly social compacts (i.e. a tendency towards de-commodified labor), but these contribute 
to a crisis of profitability. Resolutions of profitability crises tend to break the labor friendly 
social compacts and commodify the labor, leading to a legitimacy crisis which causes 
backlash resistance (Silver, 2003: 20; 178).  
These restorations of profitability consist of four possible “fixes”10 (Silver, 2003: 39-40). 
These are essentially recurrent methods for countering the crises of profitability which plague 
 
10 The term “spatial fix” is taken from the works of David Harvey (1989, 1999), and the three additional 
processes Silver describes are analogous to his original concept. According to Harvey (2001) the term itself has 
been often misunderstood as the word fix has several possible meanings in the English language. Harvey did not 
wish to suggest the meaning of a fix as a permanent solution to a problem or as a fixated position in space, but 
rather as an addict’s use of drugs which offers only a short-term relief of a pervasive and recurrent need (ibid: 
24). This was suggestive of the need of capitalism to resolve its internal contradictions by geographically 
relocating the profit creation to an untapped area. Such a fix will always be eventually followed by another. 
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the process of capital accumulation. The first is the spatial fix (which Silver adopts directly 
from David Harvey), which is a geographic solution to a profitability crisis. In terms of labor 
militancy, a strong organization of labor could provide a profit crunch in a developed country, 
and capital could migrate to a new location (e.g. shifting production to a less developed 
country). After a necessary period of organization, the new location will also be able to 
organize its labor and provide a profit crunch necessitating a new relocation. Such a view has 
prompted one of Silver’s central claims, according to which: “where capital goes, conflict 
follows” (Silver, 2009: 179). The second fix is technological and describes the post-Fordist 
cost-cutting movements towards greater control of labor (lean manufacturing). The third 
process is the product fix, describing the quest for enlarged profits through expansion into 
new industries and products. Silver uses the Vernon (1966) model of a product life-cycle to 
show that the innovations tend to cluster in the capitalist core and the production of new 
products only shift to less developed countries (or rather, their companies) once the profit 
bearing monopoly phase of the product life-cycle has been exhausted. Finally, there is the 
financial fix, which is explicitly adopted from Arrighi and his concept of financial expansions. 
The basic idea of a pendulum between the two tendencies of commodification and 
decommodification of labor is taken from Karl Polanyi, who interpreted labor markets as 
subjected to a double movement – where the extension of the free market role is continuously 
met by efforts to protect labor via mechanisms like legislation, unions and unemployment 
insurance (Polanyi, 1957/1999; Silver, 2003: 17-18). This view of labor markets is supported 
by Polanyi’s idea of labor, money and land as three fictitious commodities, which was a point 
not lost on Silver or Arrighi11. These three must be treated as commodities in order to 
organize large-scale industrial production, but none of these are produced for sale on the 
market, with labor being human activity, produced only inasmuch life itself is produced, 
money is produced only metaphorically as it represents only tokens of payment and land is 
inherited rather than produced. This makes them fictitious as commodities and opens the 
possibility for disaster if these should be subjected to self-regulating markets (Arrighi, 
1994/2010: 263-265). This underlying logic helps us locate labor in the basic concepts of 
capitalism, where it stands both in markets and societies. Labor is necesary for production, 
and therefore subjected to markets with workers driven to extremes of toil when this market is 
 
11 Polanyi is often referred to throughout Chaos and Governance in the World System (Arrighi and Silver, 2003) 
and Adam Smith in Beijing (Arrighi, 2007), as well as Arrighi's crucial book The Long Twentieth Century 
(1994/2010), which bore the subtitle Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times which was a nod to Polanyi's 
seminal book The Great Transformation and its subtitle of The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
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not regulated. Simultaneously, labor refers to an activity of human beings, who will try to 
protect themselves from abuse in a way no other commodity ever could. Therefore, labor 
uniquely stands on the crossroads of markets and political power. 
In her conceptualization of labor power itself, Silver follows Erik Olin Wright (2000) and his 
distinction of associational and structural power. Associational power refers to the ability of 
labor to collectively organize through unions and parties. Structural power refers to the 
bargaining power of labor, which is a result of the position in the economic system. Structural 
power is further divided on marketplace bargaining power, which is a consequence of the 
position of workers on the labor markets as a whole, and workplace bargaining power which 
is a result of a strategic location of a specific group in a key industrial sector (Silver, 2003: 
13). 
The four fixes have specific effects on these types of labor power. Spatial fixes diffuse 
structural power, reducing it in the old center of production (i.e. its material expansion has 
ended) but eventually increasing it in the new center of production (ibid: 169). Technological 
fixes do not have clear-cut results in terms of power, but the historical late 20th century trend 
towards lean manufacturing and just-in-time systems of production has contributed to greater 
workplace structural power (making the system vulnerable to a limited obstruction). Product 
fixes tend to reproduce the divide between the core and the periphery, with the monopoly 
phases clustering in the core and the diminished profit phases of the product life-cycle 
clustering in the periphery. This creates a potentially explosive situation created by a 
combination of spatial fixes - which increase labor power – and product fixes – which 
decrease the possibilities of labor friendly outcomes due to lower wealth creation to be 
distributed between capital and labor (ibid: 170). Finally, the financial fix creates structural 
unemployment and reduces marketplace labor power (ibid: 176). In all of these cases, the lack 
of structural power can be offset by associational power, suggesting a need to observe specific 
national context in which labor is organized (i.e. unions and labor-oriented political parties). 
Silver provides us with a somewhat subtler reading of the systemic cycle, focused on several 
explanatory factors and describing the pendulum of labor power as shifting in terms of 
workplace and marketplace bargaining and associational capacity power. These forms of 
power shift as a result of the dynamics between profitability and legitimacy crises which also 
underscore the creation and dissolution of labor friendly social compacts (commodification-
24 
 
decommodification). Within these shifts, there is also a Polanyiesque logic in which a greater 
power of labor suggests the ability of the society to protect itself from the disruptive capacity 
of free markets. Within the systemic cycle, this gives us an image of two interlocking 
processes: the dominantly global process of capital and investment and the dominantly local 
or national process of labor. While the interests of groups representing either capital or labor 
could conceivably be very complex, this subtle reading of the systemic cycle by Silver already 
gives us a historically influenced image of a modern world. It assumes the accumulation of 
capital which is sufficient both for the global mobility in very large patterns and for the wage-
workers to become a very strong social force. This makes labor the crucial societal element 
which is, however, already on the defensive from the free market forces embodied by the 
mobile capital. In other words, labor power and labor institutions tend to be the societal 
bulwark against free market tendencies and therefore stand at the decisive juncture of the 
divide of national and global levels of capitalism. Labor can be therefore be understood as 
supremely political and its link to profitability makes it a crucial element in growth models as 
well. However, as we will see, the notions of social compacts and 
commodification/decommodification of labor are insufficiently developed and could benefit 
from a far more explicit treatment in order to be able to better outline the effects of labor 
mobilization. 
1.3. The uses of the systemic cycle  
Arrighi has developed an advanced version of the world-systemic analysis, primarily through 
his appreciation of the role played by the global interplay of material and financial expansions 
and the intensive and extensive strategies that underline them. Silver added a logic of labor 
power to the systemic cycle predicting pendulum swings between crises of legitimacy and 
crises of profitability. The central contention of this thesis is that the conceptualization of the 
systemic cycle as capitalist development is useful to understanding institutional change. 
Segment 1.3.1. will deal with elementary methodological issues with temporality at stake to 
show the differences between the systemic cycle and equilibrium inspired social sciences. 
These advantages of the systemic cycle are crucial as the equilibrium atemporality tends to 
create significant obstacles in conceptualizing endogenous institutional change, as we will see 
in the next chapter. Segment 1.3.2. will show the importance of the systemic cycle process for 
the interpretation of financialization, trade and crises. It will also outline domestic labor 
power effects of trade and finance expansions. Finally, segment 1.3.3. will outline the issues 
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with organizations and institutions in systemic cycle theory – outlining labor power changes 
in response to the organizational strategic shifts. 
1.3.1. Historical grounding versus equilibrium atemporality 
World-systemic analysis has the potential to be historical in a meaningful sense. Braudel, 
Wallerstein and Arrighi have all undertaken to write dense historical studies of early 
capitalism while Arrighi and Silver have strived to offer a theory of future movements. If 
successful, such theories may provide us with useful predictive capabilities. The predominant 
mainstream alternative to this potential is the equilibrium analysis, with all its predictor 
failings. Historically grounded analysis offers a great improvement over such sterile and 
abstracted (essentially nomothetic) type of analysis in much of social science. This static 
tendency is well exemplified by the widely implied notion of equilibrium in economics (Blyth 
et al, 2011: 2), from where it proliferated into political science and elsewhere12. As explored 
in the next chapter, the notion of equilibrium is one of the most limiting factors in 
approaching endogenous institutional change. This is the case as the very analogy of 
equilibrium, borrowed as it is from physics, forms an important part of the cognitive map of 
various epistemic communities related to social sciences (and creates significant obstacles in 
conceptualizing institutional change, crises, trade policies, market failures etc...).   
The devastating critique along similar lines of what is today known as neoclassical economics 
is what propelled the thought of John Maynard Keynes into the fore after The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest, and Money (Keynes, 1936). The principal authors of the marginal 
revolution mostly explored the partial rather than the general equilibrium13, which is suitable 
for assessing the growth of the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, the equilibrium as a 
 
12 The mainstream of economics is known as the neoclassical school of economics and it owes its existence to 
the marginal revolution in the second half of the 19th century (Leon Walras, Carl Menger and William Stanley 
Jevons). This generation of scientists brought concepts of marginal utility and partial equilibrium into the 
foreground analysis and set categorical foundations for the economic science as it exists today (see Schumpeter, 
1954). Neoclassical economics is sometimes known as Marshallian economics due to its synthesizer Alfred 
Marshall and his ubiquitous textbook Principles of Economics (1890). This was the mainstream economics 
before the Keynesian revolution and is the basis for the new classical economics (sometimes indiscriminatingly 
also known as neoclassical economics and sometimes pejoratively as neoliberal economics) which proved to be 
the mainstream position after the 1970s (see also Strpić, 1998: 7-19). Neoclassical economics is based on the 
mathematical abstraction of marginal utility, which simplifies the economy in several important ways. 
Methodological individualism focuses on individual activity, while presumption of rationality subsumes also the 
full information these individuals ostensibly possess. It focuses on equilibrium (e.g. supply and demand) as the 
default position, and tacitly assumes that the equilibrium position free markets tend to automatically move 
towards is that of full employment. This creates substantial challenges for neoclassical economics in explaining 
the business cycle (Lučev, 2014a). 
13 With the notable exception of Leon Walras. 
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conceptual tool has informed the subsequent work on economic growth. The very concept of 
equilibrium was introduced into economics after its apparent success in Newtonian physics. 
But while it may successfully explain the statics and dynamics of objects, its use in social 
sciences suggests the expectancy of a simplified world with immutable laws and predictable 
behavior of all agents. There are obvious and often reiterated issues that may arise in 
conjecture with such concepts – including the fact that humans are, unlike stones or apples, 
often unpredictable, irrational and reflexive agents. Apart from these, the equilibrium as a 
central concept has the implied flaw of being a static state. To theorize change using 
equilibriums may result in describing the starting and final position of agents and not 
explaining the movement between the two. While neoclassical economists were and are aware 
of time as a concept, they tend to circumvent the issue by discerning merely the short and 
long run scenarios of two equilibrium points14. To describe the microeconomic functioning of 
markets, the earlier forms of neoclassical economics focused on the perfect competition 
model, with a multitude of unrealistic assumptions (perfect rationality, perfect knowledge, 
absence of the ability to set prices, very large number of very small suppliers, homogeneous 
products, no barriers to market entry, no transaction costs, no super-profits etc.). This model 
of a market structure is very optimistic in its predictions as the outcomes are best from the 
point of view of both the consumer and the as it predicts the largest output for the lowest 
price. While modern approaches to markets are increasingly subtle, they often bear the 
markings of the original simplification15. 
 
14 Alfred Marshall, the principal figure of neoclassical economics, refers to four types of periods in which prices 
fluctuate: firstly there are the briefest “market” period where he refers to “events in sight” (1920: 221), and the 
most expansive “secular” movement in which processes take place in terms of generations. Secondly, there are 
the two “normal” periods: the “short” period which lasts up to a year and the “long” period which lasts for 
several years (ibid). 
15 Most obviously, the perfect competition model was augmented in the early 1930s with the more realistic 
model of monopolistic competition (Robinson, 1933/1969; Chamberlin, 1933/1962), which modeled markets 
with diversified products (brands), and recognized the possibility of large, profit generating suppliers which by 
itself meant lower quantities produced and higher prices achieved as a result of market forces when compared to 
perfect competition. However, the two “normal” timeframes used by Marshall are usually used in monopolistic 
competition to indicate that in the long period monopolistic competition will generate more competitors and 
therefore gradually move towards the perfect outcomes of the optimistic equilibrium of perfect competitions. 
Here, we can observe the neoclassical connection between free market optimism, equilibrium analysis and long 
run orientation. In the long run, the markets (as modeled in the mainstream neoclassical school) will produce the 
most efficient equilibria. Therefore, the long run tends to average out and polish the sordid inefficiencies of 
daily, weekly, monthly and yearly market behaviors. This means that markets are efficient in the long run and do 
not need interventions of any sort – in other words, to be able to focus on the more efficient side of the markets, 
one must take a sufficiently long-term view of markets, one that misses the short term imperfections and deals 
only in the averages which, therefore, become blind to short-term change and somewhat atemporal. Such a view 
was challenged by Keynes in the 1920s and 1930s (Keynesian revolution) and defended by Friedman from the 
1950s onwards (Chicago counter-revolution). 
27 
 
All of this helped create an overly market-optimistic mainstream of economic science, but it 
also helped economics become a mathematically rigorous science reminiscent of natural 
sciences. This made it attractive as a model for other social sciences (and as we will see in 
Chapter 2, the notion of equilibrium informs much of modern institutional thought). However, 
what it gained in rigorousness, it lost in the need to abstract and assume – i.e. in foregoing the 
messy and fully detailed historical world for one of perfect rationality, perfect competition 
and efficient markets. Social sciences in general have, in taking after economics, started to 
favor research-in-small-chunks preferring micro- or perhaps meso- approaches and viewing 
the macro- only with suspicion. It was against such a view of social sciences that Braudel, 
Wallerstein and Arrighi have argued and their alternatives came in forms of dense historical 
descriptions. In Arrighi’s version we also see some ability to predict future economic 
movements. The very long period of European and then global capitalism is divided in 
consecutive periods of material and financial expansions led by the geographically shifting 
core of the world-system.  
Crucially, what enables this maneuver is the unit of analysis which is simultaneously national 
and transnational (world-systemic). The first belongs to the space-of-places in that the space 
in which a process takes place is fixed. The second belongs to the space-of-flows in that the 
process is unlimited by fixed places. Wallerstein opted to focus on the world-systemic and see 
states as mere sub-units. While this is a possible conceptualization, it seems to point towards a 
static structure of core/periphery/semi-periphery and itself represent a form of self-replicating 
equilibrium. Silver successfully challenged this view as simplistic and argued that while there 
are world-systemic constrictions on the national level, it is equally true that agency on the 
national level constructs, replicates or changes the world-system itself. To follow the logic of 
the systemic cycle theory, we must concede that capitalism is simultaneously both national 
and world-systemic. The result is a unit of analysis which recognizes both the structure of the 
world-system (and the unequal positions of states within it) and the ability of states to 
influence their positions and the world-system itself. This enables the systemic cycle theory to 
potentially move beyond determinism and focus on the various national-level effects of global 
processes which were themselves the result of processes which are best discernable on 
national levels. Our aspiration is to discern the national-level institutional processes in such an 
interaction. In order to eventually do so, we will first use the next two segments to develop the 
specific effects of the systemic cycle on social power underlying changes in institutions. 
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1.3.2. The capitalist structure, process and crisis  
The systemic cycle is a theory of a capitalist process based in the logic of sequential material 
and financial expansions. These are bracketed by signal and terminal crises which are 
explained through an overlapping Smithian and Marxian theory of investment. A significant 
corollary is the effect on marketplace power, with the financial expansion bringing lower 
levels of labor power, and material expansions bringing higher levels of labor power. In both 
cases, the shift is a result of a different role that the workforce (particularly the industrial 
workforce) has to play in the economy as a whole. In material expansions, industrial labor is 
crucial to the growth of the economy, and a general strike could conceivably largely stop the 
economic life in a given location. In financial expansions, industrial labor is not as important 
as the financial sector increases in importance. Likewise, large trade deficits suggest a 
diminishing role of domestic labor, as a large part of domestic demand is met by foreign 
production. Both financial expansion and adverse trade relations diminish the structural power 
of domestic labor, which makes them relevant to projecting the bargaining power of labor in 
national level processes.  
Both instances (crises defining the material/financial phases and adverse trade relations) are 
examples of disharmonious market relations. To have a theory which entertains and explains 
both is itself an advantage over the mainstream social sciences. Crises are particularly 
difficult to foresee from the efficient-market driven models in the mainstream economic 
thought. As we have seen, mainstream economics expects efficient markets and rational 
actors16. While Arrighi is certainly at an advantage when compared to the neoclassical school 
as he provides endogenous mechanisms of crises, his approach leaves much to be desired. 
Arrighi’s strengths and weaknesses stem from assumptions and categorical apparatus of 
classical political economy17, particularly from Adam Smith and Karl Marx. In either case, 
 
16 Not surprisingly, one of the most serious failures of mainstream economics was the seeming inability to 
predict the financial and real economic crisis of 2007-09. At the same time, many authors of the world-systemic 
approach including Arrighi have predicted the proximate start of a systemic crisis even though they could not 
pin-point its beginning. 
17 Before the late 19th century and the slow development of separate social sciences of sociology, political 
science and economics the idiom “political economy“ was the preferred term that cut across these categories we 
take for granted today. Adam Smith spoke of political oeconomy, which he defined as “a branch of the science 
of a statesman or legislator” (Smith, 2003/1776: 537).  David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, James Mill and John 
Stuart Mill titled their ubiquitous books after political economy (Ricardo's On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation from 1817, Malthus's Elements of Political Economy from 1820, James Mill's Elements 
of Political Economy from 1821, John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy from 1848). It was not until 
Alfred Marshall that a central text was to mention economics as the new term (Principles of Economics from 
1890). The new term, and its success, is therefore a function of the success of neoclassical economics which 
made its first appearance in the writings of Alfred Marshall as well. 
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Arrighi stays largely limited to supply-side phenomena: in the Smithian sense to the number 
and size of competing players in each market and in the Marxian sense to the overinvestment 
in production. This is somewhat in conflict with monopolistic tendencies of developed 
capitalism. Although the monopoly capitalism18 does not suggest literal monopolies and large 
multinationals must still compete, their development suggests a tendency of diminishing 
rather than increasing competition (and therefore increasing and not diminishing profits). This 
suggests that profit crunches need to be explained as results of at least partially demand 
related issues which exert pressures towards lower profits. While various developments of 
Marxist thought through the 20th century have increasingly advocated the interpretation of 
overaccumulation crises as a demand-side phenomenon (as the diminishing share of variable 
capital may translate into diminishing total labor income), Arrighi does not stress this issue. In 
fact, it seems that his overreliance on Smith and Marx creates an approach which does not 
sufficiently take into account the various possibilities of aggregate demand management. The 
risk in not taking demand seriously enough is therefore present in both neoclassical 
economics and Arrighi. The great, but unrecognized, theoretical interlocutor should be John 
Maynard Keynes, who put precisely aggregate demand at the center of his theory. When 
applied to the real world in the form of Keynesian welfare state these policies were directed at 
a more active fiscal policy and some vastly more redistributive taxation systems, which were 
aimed at achieving economic growth through increasing domestic demand19. Chapter 3 will 
develop the Keynesian interpretation of Arrighi in an attempt to remedy the supply-side 
limitations in the systemic cycle. What can be gained is a more precise approach to growth 
models and their effects.  
Apart from crises as processes bracketing material and financial expansions, world-systemic 
analysis incorporates expected structural trade instabilities, a possibility which also eludes the 
tradition of mainstream neoclassical thought. A significant advantage is the understanding of 
free trade preferences as structurally biased. We can also connect these to labor power by 
analogy to the theses of Beverly Silver. In countries with growing manufactured goods 
deficits, the marketplace structural power of industrial labor is diminishing as its importance 
to the economy is reduced. Likewise, in countries with growing surpluses, the marketplace 
structural power (and the political influence) is increasing. When discussing trade relations, 
 
18 In the sense used by Baran and Sweezy or Cowling and Sugden (see Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
19 Such arguments were already put forward by John Hobson (1902) and denounced by Marxist authors like 
Lenin (1917/1999) and Bukharin (1917/1972) who claimed the bourgeoisie would never consent to redistribution 
and thus forestall imperialism and global war as a necessary result of capitalism. 
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the mainstream of modern economic science tends to consider the effects of the free market 
beneficial to all parties. This tradition is often connected to Ricardian economics of 
comparative advantage20. The point of comparative advantage is that even the country with 
higher comparative costs of production of all goods benefits from free trade. Even though it is 
least competitive in terms of labor needed to produce, it will be able to export its goods. This 
is because the country with lower costs will import the more expensive goods in order to 
reorient its resources into those areas in which it is the most productive. Free trade will 
therefore always be beneficial to all countries involved21.  
An alternative to the mainstream and liberal side of the debate are theories that stress the fact 
that free trade does not benefit all of the participants, but rather produces relatively fixed 
positions, primarily benefiting specific sets of actors. Some of these directly inform world-
systemic analysis and Arrighi’s research. An important genre of literature in this vein was the 
dependency theory22, postulating that in the long run the prices of primary products will tend 
to fall compared to prices of manufactured products. Therefore, the export of industrialized 
countries will ceteris paribus increase in value compared to the export of countries which are 
not industrialized and produce only primary products. In other words, the developed, 
industrialized parts of the world will in the long run have a considerable advantage in terms of 
economic growth over the underdeveloped, agrarian parts of the world23. World-systems 
 
20 The origins of the concept of comparative advantage should be traced at least to Adam Smith’s analysis of 
absolute (or natural) advantage in Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776. The development of the more 
complicated concept of comparative advantage is attributed to Ricardo (for a debate on the authorship of 
comparative advantage see Aldrich, 2004; Ruffin, 2003). 
21 For this point see Torrens (1815: 262-265), Ricardo, (1817/2016: 77-93) and Mill (1844: 53-55). A more 
recent variant of comparative advantage position is the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Ohlin, 1935/1933), also 
known as the neoclassical theory of trade. The HO theorem, further developed by Stolper and Samuelson in early 
1940s and Rybczynski (1955), introduced capital to the Ricardian scheme using only labor and predicted capital 
abundant countries will specialize in exporting capital-intensive goods and labor abundant countries will 
specialize in exporting labor-intensive goods. The free trade optimum predicted by this theory should not come 
as a surprise as it used the unrealistic assumptions of the perfect competition model explained above. Apart from 
this, the factors of production (labor and capital) are assumed to be perfectly immobile internationally and 
perfectly mobile domestically. Both assumptions are atemporal when compared to the real world. The 
international assumption assumes away the processes of international investment, outsourcing and labor 
migration, therefore locking a specific situation in time. The domestic assumption assumes that specializations 
are instantaneous, with labor and capital moving from non-competitive to competitive industries as a result of 
free trade. This means that processes of bankruptcies, foreclosures, and unemployment, which are a part of a 
vanishing industry and processes of investment and education which are a part of the formation of a new 
industry, are assumed to take place instantaneously. This double atemporality of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
was all the more troublesome as it informed the mainstream theory of trade for decades. 
22 Dependency theory originated in the 1949-50 works of Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer (hence the Prebisch-
Singer thesis – or PST).  
23 See Raffer and Singer (2001: 16-31), Toye and Toye (2003), Sapsford, Sarkar and Singer (1992), Harvey, 
Kellard, Madsen and Wohar (2010). Apart from the world-systems analysis, another path to addressing the 
insufficiencies of neoclassical trade models emerged in the 1970s through the new trade theory, which built on 
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analysis postulates a division of labor in the global economy between the countries/areas of 
the core (centers of global industrial production and finance) and countries/areas of the 
periphery (locations with primary products) mediated through the countries/areas of semi-
periphery. Compared to mainstream trade theories, this approach is decided in claiming the 
benefits of global free trade are largely concentrated in the core of the system. The advantage 
of such an approach is the ability to survey international trade as benefiting some economies 
in particular, even though it cannot be construed as a zero-sum game. The world-system is a 
complex level of analysis, enabling a very broad view, but great care must be awarded in 
avoiding determinism. 
In moving beyond the equilibria-inspired views of markets, the systemic cycle theory 
surpasses not only the efficient free market views, but also the more naïve versions of the 
world-system. At the center of world-systemic analysis we find a geographic division of labor 
which spells out differences in economic development. In Wallerstein’s version of world-
systemic analysis there was a tendency to predict relatively static positions of this division of 
labor (i.e. core and periphery), while the subtler Arrighi/Silver reading of the systemic cycle 
presented here gives us a dynamic of development though which strategies on the national 
level create the world-systemic dynamic while at the same time being shaped by it. This 
version is much less dependent on deterministic views of market processes and capable to 
validate successful national-level growth models. This is relevant not only in the sense of 
world-systemic analysis being more useful to analyze the real world, but also by virtue of the 
possibility of including the market instabilities (crises and trade relations) into a functional 
cyclical view of labor power, which can be used to predict institutional changes. 
 
neoclassical foundations in order to model situations in which non-free-trade policies were. As neoclassical trade 
models assume perfect competition, there was ample room in acknowledging the developments in monopolistic 
competition from the early 1930s and using them as a part of trade theory. An influential foundation for this 
inclusion was created through the Dixit-Stiglitz macroeconomic model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) which 
acknowledged monopolistic competition and was used by a number of sub-fields including new trade theory. 
Further corrections in new trade include the acknowledgment of other market distortions and the economies of 
scale (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; 1989). The two main points (monopolistic competition and economies of 
scale) suggest that agglomeration of industry is possible (as the largest players may have the lowest costs of 
production). Therefore, free trade can lead not to mutually beneficial specialization as postulated by classical and 
neoclassical trade theory, but rather to further clusters of production located perhaps partially according to factor 
endowments, but also according to existing agglomerations. In other words, production may shift to where labor 
is abundant, but it may also shift to the already more developed parts of the world. These questions were further 
developed through new economic geography, which is a “new genre of research” starting around 1990 
(Krugman, 1998: 7) and building on the mathematical modeling strategies that made new trade theory so 
successful including the tendencies towards general equilibrium set ups. 
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1.3.3. Institutions, organizations and agency 
Following Smith, Marx, Braudel and Wallerstein, Arrighi created an intriguing explanatory 
and predictive scheme on the behavior of world capitalism in broad strokes. He tracked the 
changing of capital accumulation regimes and complementary transformations of capitalist 
organization which formed the competitive edge of various economic centers vying for the 
hegemonic position during financial expansions. This organization is increasingly complex 
and increasingly comprehensive even as the patterns Arrighi recognizes shift from a wider 
division of labor (extensive and financially influenced capitalism during the Genoese and 
British regimes) to a deeper division of labor (intensive and monopoly influenced capitalism 
during the Dutch and US regimes). However, Arrighi does not go into the minutiae of what 
such organizational swings might precisely entail (e.g. what kind of laws, norms, 
transnational forms etc.). While such broad strokes are necessary for the kind of grand 
historical project found in Arrighi’s writing, they do not necessarily provide a scheme precise 
enough to gauge the contemporary world24 and its organizational and institutional 
alternatives. Likewise, Arrighi does not need to identify precise drivers of institutional change 
to fulfill his purpose of describing the organizational innovations and providing a model and 
theory of their movements. He merely points to the fact that the leading agencies are generally 
an effective mix of business and state actors. If he were more precise and offered clear 
distinctions, he could have convincingly been considered an author in historical 
institutionalism.  
As it is, we have an entangled notion of institutional and organizational change with an 
essentially Darwinistic mechanism underlying hegemonic shifts. A successful organizational 
innovation propels an aspirant center into the hegemony position, establishing an 
organizational example to follow for other countries. The two general strategies are identified 
as extensive and intensive, but we know little of how they interact and how the developed 
countries chose the strategies to model. This distinction is obviously not sufficient to compare 
various types of capitalisms in the core or explain institutional change in its details. In 
focusing on the global process of capitalism, he was less interested in analyzing its relative 
fixtures. Silver fared somewhat better, recognizing the importance of the institutional context 
(e.g. Silver, 2014: 55-58), plotting the pendulum between the breaking and making of social 
 
24 As mentioned before, his similar shyness in providing empirical data or measurements to support his thesis on 
financialization in the USA prompted Greta Krippner (2005) to fill this gap, which he would duly note in a later 
work (Arrighi, 2007). 
33 
 
compacts, which are themselves in part the labor-friendly or labor-unfriendly institutional 
arrangements. This provides a vital element in predicting institutional change – i.e. the crises 
of profitability and legitimacy. However, like Arrighi, Silver was not interested in minutiae of 
institutional solutions, preferring broad-strokes necessary for the analysis of the labor 
militancy aspect of the systemic cycle. The result is the finished form of the systemic cycle, 
which is able to predict a low-resolution image of economic and political shifts but retaining 
somewhat of a blind spot for institutional diversity and change. It is therefore a vastly 
important tool, left insufficiently used in this vital area.  
Crucially, the systemic cycle theory draws our attention to labor as the key subject of the 
global/national tension of capitalism and its dynamics. Properly understood, labor stands at 
the pivot of growth models, defining both international competitiveness and aggregate 
demand management. However, the conceptual apparatus of the systemic cycle is insufficient 
to describe such a position and role of labor markets. The power resources of labor in terms of 
its capacity to organize and its structural leverage on the economy are vastly important but are 
only an isolated part of the equation. It is the institutions that provide both the context in 
which power resources materialize and are often the result of their use. They provide the 
context for labor power as the regulations and practices determine the very existence of 
unions, as well as the rules according to which they function, collectively bargain and achieve 
both membership and financial resources with which they can exact pressure. Institutions are 
also the result of labor power, as labor can mobilize political resources to influence regulation 
and standard practices that surround them. Without a clear understanding of labor market 
institutions, national level changes to labor remain tied to economic and power shifts. 
Therefore, to fulfill its potential, systemic cycle theory must be taken a step further. 
To do so, we must also disentangle organizations and institutions in the systemic cycle. This 
is particularly important as the shifts between strategic intensiveness and extensiveness of 
capitalism also brings transformative organizational innovations (e.g. internalizations of 
protection through the nation-state in the Dutch cycle or the internalization of transaction 
costs through the modern corporation in the American cycle), and the agents of these shifts 
are at the same time states and business organizations. This aspect of the systemic cycle 
theory is conceptually underdeveloped. The intensive and extensive developmental strategies 
can be a third labor power predicting element (alongside the phase of the systemic cycle and 
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trade positions), but we must clearly interpret it in this sense (which we do in Chapter 3) and 
clearly distinguish the organizational from institutional elements (Chapter 4). 
1.4. Conclusion  
This chapter set out to explain the approach to the global process of capitalism within the 
world-systemic unit of analysis and through the theory of the systemic cycle, which itself 
builds on alternating material and financial expansions. While numerous authors explain 
financial expansions, the concept of the systemic cycle provides a deep historical context for 
financializations (Arrighi, 1994/2010, Arrighi and Silver 1999, Arrighi, 2007). Following 
Braudel (1992), Arrighi explains a logic of economic development in which real and financial 
phases succeed one another. An expansion of real economy in the center of the world-system 
is followed by an expansion of the financial economy and vice versa. The mechanism behind 
Arrighi’s concept of financialization is essentially the Smithian and Marxist notion of the 
profit rate tendency to fall. The conflict that drives the prices down can be horizontal 
(intercapitalist competition), but also vertical and therefore pertaining to the relationship 
between capital and labor (Arrighi, 2009: 130). The capitalist process of accumulation 
necessitates a point at which there is a vicious competition driving the average profit rate 
down. The profit rates in manufacture and trade will fall, and as Braudel and Arrighi note, 
capital will turn to finance in search of higher profit rates.  
The point in economic development at which growth slows in any given sector (and this is 
what should interest us) was noted repeatedly through the history of economic thought. It 
exists, not only in Marxist economics, but also in classical economics (both the tendency of 
the profit rate to fall in Adam Smith and the law of diminishing returns) and the 
neoclassical/new classical economics (the Solow-Swan model). The latter is a model of 
economic development which is firmly embedded in the current economic mainstream and is 
taught as a matter of course in basic economic textbooks (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009; 
Blanchard, 2003). The specific explanations of these approaches may differ, but the salient 
point is the same: in a developed economy, the growth will eventually slow down in the 
absence of large and continuous technological developments, and the prevalent profit rates 
will fall. This is not a controversial issue; it should be enough to point at the consistently 
lower growth rates that developed countries tend to have compared to the less developed ones 
to support this view. Therefore, it would surely not be implausible to claim that in the 
described case, corporations in a developed country try to find more lucrative investment 
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opportunities abroad. Under favorable conditions the amassed investments in a specific less 
developed country might be sufficient to turn it into a very large net exporter. These favorable 
conditions in the country targeted for investment may include a functional judicial system, 
sufficient infrastructure, a relatively stable political situation, high quality of labor expressed 
in high levels of self-management, literacy and education and low real costs of labor and other 
inputs. When these conditions are met, the growth of the less developed country may be 
spurred in a way that may change its position in the world-system dramatically.  
To summarize, Arrighi has substantial advantages over the economic mainstream in the 
apparent ability to explain structured and unequal trade positions and crises and explain both 
through historically grounded research. However, serious flaws in Arrighi stem from his 
Smithian and Marxian limits, focusing on the supply-side developmental mechanisms. A 
demand-side oriented theory could help transcend these difficulties, particularly in explaining 
the extensive and intensive strategies of organizational innovation. These should, in the 
contemporary world, be observed through the easily measurable prism of the foreign or 
domestic orientation of the economy in question. Arrighi’s lack of interest in particular 
institutions and institutional change can be compensated by the available categories, models 
and theories in institutional thought (Chapter 2).  
Power elements are the element which will enable us to connect them. We have identified 
three elements of the systemic cycle theory which can help us decode power: phase of the 
systemic cycle (using Silver’s thesis), trade positions (by analogy with Silver) and, if properly 
interpreted, the extensive/intensive developmental strategy. To offer such an interpretation, 
we will develop the concepts of intensive and extensive capitalism with macroeconomic 
demand-side implications in Chapter 3. It will establish the necessary conditions for 
compatibility of the systemic cycle theory and categories found in institutional thought. 
Chapter 4 will search for the most appropriate way to conceptualize institutional changes 
consistent with the systemic cycle theory through elaborating a new framework utilizing both 
approaches. The final three chapters will apply this framework to specific labor policy 
changes in the USA as the center in decline (Chapter 5), and Germany (Chapter 6) and PR 
China (Chapter 7) as the two possible new centers with alternative development strategies. 
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Chapter 2: Institutions and institutional change 
2.1. Introduction 
The first chapter has analyzed Arrighi’s concept of the systemic cycle in the context of its 
assumptions inherited from Smith, Marx and Wallerstein and criticized it in comparison to its 
significant alternatives. One of the significant advantages of the systemic cycle over the 
categorical apparatus of mainstream economics is the implicit tendency of the latter to model 
in terms of atemporal equilibria. This chapter will deal with the concepts of institutions25 and 
institutional change in order to show the state of the art, but it also serves a practical purpose, 
as it will expose the building blocks of the approach used in this thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 will 
develop a new account of endogenous institutional change, while many existing institutional 
approaches tend to relegate the role of institutional change to exogenous factors (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010: 2-7). With the developing economic environment always providing its own 
incentive-disincentive set, it is surely crucial to endogenize it in accounting for institutional 
change.  
This chapter explores possible contemporary theoretical venues and the models they employ. 
There is a number of alternative approaches to exploring the diversity in institutionalism: one 
could find an overview in Crawford and Ostrom (1995) discerning approaches focusing on 
institutions-as-equilibria, institutions-as-norms or institutions-as-rules, while Tang (2011) 
discerns the harmony paradigm and conflict paradigm of approaches to institutions. This 
chapter will first focus on the various approaches in new institutionalism26 in political science 
 
25 It is quite difficult to segregate institution-pertinent literature from economic literature as such, even when the 
original authors do not explicitly focus on institutions. Therefore, even when neoclassical economists operate in 
complete abstractions of subjects and their surroundings, they operate with a specific ideal type institution of a 
perfectly informed, perfectly rational, fixed preferences motivated free market.  
26 The “newness” of new institutionalism and new institutional economics is in reference to older classical theory 
which did not sharply delineate institutional from political or economic thought and “old institutionalism” which 
found its focus in institutions, but was far less rigorous in its approach compared to the “new” options. Classical 
theory preceded the marginalist revolution briefly described in Chapter 1 and its conceptual implications. After 
the 1860s, and particularly after the neoclassical Marshallian synthesis of the 1890s, the mainstream was under 
the influence of the specific type of disembedded methodological individualism which relegated the micro-
foundations of the economy onto a rational, perfectly informed individual, motivated by simple utility. However, 
preceding this development, it would have been difficult to delineate structure and agency in the sense it is done 
today. E.g., the writings of Adam Smith, simplified and caricaturized though they may be in the origin stories of 
modern liberalism, belonged to the old, embedded thought. His individual would not be solely under the 
influence of utility (or rapacity) but also under the influence of pre-existing social institutions (see Elsner, 1989; 
Arrighi, 2007: 40-68). Karl Marx (1979) is also a good example of embedded thought in that the economic 
analysis is contextualized in the social, historical and institutional (see also Strpić, 1998: 7-19; 2010: 13-37; 
2015: 29-42). Following the marginalist revolution, the “old institutionalism” developed, epitomized by the 
writings of Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, John Commons and Karl Polanyi. Unlike the disembedded 
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(historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism) and 
on their methodological strengths and limitations – most notably the wide-spread blindness to 
endogenous institutional change.  
Typologies of capitalism and/or of welfare regimes have proven to be a crucial genre in new 
institutionalism in political science. They employ an ideal-type based research agenda which 
attempts to group different national institutional frameworks according to their similarities 
and at the same type construct representative theoretical models of economies which 
supposedly describe the economies so grouped. This type of research sacrifices empirical 
exactness but enables an abstracted view of interconnectedness of various institutions as well 
as a focus on the differences in national approaches to markets and capitalism. This makes the 
typological approaches relevant and has contributed to their ubiquity. Arguably the most 
important and certainly very influential point of departure in comparative static research is a 
Varieties of Capitalism based view of two complementary institutional sets: the Liberal 
Market Economy (LME) and the Coordinated Market Economy (CME). This chapter will 
show that this approach was the pinnacle of new institutionalism in terms of our present 
needs. It has admirably created a logic of mutual interactions and complementarities between 
national-level institutions, which was a step in the right direction, as institutions were not 
limited to isolated analysis.  
However, this approach has continued the new institutional difficulties with interpreting 
endogenous institutional change due precisely to its national-level unit of analysis, ideal-type 
based research and the very logic of complementarity that made it successful. We will also 
show the generations of research within the Varieties of Capitalism which recognized the 
flaws of the original formulation and worked to remedy them. Finally, we utilize the models 
and theories described here to identify three channels of institutional change: path 
dependence, intentional institutional design through formal political channels and less formal 
political interactions leveraged by power relations. The first two channels are clearly 
researched, but the latter one will require developing, which this thesis will undertake using 
 
mainstream of social science, institutionalism emphasized the specific legal norms and cultural background to 
the subject of economic analysis. Parallel to this, the Austrian school developed its own views on what we would 
today consider institutions, focusing on the communication mechanisms implicit in the market and in the legal 
frameworks (Hayek, 1945; 1990; see also Mises, 1949; Schumpeter, 2013). In political science, the study of 
formal institutions was a matter of course until the 1950s. As Lowndes laconically put it, before the behavioral 
revolution, “institutionalism was political science” (Lowndes, 2005: 86). Supplanted by the new foci of 
behavioralism and rational choice it was not until the 1980s that institutionalism found its new voice in new 
institutionalism (ibid: 86-87). 
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the systemic cycle theory on the transnational level in chapters 3 and 4. Ultimately, the goal is 
to transcend the limitations of institutional change approaches which have hitherto functioned 
best as instruments of comparative statics, and formulating a new framework of comparative 
dynamics enabling the observing of endogenous institutional change. Finally, this framework 
will be applied to labor market institutions in the later chapters. 
2.2. The emergence of new institutionalism in political science: 
arguing endogenous stability 
Political science has largely oriented itself towards functionalism and instrumental rationality 
in the first decades after World War II. These were the years of the behavioral revolution with 
the domination of rational choice approaches. A conceptual response to the reductivist 
limitations could be felt since the late 1970s and was succinctly and explicitly postulated by 
an influential article by March and Olsen (1984). This signaled a new movement towards the 
institutional context of political outcomes. While new institutionalism was developed on the 
basis of existing contributions in various social sciences it was also to manifest as a notable 
shift in political science, developing through several distinct approaches. The usual typology 
of new institutionalism mentions three approaches: historical, sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Some authors tried to improve upon this three-
pronged systematization of new institutionalism. Schmidt (2010) argued for a fourth, 
discursive new institutionalism, and Peters (2011) added four streams of thought to the 
original three (normative, empirical, interest representation and international branches). This 
chapter will, however, follow the original triple division. This segment will survey these 
original branches of new institutionalism in order to critically confront their inability to deal 
with endogenous institutional change, but also to isolate useful elements of their respective 
theories. 
2.2.1. Rational choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism is linked to the neoclassical disembedded type of 
methodological individualism, in that the actors are generally assumed to have fixed 
preferences and behave instrumentally. In other words, this approach hinges on the earlier 
developments in social sciences, primarily economics. These are essentially assumptions and 
methods of dealing with the selected issues, as well as the framing of these issues. They 
enable rational choice institutionalism to delimit the scope and nature of its analysis, but also 
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constrict importantly constrict its ability to deal with endogenous change. To frame it in 
briefest terms, modern rational institutionalism in political science is intertwined with new 
institutional economics (NIE). Both are crucially defined by game theory and transaction 
costs economics. These developments trace their heritage to the 1930s, which were a general 
period of breakthroughs for economics. Keynes brought macroeconomics and aggregate 
demand management into the mainstream spotlight and in 1933 Heckscher and Ohlin defined 
the widely influential neoclassical trade theory. Also in that year, Chamberlin and Robinson 
defined their versions of far more realistic market structure than those available to 
neoclassical economics at the time. Finally, in 1937 Ronald Coase created the theory of the 
firm which could be used by the mainstream economics. The reason why we have firms rather 
than mere individuals operating on the free market are the costs connected with using the 
price mechanism. Examples of such costs are the costs of information and negotiating 
contracts and they are largely diminished when long-term contracts can be in place (Coase, 
1937: 390-391), implying the existence of companies.  
Eventually, the costs of using the price mechanisms became referred to as transaction costs. 
These could be internalized by including the client or supplier who hitherto existed as another 
agent on the market into the organizational structure of the company (e.g. purchasing another 
company). The internalization of transaction costs (or their diminishing through long-term 
contracts) is the raison d'etre of firms, so it is worthwhile to note that these costs do not exist 
in the simple neoclassical market structure models that informed the neoclassical trade theory. 
Specifically, the neoclassical perfect competition market structure describes efficient markets 
with perfectly informed rational agents which establish situations with maximum quantities 
consumed at lowest prices and no superprofit being possible. In these circumstances 
producers are assumed to be small and extremely plentiful. The functioning of perfect 
competition (assumed by numerous neoclassical models including the Heckscher-Ohlin) 
would preclude bounded rationality, market failure and the existence of companies of any 
significant size (as there would be no need for companies on perfect markets and also limited 
possibilities of capital accumulation). In describing transaction costs, Coase framed an 
important discussion on market failure and organizational and institutional emergence.  
Building on Coase (1937, 1960) and his conceptualization of transaction costs as the basis of 
organizational emergence, effective institutions were defined as uncertainty and transaction 
cost reducing mechanisms (Wallis and North, 1986; North, 1990; 1991; 1994; see also 
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Williamson, 2000). Another development which greatly informed NIE has been the game 
theory (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1950), which has, for decades, focused on 
formal analysis of player strategies and resulting equilibriums. Such a focus on actors, their 
choices and possible pay-offs to their strategies in cooperative and non-cooperative games can 
be invaluable in understanding the evolution of institutions as such and their role in 
structuring agency. However, this approach is less useful in explaining how these institutions 
change as they are usually taken for granted in a scenario. 
A far more nuanced and encompassing approach can be found with Douglass North. For 
North, institutions are essentially rules in a society, or humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction (North, 1990: 3-4)27. Institutions can be formal (laws and statutes) or 
informal (norms and customs, ways of doing business). In terms of development and change 
some of them are created deliberately in order to create an incentive structure which can then 
guide behavior, while others evolve through behavior patterns (ibid: 4). It is important to note 
that some subjects are effectively constrained by formal and informal institutions, and others 
are not (ibid) – some organizations and individuals therefore develop strategies which revolve 
around the avoidance or circumvention of laws and norms. Actual institutions which structure 
agency should therefore in the Northian sense be conceptualized in the triangle of formal, 
informal and inactive institutions. Or in other words, institutions do not necessarily apply 
universally in any given spatial unit, as some institutions do not constrict all players equally. 
In terms of institutional change, North describes the constriction of agency by institutional 
structures, which means that the best players will be the ones who invest in necessary skills 
and knowledge and can subsequently use these in order to change the institutional structure 
(North, 1991: 108-109). This process is then a matter of constraining pressures that the 
structure exacts on the agents and pressures towards change that the most powerful agents can 
exact on the institutional structure. After such a change, the institutions exhibit tendencies of 
path dependence – i.e. a pronounced tendency to continue developing in the same direction as 
they have started to develop in (North, 1990: 103-104). This process is construed as 
 
27 In this approach to institutions as rules, North mirrors other authors, most notably John Commons (1934/1959) 
who defined institutions as “Collective Action in Control of Individual Action” (ibid: 69). Commons did not 
sharply distinguish organizations and institutions, but he did focus on incentives and disincentives as the “cause, 
effect, or purpose common to all collective action” which are understood as working rules enforced by collective 
sanctions (moral sanctions, gain/loss or physical force) which then determine what individuals “can, must, or 
may, do or do not do” (ibid: 71). These individual actions which concern institutional economics as it is defined 
by Commons transcend the focus of “classical and hedonic” economics as they no longer concern themselves 
with “commodities, individuals and exchanges” but shift the unit of analysis to transactions between individuals 
and working rules which govern them (ibid: 73).  
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historically contingent; “[i]f economies realize the gains from trade by creating relatively 
efficient institutions, it is because under certain circumstances the private objectives of those 
with the bargaining strength to alter institutions produce institutional solutions that turn out to 
be or evolve into socially efficient ones (ibid: 16). 
Elinor Ostrom was another important researcher in this vein although her name is connected 
to both NIE and political science. Her definition of institutions is similar to North's: 
“institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports 
leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales” (Ostrom, 2005: 3). 
Institutional change is viewed as a problem of higher order rules, as any set of rules is “nested 
in another set of rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed” (Ostrom, 2005: 
58). Operational rules guide daily decisions, while collective-choice rules determine who the 
subjects of operational rules are, and these rules can change and constitutional choice rules do 
the same for collective-choice rules. Finally, there could also be a fourth, metaconstitutional 
level determining constitutional choice rules28 (ibid). In terms of labor institutions, the 
operational rules could be construed to mean a daily job description or task, the collective-
choice rules are on the policy level arena which is what will interest this thesis (e.g. a law on 
labor), and the constitutional choice arena is a matter of rules that govern the policy making 
(constitution, electoral law).  
While her IAD (Institutional Analysis and Development) framework29 was not intended to 
track institutional change, Ostrom's later work suggested guidelines for this following Donald 
Campbell. In order to describe the evolutive process of institutional change Ostrom and 
Basurto explain that a variety of rules must first be generated. After this, the selection of rules 
based on performance and the retention of rules that perform better can take place (Ostrom 
and Basurto, 2011: 333). Chapter 1 described the Arrighian perspective of systemic cycles 
and the organizational changes they engender. In doing so, Arrighi described a specific model 
of evolutive institutional change which is fully compatible with Ostrom's description. The 
 
28 Oliver Williamson (2000) also identifies four levels of institutions: L1 are norms, customs and religion which 
change with a frequency of 100-1000 years, L2 are the formal rules of the institutional environment like polity 
and judiciary (it seems these represent aspects of Ostrom’s collective choice and constitutional choice rules) and 
they change at the frequency of 10-100 years, L3 are contracts changing at the frequency of 1-10 years and L4 
are resource allocation and employment which change continuously (ibid: 597). 
29 Ostrom distinguishes frameworks from theories and models and this distinction is crucial to the new 
framework of institutional change in Chapter 4 and its illustrations in chapters 5, 6 and 7, but it is worth noting 
that this thesis also uses the term institutional framework, i.e. an interlocking set of institutions. 
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generated varieties of rules are different organizational strategies (e.g. intensive and 
extensive), the selection based on performance is a matter of achieved trade positions 
(competitiveness) and higher growth rates. This evolution may, however, become stalled on 
the macro level (or the constitutional choice arena). To fully drive the Darwinian metaphor 
home, this evolutionary process would require the retention process, implying the possibility 
of the eradication of institutions. On the macro level, however, it is possible to encounter 
inefficient institutions which are very slow to change (corruption, authoritarian regimes).  
Rational choice institutionalism describes institutions as solutions to collective action 
dilemmas mapped often after models like the prisoner’s dilemma and focusing on strategic 
coordination calculus (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 12-13, see also Shepsle, 2006). Underlying the 
rational choice institutionalism is both game theory and New Institutional Economics, and the 
result can be a focus on stable equilibria rather than dynamic change which is not induced by 
an exogenous shock (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 6). This is potentially a great handicap in 
viewing institutions as the equilibrium can be linked to the same neoclassical assumptions of 
market efficiency and actor rationality explored in Chapter 1. In the sense of rational choice 
institutionalism, the danger is viewing institutions as at least locally optimal (or at least 
optimal concerning local parameters) and therefore static in absence of exogenous change (i.e. 
change in these parameters). Examples of such works are Kandori (1992) and Hardin (1982) 
which are game theoretical explanations of assuring cooperation (see also Greif and Kingston, 
2011).  
Avner Greif and David Laitin are often pointed to as authors of a worthwhile attempt at 
bridging this gap. Greif and Laitin (2004) start with the traditional game-theoretical view of 
institutions-as-equilibria which explains institutions as results of strategies under external 
parameters. Strategies cannot change the parameters into which they are embedded30 which 
can make game-theoretical endogenous institutional change a contradiction in terms (ibid: 
633). The institutions in traditional game theory could change only if the external parameters 
changed – as institutions are by definition optimal strategies to external parameters (ibid). In 
response, they formulate a model of endogenous change within the game-theoretical view of 
institutions. Some endogenous aspects should be considered quasi-parameters which can be 
changed from within the game and can influence either the self-reinforcing (leading to 
 
30 note the mentioned notions of rule embeddedness in Ostrom (2005) and Williamson (2000). 
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stability) or self-undermining (leading to a break-down) nature of institutions31 (ibid: 636-
640). Their contribution is a way of transcending the constricting assumptions of game theory 
in enabling games with parametric change – i.e. with endogenous institutional change even 
though it escaped the focus of earlier theory. It is worth noting that they could only do so by 
re-writing the traditional concepts of game-theory and enabling the bottom-up channel (i.e. 
the structuring elements of the game being influenced from within the game) apart from the 
usually exclusive top-down channel. 
2.2.2. Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism focuses on culture as institutions, and serves as a worthwhile 
reminder that value and role systems structure agency as much as formal rules do (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 14-17). Focusing on “noncodified, informal conventions and collective scripts 
that regulate human behavior” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 5), it explains the spread and 
resilience of norms rather than their change (ibid)32. Like rational institutionalism, the limits 
of this approach are also the result of its conceptual foundations and intellectual history. 
Sociological institutionalism originated primarily in organizational theory in 1970s.  
The strength of this approach lies in its avoidance of functionalism as institutional forms and 
procedures are understood not necessarily as results of attempts at rationality, but cultural 
practices like myths and ceremonies (Peters, 1999: 25), where rationality is merely one of the 
possible goals or strategies. The emergence and stability of such practices is therefore similar 
 
31 a historical example used by Greif and Laitin to illustrate their theory is the comparison of the evolution of 
political institutions in medieval Venice and Genoa (as two of the most successful Italian maritime city-states). 
Both states were based on the power of clans (extended families) – and the initial political structure was similar 
(oligarchies electing magisters or podesta). However, in Genoa, the relationship between clans was substantially 
more competitive and the endogenous changes to quasi-parameters contributed to a worsening of outcomes. The 
first such change was the increase of economic prosperity (as a result of a solid political structure) – which 
increased inter-clan competition. The second such change was a result of greater competition which manifested 
in an arms race including the solidification of social networks and socialization of clan members into the loyalty 
to the clan (causing greater societal rifts). The political system was therefore self-enforcing, but for an ever-
smaller number of possible situation (e.g. external threats). On the other hand, Venice has had the same problems 
with interclan rivalry, but as cooperation became necessary, clans became motivated to contain any clan which 
wanted to dominate, rather than to try to dominate themselves. The formal political institutions in Venice 
became oriented towards the weakening of the clans, which meant that this system was self-enforcing for an 
ever-increasing number of situations. In other words, it became self-reinforcing (Greif and Laitin, 2004: 640-
644). 
32 Here, the similarity to Thorsten Veblen, a classical author of “old institutionalism” is striking. Veblen defined 
institutions as “prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the 
individual and of the community” (Veblen, 2016/1899: 118), which are slow to change and therefore inherited 
from the past, and “never in full accord with the requirements of the present” (ibid: 119). Institutions are subject 
to change only when coerced by severely changed circumstances which are no longer serviced by the old 
conservative institutions. This focus on institutions as a class-based habit of thought which is by definition both 
slow to change and does not change endogenously is mirrored by many modern approaches. 
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to the transmission of cultural practices in general. Sociological institutionalism tends to focus 
on the self-replicating nature of social institutions. Either through socialization (where norms, 
values and patterns of behavior are passed down to younger generations only for them to pass 
them on further) or the unconscious acceptance of cognitive institutions (so taken for granted 
that the patterns are beyond scrutiny) – the patterns of behavior are stable and replicate 
themselves. The institution itself is largely indistinguishable from the meaning ascribed to it 
(Beckert, 2010: 607) and therefore becomes stronger by the greater importance and more 
capacity being ascribed to it by its members through a greater sense of belonging to its 
cognitive frame. This suggests that sociological institutionalism is not well suited to explain 
institutional change inasmuch as it is concerned with cultural norms.  
However, with the lines between organizations and institutions somewhat blurred in 
sociological institutionalism (Peters, 1999: 97), we must accept that within its logic, theories 
of organizational change are often understood as examples of institutional change. Here, we 
do see patterns of change. Organizational ecology is one of the early organizational analogies 
within sociological institutionalism. It uses an analogy with biological populations to explain 
the emergence and “death” of organizations. An organizational niche is a crucial concept in 
this approach. It describes the “width” of space which an organization may occupy. A mix of 
resources defines the type of organization. Only a specific carrying capacity (number of 
organizations) can be found in a given niche given the surroundings. An adverse change 
suggests a contraction of the carrying capacity of the niche, and those that are best able to 
adapt to the new surroundings will survive, while those that do not will “die” (e.g. Hannan 
and Freeman, 1988; Baum and Oliver, 1991). Another analogy was isomorphism started in 
early 1980s with a paper by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who wondered why completely 
different surroundings often produce very similar organizational results. Such similarity in a 
given set is known as isomorphism. They identified three types of pressures that push towards 
uniformity: mimetic isomorphism (responses to uncertainty, as it is cheaper to take after 
successful organizations than design organizations by trial and error), normative isomorphism 
(professionalization in the context of same schools for the technocrats and the belonging to 
same professional networks), and coercive isomorphism (political influence/legislation and 
problem of legitimacy/cultural expectations).  
These two analogies provide a measure of conceptualizing organizational change: from the 
point of view of organizational ecology, change is darwinistic and a matter of adaptability to 
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the changing surroundings. From the point of view of isomorphism, change is a matter of 
various pressures towards convergence. However, other approaches are more prepared to 
draw a clear distinction between institutions as sets of rules/norms/equilibria and 
organizations as agents which both embody and play by the rules of institutions. This thesis 
also requires such a clear distinction. We must therefore concede that sociological 
institutionalism has many interesting insights to offer, but the solution to endogenous 
institutional change does not seem to be among them. 
2.2.3. Historical institutionalism 
Finally, historical institutionalism originated as a departure from functional structuralism in 
the past decades. It elucidates power asymmetry and path dependence with broad historical 
strokes dependent on both the notions of utility and culture (see Hall, 2010; Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; 2013). As Hall and Taylor summarize it, 
historical institutionalism is defined by four distinct traits: the tendency to conceptualize the 
relationship between institutions and individuals in terms of both rationality and socialization, 
the emphasis on political power, focus on path dependence and the integration of factors like 
socioeconomic development and ideas with institutional analysis (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 7). 
Historical institutionalism was one of the voices in political science which contributed to the 
“temporal revolution” (Thelen and Mahoney, 2015: 25) beginning in the 1990s which brought 
time once more into the mainstream. It seems to be best honed to issues of institutional 
change, and it has produced several structured attempts at tackling the issues of persistence 
and evolution. The emphasized eclectic conceptual nature of historical institutionalism is also 
a significant advantage. We have mentioned the conceptual distinction of institutions-as-
rules, institutions-as-norms and institutions-as-equilibria. Steinmo (2008: 125-126) argued 
that the first is an all-encompassing tendency of all three types of new institutionalism. The 
third view is clearly connected with rational choice institutionalism, and the second with 
sociological institutionalism. This leaves the concept of institutions in historical 
institutionalism as both norms and equilibria. This view can also be found in Hall and Taylor 
(1996: 8). Steinmo (2008) argues for historical institutionalism as an eclectic perspective 
where individuals should not be assumed to be merely rational calculating and strategic utility 
maximizers, not the blind followers of norms. All three approaches to institutions are needed 
to be able to respond to the historical record rather that to observe data through any specific 
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conceptual lens. This argument is a consequence of the broad (almost synthetizing) 
conceptualization of institutions. 
In terms of its analysis of institutional change, it tends to predict only very stable and 
monotonous change in absence of exogenous shocks, which means that it is difficult to expect 
solutions in endogenous institutional change. Historical institutionalism accentuates an 
interplay of path dependence and critical junctures. Path dependence conceptualizes the 
process of institutional change as highly predictable: “preceding steps in a particular direction 
induce further movement in the same direction” (Pierson, 2000: 252). Pierson links this with 
the principle of “increasing returns”, according to which “the relative benefits of the current 
activity compared with other possible options increase over time” (ibid.). In other words, the 
more a set of institutional arrangements develops, the better it can influence the economy but 
even more importantly, the costlier it becomes to switch to a different development path. Such 
a transition will also become costlier as the institutional development progresses along a 
certain path for political reasons. Institutions have winners and losers, and capturing the 
benefits of specific institutions can mean that a specific group has increased its resource 
stocks and flows and can now more effectively argue for the development along the same 
lines and prevent a switch to a different institutional strategy (Pierson, 2015: 133-137). 
A compatible concept is that on a critical juncture, which helps explain how an institution 
may change despite path dependence. Critical junctures are “major exogenous shocks and 
crises that disrupt the status quo and trigger fundamental institutional changes” (Campbell, 
2010: 92). A shock such as a crisis or a war shakes the foundation upon which the existing 
institutions are founded and may start off a movement in a different direction, starting to 
exploit increasing returns to a set of completely new set of institutions. This view is known 
also as a punctuated equilibrium – in which critical junctures create conditions for path 
dependent movements towards new equilibriums. Punctuated equilibrium is originally a 
concept from biology (where it described the evolution of species) from where it was adapted 
into the described institutional concept by Krasner in the mid-1980s (see Streeck, 2010: 663). 
These developments spelt out a return of social science to institutional research. All of the 
three classical research venues of new institutionalism were valid in that they provided useful 
abstractions and categories for surveying the role of institutions. Therefore, none of the three 
may be ignored even today. However, all of them encountered substantial challenges in 
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dealing with institutional change and as new institutionalism moved towards comparative 
capitalisms, these challenges carried over into this new agenda. This makes the successes and 
failures of new institutionalism important to bear in mind as we discuss the institutional side 
of national capitalisms. 
2.3. Varieties of Capitalism: systemic institutional thought 
Institutional thought is indeed still “a boiling cauldron of ideas” (Williamson, 2000: 610). 
However, the froth on the top of this boiling cauldron today belongs to typological research, 
which in the context of comparing capitalisms tends to build on Hall and Soskice (2001) and 
their Varieties of Capitalism (VofC)33. Even those authors who contest the premises or 
conclusions of VofC have often found it necessary to start their own approaches with 
references to Hall and Soskice in the years since it was published (see Nölke, 2016: 145). This 
approach is an influential hybrid of new institutionalisms which takes an ideal-typical 
research agenda to comparative political economy.  
As a hybrid approach, Hall and Soskice recognize the conceptualizations of institutions in the 
three approaches to new institutionalism discussed above: the socializing function of 
institutions from sociological institutionalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 13), the power-based 
view of institutions from historical institutionalism (ibid) and institutions as formal and 
informal incentives and sanctions explicitly following Douglass North (ibid: 9). To this they 
add the growing need to recognize institutions as strategic interactions from rational choice 
institutionalism (ibid: 12-13). In other words, Hall and Soskice conceptualized institutions in 
accordance with preceding developments in new institutionalism – all of which had 
substantial problems with tracing institutional change. An unsurprising consequence is that 
VofC was itself to display the very same issue. 
Hall and Soskice used these institutionalist conceptual insights in order to produce a 
framework of comparative capitalisms34, which was to become contested, but nevertheless by 
 
33 Hall and Soskice (2001) was not the only attempt to classify contemporary national economies or capitalisms 
– although they were in general most successful by far. A notable exception was the somewhat earlier classical 
contribution of Gosta Esping Andersen (1990) which has had a somewhat narrower focus of welfare regimes. 
According to Google Scholar data, Esping Andersen (1990) was cited 30930 times and Hall and Soskice (2001) 
was cited by 11627 scientific texts as of late May 2018. Projects of comparable period and purpose have 
substantially fewer citations: Crouch and Streeck (1997) at 1078, Kitschelt et al (1999) at 775, Wilensky (2002) 
at 763 and Amable (2003) at 2619. 
34 It is worth noting that many of the basic elements of this approach seem to be attributable to writings of David 
Soskice in the 1990s (see Hall, 1999). 
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far the most important one in new institutionalism. In doing so, they explicitly attempted to 
move beyond the existing (in some cases far earlier) comparative approaches and argued 
against some of the tenets of existing theories that they found to be dominant and problematic: 
they attempt to move beyond the focus on the strength of states in modernization theory of 
Andrew Shonfield (1965), and wish to focus on the private sector; move beyond the exclusive 
focus on trade unions in neocorporatist literature of the 1970s and 1980s and attempt to also 
take firms and employer organizations into account and finally, move beyond the social 
systems of production (innovation systems, production regimes, sectoral governance) from 
the 1980s and 1990s which focus on many levels of the political economy, while VofC 
considers only a strong orientation on national political economies appropriate (ibid: 3-5). 
This last point is crucial, as it delimited the unit of analysis in what was to become the most 
important contemporary approach to comparative capitalisms.  
The national level of economy is the appropriate level of analysis for VofC as Hall and 
Soskice argue that the most important institutions - labor market regulation, education and 
training, corporate governance are all “the preserve of the nation-state” (ibid: 4). Clearly and 
explicitly, this approach finds capitalism in its institutions on the national level. This was a 
significant step in the right direction, as it enabled observing the systemic interactions of 
various institutions on the national level, replacing the limited focus on isolated institutions 
and economic areas. However, we will argue that the lack of a global perspective in the unit 
of analysis is one of the three principal reasons of the lack of an endogenous theory of change 
in VofC. 
Nevertheless, the state-level focus combined with a subtle and encompassing theory of 
institutions made this approach useful for the comparative research of national institutions. 
The ideal types like those employed by VofC can in general be a useful tool in comparative 
statics as they abstract the simple form from the complex reality and therefore enable a sharp 
relief between similarities and differences in national institutional forms. However, the 
complex empirical reality is not only more diverse than the ideal types would lead one to 
believe, it is also constantly changing. In other words: “ideal types are fixed, empirical cases 
are moving” (Becker, 2009: 12). The reliance on ideal types is the second principal reason for 
VofC having issues with the research of institutional dynamics.  
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The third principal reason stems from the elementary logic behind it. The key concept here is 
the complementarity of institutional arrangements in which “two institutions can be said to be 
complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency 
of) the other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17). Therefore, the precondition for economic success 
of any given country is not any single institutional solution, but rather a consistent approach 
throughout the political economy. There are five important political-economic areas that were 
initially identified as significantly affecting the overall complementarity. Industrial relations 
describes institutional arrangements which resolve bargaining over wages and working 
conditions between the firm and its labor. This process has a profound effect on the wage 
levels and productivity levels for the firm. Vocational training and education is the 
institutional sphere in which firms need to achieve a suitable skill level of its workforce, and 
workers need to decide the skills in which they will invest in and the level of this investment. 
Corporate governance describes institutional arrangement in which firms secure financing 
while investors seek returns on investment. Inter-firm relations are types of relationships 
formed between enterprises (suppliers, clients), encompassing issues of securing appropriate 
technology, demand for products and supplies for inputs. Finally, employees describe 
institutional arrangements which ensure the cooperation of employees with each other in the 
best interests of the firm while using their specific knowledge of the functioning of the 
enterprise itself (ibid: 7). 
The number of these areas has varied in accordance with the intent of specific research. Even 
the original contribution used schemes which removed employees as a special institutional 
sphere (ibid: 28, 32), while later contributions introduced various other spheres (e.g. social 
protection and product market regulation in Hall and Gingerich, 2009; and aggregate demand 
management systems in Carlin and Soskice, 2009). The concept of complementarity hinges 
on the three institutional areas that the original authors emphasized in their insistence on the 
nation-state unit of analysis, i.e. corporate governance, industrial relations and education and 
training systems. 
VofC produced a narrative according to which the crucial predictor of national 
competitiveness35 and high rates of growth is the mutually complementary institutional 
 
35 The full title Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage is a clear nod 
to Ricardo, whose concept of comparative advantage dominated mainstream ideas on trade throughout most of 
the 19th and 20th centuries. Hall and Soskice were suggesting that national competitiveness has a strong 
foundation in institutions. 
50 
 
alignment of the relevant areas. In other words, the more complementary the national 
regulatory framework is, the higher sustained growth rates we can expect from the economy it 
steers. The analysis of developed countries by Hall and Soskice revealed two principal types 
of such institutional consistency – the coordinated market economy (CME) as a more 
restrictively regulated and strategically oriented variety of capitalism and the liberal market 
economy (LME) as a more flexible variety oriented in the direction of free markets. CME 
path to efficiency and growth is based on specific skills formation, protected and organized 
labor markets and long-term bank-centric corporate governance systems. This was considered 
an adequate representation of Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan. On the other hand, LME countries base their 
institutional comparative advantage on general skill formation, flexible labor markets with 
low unionization and short term oriented corporate governance with predominant stock-
market financing. These were identified as USA, Canada, Ireland, UK, Australia and New 
Zealand36 (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 19-21).  
In general, these are ideal-typical institutional architectures which are themselves results of 
different political-economic organizations (long running corporatist tendencies in Europe, and 
a dismantling of an initially comparatively weak labor structures in the USA). The different 
economic results can most succinctly be postulated for a marginal case of a crisis, which 
inevitably brings severe pressures for a company. An LME will have corporate governance 
favoring profitability and the price of stocks, suggesting a need to keep the company “lean 
and mean”. If demand should drop, the tendency will be to reduce the workforce, and the 
flexible labor market in combination with low labor organization will allow this to happen. As 
the workers have non-specific skill sets and do not typically represent irreplaceable assets for 
the company, which will therefore be prepared to lay them off. If a CME should experience a 
crisis, markets will react in the opposite way. The patient bank capital will not necessarily 
push for lay-offs, the companies see their employees as irreplaceable assets due to the 
educational investment they represent, the workers may easily be formally represented in the 
decision making bodies of the company (e.g. through the German principle of 
codetermination) and are protected by strong labor unions and a relatively rigid employment 
 
36 VofC has served as a worthy reminder of complexity with which social sciences are faced and served to 
revitalize this field in the context of simplistic free market policy recommendations, informed by either race-to-
the-bottom globalism or one-size-fits-all type of free market ideal. The message was clear: even in the post-cold-
war era of increasing trade and capital mobility there can be such a thing as effective strategic coordination 
(CME). In fact, more efficient developed countries follow this route than that of market coordination (LME). 
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law. However, all of this suggests that workers cannot be easily laid off even in times of 
reduced demand. This suggests that profits and stock prices will be vulnerable. 
The organizational premise and the result in terms of distribution can be vastly different in 
these two models. However, the central message of VofC is that both models work, and both 
can be used to produce high levels of growth. Corporate governance systems dictate the 
pressures towards investment returns, with the prevalent stock markets in LMEs dictating a 
fast tempo of returns with hostile takeovers as a constant threat and large banks with strategic 
stocks in CME allowing for a slower and less profit-oriented tempo of decision making. 
Consequently, an LME company faces short time-horizons caused by impatient stock-market 
investments and it pushes it in the direction of ensuring greatest possible profits/stock prices. 
Labor is weak and unprotected and cannot push back when the profit priority threatens it. At 
the same time, the education and training system suggests little sunk costs into the employee 
skill set – meaning that from the point of view of the company in an LME, labor can be easily 
disposed of in a crisis because there are pressures towards it, no protection or intrinsic motive 
to keep it. The opposite holds true for a CME company. Longer time horizons are made 
possible by the patient strategic investments, and the labor is not only well protected but also 
embodies sunk costs through the training system. Both LME and CME models offer viable 
survival strategies for companies, as they are complementary systems (all arrangements point 
in the same direction). The problem occurs when the institutional arrangements are not 
complementary. E.g. if the pressures from impatient capital should manifest, but the 
employment law is prohibitive, the unions are strong and/or the workers have specific skill 
sets useful to the company. In this case, the company would have to either suffer the 
consequences of diminished financing or incur various labor related costs. 
The framework offered by Hall and Soskice was both vastly successful and severely flawed. It 
offered concepts that were in line with the best new institutionalism had to offer and created 
an encompassing framework in which various institutional arrangements interact with each 
other. This enabled a national unit of analysis which used the point of view of a private sector 
company to identify the relevant institutional spheres in which it encounters coordination 
issues. The result was an institutional framework which could be portrayed in terms of 
prevalent strategies which are a result of formal and informal restrictions/rules (which is a 
complex consequence of the rational choice institutionalist concepts). But it also created an 
understanding of a very deep path dependence (an application of historical institutionalism 
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restrictions), because the successful states were already reaping the benefits of institutional 
complementarity and therefore had no incentives to change. This section has argued that there 
are three methodological strategies of VofC which limit its possibility to explain endogenous 
change: apart from the logic of complementarity, there are the equally significant restriction 
connected to ideal-typical comparative-static research and the definition of capitalism as a 
phenomenon on the national level.  
2.4. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: issues with dynamics and types 
The limitations of VofC became apparent in the years following its publication, not least 
because national economies began to change in unpredicted ways, while the original 
framework offered limited possibilities in institutional change analysis. Andreas Nölke (2016) 
points out that the VofC agenda represented ground zero for contemporary comparative 
capitalism research (he treats the original VofC as the first generation of such research) and 
offers a survey of attempts to correct the original flaws which he sees as “binary orientation, 
exclusive focus on the supply side and neglect of common tendencies within contemporary 
capitalism” (Nölke, 2016: 145). The second generation of research (post-VofC) focused on 
expanding the binary orientation by exploring new geographic areas not covered by the CME-
LME binome and the third-generation critical comparative capitalism attempted to 
incorporate the demand side, and interaction of national capitalisms with each other (ibid: 
145-146). The aspirations of this thesis put it in the context of this, third generation of 
comparative capitalism research. 
The authors understood by Nölke to belong in the second generation focused on type 
expansion and historical interpretation of these groups. Their research agenda started with the 
obvious recognition that not all developed economies correspond to the LME and CME 
descriptions. One type of attempt to address this problem has been to hypothesize new ideal 
types. The original contribution referred to a possibility of a Mediterranean group combining 
large agrarian sectors with liberal labor markets but non-market capacities in corporate 
governance (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21), while Schmidt (2003) has similarly argued for a 
third, French variety of capitalism.  
The relatively recent EU members (since the 2004 expansion) in Central and Eastern Europe 
have proven to be another promising field of VofC research. These post-socialistic political-
economies enjoyed in relatively steep growth rates before the 2009 contractions and attempts 
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were made to link some of these with institutional-complementarities. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were sometimes viewed as LME-type economies (Feldmann, 2006; Buchen, 2007; 
Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, Lučev and Babić, 2013), Slovenia was often, and Croatia 
sometimes, classified as kindred to the CME type (Feldmann, 2006; Buchen, 2007; Knell and 
Srholec, 2007; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; Adams, 2011; Lučev and Babić, 2013). Also, 
Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) called for an enlargement of VofC literature to encompass the 
Dependent Market Economy (DME) variety in Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics 
(mirrored also in Bohle and Greskovits, 2007).  
Another early criticism of VofC was directed at the discrepancies between the ideal-typical 
models and empirical situation, as the actual levels of complementarity differ even inside the 
CME and LME groups, and may change over time37. This was a clear effect of the conceptual 
limitations of ideal-types as not all developed economies were identical with the VofC 
categorical apparatus used to group them, particularly as they changed over the course of 
time. The contention of this thesis is, however, that some developed countries do display 
certain important complementary institutional solutions. The focus of chapters 5-7 will be on 
labor policy which is assumed to be oriented towards labor protection in well-defined CME 
cases and oriented towards labor flexibility in well-defined LME cases (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2004). In such a research agenda, the idea of complementarity and 
the interlocking logic of institutional spheres still represents the best starting position for 
research. 
In fact, the central idea of VofC remains the capability of a simultaneous existence of 
divergent national capitalist models which center of the USA and Germany as typical cases. 
In this, there is a striking similarity between VofC and alternative typologies of advanced 
capitalisms and welfare regimes. The two genres of welfare regime and capitalism research 
are usually considered compatible due to both the notion of complementarity which underlies 
the logic of VofC and a certain overlap to groups of states that are grouped into types. Table 
2.1 shows the groupings postulated by selected typologies, focusing on the position of 
Germany and the USA as the two cases of interest to this thesis which are easily typified.  
 
 
37 for criticisms of the VofC framework along these lines see Becker (2007) and Blyth (2003) and Hancké et al 
(2007) and for an explicit response to Blyth see Hall and Soskice (2003). 
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Table 2.1. Typologies of capitalism in institutional literature 
Typology (original 
number of types) 
Type including the 
USA 
Type including 
Germany 
Other types 
Esping-Andersen, 
1990 (3) 
Liberal Corporatist-statist Social-Democratic 
(Scandinavian) 
Hall and Soskice, 
2001 (2) 
Liberal Market 
Economy 
Coordinated Market 
Economy 
Various expansions 
as discussed above 
Wilensky, 2002 (3) Least-corporatist Democratic 
Corporatism  
Corporatism-without-
Labor 
Amable, 2003 (5) Market-based 
capitalism  
Continental-
European capitalism 
Asian capitalism, 
Social-democratic 
capitalism, 
Mediterranean 
capitalism 
Becker, 2009 (5) Liberal Corporatist Statist, Meso-
communitarian, 
Patrimonial 
 
Wilensky (2002) analyzed 19 developed countries and created a typology according to 
“national bargaining arrangements among major interest groups and government“ (Wilensky, 
2002: 83). His typology bears a great resemblance to the VofC: the democratic corporatist 
group of cases encompasses Sweden, Norway, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, 
Denmark, Italy, Israel and West Germany, meaning it excludes only Japan and Switzerland 
(and adds Israel and Italy) to the CME variety of capitalism in VofC, while 8 out of 10 cases 
remain the same. Japan, France and Switzerland form Wilensky's Corporatism-without-Labor 
category, and his Least-corporatist category is a perfect overlap of the VofC LME group (US, 
UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland). 
On the other hand, Esping-Andersen (1990) created a seminal distinction of three welfare 
state regimes: Liberal, Corporatist-statist and Social-democratic. His typology is not as 
explicit as the others discussed here as the analysis is more complex and encompasses several 
separate elements. Esping-Andersen preferred to use examples of “direct representatives“ of 
these regimes: e.g. Germany for the Corporatist regime, the USA for the Liberal regime and 
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Sweden for the Social-Democratic regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 192). It is important to 
note that Esping-Andersen argued that “welfare-state structures are systematically related to 
labor-market outcomes” (ibid: 159), and that Social-Democratic countries are devoted to 
maximizing labor supply through promoting both female labor participation and low labor 
exit rates, while Corporatist states maintain lower labor supply through incentivizing exit rates 
and Liberal states promote neither female participation nor exit rates (ibid). 
These influential typologies do not have significant problems with discussing the similarities 
and differences of the USA and Germany. All of them place them in different categories 
emphasizing the relative orientation to free markets (e.g. 
commodification/decommodification) with the USA always fitting into the free market 
oriented type and Germany fitting into the decommodified/coordinated type. In fact, while 
these typologies construe their types around different policies and arrangements, they mostly 
accept the USA and Germany as representative cases. However, these typologies are mostly 
focused on the developed world with long corporatist and/or democratic traditions (e.g. old 
OECD members). The categorical apparatus they develop is therefore challenging for 
adaptation to very specific cases like the People's Republic of China, which is neither 
democratic nor corporatist in the western sense of these words and which combines an 
ideologically charged one-party system with many free market institutional solutions. The 
easier option is to discard any attempt of meaningful comparison of Germany, US and China 
along the lines of VofC. But this option would rob us of a better understanding of the 
similarities and differences of the old developed world and one of the most important and 
largest political economy of the world. Chapter 7 will go the harder route and strive to analyze 
China with the VofC matrix in mind in order to better outline its specificity. 
Finally, the years since the global recession of 2009 have brought forth carious research that 
focuses on the role of the global economy (therefore transcending the national unit of 
analysis) and demand-side issues (Nölke’s third generation of comparative capitalist 
researchers). An important expansion of the VofC research agenda has been the incremental 
addition of various institutional arrangements into the original framework. These have already 
included social protection, product market regulation and electoral systems, but this wave of 
research also included aggregate demand management regimes, which are particularly 
important during economic downturns. As Soskice (2007: 89-90) and Carlin and Soskice 
(2009: 21) pointed out, there are substantial institution-based differences among countries in 
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the aggregate demand management during crises. LME countries are supposed to be inclined 
towards fiscal expansion and other forms of anti-cyclical economic policy. CME, on the other 
hand, are supposed to be inclined towards conservative, pro-cyclical policies. In other words, 
CME countries would naturally enact fiscal consolidations in face of falling GDP. There are 
significant aberrations, as Scandinavian countries and Japan tend to act fiscally expansionary 
(Carlin and Soskice, 2009: 21-22). This agenda became significant in the specific 
transnational context of EMU as new VofC research suggested the frictions between EMU 
level prescriptions and national trade unions or fiscal and monetary preferences (Hancké, 
2013; Iversen, Soskice and Hope, 2016; Hall, 2017). Other authors have expanded the ideal 
type structure in order to include the states more heavily dependent on the international 
economy (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Nölke et al, 2015). Still others have connected 
Comparative political economy and International political economy to note that the absence 
of a stronger international financial regime may well be a consequence of different 
preferences based in domestic institutional frameworks (Kalinowski, 2013). What all of these 
have in common is the attention given to the transnational/international arena and a greater 
understanding of demand-side issues. This latter issue was most significantly opened by a 
recent debate sparked by the critique of comparative political economy as insensitive to 
growth models. Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) have interpreted the comparative literature of 
the 1980s and 1990s as heavily influenced by the anti-Keynesian, pro-market shift in 
economics (ibid: 4). The result was that most of the VofC literature did not account for 
demand factors, choosing instead to focus on supply side elements as necessitated by its 
general firm-centric approach. This approach may do very well in discovering and describing 
institutional restraints and incentives as experienced by a firm, in other words an individual 
actor that is in the micro-economic focus. This is fully compatible with the economic 
mainstream since the 1970s, which accentuates micro-founded, supply side phenomena.  
However, it is not always well suited to uncover the demand-side issues accentuated by 
macroeconomics. In an attempt to further the comparative political-economic agenda, 
Baccaro and Pontusson identify (primarily) export and consumption led growth patterns in 
developed countries. These are essentially paths of institutional change following the crisis of 
the Fordist wage-led growth pattern prevalent in the Western world until the 1970s (ibid: 24). 
This article prompted two very different types of responses. Wolfgang Streeck (2016) pointed 
out that VofC types have always been a kind of historical snapshot (Streeck, 2016: 244), 
rather than a valid description of economic functioning of developed countries. Streeck 
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interprets Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) as “dealing a death blow to the so-called firm-
centered […] concept of “capitalist” diversity” (Streeck, 2016: 244) – in other words to VofC 
literature. In this interpretation, Streeck continues his own criticism of VofC as overly focused 
on the differences, rather than convergences of modern capitalism (Streeck, 2010; 2011). On 
the other hand, David Soskice (one of the original editors of the Varieties of Capitalism 
project) was involved in a rather different response, claiming that Baccaro and Pontusson are 
“wholly consistent with and ultimately dependent upon varieties of capitalism” (Hope and 
Soskice, 2016: 3), as a broadening to a wider set of advanced economies shows the 
significance of VofC with the export-led economies proving to be CME economies, and 
consumption-led economies being LME economies (ibid: 4). 
The previous section has argued that the original VofC framework was ill-equipped to deal 
with issues of institutional change due to three methodological factors: the ideal-type research 
strategy, the national unit of analysis and the logic of complementarity. This section has 
shown that the years of research following the original publication have relaxed the crucial 
obstacles: various authors have begun approaching the VofC scheme by exploring new 
varieties of capitalism and questioning the monolith and unchanging nature of the old, by 
acknowledging the shortcomings of the merely national level. This suggests that the time is 
ripe for theories of institutional change which can use the complementarity without 
understanding it as contributing to only two local optimums of CME and LME and without 
understanding it as immutable. Such theories are crucial to us, as they create the ability to 
observe national level institutions of capitalism and are sensitive to their changes or even able 
to predict the course of change. The following section will survey the existing approaches to 
institutional change in new institutionalism, both within and outside the logic of VofC. 
2.5. Towards a new framework: Comparative dynamics in new 
institutionalism 
This section will survey the several promising ways of thinking about institutional change in 
new institutionalism. Firstly, there is the sometimes overly simplistic, but otherwise sound 
logic of path dependence. As we have seen in the first two sections, the study of institutions 
tends to emphasize their enduring and unchanging nature, and they can conceivably do so for 
good reasons (Djelic, 2010: 27). Path dependence is a useful concept in terms of explaining 
institutional stability even in the presence of external pressures. It can help explain why 
different systems tend to move in the direction in which they have started. However, 
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institutions operate in a system of varied trade, technology and politics related pressures 
which influence the returns on specific paths. This suggests that in a simplified sense, one 
could foresee the imperviousness of current institutional arrangements as they are influenced 
by path dependence and supported by norms which are slow to change. One could expect a 
system which has begun to invest in CME-type institutions to remain on this path and 
continue to invest as the system would start facing increasing returns as the institutional 
framework sufficiently develops. To switch to an LME-type path would mean a costly 
dismantling of many CME elements before new regulations could be put into place and much 
time lost before growth rates respond to the new LME-type economy. However, it should be 
noted that CME and LME arrangements as documented by Hall and Soskice (2001) reflect 
particular power relations and a particular sectoral employment stratification which in turn 
reflects a specific historical technological situation. Any of these can change and therefore 
influence the strength with which path dependence asserts itself on the process of institutional 
development. 
These concepts are certainly not without value and can help explain many cases of 
institutional change. Chapters 3 and 4 will develop these elements in the sense useful for the 
analysis of change in labor institutions in the last three chapters. E.g. in the case of labor 
institutions in Germany, the critical junctures were at least the reunification of 1990, which 
brought a different and challenging structure of labor, the adoption of euro in the 1999, which 
started an era of sustained trade surpluses for Germany and ushered in further deepening of 
the European project. However, it would be dangerously misleading to stop at the punctuated 
equilibrium as a model of change, as it hinges on internal stability in absence of exogenous 
shocks that actually propel change. Such a description bears a semblance to the neoclassical 
approach to growth. The neoclassical approach is curiously atemporal as it focuses on long-
term timeframes with assumptions of efficient markets and rational individuals. In doing so, 
the mainstream of economics tends to take the static equilibrium as the conceptual fundament 
of its analysis and transplant it into the concept of growth which necessitates some concept of 
time. Likewise, the described simplistic account of institutions could take the static institution 
as the conceptual fundament and transplant it into the concept of institutional change as 
endogenously predictable.  
Both approaches would then need exogenous shocks to account for fluctuations - in growth 
because crises are neither theoretically covered nor visible in the long run and in institutional 
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analysis due to path dependent scenarios. This description also bears a resemblance to 
rational-choice institutionalism, which assumes that strategies in iterated games reach an 
optimal point of equilibrium which represents institutions themselves. In absence of an 
exogenous change in parameters, the strategies do not change as they are already optimal. As 
noted above, Greif and Laitin (2004) make an interesting conceptual foray into endogenous 
change that is compatible with the idea of institutions-as-equilibria. However, while 
intriguing, it remains a descriptive rather than predictive tool.  
The second way of thinking about institutional change are modes of change – also mostly 
centering on descriptions. Particularly of interest to this thesis is the work of Kathleen Thelen 
on varieties of liberalization, where various pressures connected with movements towards the 
deregulation of labor markets are aggregated into very different reforms in different 
institutional settings. This research has started in co-authorship with Wolfgang Streeck, one of 
the staunch critics of VofC, but has eventually been used to explicitly explain the different 
patterns of change in VofC terms. Kathleen Thelen and her co-authors (2014; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009), define five modes of institutional change. These 
are displacement, layering, conversion, drift and exhaustion. The size of that list and focus of 
these categories has changed over the years. Table 2.2 summarizes the definitions tracks the 
differing focus. 
Table 2.2. The evolution of models of change in Kathleen Thelen 
 Streeck and Thelen (2005) Thelen and 
Mahoney (2009) 
Thelen (2014) 
displacement In sociology, “new models 
emerge and diffuse which 
call into question existing, 
previously taken-for-granted 
organizational forms and 
practices” and in political 
science “the emphasis is 
typically more on political 
than on cognitive or 
normative 
factors, with change 
emanating mostly from shifts 
in the societal balance of 
power” (p. 19) Mechanism: 
defection 
Change is led by 
insurrectionaries 
(enabled by weak 
veto power of 
defenders of status 
quo, low levels of 
discretion in 
interpretation of 
institutional rules) 
direct attack on the 
existing institutional 
arrangements, largely 
descriptive of US 
liberalization 
drift “institutions require active 
maintenance; to remain what 
Change is led by 
parasitic symbionts 
dualization processes 
typical of Germany – 
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they are they need to be reset 
and refocused, or sometimes 
more fundamentally 
recalibrated 
and renegotiated, in response 
to changes in the political and 
economic environment in 
which they are embedded.” 
Without it they may 
experience erosion or atrophy 
through drift (p. 24) 
Mechanism: deliberate 
neglect 
(enabled by strong 
veto power of 
defenders of status 
quo, high levels of 
discretion in 
interpretation of 
institutional rules) 
a tendency to 
continued protection 
of insiders, coupled 
with a disregard for 
new social risks on 
the periphery. 
conversion “institutions are not so much 
amended or allowed to decay 
as they are redirected to new 
goals, functions, or 
purposes” (p. 26).  
It is a result of new 
environmental challenges or 
changes in power relations. 
Mechanism: redirection, 
reinterpretation 
Change is led by 
opportunists (enabled 
by weak veto power 
of defenders of status 
quo, high levels of 
discretion in 
interpretation of 
institutional rules) 
conversion describes 
institutional changes 
towards embedded 
flexibilization typical 
of Denmark, which 
reorient institutions 
in order to 
collectivize risks in 
accordance with 
shifting social 
coalitions 
layering Vested interests behind 
existing old institutions are 
circumvented by adding 
another layer of institutions. 
„The actual mechanism for 
change is differential 
growth; the introduction of 
new elements setting in 
motion dynamics through 
which they, over time, 
actively crowd out or 
supplant by default the old 
system as the domain of the 
latter progressively shrinks 
relative to that of the former” 
(p. 24). 
Change is led by 
subversives (enabled 
by strong veto power 
of defenders of status 
quo, low levels of 
discretion in 
interpretation of 
institutional rules) 
 
exhaustion “institutional exhaustion is a 
process in which behaviors 
invoked or allowed under 
existing rules operate to 
undermine these.” 
Mechanism: depletion 
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Displacement is a model of institutional change in which new institutions form and replace 
the old ones (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 19-22; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 16). In her 2014 
volume on varieties of liberalization, she compared the United States, Germany and Denmark 
across three comparative dimensions: Industrial relations, Vocational Education and Training 
(VET) and Labor market policy. She argues that displacement is largely applicable to 
institutional change in US institutions. It is a typical process of pure deregulation, or a direct 
attack on the existing institutional arrangements. The USA always lacked strong coordinating 
capacities in industrial relations, but the trajectory of liberalization in recent decades saw a 
collapse of extant unions and collective bargaining and an erosion of real values of statutory 
minimum wages and benefits. Other institutional domains seem to carry traits of risk 
individualization and recent developments in education are focused on increasing college 
enrollment, but without care for successful completion. Education system therefore goes a 
long way in preserving the socio-economic status quo and similarly, the diminutive active 
labor measures are limited to a short-term perspective and aimed at securing any form of jobs 
(see Chapter 5).  
Drift as a type of institutional change occurs when the existing institutions remain stable, but 
exogenous events change their context and outcomes (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 24-26; 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 17)38. This mode of change occurs when the existing institutions 
remain stable, but exogenous events change their context and outcomes. She argues that it 
describes dualization processes typical of Germany – a tendency to continued protection of 
insiders, coupled with a disregard for new social risks on the periphery (Thelen, 2014: 47-58). 
While German industrial relations appear to remain typical of a CME invested in high skills, a 
strong social partnership in the manufacturing core of the economy with high unionization 
rates conceals low union coverage for the emergent service sector. Changes in the education 
system complement these developments. The high-quality apprenticeship model is today 
challenged by the growth of the service sector (not based in specific skills required in 
manufacturing) and a drop in apprenticeship slots available. Regardless of a continued need 
for institutional reform to remedy this, the traditional institutions were generally defended 
resulting in poor distributive effects with the winners and losers distinguished early in their 
careers. Germany also witnessed a substantial growth of a low-wage sector (after Hartz 
 
38 It should be noted that the concept of institutional drift appears in different form elsewhere. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2013) discuss institutional drift as a process of gradual institutional divergence between various 
localities (ibid: 108-109). 
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reforms 2002-2005) with substantial deregulation of agency work, fixed-term and “mini jobs” 
even as the well protected blue-collar core was preserved (see Chapter 5).  
Layering is a form of change in which new rules and arrangements are instituted alongside old 
ones (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 22-24; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 16-17). Layering 
essentially involves “amendments, additions, or revisions to an existing set of institutions” 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 22) which may suggest an active competition between two sets if 
institutions, with the new sometimes able to “crowd out or supplant by default the old system 
as the domain of the latter progressively shrinks relative to that of the former” (ibid)39. 
Conversion is a mode describing the type of change in which the old institutions remain in 
place but begin serving new purposes (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 26-29; Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2009: 17-18). It may be a result of exogenous change “to which policymakers 
respond by deploying existing institutional resources to new ends” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 
26), or a result of changes in power relations implying that new actors may take the institution 
“over and turn it to new ends” (ibid). This mode of change is said to typify the evolution of 
labor institutions in Nordic countries, which Thelen showed on the example of Denmark 
(Thelen, 2014). Finally, exhaustion describes the gradual breakdown of existing institutions 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 26-29).  
 
Mahoney and Thelen (2009) go a step further and connect the modes of change with the 
political context, institutional characteristics (particularly the level of discretion in 
interpretation and enforcement) and the likely type of agents of change. Specifically, 
displacement typically occurs where the defenders of old institutional arrangements have 
weak veto possibilities (cannot prevent change), and the levels of discretion in institutional 
interpretation are low (existing institutions cannot be reinterpreted). In this context, 
insurrectionaries can deregulate existing arrangements and possibly institute their new 
versions. They do so as defenders of old institutions have strong veto power (and institutions 
cannot be changed outright), but there are high levels of discretion in interpretation of 
institutions, meaning the institutions can be reinterpreted rather than changed. Parasitic 
symbionts are the actors that typically guide drift, as they require the formal status quo to 
continue but wish to alter the spirit of the institution.  
 
39 Chapter 7 will show that institutional change in China on the macro level exhibits some signs of layering with 
the “old” one party goals sometimes clashing with “new” capitalist system elements. 
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Conversion typically occurs where the defenders of existing institutions have weak veto 
power (institutions can be changed), high levels of discretion in interpretation (institutions can 
also be reinterpreted). The actors that thrive in such an environment may be described as 
opportunists as they are able to recycle the prevailing rules in order to suit their own purposes. 
Finally, layering occurs as the defenders of existing institutions have strong veto power 
(cannot be directly attacked) and in the context of low levels of discretion in interpretation 
(cannot easily be reinterpreted) – this requires both the form and content of old institutions to 
remain unchanged, but an alternative may be set up alongside it. The typical agents of change 
are subversives, who operate within the system and set up rules on the margins of old 
arrangements, which may then proliferate and coexist as an alternative to the older 
arrangement (ibid: 14-29). Thelen’s research was groundbreaking in that it connected types of 
agents, patterns of change and varieties of capitalism in order to explain the changing 
national-level capitalisms beyond what was possible in the original VofC framework. 
However, her work has remained locked in the national unit of analysis and is largely 
descriptive, mostly dealing with how changes take place rather than explaining why 
institutions change. 
The third common way of thinking about institutional change are evolutionary analogies. We 
have seen that they were a staple of institutional thought (Commons, Ostrom, organizational 
ecology), but recent authors feel Darwinism has not yet been sufficiently conceptually tapped. 
The described tendency of social sciences towards equilibriums was particularly worrying for 
Sven Steinmo who saw it as an application of a static physical concept to a very dynamic 
social reality. Steinmo acknowledges the relatively recent tendencies in evolutionary 
narratives in historical institutionalism including the work of Streeck, Thelen and Pierson. 
However, he argues for a better inclusion of biological evolutionary concepts as more 
applicable to complex adaptive systems with complex causation (Steinmo, 2010: 7-10), as 
institutions could essentially be thought of as “genes of society” (ibid: 219), which can be 
subject to evolution. In doing so he utilizes explicit analogies from evolutionary science. The 
spread of US institutions through Northern America is likened to allopatry, which is an 
evolution of a splintered species in a new environment, sometimes in conditions of explosive 
and unchallenged growth (ibid: 25). Another example is exaptation, which is a type of 
evolution where old features adopt new roles (e.g. feathers first serving for thermoregulation 
and then for flight). Steinmo suggests that exaptation can be used to illustrate institutional 
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change as layering (where new and old institutions can coexist) as described in Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) and described below. As related in Table 2.2., exaptation would more easily be 
compared to change as conversion where an institution transforms to take new forms. Perhaps 
Steinmo sees exaptation as layering because he uses it to illustrate the evolution of Japanese 
institutions as a hybrid mix of old and new and imposed American type institutions after 
World War II (Steinmo, 2010: 110-111, 151).  
Tang also explains institutional change as an evolutionary process consisting of five phases: 
generation of ideas, political mobilization, struggle for power, setting the rules and 
legitimatization/stabilization/reproduction. These phases represent the biological evolution 
elements of variation (mutation), selection (variation reduction), and inheritance: with phase 1 
corresponding to mutation, phases 2 and 3 to selection, and phases 4 and 5 to inheritance 
(Tang, 2011: 34)40. This generalized Darwinistic insight mirrors other applications of 
evolutionary narrative onto institutional change and is a welcome insight into how 
institutional change may take place. Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify specific phases of 
selection, and some institutional processes may have few of them. A socially suboptimal 
institution like corruption, clientelism or the governance patterns focused on the rent-
extraction of predatory elites may be preserved indefinitely. They may cause great harm to the 
 
40 There is obviously a number of approaches focusing on Darwinistic evolutions as an analogy of institutional 
change. This type of analogy is has a very long history – at least since John Commons (1934/1959), who did not 
necessarily focus on change, but did explain it in passing as an evolutionary process: “custom is the mere 
repetition, duplication and variability of practices and transactions” (ibid: 44-45), this variability produces both 
alternative customs and the elimination of some customs, which suggest a “survival of customs fitted to the 
changing economic conditions and the changing political and economic dominance” (ibid). This process is in 
fact, explicitly “much like the artificial selection of Darwin’s evolution” (ibid). Why should evolutionary 
analogies then be construed as essentially new and under-used? The answer may lie in the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics that Chapter 1 has already described. In the context of business cycles and development, 
this approach can either be focused on the atemporal micro-perspective (supply and demand equilibrium where 
all bargaining has already taken place in an undefined time-period) or on the atemporal long-term perspective 
(long-term growth where crises can be averaged out and assumed away as statistical aberrancies). Likewise, in 
the institutional analysis, one can focus on the essentially atemporal micro-perspective (institutions-as-equilibria, 
where bargaining has already taken place, and parameters are exogenous) or on the essentially atemporal long-
term perspective focusing on stability through notions of critical junctures and path dependence. The result of the 
first set of somewhat simplified views is that markets are inherently efficient, and the result of the second set is 
that institutions are inherently stable. Both would then explain any empirical inconsistency as a consequence of 
an external shock and remain blind to endogenous change. These tendencies are also often implicit in the game-
theoretical institutionalism hinging on New Institutional Economics and VofC as the developed genre in new 
institutionalism in political science. In game theory this is due to reliance on institutions-as-equilibria changing 
as a result of higher order rules/parameters suggest the elementary inability to process endogenous change – as it 
must come from beyond the game itself. The exception presented by Greif and Laitin (2004) was possible only 
through a successful redefining of core concepts. On the other hand, VofC is over-reliant on static ideal types 
and defines successful institutions as parts of an institutional complementary framework. This suggests mutual 
reinforcement of institutions and their probably static nature in absence of exogenous shocks. While evolutionary 
narratives have been present as an alternative, institutional theory always seems to revert to the static due to its 
methodological constraints. 
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well-being of citizens or growth and development of the economy. However, that does not 
suggest that there are mechanisms in place that can select an alternative. If these mechanisms 
can be identified, then the evolutionary perspective can be used to describe change. However, 
it can scarcely be used to predict change. The clue is in Steinmo’s research strategy which 
focuses on societies and defines them as complex adaptive systems. These are, by definition, 
unpredictable.   
The fourth way to think about change is to connect it with power. Power in a social/political 
sense is in social sciences often reduced to its sterilized and visible version of electoral 
politics. However, we must also recognize the power element at play in the typologies of 
national capitalism varieties. Colin Crouch sees capitalism typologies as implicitly following 
a logic of compromises between opposing political forces (Crouch, 2010: 133). What he is 
referring to is the power resource theory well represented by the works of Walter Korpi. 
Power resource theory sees institutions “largely as the residues of previous activations of 
power resources, often in the context of manifest conflicts which for the time being have been 
settled through various types of compromises” (Korpi, 1985: 38).  These institutions do not 
change when there is a pronounced asymmetry of power favoring their current form, but when 
this asymmetry weakens there can be another conflict between various groups with various 
powers eventually solidifying in another compromise, i.e. in institutional change (see Korpi, 
2001; 2006; Pierson, 2015: 127-128).  
This basic insight is not contrary to either rational choice analysis or Varieties of Capitalism, 
and Korpi has entered into a dialogue with both approaches (Korpi, 2001; 2006). 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to overlook power vested in groups whenever we focus on 
the top-down models of policy reform or on the simplistic models of social cooperation via 
game equilibria, or the inherent stability of institutions. Pierson explains this blindness to 
power as a result of the preferred “atomized and micro orientations of contemporary research” 
in social sciences which prevents the systematic research of influence (Pierson, 2015: 128). 
This presents us with a significant issue, as power resources certainly must be taken very 
seriously by any theory that wishes to understand the dynamics of institutional change. The 
power resources must therefore be studied in order to predict their fluctuation and the end 
result of their activation.  
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Finally, the fifth way of thinking of institutional change is the change by deliberate design via 
formal political channels. Here, we need a theory connecting electoral politics (for 
democracies) with institutional change. The last few years have brought a renewed interest in 
electoral politics in new institutionalism (including Hall, 2018; Iversen and Soskice, 2015; 
Rovny and Rovny, 2017; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2017). Within this context, an intriguing new 
approach has been suggested by Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi (2015) who 
link the political party systems and electoral constraints with the general logic of VofC41. 
They point out that parties increasingly move away from old ideological models and construct 
their policies in line with particular constituencies they represent. The authors limit 
themselves to four key class groups in the developed world: low-skilled wage earners, socio-
cultural professionals (employed in public or nonprofit organizations, typically with high 
education), business-finance professionals (typically with high education, high earnings and 
finance assets) and petty bourgeoisie (self-employed, owners of small enterprises, typically 
with low education and relatively high income) (ibid: 21-22). Firstly, the specific sets of 
institutions are a function of historical power resource distribution and the class structure is a 
function if institutions (ibid: 24). These institutions group into four different types of 
advanced capitalism: Equality-Oriented Capitalism (Nordic countries), Status-Oriented 
Capitalism (most of continental Europe), Capture-Oriented Capitalism (southern Europe) and 
Competitiveness Oriented Capitalism (the USA, UK).  
Secondly, various reform projects that could be undertaken in these arenas reflect the possible 
coalitions between the four classes and their interests. The authors organize these interests 
ideal-typically into two axes: the scope of government intervention (weak, strong) and the 
relative orientation to investment (education or healthcare) or consumption (redistribution, 
pensions) spending. A coalition of (low skill) labor and socio-cultural professionals agree on 
the need for strong state intervention and need to compromise on the prioritizing investments 
(favored by socio-cultural professionals) or consumption (i.e. redistribution) favored by 
organized labor. A coalition of low-skill labor and petty bourgeoisie will agree on the need for 
 
41 As we have seen, referring to VofC has become inevitable, as it represents the most successful venue of 
modern comparative research. However, Beramendi et al (2015) also build upon Kitschelt et al (1999), an edited 
volume which anticipated Hall and Soskice (2001) in some respects and included chapters by David Soskice and 
Peter Hall, both of which discussed what was to become the VofC agenda. The volume was more in tune with 
issues of change and even ended with a croquis of a model of institutional change which even included 
internationalization of finance and trade patterns. Had this volume been more successful, we might not have had 
to wait for a decade and a half to further the agenda on institutional change. As it were, this model remained 
merely an afterthought, while the dominant VofC agenda used complementarity and ideal-types to steer research 
in a static direction. 
67 
 
consumption oriented policies, but will need to find a compromise on the scope needed as 
petty bourgeoisie prefers a weak state arrangement. A coalition of petty bourgeoisie and 
business-finance professionals will agree on the preferred low scope of intervention (i.e. weak 
state), but will need to compromise on the funding priorities. Finally, a coalition of business-
finance and socio-cultural professionals will agree on the preference of investment policies 
but will need to compromise on their scope. That leaves two coalitions which the authors find 
impossible: the coalition of low skilled labor and business-finance professionals and the 
coalition of petty bourgeoisie and socio-cultural professionals. As postulated by authors in 
this ideal type model these two pairs of groups have interests which are too divergent to be 
able to find common ground in any given reform (ibid: 55-57). This model has some obvious 
failings based in its ideal-typical nature. However, it admirably copes with the limitations of 
the VofC framework in that it includes both politics (agency) and reform (institutional 
change) which are significant steps in the right direction. 
As we have seen, all these models leave something to be desired and a theory of endogenous 
institutional change with predictive capabilities is still to be developed. However, these five 
models can each explain a facet in a larger picture embedded in a higher-level unit of analysis. 
Evolutionary narratives and modes of change both explain how institutions change rather than 
why they change. This suggests that they may be useful as tools of analysis, but they do not 
offer any predictive capabilities. Path dependence (particularly through the notions of 
institutional complementarity) and deliberate institutional design via formal political channels 
are both clearly elements of institutional stability and change. Power relations are an 
important, but underdeveloped predictor of change which can benefit from a theory predicting 
the fluctuations of power. We have outlined such a theory in the systemic cycle in Chapter 1 
and will further develop it in Chapter 3 in order to make it compatible with a framework of 
institutional change. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the central issues of institutional change in new institutionalism. It 
has first shown the foundations of new institutionalism through rational choice, sociological 
and historical institutionalism and their respective issues with explaining institutional change 
– with rational choice institutionalism focusing on optimization problems, sociological 
institutionalism on the spread and resilience of norms and historical institutionalism on path 
dependence. These three approaches do deal with change, but it must mostly be understood as 
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exogenous. In other words, these approaches could mostly explain the effects of change, but 
not when and why the institutional change occurs. Then, this chapter dealt with the literature 
on comparative capitalisms, focusing on varieties of capitalism and the generations of 
research it engendered. The endogenous change issue persisted through the crucial logic of 
institutional complementarity within VofC. However, developments in recent years brought 
some novel solutions. The last section of this chapter identified five common or promising 
ways to conceive institutional change: evolutionary approaches, electoral approaches, power 
resource approaches, path dependence approaches and mode of change approaches. 
Even in most recent literature, many authors have attempted to approach the issue of 
institutional change in order to offer models of change – although successful descriptions of 
endogenous change remain scarce. Chapters 3 and 4 will interpret and use the models 
explained in this chapter to construct a new framework of institutional change utilizing 
Arrighian concepts in the hope of adding to these voices. This maneuver will enable the 
explicit inclusion of global processes in institutional change by broadening the unit of analysis 
beyond the restrictive national setting. The endogeneity of change will therefore be 
conceptualized in a much wider system than that presented by most games or institutional 
models. After all, the institutional changes we hope to explain are often also results of 
processes internal only to the world-system and not to national or local levels. 
To do so, we will utilize the channels of institutional change identified in this chapter. Path 
dependence and political/electoral outcomes will be used alongside an interpretation of power 
relations that utilizes the insights from Chapter 1. This will, after conceptual clarifications of 
the next chapter, be used in the new framework of institutional change in Chapter 4. Thelen’s 
modes of change and evolutionary analogies will be revisited in Chapter 8 in order to observe 
the patterns from chapters 5-7. 
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Chapter 3: Framework oriented interpretations of the systemic 
cycle and institutional theory 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to enable a framework which utilizes both institutional 
approaches and the systemic cycle theory. The first section will revisit the problematic issues 
in the systemic cycle theory, notably the lack of institutional and macroeconomic insights. It 
will also attempt to overcome the supply-side focus of this theory by offering a 
Keynesian/demand-side reinterpretation of Arrighian concepts of extensive and intensive 
capitalism strategies. The second section will survey the open issues of institutional analysis, 
notably the problem of endogenous institutional change. It will also offer a conceptual 
synthesis intended to overcome this issue by defining institutions and institutional change in a 
manner consistent with a global-level theory of endogenous institutional change. The third 
section will argue there are asymmetrical similarities in these faults. In other words, the two 
research agendas could substantially benefit from searching for their mutually complementing 
elements.  
The interpretations offered in his chapter are an attempt to bridge the gap between these two 
theoretical approaches and enable the explicit framework using these theories in Chapter 4. In 
particular, Chapter 1 has identified the power resources effects of two elements of the 
systemic cycle: trade relations and the phase of the systemic cycle. It has also argued that the 
third element – extensive and intensive developmental strategies should be better developed 
in order to build the links with power relations and offer institutional change predictions. 
Chapter 2 identified two adequate channels of institutional change: path dependence and 
deliberate institutional design. It has also argued that the third channel of power resources 
should be better developed for their fluctuations to become predictable, and in turn to be used 
to explain endogenous changes in institutions. This chapter will present two crucial elements: 
the demand-side interpretation of intensive and extensive developmental strategies, and the 
conceptual interpretations of institutions and institutional change.  If successful, this chapter 
will develop crucial links between the two theories and enable a metatheoretical language that 
the framework of the next chapter can utilize in order to push the institutional change agenda 
onto the transnational level. 
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3.1. Demand- and supply-side interpretations of the systemic cycle 
theory 
Chapter 1 explored the systemic cycle and its effects on power distribution in the context of 
world-systemic dynamics. The point of departure for world-systems analysis was the world-
system as the appropriate unit of analysis of social systems. Among other abstractions, this 
also necessitated the removal of the state from analysis (Wallerstein, 1974: 3-11; Wallerstein, 
2000: xviii). The inherent disadvantage of world-systems analysis is directly connected to this 
simplification: the scheme of center/semi-periphery/periphery does not in principle allow for a 
plethora of functional institutional arrangements. It is also possible that some world-system 
theoreticians did not see this as a significant disadvantage due to their Marxist theoretical 
origins and accompanying difficulties in theorizing the state. This does not suggest that 
Marxist theory is an obstacle for such research, as the Regulation Theory clearly shows (e.g. 
Jessop, 1990; Boyer, 2005; Aglietta, 1979/2015), but it does present a critical issue for any 
Marxian based analysis including that of Giovanni Arrighi. 
Building on Wallerstein and Braudel, Arrighi made some progress in explaining 
“organizational structures”, but he did so constrained by his theoretical foundations. Arrighi 
describes regimes prevalent in the core, but he does not explain the institutional heterogeneity 
of the core (Arrighi, 1994/2010; Arrighi and Moore, 2001). In other words, while presenting a 
functional theory of change, Arrighi does not create a corresponding theory of institutions 
(Robinson, 2011). He did, however, provide some important and valid conceptual 
innovations. Particularly striking is the notion of alternating extensive and intensive strategies 
employed by the competing governmental and business agencies (countries competing for the 
central position) in financial expansions. This insight could be used to provide elements of a 
theory of institutional change, provided it could be interpreted in the context of institutions. 
However, in order to understand these strategies not merely as preferences of capital, but also 
as developmental processes which involve various groups with various interests and political 
power, we must turn to a reconstruction of a national-level process of capitalism. In other 
words, we must turn to macroeconomics. As argued in Chapter 1, Arrighi focuses on supply-
side phenomena, due to his theoretical background. This somewhat counterintuitively makes 
his historical structuralist and global approach resemble neoclassical microeconomic or 
micro-founded approaches, which also overly focus on the supply-side. This is fundamentally 
dangerous as a research strategy, as it creates difficulties in conceptualizing crises, growth 
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models or the effects of labor markets. In order to remedy this and make the systemic cycle 
theory adaptable to the research of institutions on the national level, we must first interpret the 
crucial categories through the lens of demand and macroeconomics. To do so, we will first 
turn to an overview of Keynesian ideas on the importance of demand-side thinking. Then, we 
will offer a demand-side interpretation of intensive and extensive developmental strategies. 
In terms of research strategy, Keynes did not agree with the atemporal equilibrium/long-
termism of the neoclassical school (which we can argue is implicitly present in Marx as well). 
As he colorfully argued in connection with the quantity theory of money: “long run is a 
misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves 
too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm 
is long past the ocean will be flat again” (Keynes, 1924: 80). In focusing on the short run, 
Keynes could zoom into actual causes and effects, rather than averaging data out into 
optimistic determinism of self-sustaining free markets. 
Keynes summarized the inability to fathom crises in mainstream thought preceding him42 
through the idea that “supply creates its own demand” which he called “Say’s law” (Keynes, 
1936/2013: 18). As no level of production can be too much for the market to clear, any and all 
unemployment must be voluntary. Labor is after all, but another marketable commodity, and 
the equilibrium it forms means that the real wage must be equal to the disutility of labor that 
the worker incurs (ibid: 21-22). What Keynes developed in to replace such an inadequate 
understanding was a logic of the interaction of maximum GDP (i.e. potential output or 
potential supply) and effective aggregate demand (i.e. actual current GDP). It was the 
responsibility of government to spend away in order to raise the aggregate demand in a 
depression, provided loose monetary policy failed to resuscitate the investment demand 
(known as a liquidity trap)43.  
 
42Unlike the more usual distinction between classical and neoclassical thought used here, Keynes invariably 
referred to the mainstream thought which preceded him as classical (Keynes, 2013/1936: passim). 
43 There are two argumentations upon which Say’s law could be easily critiqued. The first is time based: one 
man’s spending is another’s earnings, but for supply to create its demand the earnings must perpetually be spent 
instantaneously, thus instantly becoming the first man’s earnings. In practice, a portion of new income is always 
saved (Keynes called the ratios of spent and saved new income the Marginal Propensity to Consume and the 
Marginal Propensity to Save), which means that this transfer is not instantaneous. Under numerous assumptions, 
savings would become investments, contributing to aggregate demand and boosting GDP, but in crises they do 
not get utilized, as investment would entail too much risk. Thus, new income will be fully spent only with the 
passing of time, which was ignored before Keynes. I owe this point to the late professor Dag Strpić. The second 
is a matter of unit of analysis. Even new consumed income is often expended onto imported goods and services, 
thus failing to boost domestic GDP (which may be a problem in countries suffering from dramatic trade deficits). 
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Keynes suggested large deficit spending was a necessary solution to recessions44. Even 
though Keynes added numerous new elements (including the psychologically tinted animal 
spirits, the focus on the short run and aggregates, crisis resolution policies etc.), his analysis 
was based in the categories of contemporary economics including equilibrium analysis. His 
name is synonymous with mainstream policy prescriptions in the post-war trente glorieuses 
(1945-75), and cotemporaneous ever-increasing role of state. Big Government, Great Society 
and the continental European social state can all be viewed as essentially Keynesian, 
essentially demand side (i.e. spending) based. This was an era of the neoclassical synthesis in 
which neoclassical microeconomics adopted elements of Keynesian macroeconomics and 
began stressing market failure and the desirability of aggregate demand management. As 
mentioned before, the 1970s saw a return back to the traditional neoclassical staples of long 
run and supply side-oriented research through the Chicago counter-revolution also critically 
known as neoliberal economics. The concept of macroeconomics was also transformed 
through the prevalence of general equilibrium analysis (DSGE – Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium) which has greatly supplanted the Keynesian logic of aggregates through 
microfoundations which are a calculation of an economy wide result through the modeling of 
individual agents. In practice, DSGE models tend to reflect the neoclassical tendencies to the 
static and efficient equilibrium, and have the same old problems in predicting crises (Orrel 
and Chlupaty, 2016: 153; 165). This presents significant challenges to the economic 
profession as these DSGE models have permeated not only the neoclassical mainstream, but 
also the post-Keynesian and New Keynesian circles (see Krugman, 2012). Nevertheless, 
while neoclassical long-termism, micro-founded research and assumptions of acter rationality 
and market efficiency seem to have dominated over the Keynesian challenge to the 
mainstream, classical Keynesian thought provides Arrighi with an explanation he lacks in the 
 
Viewed in a simple, closed model, the trade issue is abstracted from, but it often presents a significant challenge 
in practice (except perhaps in a complete autarchy). Likewise, if we were to observe the aggregate demand in the 
whole world at the same time, trade imbalance could not be a problem as one country’s trade deficit is another 
country’s trade surplus. If the first issue was timelessness (or atemporality), the second issue is spacelessness – 
as soon as we acknowledge the existence of time and significant trade with other countries, Say’s law cannot be 
true. 
44 “a decline in income due to a decline in the level of employment, if it goes far, may even cause consumption to 
exceed income not only by some individuals and institutions using up the financial reserves which they have 
accumulated in better times, but also by the government, which will be liable, willingly or unwillingly, to run 
into a budgetary deficit or will provide unemployment relief; for example, out of borrowed money. Thus, when 
employment falls to a low level, aggregate consumption will decline by a smaller amount than that by which real 
income has declined, by reason both of the habitual behavior of individuals and also of the probable policy of 
governments; which is the explanation why a new position of equilibrium can usually be reached within a 
modest range of fluctuation. Otherwise a fall in employment and income, once started, might proceed to extreme 
lengths” (Keynes, 1936/2013: 98). 
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far greater ability to utilize aggregate demand in modeling crises and intensive and extensive 
national strategies of global economic domination. 
We can now recognize the intensive capitalism strategy as the strengthening of the middle 
class through Keynesian policies aimed at greater regulation, income redistribution and wage 
led growth. These were in vogue in the USA and Western Europe from the end of WWII and 
the 1970s. In this, they coincide with Arrighi’s material expansion phase of the US capital 
accumulation regime. A Keynesian spin on the two strategies explained by Arrighi gives us an 
interpretation which overcomes his simplification of the business cycle. Table 3.1. offers a 
scheme of such a Keynesian demand-side spin of extensive and intensive capitalism. 
Table 3.1. Arrighian categories with a demand-side interpretation 
 Extensive capitalism Intensive capitalism 
Primary orientation Supply side (production 
wages must be low as they 
are primarily considered as 
input costs) 
Demand side (production 
wages must be sufficiently 
high as they are considered as 
demand inducing) 
Alternative interpretations Neoliberalism, Washington 
consensus, finance-led 
capitalism, race to the 
bottom, globalization, the 
third way, Liberal Market 
Economy, export-led growth, 
monetarist policy regime 
Keynesian welfare state, 
industrial society, import-
substitution, traditional 
Coordinated market 
economy, development state 
Expected outcomes High income inequality, 
disorganized labor, labor 
market deregulation 
Lower income inequality, 
more ability of labor to 
organize and higher levels of 
labor market regulation 
 
Extensive capitalism could in the modern context be taken to mean a supply-side orientation, 
which logically deals with a given (i.e. external, or export) demand structure and limits itself 
to the management of production costs (as it cannot influence quantities demanded). With 
cost reduction in mind, labor is viewed merely as one of those costs. A primary competitive 
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strategy would be concerned with a reduction of costs including labor. In contrast, the 
orientation of intensive capitalism is to the demand-side, where labor costs eventually 
translate into disposable income of the workers and therefore effective domestic demand. 
Therefore, high labor costs mean higher product prices, but also a strong domestic demand, 
while lower labor costs suggest lower product prices, but also a weaker domestic demand. 
Logically, the extensive capitalism strategy is export oriented (with competitive prices but 
insufficient domestic demand) and the intensive capitalism is domestic market oriented (with 
less than competitive prices, but a strong domestic demand). A successful intensive capitalism 
may therefore also be somewhat protectionist, as high product prices in an open economy 
would translate into a large trade deficit45. In ideal-typical terms we could construe intensive 
capitalism as a development strategy hinging on high levels of trade protectionism and labor 
market protection essentially pointing to import substitution. The extensive capitalism 
strategy would then be understood as an export-oriented strategy of both trade and labor 
market liberalization. 
We can now integrate these insights with the world-systemic outlook. We need to interpret the 
ideal-type systemic cycle as encompassing the world-systemic unit of analysis (in focusing 
specifically on cores and centers – Wallerstein via Silver), the capital-led processes of 
material and financial expansions as the basis of the systemic cycle (Arrighi), the power 
dynamics under the influence of the systemic cycle (Arrighi and Silver) and the 
macroeconomically interpreted developmental strategies (Arrighi via Keynes). 
The systemic cycle influences the various sub-units of the world-system in a variegated way - 
an insight, which is one of the predominant strengths of this approach. Starting with the three 
phases of the systemic cycle (Financial I, Material, Financial II) we can track the cycle 
through sub-units. Chart 3.1 shows the dynamics between new and old centers schematically. 
During the Financial I phase, movement away from production and trade in the old center 
brings investments looking for profitable opportunities to possible future global centers of 
production; several such possible new centers compete and political/organizational 
innovations abound attempting to formulate the winning growth model; trade position of 
possible future centers is improved, with a falling unemployment as a result, and the 
marketplace structural power of labor in the aspirant center increasing. These experimental 
 
45 This connection between trade openness and labor protection has also been proven empirically (see Rueda, 
Wibbels and Altamirano, 2015). 
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political/economic innovations may be very complex, but their growth model aspect can be 
reduced to two developmental strategies: intensive (own market) and extensive (global market 
oriented) – in the highly complex modern stage of world capitalism they can therefore be a 
result of either social compromises directed at strengthening of the middle class (intensive) or 
at reducing production costs in order to produce competitive exports (extensive). As a 
terminal crisis weakens the old center, these new strategies become more important on the 
world stage. This is a period of systemic chaos in which the economic and political hegemony 
of the old center has weakened and the world-system grows increasingly multi-polar.  
During the Material phase, the divergent effects of the two development strategies intensify, 
with the intensive strategy increasing the marketplace structural labor power, incentivizing 
relatively well protected labor markets and rising living standards (real wages). On the other 
hand, the extensive strategy banks on the relatively low real protection of labor markets and 
moves towards greater income inequality. Either successful strategy will result in an 
expansion of production (sustained output and GDP growth) and rising development 
indicators (GDP/capita). One strategy will prevail by profiting most and becoming the global 
center politically and economically dominating the club of the developed countries (core). 
Such a domination will ideal-typically produce a hegemony, in which the economic, political 
and military capacity come together to advance the interests of the new center, and 
international organizations are aligned to support the general hegemonic arrangement. This 
moment of hegemonic realignment can be extremely prolonged in the modern world, and its 
results are not immediately observable. We will eventually analyze the limits of hegemonic 
transitions as darwinistic moments rewarding the successful strategy (Chapter 8). The 
Material phase is drawn to an end as the investment cycle will eventually result in a profit 
crunch in manufacture and trade and a signal crisis. 
The Financial II phase commences with the signal crisis questioning the efficiency of the 
existing regime of capital accumulation based on the real economy, and capital, hitherto 
employed in production, finds higher yields in the financial sector and in the real sector 
abroad. The result is a relative deindustrialization of the old center with the structural labor 
power decreasing. The trade position of the center is exacerbated, and the result is a jobless 
recovery (stagnating unemployment) from the signal crisis, with structural labor power further 
decreasing. The financial sector becomes dominant in the economy and monopolistic 
tendencies become increasingly apparent. Income inequality increases in an increasingly 
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deregulated economy. Ultimately, another terminal crisis creates a sufficient downturn in the 
center to incentivize the development of political/economic innovations in new aspirant 
centers as they vie for hegemonic dominance in a new period of systemic chaos. 
Chart 3.1 The ideal-typical systemic cycle
 
We can observe the interplay of power, the investment finance cycle, and the two mentioned 
strategies during material expansions. This distinction seems to point to the crucial strategic 
moment of choosing alternative paths to developing own internal markets through new social 
compacts (even though a resulting higher leverage in the hands of the labor may contribute to 
the profit crunch following the material expansion) or developing production runs for external 
markets (an export led strategy). They describe vastly different growth models, with the 
intensive strategy hinging on domestic demand and extensive strategy depending on foreign 
demand. These strategies are a result of the changing dynamics of power in the national 
context, most importantly the power of interests contrary to the dynamics of 
lower structural  
labor power due to  
financial expansion 
  
global competition 
produces 
In
v
es
tm
en
ts
 m
o
v
e 
in
to
 
fi
n
an
ce
 
terminal crisis 
signal crisis 
terminal crisis 
Old center 
Intensive center aspirant Extensive center aspirant 
Financial I 
Material 
Financial II 
New 
center 
77 
 
capital/entrepreneurship driving the systemic cycle. The power of these contrary interests, 
largely represented by the marketplace structural power of labor, is itself influenced by the 
systemic cycle. Structural labor power in the marketplace is reduced whenever the importance 
of manufacturing labor in the economy is reduced. These are circumstances in which the 
hypothetical influence of strikes as the final measure of union power is diminishing for a 
number of possible reasons: the diminishing relative importance of manufacture (e.g. due to a 
financial expansion), trade deficits or growing unemployment. Therefore, we can discern the 
basic elements of interactions between power and developmental strategies which underscore 
the elementary economic processes. An extensive strategy focuses on improving aggregate 
supply – as demand is in great part foreign, while an intensive strategy focuses on issues of 
aggregate demand – which has repercussions on the connectedness with the interests of labor. 
This leads us to a contentious issue: while material expansions can occur in both types of 
strategies (suggesting high structural labor power), only one of these strategies (i.e. intensive) 
is fully labor-friendly. To understand what factors outside the systemic cycle lead to a choice 
of developmental strategy, we will turn to institutional analysis. 
3.2. Addressing the issue of endogenous change in institutional 
analysis 
Chapter 2 has analyzed the general tendencies in institutional approaches and identified 
endogenous institutional change as the crucial open issue. It argued that the insufficiently 
explored status of endogenous institutional change is a result of the conceptual basis of 
research. It also identified several approaches which offered conceptual answers to the issue 
of institutional change. 
In terms of definitions a common type of understanding of institutions is the institutions-as-
rules approach most influentially expounded by Douglass North. A welcome implication here 
is the need to seek any type of rule which structures activity. An alternative is the institutions-
as-equilibria approach which sees institutions as repeating strategies in response to exogenous 
parameters. This approach has significant issues with explaining institutional change as the 
rules of the game are understood as exogenous to strategies which can only be modified as a 
result of exogenous change (itself strategies subject to some higher order parameters). In 
order to endogenize these changes, it was necessary to start thinking in terms of quasi-
parameters which are simultaneously rules and changeable within the game (Greif and Laitin, 
2004). In general, new institutionalism has shared these difficulties with conceptualizing 
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endogenous change and has stressed mechanisms like path dependency which also logically 
stress endogenous stability or stable development with discontinuities brought about only by 
exogenous critical junctures.  
These approaches have a number of interesting qualities: the game-theoretical approach of 
institutions-as-equilibria focuses on the incentives and disincentives (i.e. structure) formulated 
by both external parameters and expectations of the activity of other players. In other words, it 
tells us something about the importance of rule embeddedness (higher order parameters) and 
also of the importance of trust and defection as elements of game strategies. New 
institutionalism approaches, which focus on path dependency and critical junctures remind us 
of the inherent stability of institutions and the many conditions under which institutions either 
remain unchanged or change slowly and predictably. A large change under these conditions is 
conceivable only as exogenous. However, both in the case of game-theoretical approaches 
and general tendencies in new institutionalism, it seems that any theory of change which 
hinges on external (and therefore unexplained) drivers may have only a limited appeal. 
The most important version of new institutionalism in political science is the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which has developed a useful and empirically 
substantiated typological framework. However, while it has presented a theory of institutional 
differences, it struggled from the very beginning to provide a temporal dimension. There were 
several attempts to remedy this notable shortfall. Beramendi et al (2015) continues the older 
Kitschelt et al (1999) project to provide an electoral politics dimension, while Kathleen 
Thelen has devoted a number of works to the analysis of specific modes and actors in 
institutional change (Thelen, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 
2014), notably following and arguing against the faults of both the VofC project and the 
power resource theory. None of these has, however, outlined an endogenous change approach 
which could predict and explain the nature of institutional change. The previous chapter has 
suggested that the difficulties in approaches building on game theory (NIE, rational choice 
institutionalism) may be a result of its very conceptualization of game-parameters creating 
structured responses amounting to institutions-as-equilibria. These institutions can only be 
changed according to rules specified in higher order institutions and those rules can only be 
changed in higher orders still, which essentially gives us an explanation of change devoid of 
endogeneity. In fact, the success of Greif and Laitin (2004) in offering a game-theoretical 
endogenous change explanation was possible only through the subversion of rules other 
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authors often take for granted. Likewise, the difficulties in VofC can be attributed not only to 
the ideal-type method which inherently focuses on stability, but also to the central concept of 
complementarity according to which the gains from a proper institutional alignment can be 
preserved only through the stability of individual institutions.  
Institutional approaches in general have long been aware of the underdeveloped analysis of 
issues of change (as seen in Chapter 2) and have found various explanations of how change 
happens (mostly dependent on evolutionary narratives). Nevertheless, the issue of endogenous 
change (i.e. the explanation of why change happens) remains underexplained. A specific 
traditionally missing component was the explanation of international mechanisms such as the 
effects of trade positions on institutions. As explained above, a 2016 article by Baccaro and 
Pontusson which included growth models in VofC prompted formal responses from one of the 
originators of VofC and one of its most important critics. In order to attempt to help solve the 
open question of endogenous change, a good theory of change would need to take into 
account all the significant drivers of institutional change and, when possible, to endogenize 
them. To endogenize these drivers is to explain them with the same framework used to 
explain changes in institutions. In other words, we must strive to expand the number of 
explained drivers of change. Chapter 4 will attempt to include the predictable effects of trade 
relations into the list of endogenized and explained drivers of institutional change. However, 
we must first offer conceptual clarifications which will enable such an endogenous theory of 
change. 
3.2.1. Conceptualizing institutions between power resources and externalities  
As shown in Chapter 2, North defines actually active institutions as dependent upon three 
important aspects: formal institutions (codified laws and statutes), informal institutions 
(uncodified “ways of doing business” and norms) and partially avoidable institutions (actors’ 
ability to avoid them – this is particularly important in gauging the actual impact of formal 
policy). This approach is useful as it enables us to focus on manifest institutions (i.e. those 
that actually function as rules and structure activity) rather than ideas, policy prescriptions or 
unimplemented laws. In terms of labor institutions this distinction covers laws regulating 
labor contracts and organization via unions and collective bargaining (i.e. formal institutions – 
these can be studied by comparing written documents), uncodified practices in collective 
bargaining and trade union organization (i.e. informal institutions – these can be studied 
inferentially by observing power relations embodied in union density and bargaining 
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centralization) and loosely implemented labor regulations observable in wage theft and poor 
working conditions (avoidable institutions – these can be studied by analyzing existing 
research). 
Another important aspect of institutions is their connection with power. Firstly, institutions 
tend to favor or target specific actors which incentivizes the favored actors to strive for 
institutional stability and preservation. If the resources accrued by the functioning of these 
institutions are sufficient, this fact itself may be enough to exert substantial pressures towards 
path dependence (as explained by Pierson). Secondly, institutions themselves can be thought 
of as results of compromise between various actors according to the power they had to 
influence the process of institutional emergence (as explained by Korpi). Once the relative 
power available to these actors changes, the change in institutions becomes possible. If a 
research strategy focused only on institutions, it may be tempting to focus on power as 
something which stems only from institutions – and therefore to proclaim institutional 
stability in absence of exogenous shocks. Realistically, however, power resources are a result 
of a myriad of factors, both national and global in nature. This suggests that a power-based 
concept of institutional change must take the nationally and globally induced complex 
changes of power into account. The most visible and the most formal manifestations of 
political power are those pertaining to the election (or selection) and actions of those who 
govern. In democracies, the focus would naturally fall to electoral politics, the ways in which 
the expectations of the electoral body change, and the reactions of the parties which attempt to 
mold their electoral programs to best capture the votes. Chapter 2 has shown a modern 
institutional version of such a focus in the Beramendi project. However, the past few decades 
have seen political science focus on the less formal and less visible channels of policy making 
in the various approaches to structured policy interactions starting from corporatism and more 
recently expanding to epistemic communities, policy communities and policy networks. The 
predictors of the power of the interested groups in the first type of research (more visible and 
formal) are the changes in voter preference and the composition of the electorate (which 
would favor a certain type of party), while the predictors in the second type of research (less 
visible and formal) are the ability of the interested groups to organize and the strength of their 
bargaining position. Both types of research are relevant in conceptualizing power in 
institutional change and should be taken into account wherever possible. 
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Finally, institutions interact with other institutions – and the conceptualization of these 
interactions has had two effects: firstly, the development of an influential genre of 
institutionalism as a form of typological thought (seeking to explain and classify different 
institutional frameworks) and substantial theoretical problems for approaches to endogenous 
institutional change. As already shown, game-theory has severe problems in explaining 
endogenous change stemming from the conceptual barrier between parameters and strategies, 
with the former structuring the latter (while the endogenous change would require that this 
relationship could move in the other direction). Nevertheless, the nested rules approach offers 
an important insight in that the institutions are dependent on higher order institutions for 
change (Ostrom, Williamson). Much like the parameter-strategy relationship, this view of 
change only takes one possible direction. The notable difference between two versions is that 
while Ostrom created a legal-hierarchical version of nested rules, Williamson argued 
primarily for a hierarchy according to time needed for change. The primary difficulty in 
describing endogenous change is the ever-expanding nature of the unit of analysis – the rules 
are changed according to rules of change inscribed in higher order institutions - and it is very 
difficult to see how the actors which are only active at lower levels could enact change at 
higher levels (as imagined by game theory). But crucially, we are reminded that there are 
many arenas in which these actors can function and enact change, and in actuality the same 
actors may be activated across a number of possible levels (e.g. by a union being consulted 
during a labor law reform).  
In contrast with these rational choice and NIE issues of endogenous change, VofC provides a 
logic not of hierarchical nested rules/institutions, but rather of a circular complementarity of 
rules/institutions. Those systems/institutional frameworks which are properly aligned (LME, 
CME) have substantial advantages in terms of growth. The primary issue is that endogenous 
change is difficult to project, as partial change is costly in the long term due to the lost 
advantages of the initial structure and a comprehensive change is a rare and even more costly 
in the short term. The principal advantage of this approach is the specific logic of 
complementarity according to institutional externalities – according to which many 
institutions have unintended impact upon others by providing them with a state of affairs 
which can be usefully exploited by a specific alignment of an institutional arrangement.  In 
other words, when properly aligned, institutions provide functional incentives for other 
institutions to remain unchanged. 
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We would like to conceptually further this approach by two suggestions. Firstly, it is not 
merely the institutions that can provide externalities affecting institutional change/stability. 
The state of affairs affecting the advantages of a specific institution may come from a number 
of political and economic factors including technological shifts, global processes and growth 
models – and not only from other rules. Secondly, if we accept that externalities come from 
economic processes, then the incentives may actively change through time. In other words, 
the complementarities and externalities become incentives for institutional change rather than 
merely incentives for institutional stability. The implicit danger in these suggestions is 
slipping into functionalism by claiming that institutions change merely because they have a 
possible better form. Any change is mediated by power relations, specific interests and the 
mobilization of political power or lack thereof.  
Therefore, we can define institutions as active formal and informal rules which structure 
social activity. Their functioning is influenced by other rules and other economic, 
technological and political factors – and their creation and maintenance is underwritten by the 
power of interested actors, with changes of this power (itself a result of overlapping global 
and national processes) enabling the change in institutions. All of these factors and processes 
can therefore be understood as mutually nested, or potentially complementary. Shifts in any of 
these may provide the needed drive for institutional change, which is why all of these can be 
referred to as drivers of institutional change. A non-deterministic hierarchy may be discerned 
between these change drivers according to the time interval needed for change in a specific 
process– and these timeframes will provide us with a logic of embeddedness of institutional 
drivers. 
3.2.2. Similarities and synergies of the systemic cycle and institutional analysis 
The previous two segments have outlined the crucial issues of systemic cycle theory and 
institutional analysis. The first segment answered the demand-side underdevelopment of the 
systemic cycle, but delayed the issue of the lacking institutional theory. The second segment 
conceptually addressed the issue of a lacking endogenous change in institutional analysis, but 
delayed the application of these concepts. This suggests that the two theories have now been 
brought to an intersection at which they may benefit from each other. Institutional theories 
can help the systemic cycle achieve insights into the national functioning of capitalism via its 
institutions. More importantly from the standing point of this thesis, the systemic cycle as a 
theory of global change may help institutional analysis endogenize drivers of institutional 
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change which cannot be found on the mere national level. To do so, we must first outline the 
compatible and contradictory elements of these theories. 
The crucial point of difference between comparative institutional thought (and therefore 
VofC) and world-systemic literature (and therefore Arrighi) is the research strategy pertaining 
to capitalism – and particularly the unit of analysis at which capitalism is to be researched. 
For the Varieties of Capitalism, capitalism is about the functioning of national markets. The 
obvious assumption is that regulation is formed on the national level, and the appropriate unit 
of analysis is therefore the state. In the systemic cycle, the unit of analysis is the world-
system, and the various states are interconnected through the logic of core/semi-
periphery/periphery. The crucial point was made by Beverly Silver who rejected the 
determinism of a simplistic reading of the world-system. She explicitly asserts the bottom-up 
processes which determine the position of the specific state in the world-system. National 
movements continuously construct and reconstruct, hinder or replicate the relations within the 
world-system. Developmental strategies, as we have defined them in this chapter are 
processes which influence the composition of the world-system by allowing peripheral or 
semi-peripheral economies to climb into the core and even become the new center of the 
world-system. These strategies are also embedded in the power relations which occur on the 
national level, but often have global causes. 
This interpretation enables us to view the global system of trade as the relevant playing field 
and to comprehend the global mechanisms which have vastly diverse effects on different 
states – i.e. mechanisms such as the systemic cycle. And vice versa, it enables us to view the 
strategies of specific states as influences on the composition of the world-systems. In both 
cases, nation states are sub-units of the world-systemic unit of analysis of capitalism – global 
interactions are therefore far more than just the sum of all exports and imports. This is not 
merely a conceptual difference and if approached carefully could offer a possible solution to 
the central issue of endogenous change. Namely, if we accept that global phenomena provide 
significant incentives for national institutional change then we must accept either the need for 
exogenous change or the need for a unit of analysis broader than the nation-state. Here, the 
endogeneity or exogeneity are essentially functions of the appropriateness of the unit of 
analysis, which must be large enough to encompass the relevant mechanisms of change if it is 
to strive for endogenous change.  
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E.g. if we were observing the social life of a child instead of institutional change in 
capitalism, we would have to adjust the unit of analysis to the nature of child's behavior. If we 
were analyzing a one year old, the nuclear family may provide us with the necessary unit of 
analysis as the small child's interactions remain restricted to the family. If we were observing 
a 10-year-old, we would face an important choice. We could either preserve the old and 
restrictive unit of analysis and be unable to explain the child's social life without resorting to 
elusive exogenous factors. Or we could broaden the unit of analysis to encompass the relevant 
organizations (school, sports clubs, social networks…), which would keep all relevant 
mechanisms endogenous. Institutional thought has a tendency to choose the first strategy by 
insisting on the national level of analysis and comparing only internal tenets of institutions. 
This thesis suggests that the second strategy is a viable alternative and consists of recognizing 
that the relevant unit of analysis has long outgrown the size of a nation-state. 
In other words, we need a framework which takes the state and its regulatory apparatus 
seriously, but at the same time acknowledges their immersion into the global system of 
trade46. Only then can trade positions be thought of as more than a matter for individual 
countries to resolve for themselves47. More importantly, the choice of the appropriate unit of 
analysis allows us to move to an endogenous theory of institutional change. 
This expansion has not already occurred as it requires a theory ambitious enough to 
simultaneously explain global distributions of growth, trade, income, production and possibly 
even power. The two obvious candidates are new economic geography and Arrighi’s systemic 
cycle, and as explained in Chapter 1, Arrighi’s theory has several advantages going for it 
including a long-term historical perspective. Here, we can use it to recognize that the CME 
and LME institutional positions are ideal typical descriptions of national markets in the 1980s 
and 1990s (as recognized by Streeck, 2016) and that these descriptions lose their 
 
46 An application of dependency/world-systemic theory to a comparative analysis of capitalism varieties has been 
undertaken before. Senghaas and Menzel applied the world-system analysis of Samir Amin to several projects 
involved with mapping the global versions of capitalism starting as soon as the 1970-ies (Mjøset, 2009). Also, 
there were several attempts which aimed at the integration of Arrighi inspired financialization perspective and 
VofC literature. E.g. Jessop (2012) dubbed his combination variegated capitalisms, while Van Treeck (2009) 
attempts to include the macroeconomic perspective into the financialization and VofC fields which he sees as 
basically microeconomic. Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) relatively recently published an attempt at quantifying 
some data on financialization across the capitalisms, and Nölke and May (2013) open some broad questions 
including the possibility of including Arrighi in the study of institutions. 
47 E.g. one could be puzzled that vast national reforms related to greater competitiveness (supply side measures 
like cost-cutting through reducing labor cost) does not improve the trade position of a given country. “Zooming 
out” to a broader geographic area may reveal that the most important trade partners have been conducting similar 
reforms which means that the specific national competitiveness remained unchanged.  
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attractiveness in the empirical sense as soon as we recognize the capacity of institutions for 
change. However, VofC has provided a vastly useful template for institutional analysis and it 
would be dangerous to throw the baby out with the bath water. The concepts of institutional 
complementarity which underline it can be used alongside path dependency and institutional 
embeddedness to explain change instead of stability, provided we can make sense of it 
through an appropriate theory of global economic change. 
Arrighi has provided such a theory, predicting trade relations and the shifts from global 
material to global financial expansions. This suggests that a successful inclusion of Arrighi’s 
theory (with the mediations via Silver and Keynes) into institutional thought could provide a 
useful tool which would expand the theory of institutional change into a significant and 
currently unincluded area. A significant important similarity of Arrighi and the Varieties of 
Capitalism strand of institutional thought is the firm-centric nature of their explanation. 
Varieties of Capitalism identified the five institutional arrangements by explicitly positioning 
the firm at “the center of analysis” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 5) and elucidating the restraints 
and incentives it faces and coordination mechanisms it uses. Arrighi speaks of business and 
governmental agencies and capital, often seemingly presuming the monolith nature of these. 
However, when one wishes to research the mechanisms he identified (e.g. the flight of capital 
into finance in the US), one must necessarily take a look at firm level data as pointed out by 
Krippner (2005) and accepted by Arrighi (2007: 140-141). The business decisions entailed in 
the flight of capital are made on the level of firms/corporations (at least in the USA), and the 
data through which such a flight may be measured is reported at firm level (tax reports).  
Ultimately, there is a somewhat natural compatibility between Arrighi’s theory which does 
not really extend to institutions but explains predictable economic and developmental change 
and institutional approaches like the Varieties of Capitalism which explain institutional 
typologies but struggle with endogenous change. Their issues can be transcended by 
constructing a framework which utilizes a world-systemic unit of analysis and systemic cycle 
theory together with an institutional categorical apparatus. 
3.2.3. Delimiting the two groups of theories via drivers 
As discussed in the introduction, the basic methodology follows Ostrom in constructing a 
framework from different theories, which themselves support various models. We construct a 
framework of labor-institutional change by utilizing systemic cycle theory and institutional 
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analysis (itself a spawning ground for numerous theories), which support various drivers of 
institutional change (or models in Ostrom’s parlance). The systemic cycle theory provides us 
with three drivers: systemic cycle phases (material or financial expansions), within which the 
developmental strategies (extensive or intensive) can develop and then manifest as trade 
relations. The institutional theories provide us with further three drivers of path dependence, 
power relations and formal politics. Power relations are the element in which these two 
strands most clearly overlap as institutional analysis can make strong predictions concerning 
institutional effects of labor power, while systemic cycle theory makes strong predictions 
concerning its causes. However, there is also a seventh driver we will take into consideration 
– that of technological shifts. It is implied by both theoretical strands, but hardly presents a 
central point of either, which is the reason for its avoidance in the previous two chapters. This 
driver takes a long timeframe to develop but may have enormous bearing on the structural and 
associational power of labor. This makes it a crucial contextual element, which must 
nonetheless remain exogenous. Its effects have hitherto been avoided but merit a theoretical 
discussion before we proceed with the framework in the next chapter. 
Technological change has at least two aspects of use to our scheme: the cumulative and the 
developmental aspect. The cumulative is a matter of best available technology, or the global 
sum of useful innovations. This changes through the long run as various innovations propel 
growth and social development. The developmental aspect of technology is a matter of capital 
deepening, or the availability of useful technology in a specific location. As far as the 
cumulative aspect goes, innovations shape the models of growth and the modes of production 
and trade. The steam-engine and the telegraph shaped the late 19th and early 20th century as 
much as the computer, robotics and satellite communications have shaped the late 20th and 
early 21st century. Consequently, they provide the impetus for institutional change as well. On 
the lowest level of technological and (therefore) social development all individual members 
must take part in the production of food. As the availability of farming equipment and 
organization increases, societies may urbanize. With the advent of industrial development, 
societies move towards greater preponderance of secondary sector employment with 
industrial workers gaining in relative importance (for the USA, the plurality of primary sector 
employment was lost around 1905 in favor of a rise of both secondary and tertiary 
employment). In the thirty years following WW2 the developed western countries met the 
conditions for a growing divergence between industrial (secondary sector) and service 
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(tertiary sector) employment. The technological development and continued capital deepening 
process meant that a diminishing portion of all employed needed to work in either agriculture 
or industry in order to supply the quantities sufficient for global demand. This provides the 
true postindustrial society48. This development also has profound effects on the functionality 
of labor organization. In general, union power is linked to skill set specificity, with bargaining 
leverage being more acute when a strike of a worker would incur a large price for the 
employer in replacing the worker (as his/her skill is specific and therefore more difficult to 
replace). Again, in general, skill sets are more specific in industry than in service employment 
(waiters are easier to train and therefore to replace than automobile plant workers). This is a 
possible cause of union density generally being lower in service employment49. As the service 
employment in the developed world continued to rise in the past few decades this created 
incentives for liberalizations of labor markets as labor organization lost the leverage it once 
enjoyed.  
The developmental aspect is something useful to consider when discussing China, which 
underwent a significant developmental leap in recent decades. Firstly, technology tends to 
migrate from the most developed towards the least developed in patterns, with the peripheral 
areas organizing production at lower technological levels than those found in the core50. In 
Chapter 1 we saw that labor-intensive industrialization was the traditional East Asian 
approach. This long-standing developmental strategy was made possible in recent decades 
through a constant inflow of migrant workers from rural and comparatively underdeveloped 
areas (e.g. Szechuan province) towards the increasingly complex production on the coast (e.g. 
the Guangdong province). These workers were abundant and cheap, and it seems their 
incessant flow has very recently subsided (Chapter 7), resulting in their scarcity, and therefore 
greater labor power by definition. Capital deepening and cutting-edge technology will now 
have a different functionality, replacing the labor made troublesome by its sudden scarcity. 
Technology is also important as it causes different employment profiles. In turn, specific 
employment structures create specific incentives and disincentives for regulation and/or 
institutional change. The manufacture-labor dominated post-WW2 continental European 
economies (or CMEs) had strong incentives to develop the systems associated with the quasi-
 
48 For classical treatments see Illich, 1973 and Bell, 1976. 
49 E.g., in 2008 the union density rates for manufacture and services were 17% and 7% in Germany, 48% and 
34% in Belgium, 45% and 30% in Norway, 61% and 43% in Sweden etc. (Hassel, 2015: 256). 
50 For classical contributions see Vernon, 1966 and Akamatsu, 1962. 
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corporatist structure that dominated Europe. The vast number of workers was a potential 
threat to the continued functioning of the economy as a whole (had they decided to strike) and 
the corporatist tripartite structures helped defuse this threat through co-opting. High levels of 
unionization helped organize one of the sides in the negotiations. A predictable result was a 
well-protected labor market focused on labor rather than capital. Such an arrangement did not 
go to waste as the German led CME model included well developed VET (Vocational 
Education and Training) focused on manufacture, which developed a fresh employee into a 
valuable resource based on very specific skills. Such a specific skill set benefited from well-
protected, unionized labor market as it made job-mobility scarce. The investment into worker 
education and into specific skill set was therefore well protected. 
All of this suggests that there are good reasons to distinguish between cumulative (the 
innovative aspect) and developmental (strategies of capital deepening) aspects of technology. 
The former suggests links between innovations, their gradual application and resultant 
employment compositions. This driver is a long-term process and most closely associated 
with the general meaning of technology. While this driver is very important and technology is 
included in the framework in this sense of the word, it must be clear that the long-term nature 
of the driver makes it exogenous to the theory of change presented here. All other drivers can 
be explained by their interactions and theories of their development, but we treat technology 
as external. The latter meaning most probably entails a change of a mid-term proportions and 
directly interacts with the systemic cycle. It interacts with the systemic cycle as one of the 
possible outcomes of developmental technological progress is the accumulation of capital, 
which under the conditions of stiff competition causes the shift from the material expansion 
phase to the financial expansion phase.  
In this, we can see the composite Arrighian dynamics of investment (referred to here as the 
developmental aspect of technology) as driving the systemic cycle through an increase of 
individual production in competitors (accepting a resulting drop in profits) followed by a 
crisis showing the structural issues of capital as a whole which resulted from this gradual 
individual increase of capacity. We could add that the development of markets increases 
monopolistic tendencies which are a result of expected means to increase profits (there is 
always an option of mergers and acquisitions to neutralize irritating competitors). Also, the 
Marxian dynamics of capital overaccumulation has an inherent tendency to overlook demand 
management (as argued in the previous chapter) – as it is generally a supply-side argument. 
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Therefore, what could be operationalized as a developmental aspect of technology, we will 
cover through the notions of the systemic cycle and the developmental strategies, while the 
technological factor we focus on remains the exogenous driver of cumulative technology.  
3.3. Conclusions 
This chapter needed to interpret the two theoretical strands from the previous chapters in a 
way consistent with an idea of a meta-theoretical framework that is to be developed in the 
next chapter. It has first outlined two major issues in the systemic cycle theory as the 
underdevelopment of demand-side arguments and the underdevelopment of institutional 
analysis. It addressed the first issue by offering a macroeconomic or demand-side 
interpretation of Arrighi’s categories of intensive and extensive strategies as models of 
growth. It suggested combination with institutional analysis as the appropriate solution to the 
second issue. It also outlined the major issue of endogenous institutional change in 
institutional approaches as the second theoretical strand. The solution offered here was a 
conceptual interpretation utilizing Northian insights alongside the concepts of power 
resources, institutional embeddedness (NIE) and institutional complementarity (VofC). 
Institutions have their formal, informal and avoidable aspects, and they are intimately 
connected with power. This chapter suggested that the logic of embeddedness and 
complementarity can be used to model institutional change as path deviation occurs when 
such change is complementary to the various drivers of change. 
The goal has been to show that some of the most notable shortfalls of both systemic cycle and 
institutional analysis are mutually compatible and to offer a reinterpretation of Arrighi’s 
categories of intensive and extensive capitalism which may make his theory more useful for a 
research into the modern world and more useful from the point of view of institutional 
thought. Specifically, a significant and as of yet insufficiently recognized issue in institutional 
change is the effect of trade positions, growth and system development on the institutions. 
The inclusion of the systemic cycle in the quest for various drivers of institutional change is 
an attempt in overcoming this issue. Chapter 4 will offer a framework which includes both 
theories and the subsequent three chapters will apply it to the three selected labor market 
cases. 
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Chapter 4: A Systemic Cycle Oriented Framework of Institutional 
Change 
4.1. Introduction 
As Chapter 2 has shown, the number of authors arguing for the better development of 
endogenous theories of institutional change has grown in previous years, and there are 
attempts to include new drivers of institutional change such as economic growth models. This 
thesis was prompted by the idea that such an agenda can be taken further by an inclusion of a 
suitable theory of broadly understood economic change.  
To this end, Chapter 1 has argued for the usefulness of Arrighi’s thought which enables 
perceiving the global picture as more than just the sum of its national parts and supplies a 
theory of change in a unit of analysis broad enough to capture the relevant processes. Arrighi 
explains both national and global developments cyclically through his concept of the systemic 
cycle, which makes them well-suited to be explained as endogenous elements in a framework 
of institutional change. Furthermore, trade positions are often a result of development 
strategies which Arrighi has called extensive and intensive and interpreted them as successive 
deeper and wider elaborations of the division of labor through the centuries since the late 
middle ages. The previous chapter has developed these strategies further in explaining them 
as supply- and demand-driven growth strategies with the former one being more compatible 
with general free trade policies sometimes critically known as “neoliberalism”. 
This chapter will offer a new framework of institutional change which takes development 
strategies, trade and global economic development explained by the systemic cycle into 
account. Alongside these elements it will also contextualize them through the inclusion of 
others, more familiar drivers of change: technology, power relations, transnational 
conditionality and institutional starting positions. Finally, as this framework is to be illustrated 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7 by changes in labor institutions in the USA, Germany and P.R. China, 
this chapter will explain the selection of these three cases and the selection of the post-1980 
timeframe. 
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4.2. Drivers of institutional change: building the new framework 
As stated in the previous chapter, a good theory of endogenous institutional change must 
strive to include all significant drivers of change that it logically can. A particular issue of 
institutional change theory is the insufficient inclusion of drivers of institutional change 
stemming from the economic environment. Both global economic development and trade 
positions create specific opportunities which institutional changes may capture, and the 
Arrighian conceptualization of the systemic cycle provides us with a theory which may 
predict them. On this basis a dynamic of specific developmental strategies may develop, for 
which Arrighi has offered a simple framework of intensive and extensive strategies developed 
further in the last chapter. This section will explain the three channels of institutional change 
– path dependence, systemic cycle driven power relations and institutional design. Though 
these three channels, we can observe an interaction of several significant drivers of change: 
technology, transnational conditionality, starting institutional positions, trade relations, the 
systemic cycle, developmental strategies and power resources/political struggle. The section 
will close with connecting these elements in a framework of institutional change suited to the 
purpose of identifying drivers of change in labor institutions in the USA, Germany and China 
since 1980. 
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Chart 4.1. The three channels of institutional change
 
 
There are three channels of institutional change emphasized in Chart 4.1. – these will be 
narratively explored in the rest of this section and connected graphically at its end. Firstly, 
there are the path dependent effects of the existing institutional structure. The institutional 
frameworks often tend to change in predictable and stable ways because of the 
efficiency/successfulness of their growth model (where changes need to be comprehensive 
due to the complementarity of successful institutional frameworks, are therefore expensive 
and have unpredictable effects). Also, the path dependence is caused by the relationship of 
power resources and institutions where the power resources of those favored by the 
institutions can be used to maintain their stability. Therefore, path dependent effects are the 
first possible channel of institutional change taken into account by the Chart 4.1. However, 
the pressures towards institutional stability or stable change stemming from such path 
dependence are confronted with other types of pressures which may be directed towards 
change. They may be a result of a changing economic environment or changes in power 
relations, both of which are precisely what this framework seeks to endogenize. In any event, 
Reforms 
Channel 1: Path dependence 
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
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Institutional 
result 
Interactions of 
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conditionality and 
electoral politics 
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the result of institutional change will be the balance between several types of pressures of 
which path dependence is merely one. 
The second channel of institutional change is a complex interaction of technological change, 
power resources, and the systemic cycle including phases of the systemic cycle, 
developmental strategies and trade relations. Considering the timeframe of this analysis, 
technology in its cumulative aspect represents the most long-term process which could be 
considered a driver of institutional change. This makes it a context for all other processes, but 
that should not suggest technological determinism. Technology plays a part in economic 
development only through a necessary interaction with mid-term processes including the 
developmental aspect of technology, i.e. with the technology actually in place in production 
(and it could go in the labor saving or the labor-intensive direction). The effects could 
therefore be either greater or smaller capacity of labor to exert political pressure and influence 
institutional change. Specifically, the US was already a capital-intensive market in the 
timeframe considered here. The capital deepening should be considered a driver of the 
systemic cycle (as it suggests greater capital accumulation), but it has already taken place in 
this case. Since 1980 the manufacture jobs have been replaced by service jobs, and the trend 
was exacerbated by growing net imports (i.e. by the trade positions driven in turn by the 
systemic cycle). In Germany, the trend was similar as the markets already underwent capital 
deepening, but the systemic cycle playing out in the USA as the center of the world-system 
caused an improving trade position in Germany (increasing the importance of manufacture in 
the economy) although service sector employment was taking over (decreasing it). The result 
was a dualistic labor market with well protected manufacturing core and a liberalization of the 
most others. The mentioned timeframes mean that the cumulative aspect of technology is 
exogenous to our analysis which does not predict great shifts in innovations. In China, the 
trend was entirely different with a development and capital deepening taking place in the past 
decades (and in the context of the US systemic cycle with an influx of manufacturing jobs) 
with the effect that employment in manufacturing sector was rising together with the service 
sector subsuming technologically outdated agricultural employment. This enabled the vast 
influx of low-cost labor into manufacturing sector enabling labor-intensive techniques to 
dominate the developmental aspect of technology in China. The developmental aspect of 
technology is therefore important, but it significantly overlaps with our understanding of the 
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systemic cycle, and we have subsumed this type of process under the developmental strategy 
as a part of the systemic cycle. 
It follows that the interplay of technological factors, the overlapping global process of the 
phases of the systemic cycle and developments in trade relations determine the sectoral 
composition of employment. This suggests something of the developing power relations - i.e. 
the significance of manufacturing for the economy as a whole (manufacturing jobs being 
important as they are most easily organized due to the skill specificity they entail). These 
economic factors then come into interaction with the more overtly political ones which 
codetermine the decision-making playing field. The changing sectoral composition is only 
significant in the context of the initial institutional structure (protecting some actors and not 
others and suggesting an initial and somewhat path dependent power resource composition) 
and the newly developing power relations (union density, bargaining coverage) which is an 
indirect result of both the initial institutional structure and the sectoral compositions changes. 
All of this influences the developmental strategy (intensive, extensive) which is crucial in 
determining the institutional change in labor markets. Factors favoring an intensive strategy 
are the scarcity of labor (and a developing capital-intensive developmental technological 
aspect), a CME-like composition of initial institutions, an increasing role of manufacturing 
labor (itself a function of the systemic cycle and trade positions) and the increasing ability of 
labor to organize. Inverse also holds true: an extensive strategy is favored by the 
overabundance of labor, an LME-like composition of initial institutions, a decreasing role of 
manufacturing labor (itself a function of the systemic cycle and trade positions) and the 
decreasing ability of labor to organize. 
Finally, there is the third channel, focusing on visible formal power in transnational 
conditionality and electoral politics. These two short-term drivers can only become 
intelligible within the presented complex nexus. The first is included here for the sake of 
completeness and is endogenous in the sense of the world-system. The issue there is the 
relative power of states and transnational organizations, and current or aspiring centers of the 
world-economy are not likely to be significantly affected. The second is the most visible level 
of formal politics with parties vying for political power by ostensibly offering policy 
programs to the voting public. However, it is clear that more than mere informed interest is at 
play in voting behavior and that a range of issues can be operationalized politically including 
the cultural, the symbolic and the ideological. It would therefore be naïve to claim that the 
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power-relations directly translate into electoral coalitions. However, it is possible that 
sometimes electoral coalitions do in fact form with the goal and ability to influence 
institutional change. In other cases, it is worth reminding that formal institutions (i.e. those 
likely to be influenced via elections) are merely one of the three relevant aspects, while the 
informal and avoidable aspects are equally likely to be influenced by power relations as the 
formal ones. 
4.2.1. Channel 1: Path dependence – The importance of institutional starting 
positions  
Institutional starting positions are central to the study of institutional change, as no change 
occurs without the significant context of what it is that changes. The same liberalizing 
tendencies can exert pressure in many developed countries, and yet they will manifest in 
drastically different ways. Part of the reason for this lies in the substantial starting differences 
in these countries. By its very definition, the “starting” position is an imagined static context 
preceding institutional change. However, an implication of stasis is not always a realistic one, 
even if it is necessary in the sense of an analysis always having to start at some point in time 
(in our case 1980) and gauge change against this benchmark. Institutions are not static, but 
evolve over time, and if the institutional frameworks of the VofC are what we are observing it 
would take a mid- to long-term perspective to delineate. 
Chapter 2 developed the fundamental elements of institutional economics and static 
comparative research of institutions. Some of the most promising research in this vein was 
conducted through or explicitly against the Varieties of Capitalism approach – and it can 
serve us here to very briefly show the importance of starting positions. This approach 
postulated that developed capitalisms are grouped into two general varieties: LME (liberal 
market economies) and CME (coordinated market economies). Even though both are market 
oriented, these two types organize economic activities through very different mechanisms. 
The former functionally couple the impatient capital of the stock markets with flexible labor 
laws and low capacity for labor organization and non-specific skill sets in workers while the 
latter (also) functionally couple the patient capital of large banks with more rigid labor laws, 
larger union presence and specific skill sets managed by well-developed vocational training 
systems. The first (LME) type was modeled after the economic, legal and political structure of 
the United States of America (Chapter 5), while the second (CME) type was modeled after the 
economic, legal and political structure of Germany (Chapter 6). However, China (Chapter 7) 
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is one of the countries which do not easily fall into either category. Varieties of Capitalism 
(alongside much institutional thought) more often than not looks for elements of stability in 
institutions. According to VofC if the existence of specific institutional arrangements in a 
well-developed system is preconditioned by the complementarity within the institutional 
framework, then an institution will tend to remain in place regardless of power relations 
underlying it. 
This approach is a specific example of the path dependence principle suggesting that 
developments in critical junctures tend to significantly influence further reform choices. New 
institutionalism traditionally placed too much emphasis of the combination of path 
dependence and critical junctures. The result was sometimes a stationary view of institutions, 
all but blind to issues of endogenous change (much like the original VofC views), and this is 
precisely the limitation that this thesis is attempting to help transcend. Nevertheless, it would 
be misleading to suggest that path dependence was not an important element in play. Even 
though institutional thought must no longer be satisfied with merely explaining stability, it is 
clear that previous choices and structures restrict the plausible choices today and therefore 
contribute to the shape and direction of institutional change. 
The present scheme will explain the varied influences behind Chinese development as well as 
the dynamics of German and US development. These starting positions suggests a different 
path of institutional change in these countries. The global incentives for policy reform were 
universally geared towards free markets in the 1990s and early 2000s, the various countries 
responded to these liberalization pressures differently.  
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: initial structure has a path dependent effect via power relations. A 
structure which has very low labor organization capacities but is oriented towards 
profit maximization (e.g. LME) will exhibit pressures to further flexibilization as it 
will have no power structures capable and willing to prevent it. A structure with high 
labor organization (e.g. CME) may exhibit pressures towards lesser flexibilization as 
there are power structures which may undermine such a project. In both cases, 
institutional structure presents itself as a historical compromise between societal 
powers and its functioning is dependent on the balance of these powers (most notably 
employees and employers).  
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b) Phase of the systemic cycle: financial expansion will progress more quickly with 
financial deregulation or without formal institutions which would prevent rapid capital 
accumulation. Historically, an initial corporatist CME-like structure may have delayed 
a move from material to financial expansion in the 1970s, while the market-oriented 
LME structure in the US accelerated it.  
c) Developmental strategy: on the most elementary level, one could be tempted to argue 
along the lines of path dependence: a coordinated market structure allows a strong 
institutional channel for labor organizing power to act through and be active in 
attempting to achieve labor-friendly results. This would suggest that path dependent 
effects push towards an intensive developmental strategy and path dependent effects 
of a market-oriented initial structure push towards an extensive developmental 
strategy. However, social reality is far more complex. Developmental strategies need 
to shift in response to the changing political-economic environment if they are to be 
successful, and this suggest a different line of reasoning. The point in time in which 
the circumstances and power compromises embodied in the initial institutional 
structure have changed is the point in time which is ripe for an alternative 
developmental strategy which will, if successful, be institutionalized as a part of the 
new institutional structure. If we opted for a narrower unit of analysis, this 
institutionalization could be interpreted as a critical juncture. Critical junctures (as we 
have seen in Chapter 2) are periods of large decisions with long-term path-dependent 
results. However, they are by definition exogenous. If we were willing to redefine 
critical junctures to be endogenous, then the initial steps of developmental strategies 
would certainly provide the critical junctures crucial to this framework. If successful, 
these strategies could ex-post be defined as critical junctures, would provide elements 
of the institutional result, which in turn provides us with a path dependent channel of 
the next institutional change iteration.  
d) The result of institutional change: path dependence of initial structures tends to 
produce stable change in the direction of initial institutions. This framework suggests 
that while this is one of the tendencies, there are several other influences connected 
with economic development, global processes and power that are endogenous to our 
analysis and compete with path dependence, diminishing its effects. 
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4.2.2. Channel 2: Complex interaction of power relations and the systemic 
cycle 
The second channel of institutional change is more complex than the first one. It hinges on an 
interplay of five drivers, including the predictable fluctuations of structural power as a result 
of technological and systemic cycle shifts. Chart 4.2. shows the interactions within this 
channel. 
Chart 4.2. Channel 2 – power relations and systemic cycle
 
Phase of the systemic cycle, developmental strategies and trade relations constitute the three 
systemic cycle drivers, organized here according to the timeframe necessary for their 
development. Chart 4.2. also shows their interactions with the long-term driver of technology 
shifts and the power relations. The rest of this segment will elaborate these interactions and a 
simplified version of Chart 4.2. will be included in the comprehensive Chart 4.3. at the end of 
this section.  
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
Technology – long-term 
exogenous shift causing 
different employment 
patterns – influences 
structural power Systemic cycle phase 
– influences structural 
power  
Power relations – a 
balance of power 
resources which are 
influenced by most 
other drivers 
Trade relations 
– influence 
structural power 
Developmental strategies – 
influenced by power relations 
but constitute a new regime for 
associational power  
99 
 
4.2.2.1. Technology  
Technology is an important element in growth and development – although the selected 
timeframe and the complexity of the subject requires us to use it as an exogenous variable. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, we can discern the cumulative and the developmental 
aspect of technology. The former refers to actual innovations, which can only be treated as 
exogenous to the framework as they not predictable and their effects may take a long time to 
manifest in terms of productivity and growth. The latter refers to the application of technology 
(e.g. capital deepening) and could be understood as endogenous as underdeveloped (lower tier 
in the world-system) countries can experience a growth-boost by enjoying the possibilities of 
technological catch-up, while the developed world experiences such boosts only in periods of 
great technological transformation. By treating these two aspects as a single driver we avoid 
unnecessary complexity of the framework, but more importantly, also conform to the selected 
timeframe, which is relatively brief from the point of view of technological shifts. In any 
event, the crucial point is the changes in employment compositions and the role of labor in the 
economy. Owing to the long-term technological tendencies of the 20th century, a developed, 
post-industrial economy hinges on the service sector, which largely employees easily 
replaceable personnel operating in a decentralized context. This influences both the structural 
and associational labor power, as labor has severe issues in organizing (lower associational 
power) and the workers have a diminishing role in the economy (lower structural power). The 
inverse also holds true, as an agricultural country experiencing an industrial shift may find the 
power of its labor increasing in both elements. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: as technology changes, it creates different methods of production, 
which may substantially change the power resources. Historically, it reduced the 
number of workers needed in manufacturing. This changed the elementary power 
resources and diminished the bargaining position of labor. 
b) Developmental strategy: a technological shift may create new investment possibilities 
making the old growth models obsolete and trigger a choice of new developmental 
strategy. 
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4.2.2.2. Phase of the systemic cycle 
Dynamics of phases of the systemic cycle may greatly influence the distribution of power 
resources. The periodization of this dynamics is dependent on large crises which can be 
indicators of shifts in accumulation regimes. The process of economic development in the 
developed world (core) tends to fluctuate between periods of material and financial 
expansion. The mechanism of this shift is a wide profit crunch occurring in the real sector and 
the capital fleeing into the more short-term oriented financial activities and triggering the 
financialization (financial expansion). This suggests different prospects for labor as the 
inability of generating large profits in manufacture also means that a traditionally unionized 
labor has become unattractive for use in production (i.e. capital will move into a less labor-
intensive use of speculative finance). 
The systemic cycle is best described as a sum of interacting and overlapping global processes 
with specific geographic origins (cores or centers). It consists of two distinct general types of 
processes: material and financial expansion. Both together may take more than a century to 
develop (i.e. Arrighian long centuries), but their duration has increasingly diminished 
historically and our chosen timeframe suggests that these processes cannot be analyzed in 
terms of entire financial-material-financial scope. We are interested in the period after 1980, 
and the US financial expansion has taken 35 years from the signal crisis of 1973 to the 
terminal crisis of 2008. We are now arguably observing the initial period of the new material 
expansion which may take even less. In other words, the systemic cycle processes that we are 
interested in are mid- to long-term duration processes. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Trade relations: material expansion (particularly in the context of the extensive 
developmental strategy) suggests a substantial trade surplus, while a financial 
expansion of the old center suggests a widening trade deficit. 
b) Power resources: material expansion creates more manufacturing employment, 
creating a bigger role for manufacturing labor in the economy, suggesting more 
bargaining and organizational power. A shift from material to financial expansion 
suggests lower manufacturing employment levels and lower labor power. 
c) Developmental strategies: financial expansion signals the waning of power in the old 
center and its finishing phases provide a context for the choice of the developmental 
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strategy in prospective new centers. The successful developmental strategy becomes 
the new global center and leads the new material expansion. 
 
4.2.2.3. Trade relations – current and changing positions in the world-system 
The systemic cycle suggests that employment shifts away from areas in which manufacture 
related activities are facing a profit crunch (core areas during financial expansions) and into 
semi-peripheral and currently underdeveloped areas which can hold promises of larger profits 
in manufacture (e.g. China since the 1980s). Such a shift holds specific incentives for 
institutional change with workers in deindustrializing countries becoming increasingly 
superfluous and therefore decreasingly powerful. Liberalizations of labor markets may, then, 
proceed with greater intensity. An employment importing country on the semi-periphery does 
not, however, automatically move towards greater coordination of labor as a prerequisite for 
this is two-fold. Firstly, the workers must become scarce and therefore gain functional 
bargaining power, which can then manifest in formalized power relations (greater union 
density, higher level collective bargaining and more bargaining coverage). Secondly, the 
institutional framework must be able to orient towards such a move, according to issues of 
institutional complementarity. 
In this view the trade relations are a somewhat delayed effect of the systemic cycle, but they 
are certainly influenced by a vast number of other factors as well (global prices of goods, 
resources and transport, exchange rate changes etc.). A significant and durable change in trade 
relations could be observed in the short- or mid-term. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: an increase in trade surplus suggests an increasing role of 
manufacturing in the economy and a greater bargaining power of the workers. An 
increase in the trade deficit suggests a diminishing role of manufacturing in the 
economy and a lower bargaining power of the workers. 
b) Transnational conditionality: a large trade surplus is a conceivable way to 
development and growth. It can therefore contribute to the countries power substantial 
enough to avoid transnational conditionality.  
c) Systemic cycle phase: a shift from trade surplus to a trade deficit is compatible with a 
shift from material expansion to a finance expansion.  
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d) Developmental strategies: an extensive strategy is oriented to the export markets in its 
growth model, while an intensive strategy is oriented towards domestic markets. This 
duality was logically developed in the previous chapter (as high wages of the intensive 
strategy contribute to domestic demand but reduce external competitiveness and low 
wages of the extensive strategy reduce domestic demand but increase external 
competitiveness). However, this is a matter of strong tendency rather than mutual 
exclusiveness as an intensive strategy could still attempt to formulate a strong export 
niche – what defines it as intensive is the relatively larger importance of the domestic 
markets rather than the absence of export markets. 
 
4.2.2.4. Developmental strategies 
We can state this in another, and less general way by utilizing Arrighi’s dichotomy of 
intensive/extensive accumulation regimes. If we interpret the modern iterations of intensive 
and extensive accumulation regimes as those seeking the demand for their output increase at 
home (intensive) or abroad (extensive) we can again see that specific institutional change 
incentives attach. A country with an intensive accumulation regime looks for domestic 
demand for its output and enters into a specific dialectic between real wages as the source of a 
demand increase and real wages as a source of rising costs of production. The latter can either 
drive the aggregate prices upwards (triggering wage-pull inflation and/or reducing the 
quantity demanded) or drive profits downwards. This suggests a domestic equilibrium like the 
ones found in the Keynesian era of the first three decades after WWII in the developed world 
(Chapter 5). If such a regime is undergoing a material expansion, this expansion is fully 
compatible with rising labor coordination tendencies, as each job is important not only 
because the skill-set of the worker employed is scarce, but also because it carries in it the vital 
element of aggregate demand. China may be currently turning towards such a regime 
(Chapter 7). 
On the other hand, in an extensive accumulation regime, material expansion is intended for 
consumption abroad. Real wages primarily factor in as production costs to be frozen or 
eliminated in order to manifest as international competitiveness. Therefore, it may become 
necessary to move towards greater liberalization of labor institutions. This is indicative of 
Germany since the adoption of the euro (Chapter 6). 
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Developmental strategies are, in this context, a mid-term phenomenon, plausibly taking a 
longer time to develop than issues of transnational conditionality or electoral policies, but a 
shorter time than issues of substantial technological change.  
 
Interaction with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: intensive strategies increase the resources of workers which can 
increase their capacity to organize and vice versa. However, the long-term effects of 
intensive strategies could be the diminished bargaining position of workers (as they 
have a diminishing role in the economy) and vice-versa.  
b) Trade relations: extensive strategy focuses by definition on external markets 
suggesting an increase in exports, while intensive strategy focuses on domestic 
markets (see above). 
c) The result of institutional change: developmental strategies have clear short-term 
societal winners (labor in intensive strategy) and losers (labor in extensive strategy). 
As the intensive strategy is a likely effect of high power resources of labor and as 
these are likely increased in the short run by the intensive strategy, this strategy is 
essentially the moment in which the compromises of power relations are 
institutionalized. In other words, the changing power relations overcome path 
dependence of the initial structure and help formulate a new strategy and a successful 
developmental strategy becomes a part of the result of institutional change. Once 
more, if the strategy is successful, and if we are willing to redefine critical junctures as 
endogenous events, this institutionalization can ex-post be interpreted as a critical 
juncture. 
 
4.2.2.5. Power relations  
Power is crucial to this framework and its functioning, and it is also the node in which the first 
two chapters can come together most fruitfully. Chapter 1 has outlined the approach to labor 
power in the context of the world-system (via Silver and Wright). Associational power refers 
to the ability to organize, whereas structural power refers to the bargaining position of labor 
which stems from its location on the labor markets and the workplace. Chapter 2 showed the 
dynamic relationship between institutions and power (via North, Korpi and Thelen). 
104 
 
Institutions can be thought of as results of power relations and compromises between the 
interests of various groups endowed with power resources. Likewise, a change in institutions 
can be thought of as induced by a change in the power relations. Power resource theory tells 
us that institutions are a function of political power held by various organized groups. An 
institution is a compromise between various powers (e.g. organized labor and organized 
employers) and institutional change is a result of a change in power relations underlying the 
institution.  
In this context, the relevant position of labor is underlined by the capacity of labor to organize 
and influence decision making. The relevant data according to the power resource theory 
would therefore consist primarily of union density and collective agreement coverage. 
Together, these figures testify to the power of organized labor in terms of the labor they 
represent (and could mobilize in strikes or otherwise) and the scope of its actions (bargaining 
coverage figures can be much higher than density figures). If unions have a high membership 
rate (i.e. density) and conduct bargaining which applies to majority of workers, then its power 
position is certainly strong and vice versa. Such power relations are results of at least mid-
term processes as densities dissolve in terms of decades rather than years. 
The most visible institutional change is one that occurs through formal political channels 
(next driver). But, as explained in the previous chapter, the Northian conceptualization of 
institutions accepted here sees institutions as far wider reaching than the legislative power 
could provide by itself. In terms of labor market reforms, the actual protection of labor is a 
result of not only the laws regulating labor, but also the practices of collective bargaining and 
the leverage represented by the unions. Therefore, the most essential element of power 
relations is the irreplaceable nature of the workers these organized labor structures represent. 
A worker in a setting which promotes high skill-set specificity (manufacturing workers in the 
CME context in the Varieties of Capitalism approach) is difficult to replace as he represents 
an investment in the specific skill set needed for his job description. A worker with a low 
skill-set specificity (a tertiary sector worker, or a worker specific for the LME economy) 
represents an easily replaceable asset. In the first case, a representing union may wield 
substantial power, while in the second case it most likely does not. We must, therefore, 
distinguish between at least mid-term power relations which are a matter of the ability of 
labor and/or capital to organize and protect its interests through all institutions, and short-term 
electoral coalitions which build upon these power relations (but also the cultural, symbolical, 
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personal, unconscious etc.) in order to produce change in formal institutions. The relationship 
between these two levels is not one sided: it is not a matter of power relations stemming from 
production determining the electoral coalitions and results. Rather, these processes are 
parallel: the power relations are a matter of the bargaining position and organizational 
capacities and the electoral politics leading to the control of formal political institutions may 
mobilize these or other capacities.  
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Phase of the systemic cycle: organized investor interests and the absence of opposition 
may accelerate the shift from material to finance expansion via quicker financial 
deregulation and vice versa. 
b) Developmental strategy: as explained above, a dynamic between path dependence via 
power relations and a shift to a new growth model. 
c) Result of institutional change: power relations in many ways determine the 
effectiveness of formal reforms (as the mobilization of relevant power resources 
enables the reflection of the intent of formal institutions in informal institutions and 
prevents their avoidance). 
4.2.3. Channel 3: Institutional design - Domestic politics and transnational 
conditionality  
The last driver and one with the shortest timeframe is the formal political channel, which 
describes the institutional change that is induced either through domestic politics (e.g. 
electoral, legislative, executive) or the transnational conditionality of various transnational 
organizations. As explained above, these attempts at reforms are the most visible and provide 
for one of the three channels of institutional change identified here. However, their 
effectiveness is dependent on power resources and path dependence (including issues of 
institutional complementarity). Specifically, Chapter 2 has explored the Beramendi project 
which hinges on the democratic process and the role that these groups play in terms of 
enticing electoral coalitions designed to capture their votes. While such a focus is interesting 
and significant, the substitutions of the more invisible mid-term power relations and mid-to-
long-term path dependence for the highly visible and short-term electoral and coalitional 
policies does not seem advisable. However, if its limitations are properly understood, the 
formal political relations can be an informative driver of change. 
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Not all power-driven institutional change has its origins within states. Institutions may be 
influenced by various transnational organizations either by offering advice or by exerting 
pressure. The latter mechanism becomes important if the organization in question holds a 
resource needed by the state (e.g. funds needed to stabilize a crisis or fund developmental 
projects) and is in the position to condition its use with the enacting of institutional reforms. 
This suggests that the prevailing intellectual ambience in these transnational organizations is 
relevant, but not as relevant as the external power position of the state. A large, developed and 
economically stable state is far less likely to be in the position to be transnationally 
conditioned than a small, underdeveloped and economically destabilized state. As an 
additional note, this driver would be considered exogenous if the unit of analysis remained the 
isolated national state. However, the world-systemic lens allows us to view individual states 
in the context of the global world-system in which the power relations between states and 
between transnational organizations and states become endogenous issues – as they are 
covered by the used theory and its models. Conditionality as conceived here is most often a 
short-term horizon driver of change. It is a visible form of power in which a transnational 
organization influences a state by applying pressure and attempting to achieve reforms in 
accordance with its own economic agenda.  
A historical example of conditionality in small states would be the promotion of the free 
market oriented “Washington consensus” policy regime in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s 
by IMF, IBRD and WTO (Stiglitz, 2002; Lučev, 2010). EU conditionality is likewise proving 
to be a significant pressure towards a more selective type of free market orientation based on 
open trade and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (Lütz and Kranke, 2010; Lučev and 
Babić, 2013). The prevalent economic mainstream and its incarnation in these institutions can 
generally be a powerful driver, particularly in times of critical junctures, in which such 
pressures may have long reaching effects. 
Therefore, while this institutional change driver may be very important in many cases, it is not 
so in our three cases. Benefiting from a world-systemic lens, we can see that the transnational 
conditionality is dependent on existing power relations between individual states and 
transnational organizations. Firstly, the most powerful states most strongly influence the rules 
and decision making in large transnational organizations. Secondly, the most powerful states 
are least likely to be put in the position of being dependent on the conditionality. E.g., EU 
fiscal rules may be applied to Germany (Excessive Deficit Procedure was open 2009-2012), 
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but these represent a dissemination of long-standing German macroeconomic policies to begin 
with – and can only provide a further incentive in the same policy direction. However, when 
fiscal conditionality was applied to Portugal, Ireland, Greece etc. it had a distinctly aggressive 
effect in that the prevalent policies were changed. Also, these countries were subject to bail-
out programs (EFSF, EFSM, ESM) which had the additional incentive of funds-disbursement 
which never came into question with Germany. In other words, while it may often seem that 
the rules are universal, the power positions are a relevant factor in individuals as well as 
states.  
The three selected cases are economies of substantial size, and their resilience to external 
conditionality is far greater in comparison to smaller states. The only significant and clear-cut 
example in the 1980-2016 period may prove to be the Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001, 
which was conditioned on a number of economic reforms, even though these did not have a 
direct labor-market component. 
The two possible types of formal political power are grouped into a single driver as they a) 
share a timeframe and b) transnational conditionality may or may not be present (it is not in 
our three cases). However, even when it manifests itself, the ultimate influence will have to be 
exerted via the domestic formal political channels (the executive power entering into 
international agreements and/or legislative power passing of formal institutions). 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Developmental strategy: Transnational conditionality can influence large parts of the 
developmental strategy by requiring changes in labor laws or even specific 
macroeconomic (investment, fiscal, monetary…) targets. 
b) Result of institutional change: formal domestic politics play a crucial part in formal 
reforms (as the control of formal political institutions enables an explicit attempts at 
reform). Transnational conditionality can also influence the final institutional 
framework, but the focus on visible results suggests a focus on a change of formal 
institutions rather than a change in the underlying power resources which will tend to 
determine the informal and avoidable aspects of institutions. 
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4.3. The framework of change in labor institutions 
Complex institutional systems are outcomes of many necessary and sufficient causes, making 
them difficult to analyze in terms of causality. Our strategy consists instead of expanding the 
notions of embeddedness and complementarity via externalities in order to accommodate the 
elusive endogenous change in a sufficiently broad (global, world-systemic) unit of analysis. 
The rest of this section will explain the time-based logic of embeddedness, according to which 
institutions are embedded not only in other institutions (as explained by Ostrom, Williamson 
and others) but also in contextual factors which provide externalities conducive to change or 
stability. In this sense, we can conceive of a hierarchy of institutional drivers which is based 
in time – with long-term (40+ years) drivers, mid-term (10-40 years drivers) and short-term (-
10 years drivers). 
Chart 4.3. A general framework of institutional change 
 
C3: institutional design 
C1: Path dependence 
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
Institutional 
starting 
positions 
Institutional 
result 
Technology 
(exogenous) 
Systemic 
cycle phase 
Power 
relations 
(informal) 
Formal power: 
Transnational conditionality 
and electoral politics 
Trade 
relations 
Developmental 
strategies 
109 
 
A process taking a longer time to develop provides a context for the development of a process 
with a shorter period of development. In this sense, these drivers of institutional change 
(themselves institutions or economic and political processes) are embedded in higher order 
processes (i.e. those of longer duration). Long-term technological change provides a context 
for institutional frameworks and systemic cycles which in turn provide a context for the 
development of power resource relations and the implementation of development strategies, 
which are themselves a context for the development of trade relations which finally support 
the short-term processes of electoral coalitions and transnational conditional pressures. This 
hierarchy of embeddedness does not, however, necessarily imply one-way causality (as New 
Institutional Economics/NIE authors might well assume according to their conceptualizations 
of embeddedness). Even though (e.g.) development strategies and power relations provide the 
crucial context for the electoral politics, they can certainly stand to be modified by the 
outcomes of elections. Therefore, while this NIE influenced hierarchy provides crucial insight 
into the relationship of institutional drivers, it does not help us to decode their effects. To do 
so, we must turn to VofC notions of institutional externalities. Through the prism of this 
analogy, it becomes apparent that institutional drivers reinforce or undermine each-other’s 
effects and that the role that they play can only be made apparent in context with other 
drivers. 
It is also worth noting that institutions in this framework are effectively evoked in several 
positions which are a consequence of their definition. The definition of institutions as rules 
structuring activity suggests that there are active institutions governing each of the 
institutional drivers (e.g. tariffs and international agreements governing trade and financial 
and corporate regulation governing the systemic cycle). However, this is another factual, but 
ultimately irrelevant and tautological position where institutions exist by definition and 
therefore must be functional. This framework suggests that specific labor institutions are most 
clearly discerned on the level of starting institutional frameworks (where we can observe the 
complementarity with other institutions) and on the level of the development strategies which 
suggest either strong or flexible regulation of labor, provided we observe development 
strategies through the lens of demand management (as we did in Chapter 3). In other words, 
we have institutions explicitly evoked in the initial institutional structure and the result of 
institutional change, but the third institutional element is the developmental strategy which 
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may, in the case of its success become a part of the long-term institutional result (hence the 
double-arrow in the representation in Chart 4.3.). 
 
Focusing on the temporal embeddedness could favor observing top-down mechanisms, which 
would suggest a form of determinism. However, there are feedback loops which exist on 
every level, with the most significant ones shown in the chart. Starting from the bottom, the 
two short-term drivers can influence almost every other level described. The outcomes of 
elections and transnational conditionality can influence the mid-term processes: power 
relations (e.g. by the passing of laws and regulations inhibiting or promoting labor 
organization or its functioning in bargaining practices), trade positions (e.g. by changes in 
trade policy), systemic cycle (e.g. by tax incentives or stimulus packages temporarily 
increasing profits and staving off the shift from material to financial), developmental 
strategies (e.g. by the expansion of the household demand via tax reforms). By doing so, they 
influence the long-term processes in adding to a new institutional framework which then 
provides the context for a new iteration of institutional change, promoting a new type of 
developmental aspect technology (e.g. encouraging a specific type of investment) or even the 
cumulative aspect (promotion of R&D).  
Same holds true for the possibilities of feedback in processes of longer duration. Changing 
power relations in favor of labor can be a powerful deterrent and/or a generator of informal 
political pressure which may be exerted in the direction of a more progressive taxation (i.e. a 
changing developmental strategy) and may lead to higher wages which can contribute to a 
profit crunch (leading to the financial stage of the systemic cycle) or a deteriorating trade 
position (if felt in price levels). On the other hand, a change in developmental strategy has 
effects on trade relations and the systemic cycle (same reasons reinforced in both counts). 
Finally, the systemic cycle in its shift from material to financial phase starts a form of 
deindustrialization even though production may remain capital-intensive (US since 1980). Or, 
a material expansion of aspiring centers (Germany, China since 1980) causes an increase in 
capital deepening. In either case, it is a change in the developmental aspect of technology 
effected by a lower order process. 
The obvious existence of these feedback loops suggests that neither determinism nor 
functionalism are prudent assumptions in institutional research. Determinism would suggest 
one category shaping all others, while the modern structures of capitalism seem to be 
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composed of numerous local (i.e. national) and global, economic and political, dynamic, 
overlapping and mutually interacting complex processes. Functionalism would suggest the 
existence of institutions is merited on their functionality, instead of the power alliances and 
specific processes which underlie them (something that the VofC agenda is often accused of). 
This framework is built on the premise of continuous and power laden mutual interaction of 
both institutions and economic and political processes. The selection of successful cases 
prohibits us to explore the decidedly dysfunctional combinations of institutions and their 
drivers, however. Nevertheless, it remains clear that institutions can be contended or 
stabilized by those with power, and that institutional frameworks which are dysfunctional in 
terms of growth and development can be maintained by vested interests of powerful 
minorities. The numerous examples of underdeveloped countries with corrupt elites should 
point to the desirability of avoiding functionalism as an assumption in institutional analysis. 
This suggests an interpretation of difficulties in deliberate and successful reform initiation. 
For a government (which is a short-term, 4-year formal political process in most western 
democracies) to initiate a labor market reform it must first recognize the prevalent power-
positions (which are results of mid-term processes) and which may work to informally subvert 
the new formal institutions and render them inactive. It must then successfully manage to 
build this reform into a successful growth model, or it will be self-defeating (it must be 
aligned with another mid-term process of 10-15 years). Finally, for the institutional reform to 
give positive results in term of growth or unemployment, it must be aligned (complementary) 
with a mid- to long-term process of institutional frameworks (particularly with financial 
market regulations and educational systems, but also macroeconomic management) which we 
treated as initial structures. A successful reform of the formal (regulatory) aspect of the labor 
market must either identify and align with processes already underway or initiate a very broad 
reform covering diverse areas (i.e. labor, education, finance and macroeconomic 
management) and negotiate this broad reform against the vested interest in all of these areas. 
This framework has suggested a logical alternative where the temporal hierarchy of 
institutional drivers may even render the formal political process irrelevant, as the results of 
uncodified practices may provide a stronger effective institutional protection than the formal 
system or undermine the formal system and result in effectively more flexible institutions. An 
example of a stronger effective network was Germany where the wide-spread protection 
awarded by collective bargaining was sufficiently strong that a minimum wage law was 
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passed only in 2015. Such regulation was not deemed necessary before due to the strong 
effective institutions on the level of informal uncodified bargaining processes. An example of 
an undermined formal system is the Chinese labor regulation which is formally amongst the 
strongest in the world but has been largely unenforced for decades as the power relations and 
informal practices do not support it. Either way, neither a purely top-down nor a purely 
bottom-up mechanism is something to be expected in institutional change. This framework 
used a temporal embeddedness of drivers in an attempt to clarify their mutual interactions and 
feed-back loops in the interactions of three recognized channels of institutional change. 
In the event of successful developmental strategy change, the elements of the strategy become 
the new rules of the game (i.e. the strategy becomes institutionalized). Chart 4.4. shows a 
simplified model of such successfulness. 
Chart 4.4. Success of developmental strategies in labor institutions
 
If the strategy were unsuccessful (perhaps due to the lack of complementarity with existing 
active arrangements), it could merely signify a failed reform. However, a successful change in 
Institutional 
starting positions 
Successful 
developmental 
strategy 
Formal politics (Channel 3), 
power relations oriented on 
collective labor action, and 
dependent on labor power 
(Channel 2) 
 The change in 
developmental strategy 
changes the rules of the 
game and sets new  
power-distributional   
patterns, causing path 
dependence (Channel 1)  
A change in strategy 
provides a critical 
juncture  
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developmental strategy (e.g. shift from extensive to intensive) institutionalizes new rules of 
the game. This shift may ex-post be identified as a critical juncture, but Chart 4.4. shows such 
path deviation (i.e. a shift in strategy) as a result of formal political processes (which we 
identified as channel 3) or shifts in labor power resources effecting a change in its ability to 
influence the more informal aspects of institutions (channel 2). Once institutionalized, the 
developmental strategy sets the tone for further development, setting in a path dependence of 
its own (channel 1). However, once we acknowledge the full macroeconomic effects of such 
shifts, we must also notice that the long-term effects may run counter to the initial intentions. 
If a labor-friendly high-wage intensive strategy is institutionalized, it will reduce the 
international competitiveness by raising the costs of production. The new intensive strategy 
will provide an internal market for higher price goods, but in an open economy, cheaper 
foreign goods will eventually crowd out some domestic manufacturing. In this event, a 
successful shift to intensive strategy (originally enabled by high structural labor power) 
eventually reduces the structural power of labor, enabling an eventual shift back into an 
extensive strategy. 
4.4. Illustrating the framework of labor-institutional changes 
The next three chapters will illustrate the central claims of this chapter by applying this 
framework on the labor institutions in China, Germany and the USA since 1980. This section 
explains this selection by focusing on the choices of institutions, cases and interval in turn. 
4.4.1. The importance of labor institutions 
It seems almost redundant to point out that class-based politics has largely lost its thrust in 
recent decades. This made labor power a somewhat unattractive area of research. However, 
while this old reason for studying labor is perhaps gone, there are a number of crucial reasons 
to focus on labor institutions. Firstly, demand management is greatly influenced by income 
distribution, which makes labor institutions a prime (and underrecognized) subject for 
macroeconomics inspired research. It also makes labor institutions intertwined with growth 
models. Secondly, labor can be, and historically often was, mobilized to achieve political 
goals. This makes the presence or absence of manifestation of political labor power a relevant 
political science issue. Thirdly, the combination of visible power foundations and economic 
effects of labor institutions makes them a relevant issue in the study of institutional change as 
labor institutions include the predictors of institutional change that can be found in existing 
literature. 
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4.4.2. Case selection: USA, Germany, PR China 
The three cases could be interpreted as a most different case study design. As shown in 
Chapter 2, the USA and Germany are consistently discerned in typologies as typifying 
different varieties of advanced capitalism. China, on the other hand represents a third distinct 
option where the rule of law and organized labor are yet to develop. However, these cases 
were selected according to the findings of the systemic cycle approach described in Chapter 1. 
The USA was clearly the center of world production in the latter half of the 20th century, as 
well as the center of global finance, political and military power. In using Arrighian systemic 
cycle theory, one would expect to see a waning hegemony/center of the world-system in the 
years following the crisis of 1973 which would also suggest a financialization in this aging 
economic center. When we observe the macroeconomic data on the USA in this period, we 
therefore expect to see signs of reduced production and increased financial activity. The 
selection of the two remaining cases reflected the need to locate competitor-states for the new 
hegemony or rather the competitors for the new world-systemic center of production as the 
first step towards such a hegemony.  
Graph 4.1. shows the trade balance in produced goods for the twelve currently largest 
economies in the world in current USD millions. 
Graph 4.1. Net goods exports
Source of data: OECD, 2019  
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The graph allows us to compare the total global effect of net exports, and it clearly delineates 
China and Germany as the largest global exporters in absolute terms. These two economies 
have consistently (since 2005) ranked in the first two places among major economies in terms 
of the value of net export of goods. We can also observe that the USA is by far the largest net 
importer of produced, physical items. This particular data is relevant as it represents the first 
element in Wallerstein’s discussion of hegemony, and as we will observe in following 
chapters, manufacturing labor tends to be most productive and most protected by regulation 
and prevalent practice. 
Table 4.1. shows the cumulative net goods exports of the three selected cases in the 1992-
201651 period as reported by OECD in current USD billions.  
Table 4.1. Cumulative net goods exports 
Time Cumulative 
net goods 
exports 
(1992-2001) 
Average 
year 
(1992-
2001) 
Cumulative 
pre-global 
recession 
(2002-2008) 
Average 
year 
(2002-
2008) 
Cumulative 
(2009-2016) 
Average 
year 
(2009-
2016) 
Germany 492.6  54.7 1488.6 186.1  1985.3  248.2 
United 
States 
-1855.9  -206.2  -5273.2  -659.2 -5503.8  -688 
China  169.4  18.8  932.4 116.6  2517.3  314.7 
Source of data: OECD, 2017; own calculation 
Table 4.1. shows the evolution in these three states. It is clear that the combined global effect 
of German and Chinese trade (both consistently in surplus) has grown increasingly 
comparable to the global effect of US trade (consistently in deficit). In the 1990s the 
combined cumulative surplus of China and Germany was approximately at 1/3 of the US 
trade deficit in goods, in the years preceding the global recession of 2009 (2001-2008) the 
Chinese and German surpluses stand at almost ½ of US deficits and in the post-recession 
years they climb to over 4/5. 
All of this suggests that China and Germany are the two suitable candidates for the next 
center of the world-system in a Wallersteinian/Arrighian sense. These are the two countries 
 
51 Starting in 1992 as this is the first year in which data for all three countries is available.  
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with the largest global export of manufactured goods which together make up most of the net 
deficits of the old center which has turned to a financial expansion in the past 40 years and 
has become the importer of manufactured goods. According to Arrighi, these two countries 
should be expected to compete with alternative organizational innovations which could 
cement their material expansions eventually translating in a massive financial expansion of 
their own following a period of global dominance of one of them and a signal crisis 
eventually serving as a harbinger of the shift from material to financial expansion. 
4.4.3. Interval selection: 1980s to today 
The period since 1980 has been momentous for labor institutions as it brought wide sweeps of 
liberalizations in very specific national contexts. These were also accompanied by large-scale 
historical shifts towards free markets and geopolitical oscillations from bipolarity via 
unipolarity to multipolarity and with the rise of China as a global superpower. The general 
idea is to make sense of these shifts via the systemic cycle theory, and in this context, 
organizational innovations in the systemic chaos periods may result in a central position in the 
world-system. Therefore, they represent new ways of being more productive and more 
competitive as an exporting center. They also represent ways of economic growth beyond 
demographic growth, by which national economies become richer. World-systems analysis 
assumes the unity of these two world center characteristics, and Arrighi's analysis of the 
systemic cycle shows us how these two are diachronically connected. A geographic location 
will start to assume the role of the most competitive part of the world during the inevitable 
downturn in competitiveness of a far richer world-systemic center now turning to financial 
activity. With time, this most competitive location will become the new world-systemic 
center: it will grow richer and expand its production and trade for decades. However, the 
initial competitiveness increase is owed to a specific political-economic innovation – i.e. a 
specific set of policy reforms best suited to economic expansion. Within the systemic cycle 
logic, the relevant dates for such an innovation are 1973 at the earliest and 2008 at the latest 
(i.e. the period between the signal and the terminal crisis roughly delimiting the period of 
financialization in the old center or the USA).  
This interpretation is crucial to the idea of the systemic cycle, but also unintelligible outside 
the actual historical context. Arrighi interprets the 1973 crisis as a signal crisis, which caused 
a shift into the hard financial expansion. This crisis was accompanied by several shocks. The 
Nixon shock was the 1971-1973 breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system of currency 
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stabilization with the USD no longer serving as the anchor of currencies, ushering a new 
period of uncertainty in international trade. The OPEC shock (1973-1974) was intended as an 
economic punishment of the Western world for its support of Israel in the context of the 1973 
Yom Kippur War. It introduced a period of higher oil prices which presented substantial 
challenges for the trade balances of the underdeveloped world and other oil importers. The 
Volcker shock sharply increased key interest rates in the 1980-1981 period in the USA in an 
effort to curb inflation. The repercussion was a different financial atmosphere with more 
abundant capital (due to the Nixon shock) but temporarily more difficult to procure by regular 
crediting channels (due to the Volcker shock) – spelling out some difficulties for the 
increasingly externally indebted developing world as well. All these developments provided a 
context for the Reagan era deregulations and liberalizations that would produce what David 
Harvey has called a neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005). Other state-wide free market experiments 
could be found from Chile and UK in the 1970s to the transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s. The pressures towards the free markets were strengthened through 
the conditioned loans activities of international organizations like the IMF and the IBRD, 
spreading what has become the free market policy-prescription mainstream known as the 
Washington consensus (Stiglitz, 2002). It was in this context that a general pressure towards 
liberalization could be felt. We can interpret this as a pressure towards the extensive 
capitalism strategy which is deregulationist and attempts to reduce production costs in order 
to produce competitive exports. Again, from the Western point of view, the first strategy 
could describe the first decades after World War 2 with various types of protection combining 
into a Keynesian welfare state. The second strategy may sound like the prescriptions of the 
Washington consensus that strived to formulate policy advice in the 1980s, 1990s and early 
1990s through the free market orientation of mainstream economic science. However, actual 
economic development strategies do not necessarily change though a change of atmosphere in 
the economic science, or a change in prevalent opinions in international organizations. After 
all, many voices predicted a regulatory race-to-the-bottom as a result of increasing trade 
openness and the liberalization of capital flows in the 1990s. As capital became migratory and 
labor remained stationary (Tilly, 1995) it stood to reason that a new globalized world would 
suggest that foreign investment would flow towards countries which had least regulation and 
therefore enabled the most profit. This would trigger competitive deregulation and supposedly 
destroy the welfare state. While such pressures certainly materialized, the results fell far short 
of expectations (Weiss, 1998). Certainly, the institutional changes were mostly neither 
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instantaneous nor enormous. Various countries dealt with pressures towards liberalization in 
various ways as shown in Chapter 2. Arrighi can help us understand such changes in a broader 
historical context. A general free market oriented shift in the last few decades from the 
Western perspective (i.e. towards extensive capitalism) does not mean that trade related 
pressures will not incentivize a shift towards more regulation and higher worker incomes in 
China. In fact, in order to interpret the modern institutional shift, we must first understand the 
role that these shifts play when embedded in broader strategies interacting with trade positions 
and the systemic cycle itself. 
However, practical considerations have pushed the present research agenda somewhat, as the 
macroeconomic data is sometimes unavailable for the period before 1980 and it is more 
prudent to start the analysis later, when more details may be observed. Also, this year is 
consistent with the initial Chinese moves towards liberalization which have started through 
the 1980s. The following three chapters will therefore focus on events occurring post-1980 
and analyze latest available data, which in practice puts the end-date in 2016, 2017 or 2018. 
4.5. Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter has been to use the elements explained and interpreted in the first 
three chapters in order to develop the approach to institutional change of this thesis. The 
primary method was the construction of an overarching framework of institutional change 
which encompasses several institutional approaches and an Arrighian approach to global 
capitalism and its iterations. The approach hinges on the idea that modern global capitalism 
has variegated national effects which have specific institutional repercussions. These effects 
can be thought of as endogenous due to the world-systemic unit of analysis which allows us to 
treat national institutions as sub-units of a far larger system. In order to analyze the effects of 
global capitalism on national systems, we must first understand the many levels which shape 
the national institutional outcome. 
To do so, the chapter has used the conceptualization of institutions from Chapter 3, which 
draws on North, power resource theory and new institutionalism to provide a concept of 
power-based and temporally grounded institutions which are capable of path dependence and 
path deviation according to the complex interplay of various political and economic factors 
which we have identified here as institutional change drivers. Their mutual interaction was 
depended on externalities and embeddedness. Using a logic of complementarity (VofC), this 
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chapter suggested that there are institutional externalia (effects which a specific institution 
may exploit) not only in other institutions, but also in various political and economic 
processes which therefore contribute not only to institutional stability as assumed by VofC 
but, in their changing nature, to institutional change. Using a logic of embeddedness (NIE), 
this chapter further suggested to that these drivers are mutually contextualized according to 
the timeframes necessary for each driver to develop. The long-term processes of technological 
change and institutional frameworks (considered here as institutional starting points) provide 
the context for mid-term processes of developmental strategy, trade relations, the systemic 
cycle and changing power relations which in turn provide the context for the short-term 
processes of formal electoral politics and transnational conditionality.  
All of these together provide three distinct but overlapping channels of institutional change. 
Firstly, the institutional starting position provides path dependence, influencing the process of 
change in the direction of existing institutional arrangements. This is the channel emphasized 
by historical institutionalism and VofC. We have argued that it can only explain exogenous 
institutional change and is therefore insufficient in and of itself. Secondly, the formal political 
power channel (provided by national electoral politics and transnational conditionality), which 
attempts to enact reforms to directly change institutions. This channel has been traditionally 
emphasized by political science (rational choice, public choice, international relations and 
foreign policy, Europeanization, coercive isomorphism…). We have developed a logic of 
temporal embeddedness of institutional change drivers to show the problems which this 
channel would face in providing efficient change if it existed in isolation. The third channel is 
the complex interaction of various institutional drivers putting the power relations and the 
systemic cycle in its center. We have suggested that the inclusion of systemic cycle theory 
allows us to predict the changes in political power of labor through several processes. The 
phase of the systemic cycle influences power resources as material expansion creates a greater 
structural power as it tends to increase the structural importance to the manufactured goods 
producers and financial expansion tends to reduce structural power as it decreases the 
structural importance of these workers. Developmental strategies are attempts at maneuvering 
the phases of the systemic cycles by specific aggregate demand management regimes which 
may initially reflect the high (intensive strategy) or low (extensive strategies) resources of 
labor but also influence trade. Finally, trade relations contribute in a similar way, as export 
increases tend to favor the structural power of manufacturing labor and vice versa. The power 
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resources of labor can in turn influence either the formal legislative politics or more likely use 
the less formal structured interactions (e.g. collective bargaining) to influence the 
developmental strategies. Developmental strategies are themselves attempts at 
institutionalizing labor-friendly and domestic market oriented intensive regimes or 
alternatively export market oriented extensive regimes. If successful, the developmental 
strategies provide the third channel of institutional change. 
Finally, the chapter explained the choice of observed institutions, cases and the timeframe for 
the use of the three following chapters. Labor institutions are important because of their 
interactions with labor power, income distribution and trade relations. This makes them an 
adequate subject for the illustration of the systemic cycle led framework of institutional 
change. The choice of cases of the USA, Germany and PR China reflects their positions in the 
world-system. The three cases are major economies with dramatically different institutional 
arrangements, power relations and positions within the systemic cycle, which makes them 
adequate for the illustration of a labor-oriented framework. Finally, the post-1980 period was 
chosen due to data availability and the fact that this is the timeframe in which the last 
financial expansion occurred enabling the observance of the effects of a global process on 
three divergent national institutional settings. 
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Chapter 5: Labor Market in United States of America 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter will use the framework of institutional change outlined in the previous chapter an 
apply it to a case study of US labor institutions. Firstly, we will research the institutions in 
their formal, informal and avoidable iterations. In short, the USA is a political-economic 
system which traditionally hinges on market based institutional solutions to social and 
economic issues. As shown in Chapter 2, this is a trait it shares with other developed countries 
with a Common Law tradition (i.e. Canada, Ireland, UK, Australia and New Zealand). In 
terms of labor institutions this suggests the absence of strong unions, low peak levels of 
collective bargaining, flexible labor laws etc. In terms of formal institutions, this traditional 
orientation of the USA was softened in the 1930s through the labor components of the New 
Deal (Wagner Act and FLSA) which guaranteed some federal level labor rights including the 
right to collective bargaining and strike unfettered by federal courts. Many of these rights 
have been reduced in subsequent decades, and the USA is today the developed country with 
the least protected labor markets. In terms of informal institutions, the collective bargaining 
structure is decentralized and both bargaining coverage and union density, never high to begin 
with, are consistently dropping. In terms of avoidable institutions, it seems that many 
employers are able to habitually ignore even the modest regulation in place. Also, a potential 
result is a very high income inequality, with no strong union presence to cause similar wages. 
Secondly, this chapter will examine the possible drivers of change. Institutional change in the 
case of the US labor institutions 1980-2018 seems to point to a continued deregulation of an 
already relatively deregulated system. Most importantly, this chapter will argue for the role 
that the systemic cycle and the extensive developmental strategy played in causing this type 
of stable change. 
5.2. Labor institutions in USA 
Douglass North offered a very useful definition of institutions, according to which institutions 
should be understood through three key aspects: formal, informal and avoidable. In the 
context of the labor market, these correspond to: formal institutions (Labor Law and other 
laws governing labor organization and collective bargaining), informal institutions 
(uncodified practices in collective bargaining which may be under strong influence of power 
relations and the degree of centralization of negotiations and avoidable institutions 
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(selectively applied regulation or practice that does not follow the law). We will survey these 
in turn. 
5.2.1. Formal labor institutions 
Formal institutions are codified and enforceable materials like laws and, in precedent based 
legal systems, court decisions as well. Table 5.1. brings the formal landmark events which 
have contributed to the modern labor institutions. Some of them fall far beyond our 
timeframe, but they are either still in force, or contribute to the context of change of labor 
institutions in the USA. 
Table 5.1. History of formal changes in labor institutions on the federal level 
Year Decision/Law Explanation 
1842 Commonwealth v 
Hunt  
A court decision legalizing trade unions – before they 
would have been seen as a conspiracy to raise wages 
1890 Sherman Antitrust 
Act  
Unions in consequence understood as trusts (monopolies) 
1926 Railway Labor Act First collective bargaining in federal legislation. It still 
covers railway workers (expanded to airlines in 1936). 
These were seen as important to the economy as a whole 
and substantial efforts were made to prevent strikes 
through a complex system of bargaining. 
1932  Norris La-Guardia  Banned yellow-dog contracts (which would prevent an 
employee to enter a union) and prevented the courts to 
intervene against nonviolent labor disputes. 
1935 National Labor 
Relations Act 
(Wagner Act) 
Guaranteed the right of private sector employees to trade 
unions which could engage in collective bargaining, and 
conduct strikes. 
1938 FLSA (Fair Labor 
Standards Act) 
Prevention of oppressive child labor and the 
establishment of the right to a federal minimum wage 
(with several decisions to increase to 75 cents in 1950, 1$ 
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in 1955, 1.25$ in 1961, 1.60$ in 1966, 2.30$ in 1974, 
3.35$ in 1977, 4.25$ in 1989, 7.25$ in 2007) and an 
overtime pay of 1.5x hourly wage 
1947 Labor Management 
Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act)  
Closed shops (prevention of non-union employment) 
were banned, union shops (obligation to join unions after 
employment) were strictly regulated, and strikes were 
restricted (banned for federal employees) - an effective 
reversal of some stipulations of the Wagner Act 
1959 Labor Management 
Reporting and 
Disclosure Act 
(Landrum-Griffin 
Act)  
Established a framework for internal affairs of unions 
including the right to secret elections, and the obligation 
to submit to financial oversight 
1965 Civil Rights Act All employees must be treated equally by employers and 
unions 
1970 OSHA 
(Occupational Safety 
and Health Act) 
First effective occupational safety regulation in the US 
1974 ERISA (Employee 
Retirement Income 
Security Act) 
Pension plan minimums for private industry 
1978 FLRA (Federal 
Labor Relations Act) 
Most public sector workers guaranteed the right to 
collective bargaining which existed for private sector 
since 1935 
1993 FMLA (Family and 
Medical Leave Act) 
Guarantees the right to paid leave for family related 
illnesses or health issues to eligible employees 
1996 Small Business Job 
Protection Act 
A federal freeze on tipped employee minimum wage at 
2.13$ 
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2010 Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care 
Act (Obamacare) 
While this is not a labor regulation law, it did potentially 
significantly alter the disposable income of workers by 
creating a modern health system 
2018 Janus v. AFSCME A Supreme Court decision preventing agency shops (fees 
of non-union members for collective bargaining) in the 
public sector 
Sources: Doyle, 2017; Compa, 2014; Godard, 2009; Thelen, 2014; Tang, 2019 
As we can see from Table 5.1., the drama of formal institutional change has largely played out 
by the post-1980 timeframe that interests us. The crucial period of labor organization was the 
New Deal which brought American labor the Wagner Act which institutionalized collective 
bargaining and strikes. Already in 1947, many formal stipulations of the Wagner Act were 
repudiated by the Taft-Hartley Act, banning strikes for federal employees and closed shops 
(plants/factory floors which only employ union members) and closely regulating union shops 
(shops which accept non-members provided they become members after employment). This 
was clearly a set of anti-labor oriented regulations in the sense of curbing associational power 
of labor (i.e. the power of unions). However, the following decades brought numerous 
improvements to labor standards and worker rights (Civil Rights Act in 1965 for anti-
discrimination, OSHA in 1970 for workplace safety, ERISA in 1974 for the pensions system, 
FMLA in 1993 for family leave and Affordable Care Act in 2010 for the health system). 
These improvements did not change the general framework for labor organizing, apart from 
the FLRA in 1978 which guaranteed collective bargaining rights to federal employees52. In 
this sense, there were no substantial changes to report in the post-1980 period. In fact, what is 
conspicuous is the absence of a labor re-regulation. In 1978, the Carter administration 
narrowly failed to enact legislation intended to promote labor organization as the business 
community successfully outspent and out-lobbied organized labor in influencing the US 
Congress. The effort passed the House of Representatives but was successfully filibustered in 
the Senate (Hacker and Pierson, 2010: 127-132). The Clinton administration failed to pass its 
 
52 A smaller shift occurred in June 2018, as an important income source of public sector unions was cut off. 
Somewhat unusually from a European standpoint, US labor laws recognize the right of unions to gather dues 
from non-members as compensation from benefits derived from collective bargaining (agency shop). States may 
circumvent agency shops by passing right-to-work laws prohibiting this practice (at the time of writing, 27 states 
have opted to enact them). The recent Supreme Court ruling in Janus v. AFSCME essentially elevated the right-
to-work principle to the federal public sector level by prohibiting the application of agency-shop principle to 
public workers. This will diminish the income of public sector unions, which is relevant as the public sector is 
currently a rare bastion of union activity in the USA. 
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Worker Fairness Acts in 1993. It would have protected the striking workers from being 
permanently replaced but was likewise defeated by a Republican filibuster (Early, 2013: 82). 
Finally, another hypothetical pro-labor piece of legislation was the Employee Free Choice 
Act, which could have enabled easier organization of Unions by supplanting the restricting 
secret ballot in place since 1959 with a simpler card check. The possible effort to pass EFCA 
was essentially avoided during the Obama administration. 
We can also benefit by observing comparative instruments which can help us compare the US 
system to those found elsewhere. Consistently with our analysis, such data shows that the 
USA has had a consistently deregulated labor market, without any substantial change in the 
observed period. OECD publishes the EPL index for regular and temporary employment. The 
index for regular employment weighs items like the difficulty of dismissal, length of 
mandatory notice period and size of severance pay to gauge the levels of legal protection of 
the labor market. In the US, these levels are lowest measured by the OECD at the index value 
of 0.26 (possible values are 0-5). This is due to the fact that workers (excepting public sector 
or union members) are employed according to the at-will principle, which does not foresee the 
possibility of an unfair dismissal, barring discrimination according to creed, sex, race, 
impairments etc. There are not federally mandated notification procedures (with some state 
jurisdictions requiring service letters be issued explaining the reasons for the dismissal) and 
no legal regulations covering the right to a notice period at dismissal (OECD, 2013). 
The fixed-term EPL index weighs items like the restrictions of fixed-term and temporary 
work to types of work, restrictions on maximum duration of fixed term work and the 
maximum number of such contracts it is legal to sign. In this index, the USA is tied for the 
least protected market with Canada, UK and Ireland at the index value of 0.25 (with possible 
values also at 0-5) as there are no limits to duration or successive numbers of contracts. Both 
of these indices remain unchanged during the entire duration of the OECD time series in the 
1985-2013 period (OECD, 2017a; 2017b). An alternative index is published by the Heritage 
Foundation yearly as the labor freedom index. Heritage is a free-market-oriented policy-
advocacy group, and its conception of free labor is essentially oriented towards labor 
flexibility, i.e. the absence of labor protection. The items weighed to construct the labor 
freedom index are “Ratio of minimum wage to the average value added per worker, 
Hindrance to hiring additional workers, Rigidity of hours, Difficulty of firing redundant 
employees, Legally mandated notice period, and Mandatory severance pay” (Heritage, 
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2017a). According to this index, the USA has the most free labor market of all developed 
countries in 2017 (91.0/100 with the global average at 59.4), and globally second only to 
Somalia (Heritage, 2017b). This is in itself an all-time low since the index was first calculated 
in 2005, with values in most years fluctuating around 95% (Heritage, 2017c). Such 
fluctuations are possible as the index includes legal categories (slow to change, and as seen by 
the EPL index unchanged since 1985) as well as economic ones (average value added per 
worker, which may change rapidly). 
To summarize, formal labor institutions in the USA did not significantly change in the 
selected period. They were not and are not well suited for labor organization, and labor legal 
protection remains extremely flexible53 when compared to the rest of the world.  
5.2.2. Informal labor institutions 
Informal labor institutions are unwritten, but relatively stable ways of doing things. 
Uncodified norms, values and expected practices are all examples of informal institutions. As 
shown in Table 5.1., the conduct of collective bargaining has been legal and encouraged in the 
private sector since 1935 and in the public sector since 1978 – although such encouragement 
was less enthusiastic than in Europe. In theory, the 1930s changes in formal institutions 
created a framework of “soft corporatism” for informal institutions, but it turned to be 
“largely a mirage” (Godard, 2009: 92), as union density increased only from 13% in 1936 to 
36% in 1945 which was to prove to be the historical peak (ibid: 91). 
The level at which collective bargaining takes place is also indicative of the coordination in 
the institutional system. As we will see in the next chapter, CME countries tend to have more 
centralized levels of collective bargaining, which is conducted at the cross-industry level or 
more commonly in recent years on the level of the entire sector or industry. The cause may be 
a high union density (or share of the workforce represented by unions) which lends necessary 
legitimacy to unions, and the effect is a high bargaining coverage for both members and non-
members of unions. In the USA, the appropriate level of collective bargaining is determined 
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which seems to favor a very decentralized 
 
53 The scope of active labor market policies which contributes to the overall institutional effects in labor has also 
become increasingly diminutive. These policies have undergone an evolution from being centered on job-
creation (as late as 1960s and 1970s) through allowing for some support for training programs (1980s and early 
1990s) to their present minimalist state. ALMPs are now comparatively small and limited to a short-term 
perspective aimed at securing any form of jobs (Thelen, 2014: 120-130). Indeed, at 0.1% GDP in 2015 the public 
expenditure on active labor market policies is one of the lowest among OECD members with only Mexico at a 
lower level (OECD, 2018a). 
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structure with bargaining most often taking place at the level of the enterprise. In fact, the 
ICTWWS database invariably classifies the predominant level of collective bargaining in the 
USA as the enterprise level through the entire duration of the series 1960-2013 (Visser, 2016).  
Another type of developing practice was the openly anti-union strategies that many employers 
began to adopt in the 1970s, with delaying union certifications, calling for union 
decertification elections, moving production to the less unionized American South and hiring 
of professional anti-union management consultants (Thelen, 2014: 40-42). The result is that a 
typical NLRB union election (determining the union which is to conduct bargaining) will take 
place in the context of employer intimidation and various delays caused by expensive 
litigation (Brudney, 2005: 108). This could essentially be described as class warfare directed 
at diminishing the associational power of labor. If the unions are present, they may well be 
seen merely as drags on profitability by the employers, and obstacles to overall market 
efficiency of the firm. This view is in stark contrast to those found in CMEs as we will see in 
the next chapter.  
This system of low-strength unions combined with the militant anti-union stance of the 
employers to produce a large low-wage sector. OECD defines low wages as a proportion of 
workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings. In the observed post-1980 period, 
the lowest proportion of low-wage work was in 1983 when it stood at an already high 20.4% 
and it gradually grew to 24.9% in 201654 (OECD, 2018b). This is a very high percentage 
compared to the OECD average of 15.9% for 2016. 
5.2.3. Avoidable labor institutions 
The third Northian aspect of institutions are the avoidable ones. This is a particularly 
important element to bear in mind in the context of the US system. Elsewhere, strong unions, 
present work councils and rigid laws offer various types of protection of workers who have 
been treated unfairly. In the US, the mistreated worker (i.e. a worker whose employer has 
avoided a labor regulation) often has the expensive court system as the only recourse. This 
means that a low wage earner will not be able to react if labor rights or contractual obligations 
are not honored by the employer. It should therefore not be surprising that many low-wage 
workers report violations of their labor rights. A fairly large 2008 study surveyed 4387 
workers in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York on conditions in the week prior to 
 
54 The highest proportions were measured at 25.3% in 2010 and 2012 (OECD, 2018b). 
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questioning and found that 26% report minimum wage violations, 76% of overtime workers 
report overtime violations and 70% report meal break violations. A substantial 68% of all 
workers have reported at least one pay related violation in the past week. This study suggests 
that even the low level of labor regulation in the US is easily avoided amongst the low-wage 
earners. In fact, workers often did not even attempt to fight for their rights: 50% of those who 
informed their employers of a work-place injury suffered an illegal reaction (the employer 
fired the worker for filing the claim or instructed the worker not to file it). As a result, only 
8% of the injured workers filed a compensation claim. When the workers attempted to form a 
union or made complaints to their employer or a governmental body, 43% of them 
experienced an illegal reaction with employer firing, suspending, reducing worker hours or 
pay (Bernhardt et al, 2009; see also Thelen, 2014: 45).  The worker groups most likely to 
experience the pay related violations were women and foreign-born workers, and the authors 
estimate the average loss at 15% of earnings (Bernhardt et al, 2009: 5). 
Another important area is the absence of discrimination, and the discrimination against 
women is a very visible and easily verifiable area. While there are many legal protections of 
pay equality, these are obviously avoidable to some extent. The World Economic Forum 
attempts to measure the gender wage gaps comparatively with its “The Global Gender Gap 
Index”. This index examines the gender gap in several areas: “Economic Participation and 
Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment” 
(WEF, 2016a). This index ranked the USA 45th in its 2016 index (compared to German 13th 
and Chinese 99th rank), fairing particularly poorly in political empowerment. In the survey 
rate of wage equality for similar work in which the USA ranked 66th globally with index 
score of 0.653 (WEF, 2016b). 
To summarize, the ability of employers in the USA to avoid institutions when facing 
vulnerable groups seems to be quite high. This is a side-effect of low union strength, lack of 
firm-level employee organizations intended to protect them and the prohibitively expensive 
nature of the court system – in other words a side-effect of the formal and informal 
institutional framework of the USA as a whole. 
5.3. Changes in labor institutions in USA 
The previous section has described the general state of labor institutions in the USA and the 
tendencies of change since 1980. This section will apply the framework developed in the 
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previous chapter on these changes. We will focus on the operation of the three identified 
channels of path dependence, cyclical power relations and institutional design. Chart 5.1. lays 
out the framework for US labor institutions, and the rest of the section describes the channels, 
drivers and their interactions. 
Chart 5.1. A framework of labor institutional change in USA since 1980
 
5.3.1. Channel 1: Path dependence - Institutional starting positions of USA 
The first channel of institutional change identified in Chapter 2 is path dependence as 
determined by institutional starting positions. Most of the definitions of institutions covered 
by Chapter 2 stress the stability of institutions. In other words, the best indicator of the future 
state of institutions would be the previous state of institutions. One of the channels of 
institutional stability is the power-based path dependence stressed by Pierson (2015). 
According to this perspective, power tends to accumulate as those with power have the 
C2: Institutional design 
C1: Path dependence 
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
Liberal Market 
Economy 
(LME) 
Increase in 
LME 
tendency 
Post-industrial 
shift 
Financial 
expansion 
Low and 
further 
decreasing 
labor power 
Failure to reregulate labor, 
shift of politics to fiscal 
issues 
A large trade 
deficit 
Consumption led 
growth  
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resources to influence policy outcomes which allow them to accrue more power.  In this 
sense, the USA always had relatively low union power and lacked strong coordinating 
capacities in industrial relations. The trajectory of liberalization in recent decades saw a 
collapse of existing unions and collective bargaining and erosion of real values of statutory 
minimum wages and benefits (Thelen, 2014: 37-47). This is precisely why it was repeatedly 
classified as a liberal market in various typologies (LME, Atlantic capitalism, liberal welfare 
state). This institutional starting position was the prerequisite of a pronounced and continued 
deregulation. Had the unions been stronger, they could strive to prevent this departure from an 
organized labor market. As they were already weak, the various drivers of economic change 
which pointed to a decrease in coordination could not be prevented. This interpretation 
suggests that a strong path dependent element is at play with LME structures pronouncedly 
vulnerable to direct deregulatory and/or decoordinatory tendencies. This is the reason why 
Thelen considers displacement as a typical process conveying pure deregulation or a direct 
attack on the existing institutional arrangements, largely descriptive of US liberalization 
(Thelen, 2014: 13). Considering this finding in the light of relative power of interested parties, 
it becomes clear that institutions are displaced if the defenders of status quo are considerably 
weaker than its attackers. Labor organization in the US was already weak and this enabled the 
swift disassembly of labor institutions once it was triggered (see drivers below). 
It is this dual determination that creates a conceptual confusion: starting institutions have their 
winners in those actors that accrue power through the institutional solutions. In order to enact 
pressure towards change or preservation of these institutions, policy advocates must have 
power. This point would drive us towards the conclusion that institutions are inherently stable 
– as those who are benefited by the present institutions are abler to drive change that those 
who are not. This point has been well taken by both old and new institutionalism, and the 
essential result is the dependence on exogenous change (i.e. critical junctures creating 
punctuated equilibria as shown in Chapter 2). We must move beyond this view and recognize 
path dependence in its proper context. The next segment broadens the lens in order to notice 
and endogenize further, Arrighian drivers of change. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: initial structures have a strong effect on power relations, as the initial 
institutional framework enables or restricts the functioning and the accrual of 
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resources of actors. The USA is a paradigmatic LME structure, which has very low 
labor resources and a history of decentralized bargaining. Such a system accrues 
political power of the employers rather than trade unions and the ability to influence 
institutional change is therefore concentrated beyond the reach of organized labor to 
begin with.  
b) Phase of the systemic cycle: the lack of focus on labor protection and the importance 
of industry have enabled a shift into finance expansion to take place without much 
resilience from the productive/manufacturing sector of the economy, which was 
neglected in terms of power which organized labor could muster, embedded as it was 
within it. 
c) Developmental strategy: the USA did not have a notable shift in its developmental 
strategy since 1980. The growth model was always consumption driven and labor has 
always been relatively deregulated, and the systemic cycle has already shifted to a 
finance expansion. The result is a severe drag on GDP growth, as production was in 
the aggregate kept neither for domestic nor for foreign markets and trade deficits 
soared.  
d) The result of institutional change: path dependence tends to produce institutional end-
results similar to starting positions. This was the case in the USA as the deregulating 
path was undertaken in an already relatively deregulated context, essentially 
continuing and exacerbating the free market LME tendencies in labor markets. 
 
5.3.2. Channel 2: Cyclical power-relations in USA 
Chart 5.2. outlines the second channel of institutional change. The five drivers it incorporates 
are technological change (an exogenous factor providing a long-term context), three drivers 
constituting the systemic cycle - the phase of the systemic cycle, developmental strategies and 
trade relations – and the power relations as the balance of power resources. 
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Chart 5.2. Cyclical power-relations in the US 
 
These interactions are explored in greater detail through the rest of this segment, organized by 
specific discussions of the five drivers in this channel. 
5.3.2.1. Technology and sectoral labor market structure in USA 
The second channel of institutional change is a nexus of drivers influencing labor power and 
linking it to developmental strategies and the result of institutional change. The first such 
driver is technological change. Chapter 4 explained the distinction between the cumulative 
and development aspects of technology. The cumulative aspects are a matter of technological 
innovations which enable a more efficient production and in effect, less labor used per same 
output. The developmental aspect is a matter of choosing the appropriate technology and 
implementing it. From the western perspective, the developmental aspect was a matter of 
continuous capital deepening which enabled shifts in sectoral composition of employment as 
shown in Graph 5.1. The US strategy of Taylorization (which Silver would treat as a 
technological fix) could be interpreted as one of the building blocks of the LME alternative 
(Thelen, 2014: 38). With a greater shop-floor division of labor, skill sets could be non-
Timeframe 
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Short-term 
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decrease of industrial 
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while other interests 
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Trade relations – shift 
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Developmental strategies – 
domestic debt-driven 
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specific. This rationalization of space and movement created productivity gains which were 
not dependent on high union density, corporatist structures or protective labor market 
regulation in order to function.  
Graph 5.1. Employment structure in USA 
 
Source of data: World Bank, 2019 
Taking a look at World Bank data for United States in Graph 5.1., we observe trends that can 
be expected bearing in mind the development-sectoral employment connection. The 1991-
2018 interval shows an incremental and consistent increase in the share of service and 
decrease in industry. In the US, the most recent data show 79.1% of employed work in 
services (compared to 71.7% in 1991), 19.4% in industry (compared to 25.5% in 1991), and a 
very small share of 1.4% is employed in agriculture (compared to 2.8% in 1991). 
Here we can see that the interaction of the short run luddite anxiety of losing jobs due to 
technology and the long run re-shuffling of the occupational structure. Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2017) model the effect of robots on employment and claim there are “large and 
robust negative effects of robots on employment and wages” (ibid: 36). We could claim the 
same for the effects of introduction of tractors on agricultural employment or the effects of the 
introduction of the Spinning Jenny machine on outdated weaving jobs.  
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Frey and Osborne (2013) estimate that 47% of all occupations are at a high risk of 
replacement through computerization. These losses are dominated by administrative support, 
sale and service jobs (ibid: 37). If these jobs were not replaced by others, we may have a 
significant issue with what Keynes called “technological unemployment” (Keynes, 
2009/1930: 196), which we know today under the more familiar term of structural 
unemployment. But, in spite of his usual far-sightedness, he did not foresee large shifts in 
sectoral employment as his classical essay Economic Possibilities of our Grandchildren (ibid) 
was notoriously wrong on this point. The current short-term anxiety may also be at fault. 
More relevant for our purpose, these sectoral shifts have a power related issue of attached 
union-density which is related to skill specificity, and in this sense, we must turn to plotting 
the relationships of technology and labor power. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: The ability to organize labor (associational power) and bargain 
(structural power) is far higher in industry than in the service sector. As technology 
enabled a smaller proportion of labor to work in the secondary sector, labor power 
diminished overall in the USA. 
b) Developmental strategy: technological process innovations may create incentives for 
new development models, but this did not happen in the USA. The new labor-saving 
production methods including robotics and IT can be seen as a continuation of skilled-
labor avoiding Taylorism which was omni-present as a production strategy. The 
growth model was consumption-led at least since the end of WWII, but the shifts in 
productivity eventually made it uncompetitive in foreign markets causing a greater 
role for imports in satisfying this demand. This does not yet amount to a change in the 
developmental strategy (as that was necessitated by the systemic cycle), but merely a 
change in its successfulness in terms of growth. 
5.3.2.2. Phase of the systemic cycle 
From the viewpoint of the USA, the systemic cycle describes its establishment as a mature 
economy in late 19th century and early 20th century, the significant material expansion in 
middle 20th century and its financial expansion between the signal crisis in 1973 and the 
terminal crisis in 2008 and even beyond. It would also describe the increasingly intricate 
behavior of global supply chains with the center of the world-economy moving elsewhere 
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through globalization in the long-term aftermath of the signal crisis. This gives us an 
appreciation of the assumptions of the systemic cycle theory in that the manufacturing labor 
was not as necessary for the core reproduction processes of the US economy after 1973 
(although the reduction of manufacture logically went hand in hand with the rising trade 
deficits and the rise of new global production centers). In being increasingly superfluous, the 
power of manufacturing labor to theoretically strike or organize became less of a threat, 
adding therefore to the decreasing power of labor visible in the declining union density rates. 
 
To establish the extent of financial expansion (or financialization) in the USA, we can observe 
several types of measurement, depending on the aspect we would wish to focus on (Table 
5.2.). It will perhaps suffice to show one type of measurement for every unit of analysis. 
 
Table 5.2. Financial expansion/financialization conceptualizations 
Unit of analysis  Financialization conceptualization 
Individual/household Increase of indebtedness, credit cards and mortgages.  
State/Country Second pillar pension systems, increased dependence on financial 
markets or organizations (ratings agencies, IMF, ECB...), increase of 
overall importance of stock markets (market capitalization as % of 
GDP). 
Company Generates profit in various situations (shift from real to financial 
activities), shifts in corporate governance regimes (shareholder value). 
 
Firstly, the household indebtedness has grown substantially in the financial expansion period 
as the liabilities of households and non-profit organizations were at 1.3 trillion dollars in 1980 
or 41% GDP and reached a peak in 2008 at 14.3 trillion or 97% GDP to nominally deflate and 
recover at a lower ratio to GDP at 14.7 trillion by 2016 or 79% GDP (FRED, 2017). In other 
words, we can use this type of data to observe the effect on households and, according to the 
FRED data, confirm the Arrighian systemic cycle theory. 
 
Secondly, within VofC, a great deal of importance is awarded to the way in which corporate 
finance is arranged. The firms in some economies (CME) rely on long run financing by the 
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mother-banks with a stake in the firms themselves.  The firms in other economies (LME) are 
more reliant on financial market financing and more vulnerable to fluctuation of the stock 
market. Attempts have been made from the beginning to show the difference by comparing 
market capitalization55 to GDP ratios (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 19). Graph 5.2. shows the 
developments of bank credit to private sector and market capitalization. 
 
Graph 5.2. Financing sources in USA 
 
Source of data: World Bank, 2018 (trend-line is a 5-year moving average) 
 
In the USA, the bank credit to private sector is a relatively steady indicator with the minimum 
at 44.2% in 1993 (an all-time low in the time series was in the starting 40.7% in 1961) the 
maximum at 59.8% in 2008, and a 10% decrease as a consequence of the intervening credit 
crunch/recession. The market capitalization ratio is much higher and much more volatile with 
the last 20 years mostly staying in the 80-140% range (with an all-time maximum in 1999 at 
172.1% after a pronounced growth since 1994 and minimum in 1990 at 51.2%). These 
volatilities also correspond to the intensity of trading, the value of shares traded as a 
percentage of GDP tends to be highest during market capitalization peaks or their immediate 
aftermath (as crises by definition may also be periods of large-volume trading). Trading 
 
55 Market capitalization is the sum of all stock market listed shares prices. Ratio to GDP, even though very 
volatile, should show the comparative roles this type of financing has relative to the entire economy, particularly 
if specific market movements are averaged out and compared to other economies. 
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reached a high-point of 289.6% GDP in 2000, dropped to 139.4% in 2003, rose again to an 
incredible 321% in 2008,  and discontinuously dropped to 225.2 by 2017 (World Bank, 2018). 
These measures are in accordance with VofC theory, with the USA being the paradigmatic 
LME case, and is theoretically expected to trade stocks in a relatively volatile fashion and also 
to have stock-market financing as the most relevant source of financing (i.e. pronouncedly 
higher ratio to GDP than the banking sector). 
 
Thirdly, as already mentioned, the analysis of Greta Krippner (2005; 2011) was a direct 
attempt to follow Arrighi and complement his theory with an empirical measurement of 
corporate profits from National Income and Product Accounts. Her findings show that in the 
1950-2001 period the share of manufacturing profits dropped from around 50% to around 
10%, and that the share of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) profits climbed from 
about 10% in 1950 to about 45% in 2001 (Krippner, 2005: 179). This shows empirically what 
Arrighi meant theoretically with the flight of capital into finance. The outcome is supposedly 
a deindustrialization (as financial resources are increasingly tied into non-productive 
investments). While deindustrialization is a result of numerous factors, the days of US 
material expansion are certainly long gone. Figures of manufacturing value-added as a 
percentage show a slow and stable steady drop from 16% in 1997 (time-series beginning) to 
11.6% in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). With market capitalization recovering since the drops of 
2000-2002 and 2008 and the deindustrialization continuing its slow pace, it seems that the US 
finance-expansion is essentially continuing. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Trade relations: a financial expansion in the context of the systemic cycle suggests a 
decrease of material production translating into a widening trade deficit in the absence 
of a new growth model, which was the case in the USA. 
b) Developmental strategy: the financial expansion necessitated a new approach to 
investment compatible with a predominance of shareholder value – and therefore an 
extensive strategy. This nexus is essentially what the LME ideal-type is already 
attempting to describe. In the context of developmental strategies, the USA entered 
into an era of weak labor with weak wage growth, but high aggregate household 
consumption, plugging the difference with high income inequality (enabling high 
aggregate demand alongside a low-wage sector) and increases in personal debt. 
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c) Power relations: The USA underwent a shift from material to financial expansion 
which suggests lower structural labor power as the importance to the economy is 
reduced. 
 
5.3.2.3. Trade relations of USA 
In the systemic cycle theory, the financial expansion is synonymous with a loss of global 
predominance in production, visible in a growing trade deficit. Table 4.1. and Graph 4.1. have 
shown the empirical side of the US loss of a favorable trade position. Graph 5.3. shows 
current account balance as a rough measure of the trade balance in comparison to GDP 
growth rates. 
Graph 5.3. Current accounts in %GDP and real GDP growth in USA
Source of data: IMF, 2018 (Current account balance for 2017 is an IMF staff estimate) 
We can observe that the current account balance in the USA was generally negative in the 
period of interest to us (the only exceptions are 1980, 1981 and 1991 with miniscule current 
account surpluses). Large deficits were mostly visible in the context of substantial real growth 
(mid-1980s and mid-2000s), the tendency to diminishing the deficit was visible in the context 
of real GDP contractions (1991 and 2009). Overall, the current account deficit expanded in 
the 1980s, briefly stabilized in 1991 and then substantially and consistently grew until 2006 
(when it stood at -6% GDP) since when it readjusted to a lower level (in the range -2% to -3% 
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since 2009). To better grasp these trends, Graph 5.4. disaggregates this data on absolute 
figures of imports and exports in goods and services in current USD. 
Graph 5.4. Imports and exports of goods and services in USA
 Source of data: World Bank, 2018 
This level of data shows the deficits of the mid-1980s and mid-2000s in absolute terms – and 
can also observe that the diminishing current account deficit was largely a matter of a growing 
GDP, as both imports and exports recovered very quickly after 2009. The incentive structure 
for labor coordination and regulation under these conditions is the exacerbation of trends 
already described. In short, the fact that labor is not globally competitive leads to a trade 
deficit and a shift of domestic capital into finance. This means that a hypothetical strike of 
American manufacturing workers can no longer paralyze the economy. It can merely 
incentivize the employers to shift the production into a different location. This was the logic 
of the now somewhat anachronistic race-to-the-bottom hypothesis (as explained by Chapter 
3). Nevertheless, the power of the unions to act must in general be lower in countries with 
large trade deficits as these countries already have domestic labor which is replaceable by 
imports. So, this shift into deficits joined the other five drivers, all of which pointed in the 
direction of further commodification of US labor.  
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Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: an increase in the trade deficit suggests a decrease of relative 
importance of domestic production for the economy as a whole, and therefore reduces 
the structural power of labor. 
b) Systemic cycle phase: a shift from trade surplus to a trade deficit is a symptom of the 
financial expansion phase of the systemic cycle. 
c) Developmental strategies: the USA has kept the consumption led model in the face of 
financial expansions. This would suggest a combination of an extensive strategy in the 
context of high household demand. Income derived from wages is gradually 
supplanted by household debt and overall profits increasingly accrued in financial 
activities. Such an extensive strategy (one conducted through trade deficits) does not 
have the same effects as an extensive strategy in the context of material expansions as 
the financial expansion phase does not center on production and trade. 
5.3.2.4. Developmental strategies of USA 
As explained in Chapter 3, we have taken the Arrighian category of extensive and intensive 
regimes and construed them as supply- and demand-side developmental strategies. A supply-
side strategy hinges on low costs of labor and the export market, while a demand-side strategy 
hinges on the development of domestic markets and can therefore put a lower importance of 
low production costs. This shift from regimes to strategies allows us to move beyond simple 
determinism and see that the form in which the economic system reproduces itself, constricted 
by many drivers of change, but ultimately determined by none of them alone. The intensive 
strategy is synonymous with the Fordist regime of accumulation/Keynesian welfare state 
which typified the US economy until the 1970s, while the extensive strategy is the normative 
free market orientation since the 1970s, here explained as a consequence of the systemic 
cycle. Specifically, the development strategy takes place in the context of the phase of the 
systemic cycle: while the material expansion creates the dilemma between labor-
compensation-as-cost and labor-compensation-as-demand (as we will see in the next two 
chapters), the financial expansion faced by the USA is oriented towards profitability. This 
creates a situation in which labor is in a similar position to an extensive strategy in a material 
expansion, but the consumption is in a similar position to an intensive strategy in a material 
expansion. This is essentially the face of an extensive strategy during financial expansions. 
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Graph 5.5. shows the growing discrepancy between wage related income and domestic 
consumption. 
Graph 5.5. Divergence between consumption and wages in USA 
 Sources of data: FRED, 2017b; World Bank, 2017  
 
The graph shows two curves: the household consumption (i.e. the domestic market we could 
conflate with the position of the worker) as a percentage of GDP and wages as a percentage of 
national income. The difference in the two curves is logically made up of any domestic 
spending that is derived from non-wage-related earnings (rents, interest, debt). We can see 
that the two lines converge until the early 1970s, moderately diverged until 1980 and severely 
diverged since. In 1960 this difference was 5.6%, in 1970 it was 1.8%, in 1980 it was still 
only 3.6% and it 2015 it was at 15.2%56. In our interpretation, this is due to the intensive 
(Fordist/Keynesian) strategy favored the development of internal markets, while the extensive 
(Washington consensus) strategy favors the development of export capabilities at the 
detriment of labor costs and therefore of the domestic market. The discrepancy is made 
possible partially due to the explosion of household debt both in absolute terms and relative to 
 
56 GDP and GNI are not the same metric, and this limits the effectiveness of a direct comparison such as the one 
in Graph 5.4. However, in the case of the USA in the period shown here, they only differ by very small amounts 
with the average discrepancy in the 1960-2016 period being 0.39% (own calculation from data in World Bank, 
2017). 
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GDP (as a GDP percentage, it more than doubled in the 1984-2008 period landing on 99% 
GDP in Q1 2008; Trading Economics, 2018; FRED, 2018)57. 
This comparison also hides the increasing divergence between the low wages of workers 
whom we could imagine seeking the protection of laws and unions and the increasingly high 
wages of top managers – with the aggregate consumption not necessarily reflecting the low-
wage sector. We can confront issues of inequality in section 5.4., but for now we are 
interested merely in the aggregates – i.e. in the relative motors of growth. Graph 5.6. tracks 
the demand composition in the USA as a manifestation of the developmental strategy. 
Graph 5.6. Demand composition in USA 
 Source of data: World Bank, 2018 (Household final consumption, Gross capital formation, 
Government consumption), own calculation according to data for current US GDP and net trade in 
goods and services in World Bank, 2018 (Net trade % GDP) 
We can observe that household expenditure is by far the largest in terms of demand. Changes 
in the composition worked to accentuate this trend with household demand increased by 8.5% 
in the 1981-2016 period, investment demand decreased by 5.7% from the peak level of 1984 
to 2016 and the effect of net trade was consistently negative, at a modest -0.6% in 1992, 
gradually reached a low-point of -5.45% in 2006 and somewhat corrected to -2.7% GDP. The 
growth model has therefore been led by domestic consumption in the entirety of the 
 
57 This is essentially confirmation of the Privatised Keynesianism thesis of Colin Crouch (2009). 
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timeframe, and more so over time. However, this was largely funded by growing levels of 
debt and has resulted in a large trade deficit. 
Interaction with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: consumption-led growth in financial expansion reduces the structural 
power of labor as the material needs of employees are large but the economy itself 
does not revolve around material labor. In other words, workers need to work more 
than their employers need them to work. 
b) Trade relations: a consumption-led growth in financial expansions certainly provides 
the major contours of a large trade deficit, as domestic demand is high, and 
competitiveness is low. 
c) The result of institutional change: the effects of developmental strategy on the 
institutional result in the USA is fairly low, as the continuing neglect of labor is more 
clearly a result of path dependence. This also suggests that critical junctures are 
difficult to find in the case of US in the chosen period. However, low power of labor 
which is also an effect of developmental strategy helped steer the path-dependent 
outcome.  
5.3.2.5. Power relations in USA 
In terms of informal institutions, we deal with stable and rule-like, but unwritten outcomes. 
These are under the influence of power relations as a relatively strong labor organization 
might produce labor-friendly institutional results and vice versa. We have followed Erik Ohlin 
Wright and Beverly Silver in focusing on the two types of labor power as structural (the role 
in the economy and the consequential bargaining power) and associational power (ability to 
organize). All of the previous drivers in this channel have had a negative effect on the 
structural labor power in the USA since 1980 and this is mirrored in the diminishing 
associational power as well. As shown in Graph 5.7, the union density in the US is at an all-
time low – therefore showing very low associational power of US labor. 
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Graph 5.7. Bargaining coverage and union density in USA 
 
Source of data: Jelle Visser ICTWWS database 5.1. (Visser, 2016) – union density is composed of two 
metrics: 1960-1979 ud series, 1980-2013 ud_s series. 
This suggests that the unions as the very organizations which should embody labor power and 
fight for its interests are severely diminishing in significance – and the bargaining coverage is 
very closely following this decline. Both were in the 30-35% range in the early 1960s but are 
in the 10-15% range today. According to the ICTWWS database, union density has dropped 
significantly in the traditionally relatively highly unionized construction workers (38% in 
early 1980s, 14% in early 2010s), and manufacturing workers (35% in early 1980s, 10.5% in 
early 2010s) and remained high in public sector (36.5% in early 1980s and 35% in early 
2010s), and the overall union density dropping from 22% in 1980 to 10.8% in 2013 (Visser, 
2016). When we add to this the unchangeably decentralized structure of collective bargaining, 
we can see that the unions, although never overly powerful in the USA have come to a very 
low point in terms of power resources available to effect an institutional change. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Phase of the systemic cycle: diminished power of labor – relative to the employers - 
would have been able to influence investment decisions in the USA. These are done 
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according to the criteria of shareholder value and therefore have easily shifted towards 
financial expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. 
b) Developmental strategy: the development strategy did not change even in the face of a 
large trade deficit. The continued legitimacy of the American dream, such as it is, is 
premedicated on the seeming pro-labor quasi-intensive strategy. However, as we have 
seen, this is a matter of a continued consumption-led growth – supported increasingly 
by debt, rather than a successful development strategy. 
c) Result of institutional change: American power relations were not stacked in favor of 
labor influencing institutional change and the result seems to have been largely a result 
of path dependence, helped along by the decreasing power of labor to resist. 
 
This channel has combined the drivers of technology (shifting the structure of the labor 
marker towards occupations with lower capacity to unionize), systemic cycle phase (shifting 
towards the superfluity of easily unionized manufacturing labor), trade relations (underlined 
by the export of easily unionized labor), developmental strategy (combining a high household 
demand growth model with an anti-labor extensive strategy) and power relations in which a 
diminishing labor power is interpreted as a consequence of the previous four elements (with 
primacy given to the systemic cycle encompassing the drivers of systemic cycle phase, trade 
relations and developmental strategy). In terms of modes of change, this explanation of 
diminishing labor power as a mechanism of change in labor institutions is compatible with 
Thelen’s idea of institutional change as displacement we accentuated in the context of the 
path dependent channel of change. In the cyclical power-relations channel we can achieve a 
slight zoom-in into the mechanics of the changing power relations beyond what interested 
Kathleen Thelen. However, the central point remains untouched – the institutions have a 
specific and unambiguous path of change provided there is a significant asymmetry of power. 
Her term of displacement may suggest an abrupt change, while our analysis shows a slow 
process, but the image is still precise enough. 
5.3.3. Channel 3: Institutional design - Domestic politics and transnational 
conditionality in USA 
The third channel of institutional reform identified by Chapter 4 is the deliberate institutional 
design, and the two obvious mechanisms in such formal politics are the domestic politics and 
transnational conditionality. The politics of USA are somewhat impervious to both 
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transnational and unilateral domestic pressures, and this channel of institutional change is 
characterized by incremental reform. In terms of formal electoral and party politics, the USA 
are a democratic system with a first-past-the-post electoral system which favors a two-party 
system, as the smaller candidates (third parties) are mostly ruled out. The two modern parties 
are the Democratic Party which traditionally favored relatively more comprehensive 
regulation and social/labor rights and the Republican Party, which is relatively more free 
market oriented. On the federal level the formal US politics are conducted through the 
institutions of the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives (which are the two 
Houses of the US Congress), with relatively high levels of political powers awarded to the 
President, making it a presidential system. In the Reagan Administration (1981-1989), the 
Republican president faced a democratic majority in the House of Representatives but had a 
Republican majority in Senate for the first six years. In the George H W Bush Republican 
administration (1989-1993) the Democratic Party had majorities in both Houses. In the Bill 
Clinton Democratic administration (1993-2001), there were Democratic majorities in both 
Houses for the first two years, but the tables were turned in 1995 with the Republican Party 
winning both majorities for the rest of Clinton's time in the White House. In the George W 
Bush Republican administration, the Republican control of the Houses continued until 2007 
(apart from a complex and shifting situation in the 2001-2003 Senate, i.e. the 107th 
Congress.). The Democratic Party again dominated both houses for the 110th and 111th 
Congress (2007-2011), which was a problem for the last two years of the Bush presidency and 
a boon for the first two years of the Democratic Obama administration (2009-2017). In the 
2011-2015 period Obama lost the control of Congress but kept Senate with a thin Democratic 
majority.  In his last two years (2015-2017), Obama had to deal with a Republican Senate as 
well. The Republican Trump administration (2017-) presides over the 115th Congress with a 
double Republican majority. In the first approximation, one might expect to see real 
legislative-institutional change when these three institutions line up, neither restricting the 
others. Such windows of opportunity existed in the first two Clinton years (1993-1995 – 
103rd Congress), the middle four Bush years (2003-2007 – 108th and 109th Congress), the 
first two Obama years (2009-2011 – 112th Congress) and currently during Trump's first two 
years. If we compare this expectation with landmark decisions and legislative action in Table 
5.1., we can see that the Clinton and Obama double majority years brought two crucial 
reforms: the FMLA family leave of 1993 and a substantial reform of the health system in 
2010 – even as reforms of labor law were defeated (Worker Fairness Act in 1993) or not fully 
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attempted (EFCA in 2009). These setbacks were made possible by the practice of 
filibustering, which is an obstruction mechanism, particularly effective in the US Senate 
where a minority can prevent legislation to be voted upon by exercising the unlimited right to 
hold the floor. To prevent the filibuster on legislation, the majority must have a supermajority 
of 60 out of 100 seats in the US Senate for a procedure known as cloture. This is not a typical 
situation and has not occurred in the Senate in the timeframe of interest to us here. This 
creates a situation in which even a party which dominates the legislative procedure often has 
to compromise and build a consensus over its proposals with at least some members of the 
opposite party. Large and controversial reforms are not a likely outcome in such a system, as 
they require substantial political resources even after a very successful election. 
The membership in WTO and NAFTA and other FTA arrangements constrict the theoretical 
ability of the USA to act in the protectionist sense which, as we have seen in Chapter 3 
correlates with labor regulation. In a more direct sense, the transnational organization which is 
charged with promoting labor standards is the ILO (International Labor Organization) by the 
UN. While the USA is the largest financial contributor to the ILO at 22% of its budget (ILO, 
2017a), the ILO conditionality could not have been very strong. Out of 189 conventions of the 
ILO (8 fundamental, 4 governance and 177 technical), the USA has ratified only 14 (2 
fundamental, 1 governance and 11 technical), which testifies to its ability to ignore ILO58 
(ILO, 2017b). The size and political power of the USA make it unlikely that a transnational 
organization could effect a substantial and unwanted change in its institutions, and the relative 
powerlessness of the ILO should not be surprising. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Developmental strategy: neither formal political channel seems to have influenced the 
developmental strategy which is still focused on consumption in the face of a trade 
surplus. 
b) Result of institutional change: the specific political-institutional framework and the 
usual strategies in negotiating it have shaped the result, but only though inaction, as 
large-scale reforms of labor are difficult to imagine. 
 
 
58 To compare: Sweden has ratified 93, Russia 75, Japan 49, Slovenia 83 and Croatia 60 (ILO, 2016). 
148 
 
This channel brings us to an interesting dilemma in terms of modes of change. While we have 
accepted Thelen’s view of labor institutional change in the USA as displacement in the first 
two channels, we must now take into account an alternative conceptualization. Hacker and 
Pierson (2010) forward the notion of institutional change in US labor as a form of drift. The 
key to their finding is the fact that the formal political process found itself in a gridlock after 
1978 in matters concerning labor, which allowed for the economic processes to eat away at 
the power of the unions and no federal action to manifest itself to prevent it. The government 
has left the arena and the world changed around the old and increasingly ineffective 
institutions (ibid: 56-61). The key level for Hacker and Pierson is therefore the formal 
political level, covered here as the third channel of institutional change. At that level, they are 
correct – the conspicuous inability of a redesign of formal institutions on the federal level 
covered in segment 5.3.1. is a logical prerequisite for the effectiveness of path dependence 
and power shifts. However, the absence of a redesign of institutions that seems crucial to 
Hacker and Pierson (named channel 3 here) did not happen in a vacuum – but was itself a 
result of power relations (channel 2) within the existing set of institutions (channel 1). Also, 
labor institutions on national levels of large countries are far too complex for their change to 
be governed by a single mode of change. Thelen is right to point to displacement in describing 
the long-term shifts, while Hacker and Pierson are right to point to drift while describing the 
effects of the political process taking a shorter term to develop. This chapter has taken both 
into account within the broader logic supplying also a cyclical notion of labor-power shifts. 
Overall, the three channels in the US case of labor institutions provided a ripe terrain for the 
path-dependence dominance, inasmuch as it defined the power to influence institutional 
design and the starting position of power shifts. Chart 5.3. summarizes these liberalizing 
tendencies. 
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Chart 5.3. Lack of developmental strategy shifts in USA since 1980 
 
The period since 1980 saw no path deviations, as formal institutions saw no crucial reforms 
via formal political system (channel 3) and informal institutions developed in the context of 
diminishing labor power (channel 2). This enabled the continued development of path 
dependence (channel 1), rather than a critical juncture scenario. The tendencies already active 
since the late 1940s simply continued and intensified. It produced what we cannot recognize 
as a successful developmental strategy as the financial expansion in progress accompanied a 
vast trade deficit. The next section surveys the social results of this process. 
5.4. Social effects of labor institutions in USA 
One of the most common arguments in favor of flexible labor markets is the ostensibly lower 
unemployment rate caused by the fact that employing is easy and filled with less uncertainty. 
If a labor market is more heavily regulated, then dismissals are more complicated. Therefore, 
less regulation should cause the employers to more readily employ, as little cost is connected 
with a dismissal should the situation change. However, it also causes them to more easily 
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terminate employment when demand is low (e.g. in a crisis). Graph 5.8. shows these links in 
the case of the USA since 1980. 
Graph 5.8. The interaction of real GDP growth and unemployment in USA 
Source of data: IMF, 2019a 
 
Unemployment seems to closely respond to GDP growth in the case of the USA. There are 
four pronounced slowdowns or downturns of growth on the chart: 1982; 1991; 2001 and 
2008/09. All four were accompanied by quick and sharp increases in unemployment, which is 
in accordance with the VofC theory as outlined in Chapter 2 and with state of labor 
institutions as identified in this chapter. 
Labor institutions can also have a pronounced impact on income inequality, as strong unions 
can exert pressure towards a more egalitarian distribution of production income or even a 
more progressive tax system. An absence of strong unions can easily translate into an 
insufficiently progressive taxation or lower labor compensation. In terms of the 
developmental strategies, an intensive strategy would suggest a more egalitarian income 
structure as the Marginal Propensity to Consume tends to be higher in lower income earners 
and therefore a higher ratio of additional income will be spent in the lower income groups, 
contributing to GDP growth. A higher ratio of additional income will be saved rather than 
consumed in higher income groups contributing to capital accumulation but not directly to 
GDP growth. An extensive strategy can afford to accept this outcome as it is export oriented. 
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This is one of the reasons why an extensive strategy would involve higher inequality levels.  
The current US strategy is, however, not oriented on the material expansion (and therefore 
exports) as it occurs late in the systemic cycle, during a financial expansion. As we have seen, 
that locks the USA in a growth model which is consumption-led in the face of trade deficits. 
The rising inequality is here a consequence of the increasing importance of impatient capital 
and shareholder value orientation (displacement), unmitigated as it remains as deliberate 
reform remains out of reach (drift). 
The most commonly used measurement of income inequality is the GINI index which 
measures the inequality on an interval of 0 (perfect equality – every person earns exactly the 
same amount) to 1 (perfect inequality, only one person in a society has any income). 
Alternatively, GINI indices can be expressed on an interval of 0-100. According to World 
Bank (2017) data, the GINI index in the USA was at 34.6 in 1979, 37.5 in 1986, 38.2 in 1991, 
40.2 in 1994, 40.8 in 1997, 40.4 in 2000, 40.5 in 2004, 41.1 in 2001, 40.4 in 2010 and 41 in 
2013. In other words, an unmistakable trend of increasing inequality which increased the 
levels from moderate to pronounced income inequality. The SWIID database (Solt, 2019) 
assembles various GINI measures to produce a continuous time series ensuring greater 
comparative capabilities amongst countries. It is an unusual database in that it uses imputation 
methods, meaning it extrapolates the missing values from existing ones59. While this enables 
uniquely continuous coverage, it also may diminish the reliability of any given data point 
(particularly in countries with scarce coverage). It works well in those intervals and countries 
which are otherwise well covered and can be safely used for those in discerning general trends 
of inequality shifts. This makes it well suited for the purposes of these three illustrative 
chapters as they focus on comparative data and general patterns of change. 
  
 
59 For a comparison of available inequality databases see Ferreira, Lustig and Teles (2015). 
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Graph 5.9. Income inequality in USA - GINI 
Source of data: SWIID 8.0 (Solt, 2019) 
Graph 5.9. shows the SWIID central measures of market GINI (inequality of income before 
taxes and transfers) and disposable income GINI (after taxes and transfers). Both measures 
were steadily on the rise since 1980, with the market index climbing from 42.8 in 1980 to 
51.6 in 2017, and the disposable income index climbing from 31.6 in 1980 to 38.4 in 2017. 
While these figures seem to be lower than the World Bank estimates, the general trend of 
steadily rising inequality is even more recognizable. It is also interesting to note that the 
correction between the two indices (i.e. the effect of taxes and transfers) remains substantially 
the same since 1980 when the correction in index was -11.2, passing through -11.9 in 2000 
and ending at -13.2 in 2017. 
GINI indices are, however, not enough to meaningfully show the differences between specific 
groups, as they remain imprecise. For that, we will need to compare pre- and post-tax income 
inequality between the richest and the lower strata. Graph 5.10. shows the available data for 
national income shares of top 1% and the bottom 50% 1962-2014. 
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Graph 5.10. Pre-tax income shares in USA 
 Source of data: WID (2017)         
The benefit of observing the trends in pre-tax income is the ability to point out the distribution 
that occurs before the specific solutions in the tax system are activated. We can see that the 
pre-tax income share of the bottom 50% grew until 1980 and then began a slow decline with 
the advent of Reagan administration. The pre-tax income share of the top 1% was steadily 
dropping until 1980 and then began a sharp climb. The latest available data shown that the 
pre-tax income of the top 1% is almost twice the size of the cumulative income of the bottom 
50%. However, the USA has a progressive taxation system which tends to somewhat 
ameliorate the income differences (as we have seen comparing the pre-tax and post-tax GINI 
indices). The tax system has become riddled with various loopholes (see Steinmo, 2010) and 
its progressive capacities have been significantly reduced in importance when compared to 
the 1950s60, but it is nevertheless a progressive system. To compare its effects, graph 5.11. 
shows the post-tax income shares of top 1% and the bottom 50% in the 1962-2014 period. 
 
 
 
 
60 In 1958 the marginal tax rate for top earners was 91% (Baneman and Nunns, 2012), whereas the top marginal 
rate today is at 37%. 
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Graph 5.11. Post-tax income inequality in USA 
 Source of data: WID (2017) 
Here we can see an even sharper increase of the share of the bottom 50% until 1980 to almost 
19% of total income followed by a slow decrease to 17% in 2014. The top 1% has had a 
decrease until 1980 followed by a sharp increase of share to almost 17% in 2014. In other 
words, the net incomes of bottom 50% have grown through the 1960s and 1970s and the net 
income of top 1% has grown in the 1980s and 1990s to meet at a higher level in the 2000s, 
effectively contributing to a diminishing middle class. In income shares we can also observe 
the extent of redistribution as the pre-tax ratio for the top 1% increased by 9.5% since 1980 
and the post-tax ratio increased by a more modest 5%, while the pre-tax ratio of the bottom 
50% decreased by 3.2% and the post-tax ratio decreased by 1.7%. An additional way to frame 
these distributional issues is the comparison of wage and profits ratios, which have essentially 
followed the same patterns. The ratio of corporate profits to GDP has risen from 7.4% in Q2 
1980 to 11.2% in Q3 2018, while the ratio of worker compensation has decreased from 57.1% 
to 52.8% in the same period (FRED, 2019). This data points to the structural distribution 
effects of the shifts in power resources discussed above as the continuous decrease in 
structural and associational power is consistent with a decreased capability of labor to 
influence income inequality. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
American labor institutions have entered the 1980s as fairly flexible with a limited scope for 
labor organization. They have only continued this trend in the four decades since – and we 
have traced their movements firstly through the three Northian aspects of institutions. There 
were no major legislative innovations (formal institutions) to overturn this trend since 1980 
and the power of labor to organize and bargain continued to drop (informal institutions). This 
has created an unfortunate situation in which marginal workers are left exposed to rampant 
wage theft and other forms of unlawful conduct (avoidable institutions). 
We have used these aspects to explain this pattern of change through the framework 
developed in the previous chapter. The three channels of institutional change intertwined in 
the case of the USA to produce a labor hostile institutional environment. The three channels 
are often at odds with one another as path dependence pushes in a different direction than 
politically induced reforms or changes in power resources. This was not the case in American 
labor institutions since 1980 as the primary role was played by a virtually unopposed path 
dependence – pushing institutions in the direction of flexible and market-oriented labor. This 
continuation of labor deregulation was made possible by the formal political institutions 
which do not favor large and rapid reforms (disabling a countercurrent via the formal political 
channel) and by the inability of labor to defend its interests. This was a consequence of a 
diminishing associational and structural power of labor caused by the shift into post-industrial 
society, the financial expansion and trade deficits. In terms of modes of change, this chapter 
has offered a logic overcoming the discrepancies between the Thelen view (displacement) and 
Hacker/Pierson view (drift). The framework we utilize develops a process timeframe 
hierarchy in which it becomes apparent that both descriptions are plausible in their own 
timeframes, with displacement a long-term interpretation of the general pattern of change in 
US labor institutions and drift a short-term prerequisite for its development. 
From the viewpoint of systemic cycle theory, this continued path-dependence, even a decade 
after the terminal crisis, suggests a prolonged period of systemic chaos with uncertain end-
results in terms of paradigmatic organizations and strategies. The post-2008 legitimacy crisis 
did not produce a new social pact, and the electoral quests for change and renewed greatness 
are yet to manifest in a fundamentally different developmental strategy that could mitigate the 
adverse social effects. Our approach to institutions helped us discern the reasons for the 
prevalence of such path-dependence. However, decades of continued growth of other large 
156 
 
economies and a restructuring of global economy may construct fundamentally different 
political realities for US as well. We now turn to two possible rivals for the central position in 
the world-economy. 
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Chapter 6: Labor Market in Germany 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will apply the framework of institutional change from Chapter 4 on the labor 
institutions in Germany. As already mentioned, Germany was the paradigmatic CME case, in 
which institutional complementarities strategically coordinate the activities of unions, 
organized employers and even the companies themselves. This chapter will argue for an 
understanding of this older conception of Germany as a CME as a side product of various 
drivers of change, but primarily of a developmental strategy of intensive capitalism. This 
strategy has been seriously challenged by the past decades of experience in labor market 
dualism, and also through the astounding organizational innovation of the European Union in 
its monetary and fiscal integrations. This chapter will offer an interpretation of this innovation 
and this version of liberalization as a turn to an extensive developmental strategy. 
The first section will firstly survey the labor institutions in Germany and their changes 
through the Northian prism of institutions as formal, informal and avoidable structures. The 
second section will apply the framework to the German labor institutions and explain the 
drivers and the three channels of institutional change since 1980. The third section will 
explore the social effects of these changes. 
6.2. Changes in labor institutions in Germany 
German labor institutions have started as a prototype for the CME ideal-type structure which 
suggests high protection for well-organized and highly skilled labor. The changes in labor 
institutions since 1980 point to a dualized labor market, with the core industrial workers 
protected by formal institutions (laws and contracts) and informal institutions (relatively 
centralized collective bargaining), but there is also an increasingly large low-wage sector with 
workers without much formal or informal protection. This underprotected sector evolved 
through the use of new or increasingly employed legal means of fixed-term employment 
contracts or temp-agency work, while the original core remained protected and regulated via 
the open-ended employment contracts and strong union presence. 
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6.2.1. Formal labor institutions in Germany 
The first aspect of institutions explains the formal, codified one, where structures may be 
discerned by surveying laws and statutes. Table 6.1. shows some landmark legal moments of 
German labor history which have created the German model of industrial relations.  
Table 6.1. Landmark legal moments in German labor history61 
Year  Germany Labor 
Laws 
Explanation 
1949 Tarifvertragsgesetz Guarantees the right to collective bargaining 
1952 Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz 
Work Councils installed, giving the workers 
representation on the shop-floor (plant) level 
1969 Kundigundgschutz-
gesetz 
Additional protection from dismissals 
1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz Companies with more than 2000 employees must staff 
half of their supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) with 
workers 
1985 Beschäftigungs-
förderungsgesetz 
Fixed term contracts for newly hired employees can be 
used without specified reasons (up to 18 months), 
maximum duration of agency work increased from 3 to 
6 months (increased to 9 months in 1993 and 12 in 
1997) 
1996 Changes to 
Beschäftigungs-
förderungsgesetz 
Maximum duration of fixed term contracts is increased 
to 24 months 
2001 Job-AQTIV Maximum duration of temporary work agencies is 
increased to 24 months 
 
61 A more encompassing historical review would need to start at least in Bismarck's regulatory innovations in the 
1880s. However, the regulatory discontinuity in the German case (particularly in the 1933-1945 period) 
substantially diminishes the usefulness of such a review. We therefore limit ourselves to the post-war era. 
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2003 Hartz I  Established PSA (Personal Service Agenturen or 
Personal Service Agencies), which were supposed to 
streamline the employment of those with low skill levels 
and fund their training; it also eliminated the maximum 
duration of temporary agency work  
2003 Hartz II  Instituted variants of low-wage temporary employment 
and self-employment (Minijob, Midijob, Ich-AG). 
2004 Hartz III  Job-center reform 
2005 Hartz IV  Lowered the unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe) 
and equated them with the levels of social security 
benefits (Sozialhilfe) and shortened the timespan in 
which they could be used 
2015 Mindestlohngesetz First national minimum wage in Germany (8.5€ per 
hour; increased to 8.89€ for 2016 and 8.84€ for 2017 
and 2018) 
Sources: Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2005; Emmenegger, 2014; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; Deutsche 
Welle, 2016; Thelen, 2014; Bosch, 2018; Kirchner, Kremp and Magotsch, 2018 
The formal institutions developing after WW2 gave us the legal aspect of what VofC have 
identified as the CME economy. The “German model” that emerged hinges on the legally 
sanctioned organization of labor on many levels: on the level of the shop-floor by worker 
councils (1952), on the level of the larger company by supervisory board cooperation 
according to the Co-determination principle (1976) and on the level of the industry by unions 
and their collective bargaining (1949). All of these create the channels for strategic 
coordination of employers with organized labor. Co-determination law (Mitbestimmung) 
awards workers half the seats in the supervisory board of large companies, works councils 
protect employees on the shop-floor, and the employment legal structure as a whole awards 
generous protection for workers (e.g. terminations must in principle have a cause and notice 
periods extend to more than 7 months, depending on the years of service; see Kirchner, 
Kremp and Magotsch, 2018). 
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The period since 1980 brought a crucial departure from this model and enabled a secondary, 
less protected labor market alongside the traditional core labor market which operated in a 
world of open-ended contracts with substantial dismissal protection. This secondary labor 
market used and gradually expanded fixed-term contracts and agency work as two tools of 
marginalized labor. The expansion of the first category began in 1985 when the possibility to 
issue fixed-term contracts for up to 18 months was first legalized. This limit increased in 1996 
to 24 months, and in 2003 to 48 months for newly established companies (Emmenegger, 
2014; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). The second category also gradually expanded, with the 
maximum limit for temporary agency work slowly increasing from 3 months to 6 (1985 
reform), 9 (1993 reform), 12 (1997 reform) and finally to 24 months (2001 reform). The 
ultimate normalization of marginal labor came with the Hartz reforms of the early 2000s 
which have eliminated the limits to temporary agency work, incentivized various forms of 
self-employment and part-time work and prohibited discrimination against temporary work 
(Thelen, 2014; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). These reforms enabled a substantial deepening of 
the marginal position of non-core workers and made low-wage temporary employment more 
usual in Germany. Hartz II incentivized part time work and it substantially grew as a 
percentage of total employment (it gradually grew from 12.2% in 1983 to 19.9 in 2001 before 
the Hartz reforms to be found at 25.2% in 2006 and a very high 26.9% in 2017; Eurostat, 
2018). Hartz IV redesigned the unemployment benefits by effectively reducing the income 
available to the unemployed and the cost of the unemployment system as a whole62 
(Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2005; Thelen, 2014). At the same time, the core employment of 
open-ended contracts largely remained protected at the same standards that were prevalent in 
the previous decades. The notice periods may be very long for ordinary terminations, and 
these terminations must meet lists of social justification to be legal (for conduct, person and 
operational reasons), while special notifications are necessary to federal agencies prior to 
cases of mass dismissals (Kirchner, Kremp and Magotsch, 2018). The most important changes 
to this primary labor market came in the form of the threshold of company size at which 
 
62 The old unemployment system in Germany was very generous, with dismissed employees receiving 67% 
(provided they had dependent children, 60% if they did not) of their last-earned salary for up to 32 months (this 
was known as unemployment benefit and was financed from contributions), after which they were eligible for 
57% of their last wages (53% with no children) for an unlimited duration (unemployment assistance, financed 
from taxes). If the unemployed did not qualify (did not meet the criteria for a lack of sufficient contributions), 
they would receive the municipally financed social assistance. After Hartz IV, the first part of the program 
remained means tested and is now limited to a maximum of 12 months (18 for people over 55). After this period, 
the unemployed are limited to the lower (and fixed) levels of social assistance (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2005: 
5-7). The levels of Arbeitslosengeld II as this part of the program is now called are adjusted yearly and are set at 
416€ for a single person for 2018 (Die Bundesregierung, 2017). 
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wrongful dismissal protection kicks in and the length of the list of social justifications for 
legal ordinary termination. In 1996 the threshhold was increased from 6 to 11 employees, and 
the list of justifications for collective dismissals was introduced. Both stipulations were 
revoked in late 1998 and reintroduced in late 2003 (Emmenegger, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
protection awarded to open-ended contracts remains substantial when compared to most other 
developed countries. 
The increasingly difficult position of marginal workers eventually prompted the need for a 
minimum national wage law in 2015. This is significant as the established traditional 
collective bargaining system (which we cover under informal institutions) used to be strong 
enough to guarantee relatively high levels of wages making a national minimum wage 
superfluous. We should also note that provisions for minimum wages on the level of specific 
industries existed since the late 1990s, when concerns over the wages paid by foreign firms to 
their own nationals for work in Germany prompted this additional level of protection (Fulton, 
2015). 
Analyzing the OECD EPL data (as explained in the previous chapter), one can observe that 
the protection of regular contract employees has slightly increased in the early 1990s. The 
indicator remains at 2.58 in the 1985-1994 and then at 2.68 until 2013 (time series begins in 
1985 and ends in 2013). The temporary Employment Protection Legislation index has, on the 
other hand, had a pronounced slide from the maximum possible 5 in 1985, ranging in the 
3.13-3.25 in the 1986-1996 period, dropping further to 2 by 2002 and with the Hartz reforms 
in place dropping down to 1 until 2013 when it slightly improved to 1.13 (OECD, 2017a). 
This means that the maximally protected labor market for temporary and fixed-term workers 
has, through a series of regulatory reforms, become a very flexible market. In fact, the Hartz 
reforms enabled and incentivized an explosion of the self-employed and low-paying mini-job 
working arrangements. Alongside this severely deregulated fixed-term and temporary labor 
market, the more mainstream regular contracts remained virtually unchanged. This rift 
between traditional mainstream (open-ended) and the marginal (part-time or temporary) 
contracts is essentially the formal-institutional face of the German-labor market dualism. The 
continued high protection of traditional mainstream employment is the reason that Heritage 
index of labor freedom ranks Germany 166th of 186 states at 42.8 for 2017, interpreting it as 
“repressed” in its terminology (Heritage, 2017c). The index dropped from a somewhat “freer” 
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48.7 in 1995 (when the series began to be calculated) to a “more repressed” 39.9 in 2010, 
climbed back to 51.2 in 2015 to drop back to 42.8 in 2017.  
6.2.2. Informal labor institutions in Germany 
The formal institutions award a high level of protection to core workers, and an increasingly 
flexible market for marginal workers. However, wherever the formal institutions leave room 
for uncertainty, there is a need for informal practices to assure efficiency. A relevant example 
is the determination of severance packages in Germany. While there is a heavily codified 
procedure for ordinary termination, the justifiably terminated do not generally have the 
guaranteed right to a severance package. However, the laid off workers have recourse to 
litigation and if they can prove they were wrongfully dismissed, they have the right to be 
reinstated with back-pay. This creates an uncertainty for both the terminated employee and 
the employer, and in 80% of terminations, they mutually agree to termination instead 
(Magotsch and Kremp, 2018: 171) and agree to a severance package usually at the level of 0.5 
monthly payments per year of service (ibid: 185). This wide-spread practice can be thought of 
as an informal institution which enables terminations to avoid potentially costly and time-
consuming litigation while enabling a financial cushion for the terminated worker.  
A higher-level informal institution is the system of collective bargaining, which we have 
already covered as such in the chapter on the US labor market. The level of collective 
bargaining is a matter of willing cooperation of organized labor and organized employers. 
This makes any stable expectations of the level of such coordination an informal institution. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the USA has a very decentralized collective 
bargaining in line with its free market orientation.  
In Germany, collective bargaining is mostly conducted on the level of the industry (i.e. lower 
than the fully coordinated national cross-industrial level and higher than the US norm of the 
enterprise level bargaining). According to the ICTWSS database, the predominance of this 
level remains unchanged at least since 1960 (Visser, 2016). This is relevant as a more highly 
centralized collective bargaining suggests that a far wider sweeping coverage can be assured. 
However, it seems that this level of coordination is threatened by the increasingly low 
participation of employers in organized structures which are a prerequisite of such 
coordination (Fulton, 2015).  
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Graph 6.1. shows the relationship between union density63 and bargaining coverage in 
Germany. 
Graph 6.1. Union density and bargaining coverage in Germany 
 
Source of data: ICTWWS database 5.1 (Visser, 2016) 
 
The graph is plotted only from 1995 for bargaining coverage as the data was both 
unremarkable and not continuous prior to this year (it seems it was estimated at 85% in five-
year intervals from 1960-1990), while the union density was available for the full time series 
1960-2013. Union density has slowly fluctuated in the 30-35 range in the 1960-1990 period. 
At this time the unification of Germany and the statistical inclusion of the more heavily 
unionized DDR to the data of BRD caused a rapid increase of 4%. After 1991 the overall 
union membership has been in a slow and steady decline eventually reaching the overall rate 
of 17.7% for 2013.  Unlike the situation in the USA, however, these two curves are quite far 
apart as a result of a more centralized bargaining process in which the results of negotiation 
are applied to entire industries rather than individual enterprises, spanning a far more wide-
 
63 In 2014 there were 7.4 million labor union members in Germany. The largest labor unions in Germany are the 
industrial IG Metall with 2.3 million, and transport and services oriented Ver.di with 2 million. Both belong to 
the DGB trade union confederation with some 6.1 million members overall. The most important non-DGB 
player is the dbb confederation, which caters to more than a million members located in the public sector and 
formerly public-owned companies (Fulton, 2015). 
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reaching number of beneficiaries. Consequently, there are always 40-50% of the over-all 
labor force which is covered by the collective agreements even though they do not belong to 
any trade union. This makes the legitimacy of unions disproportionately larger that which 
could be inferred from the relatively low overall rate of union density. 
However, while German collective bargaining is strong and centralized when compared to the 
US, developments in recent years have substantially weakened its erstwhile principles. Firstly, 
as Graph 6.1. shows, the coverage has dropped by more than 20% since the mid-1990s. 
Secondly, the central contracts have an increasing tendency of delegating issues to firm-level 
bargaining (Palier and Thelen, 2010: 120). Thirdly and most importantly, the described 
changes in the formal institutions have helped create a very large low-wage sector of the 
economy, and the trade unions are beginning to recognize that their power to negotiate with 
employers in the low-wage sector has become void (Bosch, 2018: 19). Although the average 
real wage has increased by 7% in Germany in the 2006-2015 (ILO, 2016), the low wage 
sector (measured as percentage of workers earning less than two thirds of median wages) 
expanded from 13.6% in 1995 to 17.5% in 2005 and 19.4% in 2015 (OECD, 2018b). This 
data illustrates the effect of the shift into an extensive strategy of material expansion with a 
need for a low-wage regime. 
6.2.3. Avoidable labor institutions in Germany  
Unlike the USA, wage theft is unlikely in Germany, as there are numerous channels through 
which organized labor can exert influence (co-determination principle, works councils and a 
relatively centralized practice of collective bargaining expands the leverage of unions in 
industry). The rule of law is also quite strong, and the regulation is generally not 
circumvented, once in place. The World Justice Rule of Law index places Germany 6th 
globally and 8th in regulatory enforcement (WJP, 2018). 
However, there is a particular issue in avoiding a declarative part of employment laws, as 
Germany has significant issues with gender discrimination. In the 2016 World Economic 
Forum “Global Gender Gap Index” Germany had some of the best but also some very bad 
results (ranking 1st in literacy but 100th in tertiary enrollment). Contrary to VofC expectations, 
the German survey rate of wage gender equality was even poorer than in the US and China 
and it ranked 95th with the index value of 0.591 (WEF, 2016c). Eurostat data are in 
accordance with a relatively poor gender position in Germany (Eurostat measures the gender 
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gap as a “difference between average gross hourly earnings of male and female employees as 
% of male gross earnings” and shows that the German gender gap is one of the highest in EU 
and follows only Estonia and Czech Republic at 22.3%  (Eurostat, 2017). Taking overall 
earnings into account paints and even grimmer picture at 45% and Germany in 2014 better off 
only when compared with the Netherlands at 47.5% and Malta at 45.5% (Eurostat, 2016). 
According to a 2009 report by the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior 
Citizens, Women and Youth, the gender gap is far lower in former DDR than in the West (in 
2008 the gap was 6% in the East and 24% in the West; BMFSFJ, 2009: 10). “Women are 
missing in certain professions, sectors and on the upper end of the career ladder; The 
horizontal and vertical segregation of the labour market along gender lines continues to be a 
reality; Women interrupt their careers and reduce their working time for family reasons more 
frequently and for longer periods than men; Individual and collective pay negotiations have 
not yet succeeded in effectively overcoming the traditionally low evaluation of female 
dominated professions” (ibid: 11). 
This particular issue notwithstanding, Germany does not have substantial issues with 
avoidable institutions. Unlike the USA and China, the formal and informal aspects of labor 
institutions dominate, and they point to pronounced dualism. Formal institutional changes 
have increased competitiveness and lowered unemployment but provided ample room for a 
large low wage sector to develop. Informal institutional changes point to a retreat of unions 
from the low-wage, largely service-based sector. 
6.3. Explaining institutional change in Germany 
Chart 6.1. adapts the framework from Chapter 4 to the specific national context of Germany 
since 1980. This section explains each institutional change driver in turn and explores their 
mutual interactions and effects on the institutional result through the prism of our theory. 
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Chart 6.1. A framework of labor institutional change in Germany since 1980
 
6.3.1. Channel 1: Path dependence - Institutional starting positions of 
Germany 
The first channel of institutional change is path dependence, which suggests the result of 
change is dependent on the initial institutional conditions. In 2001 Germany was described as 
a paradigmatic case of a CME with its patient capital working together with strong unions and 
a vast network of coordination networks linking a well-developed vocational education 
system with firms which include workers in their management system through the legally 
mandated co-determination principle (Hall and Soskice, 2001). At first glance, such a network 
may be difficult to change to the detriment of labor as the structures representing labor are 
quite strong. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the labor institutions have changed and moved 
away from labor protection. 
C3: Institutional design 
C1: Path dependence 
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
Coordinated 
Market 
Economy 
Dualism in 
labor 
institutions 
Gradual post-
industrial shift 
Material 
expansion 
Divergent 
structural labor 
power levels 
A shift away from the labor 
constituency in the early 
2000s 
Move into a 
large surplus 
Drift from 
intensive to 
extensive strategy 
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The specific areas in which labor was made flexible is the non-manufacturing non-traditional 
employment, while the old labor institutions remained strong in the manufacturing traditional 
core, which is why many authors identify a process of dualization of labor markets in 
Germany (e.g. Palier and Thelen, 2010; Hassel, 2011; Thelen, 2014; Häusermann and 
Schwander, 2012; Eichorst and Marx, 2011; Eichorst, 2015; Pulignano, Doerflinger and 
Keune, 2017). While German industrial relations appear to remain typical of a CME invested 
in high skills, a strong social partnership in the manufacturing core of the economy with high 
unionization rates conceals low union coverage for the growing service sector. Germany also 
witnessed a substantial growth of a low-wage sector and substantial deregulation of agency 
work, fixed-term and mini jobs even as the well protected blue-collar core was preserved. 
This led Thelen (2014) to explain this specific modus of this change as drift– a tendency to 
retain old institutional solutions even as they cover a decreasing segment of the labor market, 
which has, in the German case meant a continued protection of insiders coupled with a 
disregard for new social risks on the periphery.  
This context is crucial for understanding the data provided in the description of labor 
institutions. While the EPL index for regular employment remains high (describing the well 
protected regular employment market), the EPL index for temporary employment has 
decreased from one of the highest levels measured (in 1985) to one of the lower levels in the 
time-series. While the bargaining coverage remains high, it has been subjected to decline 
compared to even higher levels in the 1980s, union density has, however, declined from 
moderate to relatively low levels. Investment in active labor market policies is at 0.63 % of 
GDP in 2011, which is far higher than that in the US (0.1%). It is, however, drastically 
surpassed by levels found in Denmark (2.1%), Sweden (1.3%), France (1%), Finland (1.0%), 
and even Hungary (0.9%) (OECD, 2017c). 
The path dependent channel of institutional change perpetuates itself in part via its effect on 
power. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it was the relatively weak and unprotected 
initial position of US labor that enabled the continued liberalization (as displacement) of the 
labor market.  On the other hand, the continued strength of German industrial labor created a 
constricted set of possible policy choices. Specifically, the institutions that emerged around 
manufacturing labor conditions (unions themselves, works councils, codetermination, 
mainstream employment arrangements, industry-level bargaining practices) were protected by 
the relatively high power of labor in industry. If liberalization of the labor market was to take 
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place, it needed to circumvent this sector and orient itself onto the activities which were left 
underprotected by the old set of labor institutions. This need for circumvention of a labor 
power bastion prevented wide-sweeping displacement and enabled drift. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: Initial structure is often path dependent though pronounced effects on 
power relations. In Germany, initial structure awarded a great importance to labor and 
was dependent on its high associational and structural power. As German 
competitiveness became an issue which prompted a top-down political reform with the 
goal of labor commodification, the power resources of labor guided the reform onto 
the under-organized outsiders. In other words, the concentrated power of industrial, 
core labor helped produce the dualistic labor system by protecting its own base. 
b) Phase of the systemic cycle: As we will see below, Germany has significantly 
developed its financial sector since 1980. However, the relative importance of patient 
capital is not in question and Germany remains embedded in its material expansion. 
The initial institutional comparative advantage of Germany focusing on production 
and manufacturing certainly helped steer the development options and keep Germany 
away from speculative predominance of the USA. 
c) The result of institutional change: path dependence of initial structures provided 
sufficient power to protect the core workers, but the end-result was dependent on the 
two other channels. 
 
6.3.2. Channel 2: Cyclical power relations in Germany 
Chart 6.2. shows the details of the second channel of institutional change we identified. The 
five constitutive drivers are technological change (treated as an exogenous factor – providing 
a long-term context), the three drivers constituting the systemic cycle – the phase of the 
systemic cycle, developmental strategies and trade relations – and the power relations as the 
balance of power resources. 
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Chart 6.2. Cyclical power relations in Germany
 
This segment will explain in greater detail the interactions of these five drivers amongst each 
other and with the rest of the framework. 
6.3.2.1. Technology and sectoral labor market structure in Germany 
The second channel of institutional change is a nexus of drivers which link into the power 
relations and help formulate the developmental strategy. The most long-term driver in this 
nexus is technological change. 
In the Western world technological progress and implementation in production generally 
meant the continuous implementation of labor saving and/or capital deepening technology, 
gradually reducing the need to employ large numbers of workers in industry. In the late 20th 
century, the trend of an overall decrease in industrial employment and increase in service 
employment became pronounced giving rise to the popularity of the post-industrial society 
thesis. Graph 6.2. shows the changing employment structure in Germany. The modern 
employment shares seem to be comparable with US levels in the early 1980s, pointing to the 
Timeframe 
Long-term 
Mid-term 
Short-term 
Technology – long-term 
exogenous shift causing a 
decrease of industrial 
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structural and associational 
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Systemic cycle phase – 
material expansion  
Power relations – 
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industrial labor, but 
vulnerable service 
sector labor 
Trade relations – shift 
into a substantial 
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the industrial core 
Developmental strategies – drift 
towards an extensive strategy 
favoring foreign demand  
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differences in developments, with the financial expansion and trade deficits in the US 
diminishing industrial workers, and the material expansion and trade surpluses enabling 
Germany to observe only a gradual decline in its sectoral share of industry.  
Graph 6.2. Germany employment structure 
 Source of data: World Bank (2019) 
Nevertheless, the general trend in the 1991-2018 period has typical of a developed economy 
and consisted of a low share of agricultural employment, as well as continually rising service 
and decreasing industry shares. Service share is at 71.6% (compared to 60.6% in 1991), 
industry is at 27.1% (compared to 36.1% in 1991), and agriculture is at a low 1.3% (compared 
to 3.3% in 1991). These figures are substantially different compared to the situation in the 
USA today as the share of the workforce in industry is 7.5% larger in Germany (at 27.1% 
compared to 19.4%).  
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: as technology changes, new methods of production are applied, and 
these may change the employment structure in the long run. This is significant, as the 
associational and structural power of labor are concentrated in industrial occupations 
and dispersed in service occupations. The prevalent trend was therefore the overall 
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weakening of labor, but to a far lesser degree than in the USA – and with the 
remaining bastion of labor power in industry.  
b) Developmental strategy: this process created the contours of a future development 
strategy which needed to take the different degrees of power into account and 
formulate a low-wage regime around the industrial workers. 
6.3.2.2. Phase of the systemic cycle in Germany 
The systemic cycle is a global process with very different national/local consequences. The 
previous chapter has shown that in the USA, the relative importance of finance has risen, and 
the relative importance of manufacture has decreased. To illustrate this, we have chosen an 
indicator from the three levels of financialization (household/state/company). Compared to 
the US levels of household debt, German consumers have tapped the credit markets to a 
considerably lesser degree. The trend has been an increase of household debt levels through 
the 1990s (at 50.9% GDP at the start of the time-series in 1991 and rising to the highpoint of 
69.9% in 2000) and then a continuous decline (gradually dropping back to 51.7% in mid-
2018), and was at 59.5% in 2008 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018a), when this indicator for US 
peaked at 97%. 
Clearly, while financialization as a process may have involved every developed economy of 
the planet, its impact was certainly not as pronounced in Germany as it has been in the USA. 
The finance markets in Germany certainly gradually developed and were helped along by 
regulatory changes since the mid-1990s intended to produce a more market-oriented financial 
system (Detzer et al, 2017: 5). Impatient capital grew in importance and the non-financial 
companies increased their financial activities in accordance with the Arrighi-Krippner 
approach to financialization (ibid: 42-49). However, this rise was not nearly as precipitous as 
in the USA, and the structural role of impatient capital remained relatively subdued despite all 
of the changes. It is perhaps sufficient to point at the relative sizes of the two types of 
financing. Graph 6.3. shows the sizes of the two prevalent sources of raising capital in 
Germany: the bank credits, which are in VofC associated with the patient capital of CMEs 
and the market capitalization associated with the impatient capital of the LMEs – both are 
shown as a GDP percentage. 
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Graph 6.3. Financing sources in Germany 
 Source of data: World Bank, 2017 (trend-line is a 5-year moving average) 
 
Unquestionably, the role of finance in general has increased, with the cumulative ratios 
reaching 100% of GDP in the late 1980s and rising to 140% in the early 2010s. In terms of 
their relative shares, Germany shows characteristics in accordance with VofC theory with the 
role of the banks surpassing that of the stock-markets by a factor of 4 in the late 1980s and by 
a factor of 2.5 in the early 201064. The role of the stock-market finance or impatient capital 
has increased, but the relative roles of banks and stock markets are essentially reversed when 
compared to the situation in the USA. Trading activity is also far lower than in the USA, as 
the value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP was in the low single digits in early 1980s, 
steadily grew to achieve the record 111% in 2008 (still only a third of the US indicator that 
year) only to equally steadily deflate to 42.4 in 2017 (World Bank, 2018).  If we take this data 
in the context of the starting institutional positions of Germany (i.e. the manufacturing core 
supported by the patient capital of large banks), we can see that the impatient finance most 
associated with the finance expansion did not take over the economy as it did in the case of 
the USA. This is also in accordance with Arrighi’s theory which stipulates the financialization 
 
64 Bank credit indicator is also not very volatile (mostly in the 100-120% range in the past 15 years), but it is 
much higher than the market capitalization ratios. These are quite volatile (continually oscillating between 30-
70%). 
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as a process originating in the old center (USA). All of this suggests that the manufacturing 
labor in Germany at the very least did not lose its importance to the economy at large as a 
result of the systemic cycle. Nevertheless, the absolute effects of financial sector development 
in Germany are not to be taken lightly as major banks have shifted towards shorter term 
investment banking and mergers and acquisitions have substantially increased compared to 
the more stagnant period of 1980s and 1990s (Lehndorff et al, 2009: 115-118; Mager and 
Meyer-Fackler, 2017). In other words, the short-termist, impatient financial sector expanded 
and became more vibrant, but the relative preponderance of long-term institutions points to a 
far more strategically coordinated market economy than that found in the USA. Data on 
manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP also suggests a continued structural 
importance of industry. The remarkable stability of this indicator shows that the value-added 
in manufacturing grows at the same pace as the German economy and the ratio oscillated only 
very slightly year-on-year (+/- less than 1% with the exception of 2009) since 1994, when it 
was at 20.9 in 1994, only to find itself at 20.7 in 2017 (World Bank, 2018). Taken together 
with data on sectoral employment and trade, this data suggests a continued material expansion 
for Germany. 
 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Trade relations: material expansion is logically connected to a trade surplus provided 
the developmental strategy is extensive (i.e. foreign market oriented).  
b) Power relations: material expansion tends to orient towards an increase in 
manufacturing, which awards a higher level of both associational and structural power 
for labor in the economy. In this sense, German industrial labor should have structural 
power needed to defend their interests.  
c) Developmental strategies: material expansions can strategically be oriented towards 
foreign markets (extensive strategies) or domestic markets (intensive strategies) with 
different economic and political effects as discussed in Chapter 3. An extensive 
strategy banks on low wages and low labor power, while an intensive strategy depends 
on domestic demand which can be achieved with sufficient wage incomes. 
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6.3.2.3. Trade relations of Germany 
Table 4.1. and Graph 4.1. have shown the empirical side of the German increase of a 
favorable trade position. This success is certainly attributable to the gradually deeper 
European integrations which have removed many trade policy tools from the arsenal of 
European peripheral states and have cemented the initial German advantage in productivity 
(for discussions of the role of a single currency in causing imbalances see Krugman, 2012; 
2013; De Grauwe P and Mongelli, 2005; Campos and Machiarelli, 2016). Graph 6.4. shows 
the relationship of GDP growth rates and current accounts65.  
Graph 6.4. Current accounts and real GDP growth in Germany 
 Source of data: IMF, 2017 
The current account of Germany has had consistent deficits from the unification until the 
introduction of the euro. This has severely constricted any direct trade rebalancing (through 
exchange rate policy or trade restrictions) and enabled only the slow type of structural reforms 
intended to make labor more competitive through reduced wages.  
Graph 6.5. shows trade in current USD, disaggregated on imports and exports of gods and 
services. 
 
65 Current account balances measure the net export positions on goods and services, net income from abroad and 
net transfers. They are used as a rough measure of trade balances. 
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Graph 6.5. Trade in goods and service 1980-2016
Source of data: World Bank, 2018 
We can observe a slow and relatively balanced growth of trade in the 1980-1995 period, a 
stagnation until 2001 and a rapid expansion after 2001, led by a growing trade surplus. The 
trade contraction of 2009 was followed by a relative recovery with the levels remaining in the 
neighborhood of those achieved prior to the crisis. 
A trade deficit reduces the relative importance of the organized workforce for the economy 
and vice versa. Germany had trade deficits in the years leading up to the introduction of the 
euro and the Hartz reforms, and a mounting trade surplus in the years since. Today, the 
current account surplus stands at a formidable 8.3% (IMF, 2017). The labor reforms in 
Germany have continued to protect the manufacturing core workers but offer decreasing legal 
and union protection to the marginal types of employment arrangements. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power relations: an increase in the trade surplus since 2001 suggests an increasing role 
of manufacturing in the economy and therefore greater structural (bargaining) power 
of labor.  
b) Transnational conditionality: a large trade surplus in a developed economy is generally 
indicative of a sufficient political pull that tends to enable avoiding transnational 
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conditionality. However, as we will see below, in German case, there is a significant 
EU dimension, embedding the international trade in a broader political context. 
c) Systemic cycle phase: Trade trend of a continuing large trade surplus points to a 
continuation of material expansion. 
d) Developmental strategies: the 1980s were a period of slowly growing trade with a 
reasonable trade surplus and the 1990s brought stagnant trade without a significant 
surplus at any time, while the period after 2001 brought an explosion of both trade and 
surplus. As we have shown, this explosion occurred in the context of changing labor 
institutions, bringing a large and flexible low-wage sector into play. These two 
developments point to a successful switch from an intensive developmental strategy to 
an extensive one. 
 
6.3.2.4. Developmental strategies of Germany 
The turn towards the dualization of German labor in combination with the new export-
oriented material expansion indicates the changes in the developmental strategy this chapter is 
attempting to establish. The labor reforms in the context of conservative fiscal and monetary 
policy during a crisis have made labor more flexible and internationally competitive, and the 
international orientation of the material expansion increased. These are essentially the 
contours of the German export led success.  
In the context preceding the euro and Hartz reforms, Germany was a corporatist welfare state 
with rigid labor markets which the institutional literature interpreted as a Coordinated Market 
Economy. Following Arrighi, we interpret this stage as an intensive developmental strategy, 
dependent as it is on the domestic markets for growth. The early 2000s brought a critical 
juncture in the form of a common currency and the punctuated equilibrium that developed 
suggests an extensive developmental strategy, primarily orientated to the EU.  
Graph 6.5. portrays the changes in household consumption as a percentage of GDP. 
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Graph 6.5. Household expenditure in Germany 
Source of data: World Bank, 2017 
High rates of household consumption would indicate an intensive developmental strategy 
during a material expansion, and low rates of household consumption (but a large export 
surplus) would suggest an extensive developmental strategy during a material expansion. 
Graph shows the trend of household expansion rising in Germany until the mid-1980s and 
then stabilizing after a small fall and stagnating until 2004 when it begins a trend of reduced 
domestic expenditure. We interpret this as a manifestation of the switch in developmental 
strategies from and intensive to an extensive one, with full implications only beginning to 
manifest. Graph 6.6. shows the evolution of the developmental strategy in Germany by 
showing the relative GDP shares of household consumption, investment and trade in goods 
and services. Graph 6.5. could illustrate the household data in detail, while 6.6 shows the 
three relevant sources of demand in relation to eachother, flattening their developments 
somewhat. 
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Graph 6.6. Demand composition of Germany 
 
Source of data: World Bank, 2018 (Household final consumption, Gross capital formation, 
Government consumption), own calculation according to data for current US GDP and net trade in 
goods and services in World Bank, 2018 (Net trade % GDP) 
 
Household consumption in Germany has historically mostly remained in the range of 56-57% 
GDP but has diminished in recent years, falling from 57.4 in 2009 to 53.3 in 2016. Investment 
has followed a general slowly falling trend most recently at 19.2% (compared to 23.9% in 
2000). Net trade has notably increased since the adoption of the euro climbing from 0.3% in 
2000 to 8% in 2016. In all, domestic demand has been reduced in recent years while the 
importance of foreign markets has increased, compatible with the shift into extensive 
strategies, as we have defined them in Chapter 3. 
Once more, prepared to interpret critical junctures as either exogenously or endogenously 
induced periods, we can see that this shift was a result if a complex interplay of drivers. The 
developmental strategy is an intersection of power relations and the systemic cycle, while its 
successfulness merits a definition of a critical juncture. If successful, a developmental strategy 
is institutionalized, meaning that it incorporates a growth model which involves high or low 
wages with high or low equality. This makes a successful development strategy a part of the 
institutional result, providing the environment for future economic processes and institutional 
changes. 
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Interaction with other drivers and the result 
a) Phase of the systemic cycle: the successful extensive strategy itself is only made 
possible in the material expansion phase of the systemic cycle, in which 
manufacturing can be profitable. The manufacturing in Germany has certainly 
remained profitable, and as we have seen above, Germany finds itself in a material 
expansion. 
b) Power relations: In principle, a shift into an extensive strategy is complementary to 
diminished structural power in the short term, but a successful extensive material 
expansion would create a greater importance of labor to the economy – and therefore 
have a feedback effect of an increase in structural power. In Germany, the sharp 
divergence of power resources proved to be crucial as labor preserved associational 
and structural capacities in the core and sacrificed the growing and underprotected 
low-wage sector to the necessities of an extensive strategy. 
c) The result of institutional change: developmental strategies are a crucial aspect of 
institutionalization of economic developments. While the shifts in formal institutions 
may represent deliberate reforms intended to increase competitiveness, its 
successfulness (as witnessed by the increase of the relative importance of net trade to 
the aggregate demand) creates an institutional solution of its own - as extensive and 
intensive strategies hinge on low- and high- wage regimes and therefore on the short 
run low- and high- labor power.  
 
6.3.2.5. Power relations in Germany 
The second channel of institutional change culminates in the relationship of power and 
developmental strategies. In terms of power relations, the interactions of organized labor and 
employers have traditionally been conducted through an essentially corporatist structure of 
trilateral negotiations (i.e. mediated by the state). Somewhat counterintuitively, the structural 
and associational power of industrial labor manifests itself in a relative lack of strikes, as 
collective agreements often prohibit a strike for its duration. The two recent notable spikes in 
strike activity (with more than 50 days per 1000 workers lost, while averages revolve around 
15) were in 2006 and in 2015 (ETUI, 2018). In both occurrences, it was the public and service 
sector workers striking, rather than the more easily organized industrial workers. 
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While this thesis focuses on labor power resources, as they can more easily be tracked and 
seem to be more susceptible to change due to various drivers, one of the valid VofC insights 
is that strategic coordination structures depend on the ability of both labor and employers to 
organize. Both labor and employer organization have faced drops in membership, but 
maintain their ability to bargain in the industrial core as discussed above. Union density has 
fallen from 35% in the early 1990s to some 18% according to the most recent data available. 
Employer organization density data is only scarcely available, but according to the ICTWS 
database, density has fallen from 63% in 2002 to 60% in 2008 and 58% in 201166 (Visser, 
2016). 
Power relations in Germany found became a matter of a conflicting dynamics where the path 
dependence of initial institutional structure assumed structurally powerful labor and enabled it 
to act (i.e. enabled high levels of associational power), but the combination of technological 
and trade related factors constricted the structural power of labor. Notably, the Hartz reforms 
circumvented the traditional tripartite consultations that would have involved labor, with 
Schroeder appointing a separate commission to devise a plan and then achieving a 
compromise with CDU/CSU for its implementation (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2005). While 
labor was circumvented, the end-result was the preservation of (both structurally and 
associationally) strong labor in the manufacturing core but its diminishing in the periphery 
(including an incentivization of contracts which have a tendency to diminish the peripheral 
wages), spelling out the power dynamics of German dualism. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Phase of the systemic cycle: the preservation of a powerful industrial bastion is 
complementary to the continuation of the material expansion. 
b) Developmental strategy: the preserved structural and associational power in the 
industrial core have modified the extensive developmental strategy by shifting the 
downwards wage pressure into the marginally employed and largely into the service 
sector. 
c) Result of institutional change: power relations may well determine the effectiveness of 
deliberate institutional design and the protection of powerful “insiders” assured their 
 
66 While no data is available for the USA or China, the German employer organization density figures are mid-to 
high. They are substantially higher than levels found in UK and most post-transition countries (except Slovenia) 
and somewhat lower than figures found in Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark and France (Visser, 2016). 
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acquiescence. However, this did not translate into a political success of the reforms as 
the very unpopular Hartz IV remains a serious issue for the legitimacy of SPD as the 
party that enacted it. 
 
The second channel of institutional change has grouped five drivers: technology (drive 
towards the service sector reduced associational power of labor), phase of the systemic cycle 
(a combination of the continued domestic material expansion in the context of global financial 
expansion – suggesting the continued importance of manufacturing labor in terms of 
structural power), trade relations (increasingly positive since the introduction of the euro, also 
suggestive of a high structural labor power in industry), the developmental strategy (a shift 
into extensive strategy suggesting diminished power in the short term to enable the strategy, 
but with long-term positive prospects via trade relations) and finally the power relations 
(crucially bifurcated between the high-power industrial labor and low-power service labor 
enabling the contradictions to resolve themselves through a dualistic arrangement). In terms 
of modes of change, the first channel described the constricted policy options due to the 
historically strong position of German industrial labor. This channel provides us with an 
explanation of the mechanisms leading to the asymmetry of power within the German labor 
and explain the context of institutional drift identified in the first channel. The developmental 
strategy that developed was a result of the need to reclaim market efficiency and the necessity 
of circumventing the labor bastion in industry, therefore leading to the dualization and the rise 
of flexibility in marginal types of employment on the periphery.  
6.3.3. Channel 3: Institutional design - Domestic politics and transnational 
conditionality in Germany 
Finally, the third channel of institutional change is the intentional institutional design through 
formal political channels. In the present case, this channel was crucial in the shift towards a 
dualistic labor market and an extensive developmental strategy. 
The first possible aspect of this channel are domestic politics. In Germany, formal party 
politics are more fluid than those found in the USA. Not unlike the USA, there is also a bi-
cameral system in Germany with the Bundestag (lower House) and the Bundesrat (upper 
House intended to defend the interests of the federal Länder). The Bundesrat has some powers 
which sometimes enable it to obstruct the legislative process in the Bundestag. The Bundesrat 
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veto against a law (Einspruch) means either that the law must merely pass the Bundestag vote 
again (if the veto was passed with more than ½ of the votes in the Bundesrat), or that it must 
pass the Bundestag vote again with a qualified majority of 2/3 of the votes (if the veto itself 
was passed with more than 2/3 of the votes in the Bundesrat). Apart from a situation where 
the party which was in opposition in the Bundestag held (or could assemble a coalition of) 
67% of the votes in the Bundesrat, the real legislative power remains vested in Bundestag, 
which in practice makes the formal process simpler in Germany when compared to the USA. 
The two most important parties are the Christian-conservative CDU/CSU67 (Christlich 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands/ Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) and the Social-
democratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). As the Germany electoral 
system is representative, more parties play a role than in the US. These two “large” parties 
have had use of smaller partners in forming coalitions, most importantly the economically 
liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) which is a traditional partner to CDU/CSU and the 
more recent Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) which partnered with SPD on two occasions. 
The sessions of Bundestag that interest us here are the 9th (1980-1983) through 19th (2017-). 
SPD was at the helm of coalitions in 1980-1983 (with FDP) and 1998-2005 (with the Greens). 
CDU/CSU was in power 1983-1998 and 2009-2013 (both intervals with FDP), and there were 
also two grand coalitions with CDU/CSU and SPD in power simultaneously in the period that 
interests us – 2005-2009 and 2013-. Unlike the party divisions in the US system, the 
economic positions in Europe tend to be more fluid. While the CDU/CSU in the Kohl era 
(1982-2002) began the liberalizing reforms that started German dualism off, and the first 
Schröder government (1998-2002) saw the repeal of Kohl’s labor reforms, it was in the SPD 
government that expanded and cemented the liberalizing tendencies (in the second Schröder 
government 2002-2005). This is counter-intuitive, considering their traditional pro-labor 
ideological positions, but it Schröder led the business-friendly fraction of SPD and was fond 
of the Third Way reorientation of social democratic parties to market based agenda. The Hartz 
reforms themselves were successful despite protests of labor unions and the traditionalist 
wing of SPD. These objections were diffused through a combination of specific 
circumstances. Firstly, the reforms did not really threaten the core workers and therefore were 
not overly dangerous to union insiders, which could opt to pick their fights (Palier and Thelen, 
2010). Secondly, Schröder was able to use a scandal concerning spurious job-placement 
 
67 Formally two parties, but with a stable cooperation regime enabling a traditional joint stance on the federal 
electoral level. 
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records as a justification for an overhaul of the labor market. He instituted the Hartz 
commission (named after its chairman Peter Hartz, who was a Volkswagen executive) a few 
months prior to the 2002 elections and campaigned on the promise to implement its 
suggestions, whatever they may eventually prove to be (Emmenegger, 2014: 234). This 
choice of a post-scandal moment of uncertainty to win the public and the pre-election period 
to prevent reactions within his party and allies was a successful strategy on Schröder’s part. 
Even though these reforms would eventually prove to be vastly unpopular and controversial, 
he succeeded in implementing a deep-cutting liberalizing reform of the German labor market. 
The macroeconomic point of these reforms was not lost on analysts. Eichhorst and Marx 
(2011) see such reforms as proof that party ideologies play a diminishing role in determining 
policy and that governments respond incrementally and slowly to economic downturns (which 
Germany was experiencing prior to Hartz). On the other hand, Beramendi et al (2015) 
interpret this move as a politically failed attempt to reorient demand from consumption to 
investment via competitiveness-oriented reforms (liberalization, retrenchment, tax-cuts). It 
has politically failed as it banked on the support of sociocultural and business professionals, 
while ignoring the labor constituency as a crucial coalitional subject for such a program (ibid: 
40-42). In any event, with the exclusion of labor from these reforms, a split between SPD and 
its traditional electoral body has been created, and SPD has failed to be reelected as the 
strongest party and has had its success limited to being the junior partner of CDU/CSU for 3 
out of 4 governments following the Hartz reforms. 
Transnational conditionality may be an enormous incentive for institutional change in specific 
conditions, but it seems that Germany did not truly need an external pressure to drive the 
specific changes that occurred. Firstly, the ILO may exert pressures (as ineffective as they 
are) towards some basic elements of labor protection and it enjoys a better formal relationship 
with Germany that it does with the USA as Germany has ratified 85 out of 189 Conventions 
(of which all 8 fundamental conventions, all 4 governance conventions and 73 of 177 
technical conventions; ILO, 2017c). However, Germany has traditionally had a far stronger 
labor protection than that these could provide.  
Secondly, there are various international pressures that may prevent a country to take the 
protectionist route. But the membership in the WTO is not crucial the German point of view 
when there is a far deeper economic integration in the form of the EU which pressures a 
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country towards an export-oriented economy – and no country benefited from this integration 
as much as Germany has. Finally, the EU may, in its modern form exert pressures towards 
conservative macroeconomic policies (and Germany has, in fact found itself in an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure in the 2009-2012 period, conditioning a lower deficit; European 
Commission, n.d.). These may have an impact on the labor market as they may prevent active 
labor market policies or fiscal stimuli which could increase the income of workers. However, 
these are a quintessentially German way of conducting macroeconomic policy (Carlin and 
Soskice, 2009), which suggests that Germany is remaking the EU and its rules in its own 
image rather than the other way around. Employment law is likewise embedded in the 
European law and there have been instances of adjustment to EU directives and regulations 
(e.g. the implementation of the European Employment Equality directive in 2006 – see 
Kirchner, Kremp and Magotsch, 2018). However, there is nothing to suggest conditional or 
coercive institutional change pressure in the context that interests us here – i.e. a shift towards 
an extensive developmental strategy68. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Developmental strategy: the deliberate institutional design of the Hartz reforms 
directly framed the shift into the extensive developmental strategy through the 
incentivization of a large low-wage sector.  
b) Result of institutional change: the final result was an interplay of these deliberate 
reforms, path dependence (awarding a continued presence of labor associational 
power) and power related issues, which enabled a structurally strong industrial core of 
organized labor. This result was a compromise shifting the costs of higher 
competitiveness onto the margins of employment and incentivizing the unemployed to 
join this margin. 
 
Unlike the first two channels, deliberate institutional design was able to change a portion of 
labor institutions outright. On a macro level, Thelen is justified to describe the labor 
 
68 EU may have a significant influence over some states in some instances. However, employment law was 
traditionally understood as a contentious area in which there was always a widespread fear of losing national-
level regulations due to external pressures. While there are several EU-level formal channels for employment 
law change (the Community method/directives, CJEU rulings, collective agreements and the voluntaristic 
European Employment Strategy), the results have been underwhelming, as only lowest common denominator 
standards can be set, generally requiring only small adjustments from only a small number of states (Rhodes, 
2015). 
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institutional changes in Germany as drift. However, once we zoom in to the short-term 
political frame of channel 3, it becomes clear that the formal labor institutions on the 
periphery of the labor market were subject to a deliberate displacement. It was not merely a 
matter of the changing conditions eating away the nominally unchanged labor institutions 
(suggestive of drift). Instead, path dependence (C1) and power relations (C2) prevented a 
change of a part of the labor institutions as the economic landscape shifted around them 
(drift), while another part of the labor institutions was actively liberalized (C3) to promote 
efficiency, competitiveness and flexibility (displacement). In fact, the three channels of 
institutional change in the German case provided a complex interplay of drivers which 
resulted in a pronounced dualism of labor markets, particularly deepening in the Schröder 
government reforms in the early 2000s. Chart 6.3. summarizes this process. 
Chart 6.3. The institutionalization of a shift to extensive strategy in Germany in the early 2000s      
 
This interplay was a combination of continued union strength (associational power) in the 
industrial core and its weakness in the (primarily service sector margins), which we’ve 
Schröder government 
liberalized the marginal 
layers of the labor market 
(C3) as labor power 
resources were substantial 
only on the core levels 
(C2) 
Institutional 
starting positions: CME 
Shift to an extensive 
developmental 
strategy 
 The distributional 
effects of these  shifts 
are also dualistic (with 
low labor power in the 
margins) and create a 
path dependence towards 
low-wages and low 
power in lower strata 
(C1)  
This critical juncture 
strengthens the dualism of 
the German labor market  
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discussed under the heading of channel 2. Schröder’s government was able to work around 
labor power in the core by liberalizing the margins through a promotion of part-time, fixed-
term and agency employment. This created a large and growing low-wage sector, which 
increased the international competitiveness of Germany. In coordination with the introduction 
of euro and a continued capacity in high value-added manufacturing, German trade surplus 
vastly expanded in the intervening years. This is why we can treat it as a critical juncture 
scenario, which successfully institutionalized an extensive developmental strategy in the early 
2000s. 
6.4. Social effects of labor institutions in Germany 
Labor institutions have a pronounced effect on the relationship of GDP growth and 
unemployment. In Graph 5.8., we could see an intimate connection of these two curves for the 
USA as flexible labor markets enable an easy employment termination process when made 
necessary by falling demand during growth downturns. Graph 6.7. shows the same for 
Germany. 
Graph 6.7. Interaction of unemployment and real GDP growth in Germany 
 Source of data: IMF, 2019a 
While unemployment rates do respond to changes in growth, they do so far more 
unpredictably and slowly than in the case of the USA. Particularly so in the years following 
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the global crisis of 2009 when the unemployment rose only slightly and only for a single year 
and then continued its trend of falling in the context of a sollidifying European project and 
extensive strategy. 
The data for individual GINI in Germany is only calculated from 2006 in the World Bank 
database, and was at 31.8 in 2006 to 30 in 2011 and rising to 31.4 in 2013 (World Bank, 
2017). This puts the income inequality at far lower levels to those found in the USA, which is 
to be expected from the paradigmatic CME case. The SWIID database once more provides a 
more encompasing data coverage. Graph 6.8. shows the disposable income and market 
(before taxes and transfers) GINI indices since 1980 for Germany. 
Graph 6.8. Income inequality in Germany - GINI 
 Source of data: SWIID 8.0 (Solt, 2019) 
Once more, the SWIID GINI indices seem somewhat lower than those found in the World 
Bank database. Both GINI trends show a steady increase, but while the disposable income 
GINI has increased from 25.9 to 29.1 (remaining a fairly equal final distribution), the market 
GINI increased more markedly from 41.2 to 52.1, which is slightly higher than the 
comparable value in the USA. In the first assessment, this may suggest that the processes 
leading to income disparity are alike in these two countries. However, the wage setting 
processes and/or negotiations are never naïve in terms of the difference between gross and net 
wages. Workers are not necesarily always paid exactly in accordance with their marginal 
productivity (as neoclassical economics would have us believe), but are rather also a product 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
disposable income GINI market GINI
188 
 
of various labor institutions as discussed above. Therefore, the most important lesson of 
Graph 6.8. is the substantial extent of correction caused by taxes and transfers in Germany (all 
of which must be taken into account when negotiating wages).  In the USA, the difference 
between these two curves remained relatively stable (with differences in the range 11.1-13.2), 
even though it showed a slight expansion of the effect of redistribution since 1980. This 
expansion is more pronounced in Germany, as the difference between two indices was at 15.3 
in 1980 to steadily grow to 23 in 2016. The latest data-point shows an incredible correction 
from 52.1 before taxes and transfers to 29.1 once redistributive mechanisms performed their 
function.  
Finally, a comparison of profit (data on total enterprise profits - Bundesbank, 2018b) and 
wage (worker compensation – Eurostat, 2019) ratios in GDP (current prices GDP - IMF, 
2018, ratios are calculated by the author) is also telling. Wage shares were at respectable 
levels in mid- and late-1990s: at 52.2% in 1997 and at 52.9% in 2000 (at which time the 
effects of the euro begin being felt as well as the effects of the new German growth model), 
after which they rapidly contracted until 2007 (at 47.6%) when the crisis and post-crisis 
recovery somewhat recovered the wage share to 50.6% in 2016. The profit ratio climbed from 
3.5% in 1997 (beginning of time-series) to 4.3% in 2000 and 6.8% in 2007, collapsed to 3.9% 
in 2009 and then stabilised at 5.2% in 2015 and estimated 6.3% in 2016. The overall pattern 
shows a substantial shift in the 2000s before 2008 (+2.5% GDP share for profits and -5.3% 
GDP for wages) and a slight softening of this trend after the crisis. The 2000-2016 period 
brought an overall structural change of -2.5% for wages and +2% for profits. These trends are 
consistent with our interpretation of a German shift into an extensive developmental strategy 
and the accompanying partial liberalisation of labor institutions.  
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to apply the framework from Chapter 4 to the specific national 
context of labor-institutional changes in Germany since 1980. All three channels of 
institutional change played important roles in determining the institutional result. 
Path dependence of initial structures created a crucial context in which a great role for both 
organized labor and organized employers was envisioned, with the state acting primarily as a 
mediator. However, this traditional tri-partite way of conducting reforms with significant 
veto-players was a consequence of an older stage in the development of power relations in 
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which levels of associational and structural labor power were higher. The second channel of 
institutional change describes the changes in power relations that created a bastion of labor 
power in industry but never built it in the growing marginal sector of the economy (largely in 
tertiary sector). This created a dualism of power which enabled the type of institutional 
reforms that took place. The third channel refers to these reforms as a result of a formal 
political process in which the Schröder government attempted restore competitiveness by 
liberalizing the labor model and therefore reducing private consumption in its growth model. 
The result was the institutionalization of an extensive developmental strategy through labor 
dualism. It was molded by all three channels with path dependency and strong industrial labor 
protecting the working core and a deliberate reform and weak marginal labor producing a 
liberalization of marginal labor with a growing low-wage sector. In terms of modes of change, 
this chapter offered an interpretation along the lines of confirming Thelen’s view of German 
labor-institutional change as drift, but only for the two longer-term channels – and argued for 
the interpretation of the deliberate institutional design as displacement. 
In observing institutional change in the USA in the selected period, a systemic cycle 
perspective should expect to see organizational/institutional changes which are the equivalent 
of the mode of the capital accumulation shifting from material to financial expansion – i.e. 
changes consistent with financialization. Institutional change in China and Germany are also 
subject to pressures from the very center of the world-systemic core – i.e. the global trade and 
development needs stemming from the fact that the primary political and military power of 
the world (USA) is financializing. In this sense, formal political reforms and power-related 
developmental strategies as well as their social effects take place in the context of the 
systemic cycle, the phase of which evidently provides different playing grounds for Germany 
and the USA, as explored by our use of institutional drivers. We must now turn to China to 
explore a third national and developmental context. 
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Chapter 7: Labor Market in PR China 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis has set out to achieve a framework of endogenous institutional change by 
reconciling conceptions of global capitalism (the world-system and the systemic cycle) and 
national capitalism (new institutionalism). One could well wonder why a people’s republic 
would be a pertinent case study in capitalism. However, China has combined the communist 
heritage, symbolical legitimation and rhetoric with several waves of marketization and 
privatization with the result of a party-led, development-oriented state capitalism. In the 
previous two chapters, we could use the VofC typology as a starting point. While the analysis 
of institutional change clearly demonstrated the limits of ideal-typical approaches, they were 
nevertheless useful as a simplified model of market functioning in the two national contexts. 
However, unlike the USA and Germany, China does not, nor did it ever, clearly conform to 
the VofC typological matrix. Instead, it is presented by its own unique set of dilemmas, closer 
perhaps to the transitional experiences in Eastern Europe than to those of old democracies 
with developed markets. Moreover, the historical, political and economic background of 
Chinese political economy obviously creates substantial rifts compared to the developed 
countries. More than a quarter century of the Mao era certainly provided its fair share of such 
rifts through the dubious developmental ideas of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Nevertheless, it was the Mao era that provided the context 
for the reforms and explosive growth that was to follow.  
In the context of labor institutions, explicit regulation was in many ways non-existent, but the 
party rhetoric insisted on the workers’ position as masters of the state and the enterprises in 
which they worked. The benefits, such as they were, were reserved for urban workers, while 
agricultural laborers in rural areas were treated as outsiders. The institutional form of this 
urban worker “mastery” was the danwei system under which the enterprise was responsible 
for organizing housing, health system, schooling, entertainment and the provision of meals for 
the benefit of the employees, who themselves could neither quit or be fired (Estlund, 2017: 
28-29). At the same time, rural workers were provided with far fewer amenities including 
only minimal health services (Lin, 2017: 65). This division was held in place by the 
household registration (hukou) system, which limited the rural-urban migration with rural 
workers only finding urban employment on temporary contract basis at a smaller pay and 
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lesser social status compared to the urban non-contract worker (Gallagher, 2005: 106). In this 
phase, the labor contract would carry a type of stigma and symbolize the outsider status. 
After Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the collapse of the Cultural Revolution, the time was 
ripe for an alternative route into modernization. The latter manifested as a pronounced turn 
toward the free markets in the Deng Xiaoping era starting in late 1978. This eventually 
propelled the Chinese system to global prominence with stable and very high and export-led 
growth rates and low unemployment. However, this Chinese approach to capitalism is still 
conducted in a de facto one-party system69 and the consequences of this far transcend the 
political system in the narrow sense. This combination may, in fact, suggest that the aggregate 
data concerning the Chinese economy presents significant challenges in the comparison with 
western developed countries in its typological scope. 
This chapter will apply the framework of institutional change from Chapter 4 to the change in 
labor institutions in China. Chapter 5 interpreted the developmental strategy in the USA as 
one which turned from an intensive one in the 1970s and now continues as an extensive 
strategy. The previous chapter interpreted the economy in Germany as an economy which has 
turned from an intensive to an extensive strategy 15 years ago. This chapter will offer an 
interpretation of the Chinese growth model as one currently changing from an extensive to an 
intensive developmental strategy. The space for collective bargaining and coordination is 
growing in recognition of the increase in structural labor power (importance of manufacturing 
to the economy as a whole and possible damage incurred by strikes). However, it is also 
constricted by the obstacles presented to labor organization (associational power), with 
independent organization being viewed as a competitor to the Party monopoly of political 
power. This chapter will firstly survey the labor institutions in China and their changes 
through the Northian triangle of formal, informal and avoidable institutions and point to their 
changes. Secondly, it will analyze the seven drivers of change identified above through their 
three channels of change (path dependence, cyclical power relations and institutional design). 
Thirdly, it will offer a view of social consequences of these shifts. 
 
69 The Communist Party of China considers the party-system of China to be a “multiparty cooperation system 
under the leadership of the Communist party” (Liu et al, 2016: 22). Apart from the CPC, there are eight more 
recognized political parties: China Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, China Democratic League, 
China Democratic National Construction Association, China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, 
Chinese Peasants and Workers' Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiusan Society and Taiwan Democratic 
Self-government League (China Internet Information Center, n.d.). 
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7.2. Changes in labor institutions in China since 1980 
The previous two chapters showed that labor institutions of the USA and Germany could not 
be understood by observing only formal institutions. In the case of China, the distinction of 
active institutions as more than merely formal is even more important. The rule of law in 
general is comparatively low in China70, and the reasons for this are multifold. They can be 
economic in nature as China has rapidly moved through its phases of market development, 
which means that the needs stemming from underdeveloped markets are sometimes still 
active or at least very recent. The reliance on informal institutions is one such need, as the 
contracting on such markets often takes the form of an interlinked relational contract (Wang, 
2014: 2-3), where many types of relations are taken into account (social, political, economic), 
which is preferred to an impersonal contract more appropriate to a developed market. 
Pronounced formal institutional constriction may therefore not be fully compatible with 
underdeveloped markets. The reasons for the greater importance of informal institutions can 
also be political in nature. China is a one-party state, which means its political power is 
monopolized to the extent that the restrictions of formal regulation could be seen as an 
unnecessary hindrance to its functioning. The top managerial, official and political positions 
intertwine, which means that the motivations which structure the activity of a person in any 
elite capacity are themselves a result of other positions as well (Hersh, 2014). To put it 
bluntly, a trade union official and a top-level manager in an enterprise may be incentivized to 
negotiate according to their career positions in the Communist party rather than according to 
their respective positions in industrial relations or according to the law followed to the letter. 
Furthermore, the Chinese history of five-year planning in the midst of political upheavals of 
the Mao era has left a legacy in which formal regulation has tended to be conflicting, 
confusing, and therefore understood as guidelines rather than something to be literally 
followed. All of this spells out the China paradox consisting of a “sustained economic growth 
without a formal institutional infrastructure” (Wang, 2014: 92). In the case of labor 
institutions, this is specifically reflected in a substantial enforcement gap (Estlund, 2017), 
where the formally proclaimed standards are seldom met in practice. 
 
70 The World Justice Project ranks China as 75th of 113th surveyed countries for 2017/18, scoring particularly low 
in the categories of constraints on government powers, fundamental rights and open government (WJP, 2018).  
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7.2.1. Formal labor institutions in China 
Nevertheless, formal standards provide the grounding for the practice and a rallying call for 
labor related activism and protests. Even when they are imperfectly enforced, they reflect the 
tendencies of political intentions and provide legitimacy to the Party as well as to the 
negotiating processes. This is why they are far from irrelevant and must be taken seriously 
and studied carefully.  
Table 7.1. briefly surveys the development of the Chinese legal structure concerning labor. 
Table 7.1. China labor regulation 
Year  Regulation Explanation 
1954, 
1975, 
1978, 
1982 
Constitution of PRC The original Constitution from 1954 did not explicitly 
recognize the right to strike, while the 1975 and 1978 
versions did so. Finally, the 1982 Constitution (4th and 
current iteration) removed the right to strike. 
1992 Trade Union Law  Guarantees the functioning of trade unions. 
1993 Regulation on the 
Handling of Enterprise 
Labor Disputes 
Guarantees the employees of all enterprises the right to 
raise complaints regarding labor disputes to local 
Labor dispute arbitration committees. 
1995 Labor Law of the 
People’s Republic of 
China 
First modern labor law which caused a move from a 
rule by administrative decisions at the level of the 
workplace and instituted the labor contract. 
2001 Labor Union Law of the 
People’s Republic of 
China 
Not mentioning strikes explicitly, this law recognizes 
that a stoppage of work at a factory should be followed 
by the mediation of unions between employers and 
employees (Article 27). 
2008 Employment Contract 
Law  
Intended to increase the number of workers covered by 
labor contracts by penalizing the abstainee. It also 
expanded the legal protection to agency workers; 
amended with effect from July 1, 2013 in order to 
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restrict the use of subcontracted and temporary labor. 
2008 Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on 
the Mediation and 
Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes 
Makes the labor dispute process less difficult to 
maneuver. 
2011 Social Insurance Law Establishes the first national social insurance 
framework. 
2013 Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on 
Entry and Exit Control 
Immigration Law 
Sources: Gallagher, 2016; Chang and Cooke, 2015; Chan and Selden, 2017; Estlund, 2017. 
We can discern two crucial points in regulatory history through which the formal labor 
institutions developed: the first bundle of laws in early-to-mid-1990s and the second one in 
2008. We should, however, note that the regulatory history briefly shown here occurred in the 
context of several waves of marketization/liberalization in China. The initial 1980s era 
brought a gradual recognition of the private sector and an opening to foreign capital, but this 
process was interrupted by the aftermath of the Tiananmen square protests in 1989 – or as 
they are known in China – the June Fourth Incident (Lin, 2017: 75-76). 
The economic reforms were stalled for three years, after which, in early 1992, Deng Xiaoping 
delivered the vastly important “southern tour speech” which reaffirmed the states commitment 
to market-based development (Ling, 2016: 3). Following Deng’s tour, the Communist Party 
held its 14th Congress in the fall of 1992. At the congress the Chinese economy was redefined 
as a “socialist-market economy” (Lin, 2017: 33-34). In the wake of these proclamations, the 
regulatory channels for a new, market based economic reality needed to be instituted. In 1992, 
the law on trade unions was passed, and in 1993 the labor disputes of all enterprises could be 
arbitrated, which provided a rudimentary form of dispute resolution. Most importantly for the 
condition of formal labor institutions, the 1995 Labor Law signified the ending of the virtually 
guaranteed life-long rights of the old socialist worker or the breaking of the “iron rice bowl”. 
It instituted a number of important legal stipulations including the need for a labor contract. 
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This was a groundbreaking moment, as it brought the establishment of a single labor regime 
intended to replace the varied and complex network of laws, regulation and directives that 
structured the labor markets of China (Estlund, 2017: 104). However, while contracts were 
necessary for the functioning of market relations, they essentially caused a reduction of rights 
of the average worker rather than their increase (Gallagher, 2016: 240-241). In reality, this 
Law was virtually unenforced (Ling, 2016: 4), and the high number of labor disputes and 
unrests were attempted to be remedied in 2008 by the National Labor Contract Law which 
disincentivized abstaining from formal contracts and a law on mediation of disputes intended 
to make the dispute process easier to maneuver (Gallagher, 2016: 241-243). The contract law 
also restricted the use of fixed-term contracts, with the effect of a dramatically increasing use 
of agency workers (in order to circumvent the stipulations of the labor laws) amounting to a 
fifth of urban employment by 2011 (Estlund, 2017: 106-108).  
These renewed initiatives attempted to strengthen the labor law and occurred in the context of 
several moves towards more coherent and modern social assistance and medical insurance 
schemes. While these are not labor regulations in the narrow sense, they are complementary 
institutions which may fundamentally change the position of workers and even their work-
related expectations. The medical insurance reforms were intended to increase coverage of 
health insurance and evolved through stages, with the rural scheme introduced in 2003, the 
urban scheme fully implemented in 2007 (having been more modestly initiated in 1998) and 
an ambitious and well financed reform in 2009 forwarded the idea of government financing in 
the provision of health services (World Bank, 2016: 1). Another important example is the 
dibao, a social assistance program that is intended to alleviate poverty. It was first piloted in 
Shanghai in 1993, covered all urban areas in 1999 and (crucially) became national in 2007 by 
fully covering the rural areas (Li and Walker, 2018). 
Formally, the workers in China are very highly protected. The Employment Protection 
Legislation index has been calculated by the OECD for China since 2008. The regular 
employment index is 3.26 and the temporary/fixed-term employment index is at 1.75 (OECD, 
2017a). This makes the labor markets far more protected by the laws governing them than 
those of Germany. However, Heritage index for labor freedom awards a much more “free” 
rating to China, estimating it as “moderately free” at 63.4% for 2017 (an end result of a start 
at 65% in 2005, a slip into the “mostly unfree” category in the 2009-2012 period with the low 
point at 53.2% and a gradual return) (Heritage, 2017c). The OECD measure would make the 
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regular employment market one of the most legally protected ones in the world. This reflects 
the ambitious nature of the 2008 laws. However, in terms of estimating actual active 
institutions, it seems that the Heritage foundation may be more realistic. To understand how 
the labor institutions in China actively function, we must turn to the informal and avoidable 
labor institutions. 
7.2.2. Informal labor institutions in China 
In keeping with the logic of informal institutions as non-codified stable activity-structuring 
elements, we have defined the collective bargaining practices as informal institutions. 
However, in the Chinese case, we must also explain the special position of the right to strike. 
As Table 7.1. showed, the right to strike was constitutionally guaranteed only in the 1978-
1982 period. However, strikes are not explicitly illegal today, and some laws implicitly 
recognize them (like the Labor Union Law of 2001), even though they do not protect or 
advocate them (Chang and Cooke, 2015: 445). Therefore, the legal stipulation that the failure 
to follow the employer’s rules is grounds for dismissal can be used against strikers (Estlund, 
2017: 142). In other words, the workers can be (and often are) legally fired as a punishment 
for participating in strikes, provided their employers have a rule prohibiting striking. The 
possibility of a strike should be a tool in the hands of organized labor – a final recourse if all 
other approaches should fail. However, trade unions in China do not initiate strikes. These 
are, rather, spontaneous affairs in which the workers organize themselves in an ad hoc 
fashion, while unions mediate between the workers and managers (Friedman, 2014; 
Gallagher, 2016; Liu and Shi, 2016; Estlund, 2017). This mediating role of unions suggests 
that unions in China occupy a very different role compared to those in Germany and the USA. 
The political power embodied in the western unions stems from the position of workers 
(scarce, necessary, abundant, superfluous), whereas this type of political power is an attribute 
of ad hoc organization in China, and the Party stands behind and constricts the activities of 
the unions. 
The legal framework for tripartite collective consultation has existed since the early 1990s 
(Trade Union Law of 1992 and Labor Law of 1995). These remain a formality in practice, or 
a “result of top-down requirements from the government or higher-level trade unions”, as the 
unions regularly accept or approve initiatives rather than negotiate labor conditions (Chan and 
Hui, 2013: 6-7). The result is that the tripartite “negotiations” seldom differ from the 
minimum legal standards (ibid). Therefore, while steps have been taken to institutionalize the 
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consultation process, the worker representatives have a dual allegiance: to the management 
and to the party, but not necessarily to the workers as well. 
It is not surprising that actual collective bargaining is not centralized and effectively takes 
place at the enterprise level (Visser, 2016). In other words, while there exists a formal 
structure of national level negotiations (the most centralized possible), the actual collective 
bargaining is conducted on the least centralized level. In other words, the prevailing approach 
to collective bargaining in China is “top-down, quota-driven, bureaucratic, and enterprise 
based” (Estlund, 2017: 136). However, there are local exceptions. The collective bargaining 
on a sectoral level in Zhejiang province was seemingly a response to a rising power of the 
workers due to a great demand for labor – although such sectoral negotiation is also far 
removed from the collective bargaining in western countries as, again, both employer 
organizations and trade unions are Party-controlled (ibid: 138, 139). In Guangdong province, 
the 2014 regulation (granted, a formal institution) was intended to promote a more substantial 
process of collective bargaining, but fell short of its intentions (Gallagher, 2017: 76). 
The result of this situation is that the ratio of workers covered by bargaining is, in fact, lower 
than union density. While the data is scarce and not continuous and therefore pointless to 
graph, the ICTWSS database shows union density at around 60% in the early 1980s, around 
70% in the late 1980s to mid-1990s and 30-43% in the 2008-2013 period, and the bargaining 
coverage rate was in the 22-39% range in the 2008-2012 period and in each specific year the 
bargaining rate was lower than union density (Visser, 2016). This is in significant contrast 
with Germany where we found 40-50% more covered by bargaining than union density (due 
to a functional and relatively centralized practice of negotiations), and even the USA where 
bargaining coverage was only marginally higher than union density (due to unions losing 
power through retreating wherever they lose their function).  
In China, unions formally organize labor and bargain at a formidable level (as measured by 
union density rates), but they actually contribute little apart from another level of party-led 
mediation between workers and management. The slack in organization is taken over by ad 
hoc organization, NGOs and legal activists which attempt to protect and promote the workers’ 
rights. However, this type of activity has been targeted in a 2015 crackdown by the police 
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(Liu and Shi, 2016: 5)71. Unlike unions, such activity creates a potential to politically organize 
outside the party and this makes such organization a potential adversary to the Party’s 
monopoly of power. In a politically monopolistic country, labor can become co-opted via 
unions, pacified via mediations or targeted as it was in 2015.  
7.2.3. Avoidable labor institutions in China 
Explaining the avoidable aspect of institutions in China is crucial to understanding the 
Chinese political economy in general as well as labor institutions specifically. The mid-1990s 
have seen improvements in a more universal and less complex type of labor legislature. 
However, the consistent enforcement gap suggests that one type of complexity and confusion 
was exchanged for another. Moreover, this type of institutional structure allows for 
substantially different effects on different groups. Most importantly, the position of old, 
socialist insiders and the increasingly important migrant workers was divergent. Growth 
model in the Deng era needed to attract foreign capital in order to start massive production for 
export, which itself needed inexpensive inputs. This meant the dismantling of the old danwei 
system and a restructuring of the old state-owned industry amassed in the northeast of the 
country. Also, it meant the expansion of production particularly in the southern coastal 
regions through a loosening of the hukou system in order to attract migrant workers. The first 
became the Chinese rustbelt and the second became the Chinese sunbelt (Lee, 2007). The 
grievances of workers from the rustbelt were tied to the loss of insider status through contract 
law and the possibility of being laid off, while the grievances of workers of the sunbelt 
concerned the alarmingly inappropriate working conditions in a widening enforcement gap 
(Estlund, 2017: 31-36). If the state strived to establish a regulatory presence in the rustbelt, it 
retreated before the pressing requirements of market efficiency in the sunbelt. 
Effectively, the conditions of workers in both areas deteriorated. In the rustbelt, the room for 
avoidable institutions slowly shrank (although, as we saw, this was a very gradual process) 
and slowly opened the old protected insider relations to the market through attempts at 
universally applied regulation. The most visible consequence of this was the massive 
privatization drive in the 1998-2001 period through which 30 million workers were laid off 
(Gallagher, 2014: 4). In the sunbelt, the room for avoidable institutions grew. Labor rights 
were habitually ignored in order to achieve a capital-friendly environment, particularly in the 
 
71 Likewise, 2015 saw a change in rhetoric at the top of the Party, with the promotion of sectoral collective 
bargaining now portrayed as a threat (Estlund, 2017: 147). 
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case of migrant workers from rural areas. These breaches include forced overtime work, 
hazardous working conditions and non-payment of wages (Lee, 2009: 4). In the period 
following the southern tour speech, the coastal areas were in the process of being turned into 
the factory of the world with the cheap migrant labor becoming a crucial input. Such a growth 
model was compatible with working conditions that included industrial injuries, occupational 
diseases and massive accidents such as fires, as well as low and late wages and extensive 
overtime (Ling, 2016: 3-4). By the mid-2000s the situation has improved somewhat with 
labor intensity declining and the overtime, injuries and diseases all becoming comparatively a 
smaller problem (ibid: 9). The strikes, organized through informal channels as shown, started 
to focus on the economic and distributional issues, i.e. wage labor shares in increasingly 
profitable firms. This is a fundamental change and it influences the wage regime. Wherever 
labor is able to push for larger wages, the profitability within the existing growth model may 
be called into question. This was certainly the case with China where the average real wage 
grew by 125% in the 2006-2015 period (ILO, 2016: 12). Additionally, the growing structural 
power of labor and the growing salience of their demands could also be felt in the steadily 
growing number of strikes through the 2010s72. 
While structural labor power is high, associational power remains low as there are no 
independent unions to protect the workers. There is only a state controlled all covering 
ACFTU. It is understandable that the post-corporatist functions and arrangements of unions 
expected in the west simply do not apply. Worker rights are traditionally conceived as 
individual rights and independent worker organization is seen as political, and not necessarily 
compatible with the one-party socialist system of China today. Where we would expect the 
role of the unions to be that of organizing labor from the western point of view, ACTFU 
mediates between ad hoc labor organization and management, which is clearly a 
fundamentally different role. 
Chinese labor markets show a dynamic of high formal protection with a large enforcement 
gap all tying into a dualistic labor market with low possibilities of labor organization and 
independent protection. Such a structure tends to rely on informal channels of power (within 
the party or within the society). This means that those otherwise most vulnerable will also 
 
72 There are no officially reported strike statistics and the best available methodology seems to be the monitoring 
of the media by the China Labor Bulletin, which reported 184 strikes for 2011 (first available data), 382 for 
2012, 645 for 2013, 1358 for 2014, 2774 for 2015, 2664 for 2016, 1257 for 2017 and 779 for 2018 as of early 
June (CLB, 2018). 
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become the most vulnerable in the poorly enforced area of labor rights. It should not be 
surprising that in terms of gender inequality, the situation seems convincingly patriarchal. The 
World Economic Forum “Global Gender Gap Index” ranks China 99th globally (compared to 
German 13th and US 45th rank) with women faring badly in economic participation and 
opportunity receiving the index score of 0.649 (ranking 70th) in the survey rate of wage 
equality (quite similar to the result in the US; WEF, 2016d). It seems that the most active free 
market extensive years contributed to an unequitable trend. Chen uses the Chinese Health and 
Nutrition Survey to show the dropping trend of gender inequality in the 1989-2000 period, but 
a significant rise from 2000 onward (Chen, 2011: 16). 
7.3. Explaining the labor institutional changes in China 
As in the previous two chapters, we start with applying the framework of institutional change 
to the specific national context, in this case to the Chinese institutional context in Chart 7.1.  
We then explain the logic of each driver and their mutual interactions. 
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Chart 7.1. Framework of labor institutional change in China  
 
7.3.1. Channel 1: Path dependence - Institutional starting positions of China 
The first channel of institutional change that we identified is the channel of path dependence. 
To function, this mechanism requires feedback loops which can relate to the 
distributional/power effects (historical institutionalism) or complementarity effects (VofC). In 
the case of China, power related effects are substantial as the institutional framework hinges 
on the power monopoly of the Communist Party of China, which cuts across labor relations, 
organized business, investment priorities etc. A result of this specific overarching institutional 
arrangement is that the institutional complementarities have a decidedly different nature than 
those that can be found in LME or CME structures. The elementary concepts of the Varieties 
of Capitalism approach have been formulated with stable and developed democracies in mind. 
In years since its inception the field has been expanded to a number of new countries and has 
C3: Institutional design 
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been successfully adapted to a number of post-transitional countries. Slovenia and Estonia 
were recognized as both developmentally successful and at the same time relatively 
institutionally complementary countries (Buchen, 2007; Feldmann, 2007), with Slovenia 
belonging to the CME and Estonia belonging to the LME varieties of capitalism. It has also 
been argued that Croatian institutional arrangements bear more than a passing resemblance to 
CME, even though Croatia failed to capitalize in terms of sustained economic growth 
(Bartlett, 2007; Lučev and Babić, 2013). As already mentioned, Nölke and Vliegenhart (2009) 
suggested a new variety – DME – to explain institutional complementarity in Hungary, 
Poland, Czechia and Slovakia. China has, however, presented researchers with a considerable 
challenge. In Central and Eastern Europe, countries underwent political transition (political 
liberalization, democratization) simultaneously with economic transition (economic 
liberalization, private market development, privatization). The institutional results were 
somewhat comparable with developed and stable democracies as described by Hall and 
Soskice, even if some post-transitional countries had left much to be desired. On the other 
hand, the transition in China was not multifold as it was in Europe. Markets were greatly 
deregulated, and private markets were developed, but political power was never shared. The 
Communist Party of China remained the de facto political monopolist of the political sphere, 
and this includes the domination over the labor markets with de facto only one trade union 
allowed73 – All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACTFU). A balance of power at the base 
of VofC approach is therefore not something we can expect in China – we cannot expect to 
see compromise between organized labor, organized capital and the state as all of the above 
are dominated by the Communist Party of China. Nevertheless, VofC has inspired attempts to 
analyze Chinese specific institutional complementarities, as the economic results are 
remarkable and it is worthwhile to explore possible institutional foundations. 
It is certainly insufficient to merely point to state capitalism as a label, as China has developed 
subtle and sophisticated arrangements that ensure its State Owned Enterprises are oriented 
towards profitability and internationalization (Mussachio and Lazzarini, 2016: 404). In terms 
 
73 ACTFU is formally a federation of 10 unions: All-China Federation of Railway Workers' Unions, National 
Committee of the Chinese Agricultural, Forestry and Water Conservancy Workers' Union, National Committee 
of the Chinese Aviation Workers' Union, National Committee of the Chinese Banking Workers' Union, National 
Committee of the Chinese Defense Industry, Postal and Telecommunications Workers' Union, National 
Committee of the Chinese Educational, Scientific, Cultural, Medical and Sports Workers' Union, National 
Committee of the Chinese Energy and Chemical Workers' Union, National Committee of the Chinese Financial, 
Commercial, Light Industry, Textile and Tobacco Workers' Union, National Committee of the Chinese 
Machinery, Metallurgical and Building Material Workers' Union and National Committee of the Chinese 
Seamen and Construction Workers' Union. 
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of the VofC typology, Jeanne Wilson points to a “distinctive, and arguably dysfunctional, 
dualism” of simultaneous movement towards LME-type free market policies and state-
promotion of key industrial areas (Wilson, 2007: 240) as a characteristic of Chinese 
development. Witt (2010) agrees that China does not fit neatly into either the CME or LME 
type, although it “looks much more like an LME than a CME” in many respects (Witt, 2010: 
3). Considerable challenges to institutional analysis of China are presented by several 
circumstances. Firstly, formal and informal practices considerably diverge in China, and 
secondly, private and public firms in China play by different rules, which suggests that the 
institutional complementarities are diverged within the same country (Witt and Redding, 
2014: 16-17). The coordination of state-owned firms is certainly one of the distinguishing 
features of the party-led capitalism in China. A complex pyramidal structure is expected in 
most studies with minority and majority models of government ownership being intertwined 
with the party dominated state apparatus at the top (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2016: 403). An 
attempt at VofC inspired institutional analysis concluded that China combines elements of 
predatory state (with leaders and their families enriching themselves), with elements of the 
Japan-like Asian development state (Witt and Redding, 2013). In fact, Witt and Redding 
(2013) conclude, that, apart from Japan, the Varieties of Capitalism framework cannot be 
neatly applied to Asian countries, and China is best described as an authoritarian capitalism 
within the cluster of post-transitional Asian countries. Peck and Zhang argue for a model of 
“variegated, polymorphic capitalism” (Peck and Zhang, 2013: 385) and suggest a third, 
Chinese model of capitalism alongside LME and CME varieties. This model would recognize 
among other aspects the party control of unions, segmented labor markets, tightly knit guanxi 
relational networks and state control dominating inter-firm relations, a generous financial 
support of state control firms and a lacking one for private ones (ibid: 363-364). In a similar 
vein, Nölke and his coauthors argue for yet another variety of capitalism describing the state-
permeated capitalisms (SME – State-permeated Market Economy) of China, India and Brazil 
entailing the large-scale involvement of national capital and preserving low-wage regimes in 
highly segregated work-forces and large domestic markets (Nölke et al, 2015: 539-545). 
In all, overarching party control (rather than state control) does not create the type of 
complementarity that formed the basis of VofC, where all relevant institutional arrangements 
were cyclically embedded in each other forming a path-dependent structure. In China, 
particular institutional arrangements form elements which can be changed with relative ease 
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from the top, because power is not vested in a political system dependent on elections or on 
various veto players functioning through structured interactions. It is vested in the power 
monopoly of the party, and this is the elementary fact informing path dependence in China. In 
other words, strategies, growth models, and institutional arrangements may change, but not in 
a direction overly dangerous to the power monopoly. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: As we have seen, the CCP is not willing to allow the labor to 
independently organize, with the only legal representatives being grouped in the party-
led ACTFU. This suggests that the associational power of labor in China is necessarily 
very low, which diminishes the power resources available to labor due to the need to 
preserve the political dominance of the Communist Party. 
b) Phase of the systemic cycle: the investment cycles in China are also under direct 
influence of the Party and have enabled significant over-capacity. This suggests that 
the material expansion of China could be prolonged beyond profitable levels. In other 
words, the elementary process of capital flight from material to financial expansion 
may function with a significant delay in China, as the development strategies catch on 
to the changing market circumstances. 
c) Developmental strategy: initial institutional positions do not offer a strong channel for 
a strong labor to influence the developmental strategies in a labor-friendly direction. 
However, top-down Party-led strategies can be formed as a response to external 
shocks or in recognition of a growing structural power of labor (to preserve legitimacy 
and prevent wild-cat strikes harming the production). This occurred in the past decade 
as a labor friendly developmental strategy was formulated by the CCP, encompassing 
poverty reduction, supply side reforms focusing on higher value-added production and 
the labor protection gaining important traction in the legal system. These reforms were 
increasingly significant with the shock felt in 2009 in the Chinese export markets and 
Chinese real growth slowed somewhat to the “new normal” of 6-7%. At the same 
time, the growing structural power of Chinese labor was felt in increasingly large 
illegal strikes (Honda in 2010, Yue Yuen in 2014).  
d) The result of institutional change: path dependence of initial structures provides 
pressures in the direction of existing institutional development, but in China the 
power-players are primarily located in the Party, and the business and labor elites are 
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equally intertwined with the Party. In the specific case of China, path dependence is 
reliant primarily on party monopoly of power, meaning large shifts are possible as 
long as they do not threaten this monopoly. In other words, the growing structural 
power of labor can be recognized through a new and more labor-friendly 
developmental strategy, but its associational power must be (and is) curbed as it 
represents an alternative to Party organization. 
 
As was the case in Germany, the path dependence channel builds upon a strong veto player 
and constricts the set of institutional change possibilities. In China, the ingrained asymmetry 
of power suggests that a change which does not favor the continued political monopoly of 
power of the Communist Party is not a plausible scenario. The next segment will discuss 
channel 2 and the power shifts in labor which sometimes put it at cross-ends with the path 
dependent channel. In terms of modes of change, this contradiction was resolved primarily 
through the process of layering, characterized by both localized market experiments and 
general uncertainty caused by the domination of avoidable institutions (enforcement gaps).  
7.3.2. Channel 2: Cyclical power relations in China 
Chart 7.2. shows the details of the second channel of institutional change identified here. The 
five constitutive drivers are technological change (treated as an exogenous factor – providing 
a long-term context), the three drivers constituting the systemic cycle – the phase of the 
systemic cycle, developmental strategies and trade relations – and power relations as the 
balance of power resources. 
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Chart 7.2. Cyclical power relations in China
 
7.3.2.1. Technology and sectoral labor market structure in China 
The second channel of institutional change is a complex nexus of technological changes, 
systemic cycle phases, trade relations, power relations and developmental strategies. The 
longest-term process is that of technological change. Graph 7.1. shows the relative shares of 
overall employment for agriculture (dominates in underdeveloped countries and some 
emerging markets), industry and services (dominates in developed countries). 
Timeframe 
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Short-term 
Technology – technological 
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Graph 7.1. China employment structure 
 
Source of data: World Bank, 2019 
In China, the occupational shares are slightly more dramatic than those found in developed 
economies. Agricultural share has had a notable decline since 2000, when it was at 50%, even 
though it is still at a comparably high level of 26.7%. Service share has gradually increased 
and surpassed the industrial share in 1999 and the agricultural share as recently as 2011, to 
now be found at the level of 44.6%. Industry share has reached a high-point in 2014 at 29.4% 
and has dropped off slightly to 28.6% by 2018. This dynamic is quite different than that in 
Germany and the US. Service sector overtook the industry in the late-1990s and has only 
recently surpassed the agricultural sector. This would suggest that (according to general 
trends) there was still room for the growth of urban population in forms of industry and 
service employment. However, the main motor behind these shifts was cheap rural labor 
being used as a factor in the growing of export-oriented industry on the coast. This is a 
common pattern of development, but at some point, in each country cheap rural labor dries up 
causing a rise in both rural and urban wages. This is known as the Lewis point and some 
authors have argued it has, or is about to be reached (Zhang, Yang and Wang, 2011; Das and 
N’Diaye, 2013). This is significant as it suggests a different array of available inputs with 
labor gaining more structural power through its scarcity and therefore through the diminishing 
ability of the employers to readily replace workers. 
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Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: in sharp contrast to the effects of technology in western countries, 
industrial and service sectors only recently caught up with agriculture in terms of 
employment, which is indicative of the vast possibilities of technological catch-up in 
China. Such catch-up enabled Chinese material expansion and, crucially, the increase 
of labor structural power. 
b) Developmental strategy: supply side reforms utilize the available expansion of IT and 
robotics to slowly emulate the trends prevalent in Japan, Europe and the USA – i.e. 
circumventing the increase of labor workplace structural power – itself contingent on 
the broader shift towards an intensive developmental strategy. 
 
7.3.2.2. Phase of the systemic cycle in China 
In the period of interest here, the systemic cycle of the US accumulation regime brought a 
financial expansion in the USA, accompanied by decreasing importance of national industry. 
It also resulted in mounting trade deficits which meant that the consumption on US markets 
incentivized production abroad. Therefore, while the effects on the Chinese economy may 
have been a stimulation of financial markets to some degree (e.g. as a need to accommodate 
FDI and manage production), they were fundamentally more likely to increase the efforts of 
the real economy. We can illustrate the effect by focusing on the same three levels as in the 
previous two chapters (household/state/company). In terms of household debt, the recent 
years brought a dramatic increase with household debt at 10.7% GDP in 2006, but at 49.2% in 
2017 (IMF, 2019b). These levels are far lower than those found in the USA and still slightly 
lower than those found in Germany, but the rapid trend is indicative of the Chinese “new 
normal” world. At the level of the state or entire economy, we can compare the standard 
sources of capital74. Graph 7.2. compares two types of financing: the domestic bank credits 
 
74 The very existence of a well-ordered and credit-based financial system is a significant difference between 
capitalism and socialism, with capitalism requiring risk-taking investors who can bet with loaned funds. 
However, what makes this mechanism efficient is the existence of hard budget constraints in the form of a threat 
of liquidation should such a bet prove ill advised. The socialist alternative is a centrally allocated resource 
allocation, enabling soft budget constraints in order to remain focused on plan fullfilment rather than operational 
efficiency (Pistor, Li and Chun, 2016: 353-354). In this sense, China keeps a certain soft-budget tendency in its 
banking sector, but has created a stock-market system providing a combination typical of its long-term market 
reforms. Mainland China has two stock markets – Shanghai (began operating in its current form in 1990) and 
Shenzhen (began operating in 1991). Their operations initially catered almost exclusively to state-owned 
enterprises, as the State Planning Commission selected the firms allowed to be listed. This stipulation was 
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associated with the patient capital of developed CMEs and the market capitalization rates, 
high rates of which are associated with the impatient stock-market capital of developed 
LMEs. 
Graph 7.2. Financing sources in People's Republic of China 
 Source of data: World Bank, 2017 (trend-line is a 5-year moving average) 
 
China exhibits consistently higher bank credit levels (similar to Germany, although more 
volatile), even though in 2007 the market capitalization made a remarkable one-year jump 
exceeding the bank levels. In all, the cumulative level of these two sources was at 157% in 
2003 (no data was available for market capitalizations before this date) and at 222% in 2016. 
Market capitalization spikes logically correspond to periods of more active trading. In terms 
of the ratio of traded shares to GDP, 2007 marked the high-point of 177.5%, a slowdown in 
2008 was partially recovered with the ratio of 153.2% in 2009, and these were surpassed only 
in the dangerous year of 2015 at a remarkable 355.4% (almost two thirds above the 
corresponding indicator for the US) and the most recent available data show 140.3% in 2017 
– at approximately half the value of the US indicator (World Bank, 2018). These measures are 
perhaps sufficient to validate the central point: in China, the impatient stock-market may have 
 
removed in 2000 and the privately owned enterprises steadily began to take over, becoming the majority by 2010 
(Lardy, 2014: 112-113). 
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its bubbles and crises (and apexes of trading may rise above those found even in the US), but 
its averaged relative size to GDP remains far below the US levels.  
This is an important distinction, as financializations/finance expansions can logically be 
operationalized as absolute or relative indicators. If the term was taken to be absolute, i.e. 
manifested in any increase in financial activity and/or the importance of various financial 
subjects, then any trend showing such an absolute increase could be construed as evidence of 
financialization. However, we approach financializations/finance expansions through the 
prism of the systemic cycle theory, using a relative meaning of the term. Here, a 
financialization/finance expansion is understood as a dominant phase of capital accumulation 
in relation to material expansions. The prevalence of stock-markets over banks would be a 
strong indicator of the domination of the speculative capital as envisioned by Arrighi, while a 
domination of banks over stock-markets is compatible with material expansions. In explicitly 
keeping with an Arrighian concept of financialization as a process in which real investments 
make way to financial ones, Liu and Lee (2018) use recent data on listed non-financial 
corporations and find evidence of an upward trend of Arrighi-Krippner financialization 
process in China (i.e. more financial investment for non-financial corporations). However, 
this is an absolute finding on the company level, and its expected relative systemic-cycle 
effects in terms of crowding-out manufacturing did not manifest themselves as of yet. Data on 
value-added in manufacturing expressed as a percentage of GDP shows a continued 
importance of manufacturing with 32% in 2004 (at time-series start), still at 32% in 2011, and 
slightly dropping to 29.3% in 2017 (World Bank, 2018). While this measure will presumably 
continue to drop in the decades to come (as China’s economy matures), the current level is far 
above the levels found in the USA and even Germany, showing a larger structural importance 
of the real sector. 
In other words, China is undergoing a financialization in absolute terms (rapidly rising 
household debt/GDP levels, a rising average level of market capitalization/GDP levels and 
Chinese non-financial corporations turning to financial profits) but does not display signs of a 
financialization in relative terms, as manufacturing remains very important. In terms of the 
systemic cycle theory, this state is understood as a part of a broader phase of material 
expansion. 
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Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Trade relations: material expansion through extensive developmental strategies 
suggests a trade surplus. China has had a notably export-led growth model as a basis 
of its development, and its material expansion was crucially supported by large net-
exports. 
b) Power resources: material expansion tends to promote manufacturing employment, 
suggesting more structural labor power. China has had a material expansion led by 
exports, and the structural power of its labor made itself felt through highly damaging 
(and successful) illegal strikes. The high levels of structural power made evident in 
strikes must, however, work against the low levels of associational power. 
c) Developmental strategies: the phase of the systemic cycle does not have a direct effect 
on the choice of extensive or intensive strategies. However, the exhaustion of the 
systemic cycle in the core creates a world-systemic chaos in the sense of a growing 
multi-polarity in which strategies can be formulated. The period after 1980 was a 
period of a financial expansion in the USA to which China responded with an export-
led (extensive) strategy. The post-2009 world is the chaotic world in which China 
seems to be switching to an intensive strategy. 
7.3.2.3. Trade relations of China 
Table 4.1. and Graph 4.1. have shown the development of the Chinese manufactured goods 
surpluses. Graph 7.3. demonstrates a rougher measure of net exports (current account balance) 
and its interaction with the real GDP growth rate. 
212 
 
Graph 7.3. Current accounts and real GDP growth in China 
 Source of data: IMF, 2017 
Two clear trends dominate the chart: an increase of both measures in the 2001-2008 period 
and a decrease of both measures in the 2009-2016 period. The current account surplus the size 
of 10% of Chinese GDP certainly greatly contributed to its GDP growth at 14% in 2007, and 
a decrease of the current account surplus to less than 2% by 2011 certainly contributed to the 
reduced growth rates of the new normal. Chart 7.4. compares separate data for exports and 
imports. 
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Graph 7.4. Imports and exports in current USD
Source of data: World Bank, 2018 
Unlike the previous graph, which showed current accounts as a rough measure of trade 
relative to GDP levels, this graph shows exports and imports in absolute terms of current 
USD. We can see that both imports and exports grew aggressively after 2001, with the growth 
of exports outpacing that of imports. Once more, we can see the shock of 2009 with both 
exports and imports shrinking and the surplus being reduced until 2011, as imports grew at 
greater speeds than exports, thus narrowing the gap. International trade nevertheless 
handsomely recovered until 2015, when we can notice another fall in both exports and 
imports. 
These trends also point us to the incentives and disincentives for labor institutions. The 2001-
2008 period was the period of export-oriented material expansion, which benefits from a 
flexible and low-cost labor, much like the one provided with the lax enforcement of the 
ambitious formal labor legal structure of China. The period since 2009 is one in which a 
domestic market has been developed in order to place the material expansion on sure footing.  
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: an increase in trade surplus suggests an expansion of manufactured 
goods production and greater structural labor power, as the importance of 
manufacturing labor grows. The interval until 2008 in China was a period of an 
increasingly large trade surplus suggesting an increase in structural power of labor. 
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Growth of trade has henceforth shown signs of a focus on domestic demand with 
imports approaching the levels of exports (but always maintaining a surplus), and 
recent years show a greater contraction of imports compared to exports once 
producing a substantial surplus.  
b) Transnational conditionality: a large trade surplus may have an indirect effect on the 
ability to withstand transnational pressures toward reform. China has had a very 
successful export-led (i.e. extensive) growth model which has resulted in it becoming 
one of the most important economic powers in the world, and therefore in not being 
overly vulnerable to outside pressures. 
c) Systemic cycle phase: notwithstanding a recent contraction shown by data, a steady 
expansion of trade alongside the continued trade surplus remains consistent with the 
continued material expansion. Next segment will, however, show that the relative 
importance of this continued surplus to the Chinese GDP has shrunk. 
d) Developmental strategies: an extensive strategy in our interpretation oriented to the 
export markets in its growth model, while an intensive strategy is oriented towards 
domestic markets. A strong surplus in trade would itself suggest either the extensive 
path or a presence of a strong export niche, while a deficit during continued growth of 
production suggests an intensive path. China has used the last decade to start its switch 
from extensive to intensive growth. 
 
7.3.2.4. Developmental strategies of China 
The period after the Deng Xiaoping’s reforms banked on the low wage, low labor protection 
growth model, which increasingly catered to the foreign markets. Its resulting success as an 
extensive developmental strategy propelled the remarkable growth rates of China. However, 
in the mid-2000s the formal institutions began to take labor into greater account and the 
global 2008/09 crisis solidified this shift. The post-2009 period brought the need for fiscal 
stimuli in order to prevent a GDP downturn. These stimuli can be seen in the gradual increase 
of the government expenditure of China from 18% GDP in 2007 to 32% in 2016 (IMF, 2018). 
Taken alongside various other programs, it seems to suggest the new developmental strategy, 
which no longer depended on the low-wage regime. These programs are the poverty reduction 
programs including the dibao scheme and reducing income inequality (both recognized as 
explicit goals in the current five-year plan; “The 13th Five-Year Plan”, 2016: 154-161; 180-
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182), an explicit focus on consumption-led growth (at least since the 12th five year plan 
starting in 2011; see CIPG/CATL, 2016: 127), as well as supply-side reforms of the 
production chains intended to remove overcapacity in obsolete manufacturing and introduce 
high-tech industrialization (a part of the Made In China 2025 industrial policy; see Wübbeke 
et al, 2016). All of this suggests a shift from an extensive strategy banking on low cost labor 
to an intensive strategy dependent on a strong domestic demand (and therefore a strong 
domestic overall income) – but no longer able to bank on permanently low labor costs, 
necessitating a shift into high-tech, high added value industries. 
Graph 7.5 Demand composition in China 
Source of data: World Bank, 2018 (Household final consumption, Gross capital formation), own 
calculation according to data for current USD GDP and net trade in goods and services in World Bank, 
2018 (Net trade % GDP)  
 
We can discern these movements in the changing composition of the demand structure as 
well. Graph 7.5. shows the Chinese demand composition by comparing the relative levels of  
household consumption, investment (i.e. gross capital formation) and net trade. The general 
historical trend was one of a falling share of household demand in GDP (more than 50% in 
early 1980s, 42-46% though the 1990s, dropping to 35.8 by 2007 but then it leveled off and 
grew to 39% in 2016). At the same time, investement in China historically mostly remained in 
the 30-40% range until the early 2000s, when it began to grow, reaching the high-point in 
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2011 at 47.7% of GDP. This has prompted comments on overinvestment in China with 
infrastructure projects bringing growth only during construction itself due to poor efficiency 
and  hidden costs spreading throughout the economy (Lee, Syed and Xueyan, 2012; Ding, 
Knight and Zhang, 2016; Ansar et al., 2016). Recently, the GDP share of investment has 
begun to shrink, reaching 44.3% in 2016. Finally, pre-2008 Chinese GDP growth rates were 
dependent on the extensive trade surplus, which substantially decreased with the collapse of 
Chinese export markets. Net trade constituted 8.7% of GDP in 2007 and rapidly fell by 
several points, mostly remaining below 2.5% since 2011, with the latest available data 
showing 2.2% for 2016. The tendencies in recent years seem to point towards the initial stages 
of a new growth model with overinvestment and poverty being recognized as problems 
alongside in the context of a deteriorated situation in international trade. The result is the fall 
in the shares of both net trade (-6.5% since 2007) and investment (-3.6% since 2011) and an 
increase in household spending (+3.2% since 2007). This trend is consistent with an extensive 
strategy and if China's signalled move towards an intensive strategy of development is 
successful, this measure will substantially increase through the years to come. This will 
certainly suggest a different type of labor markets, as higher consumption levels suggest 
higher wages, which are compatible with a higher tier in the global supply chain (i.e. higher 
quality goods). This in turn suggests a higher structural power of workers. As the 
development of this model continues, this will be increasingly difficult to subdue through the 
channels currently employed by the Party. 
Once more, if we interpret critical junctures as we have above (either endogenous or 
exogenous events, and periods of developmental strategy institutionalization), we can see that 
Chinese labor markets have experienced a critical juncture through the Deng Xiaoping 
reforms which institutionalized an extensive developmental strategy. The last decade brough a 
shift towards an intensive developmental strategy. If successful, this shift will have provided 
the second critical juncture for the Chinese labor markets in the selected timeframe. 
Interaction with other drivers and the result 
a) Power resources: we are most likely witnessing the beginnings of a more labor-
friendly developmental strategy in China. It is at least a partial response to the growing 
structural power of labor, which was increasingly able to spontaneously organize (in 
spite of obstacles to associational power) and fight for higher wages.  
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b) Trade relations: a long-standing extensive strategy focused on external markets, while 
the seeming shift into intensive strategy in necessitated by the development of 
domestic markets (enabling growth even when foreign demand diminishes). 
c) The result of institutional change: the intensive strategy can be interpreted as the 
moment in which the compromises of power relations are institutionalized – which 
would put the greatest emphasis on the structural power of labor. In China, this 
process certainly takes labor into account, but is by its nature a top-down decision. Its 
continued enforcement and institutionalization will also be a product of path 
dependence on a lower level, as an increase in wages will lock in a consumption 
driven growth model.  
7.3.2.5. Power relations in China 
Power resources of labor in China follow two major tendencies. Firstly, the level of 
associational power is very low as the Party has a monopoly on legal labor organization and it 
does not tend to use it to truly represent labor. Secondly, the structural power of labor has 
increased until the mid-2000s as a result of a successful growth model building on an export-
oriented material expansion – a nexus which has been called into question as net-exports drop 
and a new growth model emerges. 
Power resources also function according to channels different than those in western countries 
as the true nature of resources of interest groups do not manifest through structured 
interactions between employers and labor but are largely held within the confines of the 
Communist Party. As already explained, the union density numbers do not necessarily suggest 
leverage of the unions nor their ability to exert pressure in the name of labor – which has 
produced spontaneous outbursts of labor anger. Again, this suggests the very low level of 
associational power of unions. 
Even as strikes are not recognized in China, they have seen “explosive growth since the 
1990s” (Lee, 2009: 1), reaching high-points in the 2010 Honda riots and the 2014 Yue Yuen 
strike (Estlund, 2017: 10-16; Gallagher, 2017: 199-200; Ling, 2016). In assessing the 
prospects for the future Chan and Hui conclude that the consultations have progressed from 
“collective consultation as a formality, through a stage of collective bargaining by riot, and 
towards a new party state-led form of collective bargaining”, unlikely to reach a western-type 
stage of worker-led collective bargaining in the near future (Chan and Hui, 2013: 19). Cynthia 
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Estlund’s 2017 book A New Deal for China’s Workers? also sought to compare the position 
of Chinese workers to those found in the West, and primarily the US. She answers her titular 
question negatively, as the ideal of “collective bargaining through autonomous, freely chosen 
and reasonably democratic trade unions” (Estlund, 2017: 207) is not shared by the Party 
leadership, which sees to forestall any political opposition. In Estlund’s interpretation, the 
improvement in labor institutions (through better minimum labor standards and access to legal 
remedies) should be seen as an attempt at suppressing demand for independent organization. 
At the same time, Party leadership is attempting to suppress the supply of independent labor 
organization through crack-down on activists (ibid: 207-208). The ad hoc organization 
manifest most visibly in strikes is always a possibility, but the main difference between the 
USA of 1920s and 1930s and modern China is the difference in the scope of strikes. While the 
strikes may be very large in absolute numbers, the relative numbers (percent of strikers in 
working age population) show that China is far behind the situation of working power 
concentration in (pre-)New Deal America with the US percentage reaching more than 2% in 
1920, 1922 and 1937 and the Chinese percentage reaching its high in 2015 (according to 
available data) with around 0.1% (ibid: 211). This underlines the central labor power issue – 
the role of labor in the overall economy (structural power) may rise to considerable levels 
through material expansion, but the capacity to organize (associational power) necessary to 
translate it into a continuous pressure towards a pro-labor regime is subdued for political 
reasons. Instead, the potential of labor power is recognized through a series of top-down 
reforms, which provide a network of pressure valves (dispute resolution, labor laws, anti-
poverty measures) to accommodate disgruntled workers75.  
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Phase of the systemic cycle: high levels of structural power of labor will prolong the 
shift to financial expansion. However, a long-term effect of a high-wage labor regime 
may prove to be lower structural power of labor as low-complexity, low-wage, labor-
 
75 The emergent reforms in China do not resemble the New Deal-era USA as they are not driven by manifest 
labor power and union activities. The more pertinent comparison would be to Bismarck-era Germany, in which 
the vastly influential German model of welfare state was established. The vast reforms of the 1880s (sickness 
insurance, accident insurance, old age and disability insurance) were passed in the context of Bismarck's anti-
socialist efforts which effectivelly banned trade unions and obstructed the functioning of social-democratic 
political forces. This was a matter of establishing pro-labor solutions and therefore taking the growing structural 
power of labor in Europe into account (fearing a German version of the 1871 Paris Commune), while still 
preventing the manifestation of structural power through association. In this sense, modern China and late 19th 
century German Empire have more in common in terms of labor reforms than modern China and 1930s USA. 
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intensive manufacture moves to less developed countries. Shift into the financial 
expansion will presumably occur after structural power of labor sufficiently 
diminishes in the long run. 
b) Developmental strategy: as explained below, developmental strategies are determined 
in a top-down fashion in the one-party dynamics of Chinese politics. However, in its 
quest for legitimacy and efficiency, the Party must acknowledge both the high 
structural power of labor and the growing need to rely on the internal market to ensure 
adequate growth rates. In this sense, the Party must also act as though labor had legal 
means to have its high structural power felt politically. 
 
This channel has combined five drivers of change: technology (a long catch-up period in 
combination with Lewisian development, which has reduced the structural labor power due to 
the availability of migrant labor), phase of the systemic cycle (material expansion, which 
increased structural labor power), trade relations (a large surplus, most notable before 2008, 
suggestive of rising labor structural power), developmental strategy (an ongoing shift into an 
intensive growth model is itself a recognition of high structural power of labor) and power 
relations (high structural power curbed in two crucial ways – extremely low associational 
power due to the inability of independent labor organization and the continuous flow of 
migrant labor undercutting the manifestations of structural power until recently).  
 
In terms of modes of change, these dynamics remain complementary to the layering 
tendencies that were already identified. Firstly, there are different interests of old insiders and 
migrant labor (visible also in terms of economic geography with clusters of older and newer 
industries, but also in terms of localized special economic zones) – and the historical 
importance of migrant labor flows undercut the structural labor power that could have been 
manifested during the material expansion. Secondly, the pronounced discrepancy between 
structural and associational power stands in direct contrast to both previous cases (in the USA 
both types of labor power are low, and in Germany the industrial sector retains high levels of 
both types of labor power). All of this suggests a patchwork of uncertainties which helps to 
produce the localized and variegated institutional solutions typical of layering. These 
discrepancies are also the reason for the very important role of channel 3 in the Chinese case. 
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7.3.3. Channel 3: Institutional design - transnational conditionality and 
domestic politics in China 
The third channel of institutional change is the deliberate design via formal politics. The 
visible political channels are distinct in the case of China, as it has become relatively 
impervious to transnational pressures while maintaining a stable internal political situation, 
not dependent on elections or public opinion to formulate policies. This makes the timeframe 
for the domestic formal politics substantially longer than those found in liberal democracies 
(10 years with the tendency to become substantially longer in the future). 
In terms of international standing, China has become a substantial economy and a substantial 
global power player. It is no easier to imagine a transnational organization forcing China to 
take reforms its government does not wish to take, than it would be for the USA or Germany. 
In fact, it has created a number of alternatives to the organizations of the American-led 20th 
century76, which is a move Wallerstein and Arrighi would interpret as a bid for global 
hegemony. However, in 1980, at the beginning of the timeframe of interest here, China was 
underdeveloped and still vulnerable to external pressure. Firstly, China has been a member of 
the IMF since 1980 and has used loans twice: in 1981 and 1986 (IMF, 2004). These are the 
early years of the free market Xiaoping reforms, which coincide with the years of notoriously 
conditioned and free market-oriented IMF loans. However, as this was before the Fund 
reformed its transparency policies, we can only infer any connection between these two facts, 
although, according to some interpretations, China has maneuvered to reduce conditionality 
(Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990: 124). Secondly, the cooperation with the ILO as the relevant 
labor-oriented organization seems only slightly better than is the case with the US as China 
ratified 26 out of 189 ILO conventions (4 of 8 Fundamental; 2 of 4 Governance and 20 of 177 
Technical Conventions) – all of which either until 1936 or since 1988 (ILO, 2017c). Finally, 
the WTO accession in 2001 was conditioned on various trade related issues like tariffs, anti-
dumping measures or non-discrimination (Bhattasali, Li and Martin, 2004: 1-13), which 
would have had an enormous effect on what we interpret as an extensive strategy of Chinese 
export orientation, but only an indirect effect on labor. In all, while China was vulnerable to 
outside pressures in the period we analyze, the transnational conditionality as a driver of 
 
76 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established in 2014 and has been interpreted by the Economist 
as the Chinese version of the World Bank (Why China is creating a new “World Bank”, 2014). The BRICS 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), established also in 2014 is interpreted as an alternative to the IMF (An 
acronym with capital, 2014), with China as the leading partner with largest voting rights. 
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institutional change in the sphere of labor in China was either non-existent, inconclusive or 
indirect. 
In terms of open domestic political struggle, the conflicting agendas are not as easy to identify 
as in the case of the USA and Germany. China is formally a semi-presidential system and a de 
facto one-party state. Any opposition to reform in the actual political system primarily takes 
form internally in the Party or amongst the administrative levels, and not in the highly visible 
and codified ways we can observe in the USA or Germany. While China does have formal 
institutions (President, Peoples’ Congress, Premier…) it is difficult to disentangle them from 
Party institutions. The National Communist Party Congress (more than 2000 members) is the 
highest organ in the Communist Party and meets every five years to discuss ideological 
principles and developmental strategies and also to name the Central Committee (more than 
200 voting members) which is the central Party administrative body, meets once or twice 
yearly and handles various policy and strategic decisions  It also elects the Politburo with 
(generally) 25 members, which is the highest decision-making body and the Politburo 
standing committee, with currently 7 members meeting in weekly intervals (Heilman, 2017: 
64-68). This onion-like structure is mirrored on the state level. The highest authority is vested 
in the National People’s Congress, which is the legislature dominated by CCP delegates. It 
meets every five years and has almost 3000 members. Between its meetings, the legislative 
power is vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (roughly 150 
members). The executive power is vested in the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China (roughly 35 members – headed by the premier), which has a Standing Committee (10 
members). However, the politics of China tends to revolve around the Presidency, which is 
becoming increasingly centralized in terms of functions and the length of terms it implies. 
Arguably, the most important political position is the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China (held by Hu Yaobang 1981-1987, Zhao Ziyang 1987-1989, Jiang Zemin 1989-
2002, Hu Jintao 2002-2012 and Xi Jinping since 2012). The modern position of the President 
of PRC was instituted in the 1982 Constitution in order to separate state and party power 
(apart from the Secretary and President, the other main leaders envisioned were the Premier 
and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission). Only Li Xiannian (1983-1988) and 
Yang Shangkun (1988-1993) held such a separate presidential position. In 1982, the post of 
the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of PRC was instituted alongside the 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC – another example of state post 
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alongside a party post, although it was always held by the same person. Deng Xiaoping held 
the very important party position from 1981 to 1989, and the state position from 1983 to 
1990. Jiang Zemin took over both positions and in 1993 consolidated these with the 
aforementioned positions of President and Party Secretary. After Jiang, both Hu and Xi hold 
all of these positions simultaneously effectively centralizing the political power in China far 
beyond levels found in the presidential system in the USA. Additionally, the 2018 
constitutional change centralized this power further by removing the two-term limit of the 
presidential tenure (Berger, 2018). 
In such a system, comparisons to electoral politics in western countries are very problematic. 
The closest analogy would be the intra-party faction rivalry, but these processes are 
necessarily opaque in nature and therefore difficult to analyze. A more attractive option is to 
observe the programs of the ruling cadre. Here we can notice some shifts towards greater 
protection of labor in the Hu and Xi presidencies. In this, the concepts used in speeches or 
plenary session reports seem to have a far more consistent and symbolical nature than in the 
west. Hu accentuated the concepts of a harmonious society and a moderately prosperous 
society. Xi has signaled similar intentions and argued in favor of supply side reforms and 
targeted poverty alleviation (Zhao, 2016). 
The formal political institutions are obviously vastly different from those found in Germany 
and the USA with a concentrated one-party political-structure intent to preserve its power 
monopoly – and the improvement of labor rights may be the means to that goal. In other 
words, while there is a serious problem with a lack of autonomous and independent 
representation of workers, the party leadership reacts to the possibility of strikes and labor 
activism by working to improve the position of labor, producing a situation which may in 
some respects even emulate the existence of independent unions. 
Interactions with other drivers and the result 
a) Developmental strategy: In the Chinese case, transnational conditionality did not play 
a role in labor institutional changes, but the direct, formal political channel (of the 
single party intertwined with state) plays a dominant role in determining 
developmental strategies including the latest shift. 
b) Result of institutional change: all of this makes formal political channels one of the 
three channels of institutional change. The end result is dependent on all three: 
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developmental strategies will be truly institutionalized if the power relations (which 
can be felt on the informal level) support it and if the path dependent mechanisms are 
aligned with these two channels or weaker than them.  
 
In terms of modes of change, deliberate institutional design has been able to gradually replace 
the iron rice-bowl danwei labor institutions with firstly a market-based system and secondly 
some semblance of modern labor protection. As we have seen, the primary backlash to 
reforms came from the specific interests of old insiders and new outsiders. However, it was 
not manifested through formal channels, nor could it have been, as the political monopoly of 
CCP was preserved through the insistence on only Party-led unions. This led to the already 
discussed dissociation of associational and structural labor power in China, which has in turn 
created the need to take labor interests into account regardless of the labor capacity to 
independently organize or even articulate these interests. Formal labor reforms were therefore 
implemented by the only real veto-player (CCP), which has needed to take a strong, if 
invisible, player (labor) into account. Unlike the US and German cases, all three channels in 
China point to a single mode of change, which is a specific form of layering. 
 
In all, the three institutional change channels combined a one-party power monopoly path 
dependence (channel 1), a rising structural power of labor (channel 2) and the power of the 
formal political governance to institute large scale reforms (channel 3). Chart 7.3. summarizes 
the three processes. 
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Chart 7.3. The institutionalization of a shift to intensive strategy in China since the late 2000s
 
Labor institutions in China have developed in the context of a stubbornly preserved one-party 
power monopoly, providing a principal driving-force of path dependence (channel 1). For this 
monopoly to be preserved, the organizational or associational power of labor needed to be 
curbed and kept under Party control, making independent unions impossible. However, the 
structural power of labor grew along with the expansion of industry and trade surplus in goods 
that were the hallmarks of the extensive strategy of the period between 1980 and the late 
2000s (channel 2). Since late-2000s the Party has instituted reforms (channel 3) towards an 
intensive strategy, increasing incomes, decreasing poverty, improving the formal regulation of 
labor and meandering on the possibility of collective bargaining.  
7.4. Social effects of labor institutions in China 
In the previous two chapters we started our brief surveys of social effects of labor institutions 
by showing the interrelation of GDP growth and unemployment. Graph 7.6. shows the real 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate in China since 1980. The high formal protection 
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might lead us to expect slow and aberrant reactions of unemployment to changes in GDP 
(similar to the ones in Germany) and the low actual protections may lead us to suspect very 
sharp and quick reactions (similar to the ones in the USA).  
Graph 7.6. Real GDP growth rate and unemployment in China  
  
Data point for unemployment in 2018 is an IMF staff estimate, and other data points for 
unemployment are relayed from the National Statistics Office. Source of data: IMF, 2019a 
 
What we see instead is a very slowly changing statistic of very low unemployment. If this 
statistic were taken at face value, the conclusion might be that the full socialist employment 
only makes sense in the context of Graph 7.1. (showing the shifts from agriculture into the 
secondary and tertiary sector). Here, the army of potential employees in industry and service 
comes not from the unemployed, but rather from the less developed rural areas of China. This 
is presumably why the unemployment rate remained stable even in the face of large migrant 
labor waves and changes in the speed of economic growth. However, the officially reported 
statistics of unemployment is often viewed with suspicion. A recent study used a 
representative sample of urban population to derive unemployment rate movement in China 
and assess significantly higher rates than those reported. The authors suggest that the actual 
rate of unemployment rose rapidly in the 1995-2002 period, in which state owned enterprises 
shed a vast number of employees (with the SOEs employing 60% of total in 1995 and only 
30% in 2002) and would reach the averages of 10.9% in the 2002-2009 period (Feng, Hu and 
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Moffitt, 2015: 14-34). This uncertainty of official statistics makes it impossible for us to 
follow the relationship between GDP and unemployment as closely as we did in the previous 
two chapters. 
Regardless of actual unemployment, a very positive trend in China’s recent history has been 
the continued reduction of poverty. Measured in terms of the ubiquitous poverty level of $1.9 
per capita per day consumption in 2011 PPP prices, the poverty in China has dramatically 
dropped from 40.2% as late as 1999 to a very low 0.7% in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). This 
indicator’s drop by 86% in the 1980-2013 period constitutes the sharpest decline of poverty in 
history (Jain-Chandra et al, 2018: 6). This trend has developed in the context of the vastly 
successful growth model described above, as sufficiently consistent high rates of economic 
growth enable such development. 
However, the extensive developmental strategy in China before the mid-2000s has not been 
oriented towards egalitarian incomes, and the impressive absolute poverty reduction was 
accompanied by significant increases in income inequality. Individual income GINI as 
measured by the World Bank (2017) shows only scarce data and measures it as 42.8 in 2008 
and 42.2 in 2012. These are very high inequality levels, surpassing even those found in the 
USA. The household GINI levels are even higher. As assembled for the World Bank in 
Sicular (2013), GINI levels were below 30 until 1986 and rose steadily (with a brief 
correction in the mid-1990s notwithstanding), reaching almost 50 by the global crisis of 2009 
and showing some signs of a slight decrease afterwards. The SWIID database also enables a 
continuous tracking of individual GINI (as it did in the previous two chapters). Graph 7.8. 
shows the disposable income (before taxes and transfers) and market GINI indices. 
227 
 
Graph 7.8. Income inequality in China - GINI 
 Source of data: SWIID 8.0 (Solt, 2019) 
Graph 7.8. enables us to discern two clear trends. Firstly, there is a general trend of steadily 
rising inequality far beyond the levels found in the USA and Germany. Secondly, recent years 
show an increasingly redistributive capacity of taxes and transfers. The disposable income 
GINI has had a significant decline since 2009 (when it was at the highest point at 43.2), 
dropping to 40.9 in 2013 and 41.2 in 2015. At the same time, no such trend is discernible in 
market GINI index, with the two most recent data-points (46.8 in 2014 and 46.7 in 2015) 
showing the most unequal income distributions in the data set for China. The result is a 
divergence of these two curves, displaying an increasing distance of income inequality before 
and after taxes and transfers. The correction of taxes and transfers in GINI indices has 
traditionally been very small (as little as -1.7 in 1994 and -0.9 in 2002), but has significantly 
increased in recent years, reaching -5.5 in 2015. This is comparatively far below the 
redistribution effects in Germany and even the USA, suggesting that real redistributive 
capacity is yet to develop. However, the trend of increasingly effective redistribution is in line 
with the shift of the growth model and anti-poverty programs described above. 
The deliberate reforms in line with the shift towards an intensive developmental strategy 
certainly played important roles in the reversal of the disposable income inequality trend. 
These include income tax reforms increasing the thresholds for its applicability, minimum 
wage hikes, the dibao social assistance system and other poverty-alleviation measures (Jain-
Chandra et al, 2018: 10-11). More active redistribution, however, is not the only factor in play 
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in the trend towards reducing inequality. The GINI indices in China have generally been 
greatly influenced by the urban-rural gap in incomes (Kotarski, 2015), and the decline in 
inequality may also be influenced by the catch-up between regions. Spatial inequality 
explained 50% of overall income inequality in China in 2007, but its effects have been 
declining since (Zhuang and Li, 2016: 9). Another important cause of income inequality is the 
education premium, which explains 25% of the urban-rural gap, but the effects of the skill 
premium are also declining as the low-skill sector wage growth have outperformed growth in 
high-skill sectors since 2009 (ibid: 6). To survey the market effects, Graph 7.9. shows the data 
on the pre-tax income shares of top 1% and bottom 50% adults available in the Piketty World 
in Data database. 
Graph 7.9. Pre-tax income shares in China 
 Source of data: WID (2017) 
These two income shares started in a relatively egalitarian structure with the top 1% earning 
6% of total pre-tax income and the bottom 50% earning 27% of pre-tax income. The two 
curves have gradually moved closer with a decrease of GINI in the mid-1990s exhibiting here 
as an increase of the income share for the bottom 50% of income earners. The share of the top 
1% has slightly surpassed the share of the bottom 50% prior to the crisis of 2009 with the 
situation turned today showing a slight trend towards greater equality. 
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While the post-tax data is not available for China, it is indicative that the relative positions of 
the top 1% and the bottom 50% are at the same level in the USA only after the progressive 
taxation system has done its work, while this is the situation in China with gross income. In 
other words, even though some of the GINI measurements point to a greater income 
inequality in China than that found in the USA, the super-rich in the 1% are not the ones 
skewing the income.  
In terms of functional distribution of income, the labor share of income remained in the 52-
54% range in the 1994-2003 period, only to rapidly drop to 47% in the 2003-2011 period and 
recover to 51% by 2013 (ILO, 2016: 18). Molero-Simarro uses the official data of the 
National Statistical Yearbooks to calculate somewhat different figures. The labor share of 
income is placed at 50% in 1992, with a slight improving tendency until the late 1990s, when 
it began a steady decline to some 43% in 2007 and recovered to approximately 46% in 2014. 
The capital share dropped from 39% in 1993 to 35% in 1999 and then steadily recovered to 
more than 40% by 2007 and returned in later years to approximately 38% in 2014 (Molero-
Simarro, 2016: 10). While these two measures point to slightly different ratios and 
periodizations, the same general trend can be discerned. The late 1990s to mid/late 2000s was 
a period of diminishing labor share and growing capital share of income, with the situation 
somewhat reversing in recent years. These trends are consistent with the disposable income 
GINI markedly declining since 2009 (Graph 7.8) and the top 1%/bottom 50% income shares 
reversing their polarizing tendencies since 2010. All of these trends demonstrate the effects to 
the significant change in the past decade, to which we have pointed throughout this chapter, as 
the labor institutions became increasingly pro-labor. Granted, labor itself played a side-role in 
these changes and the present analysis shows the importance of institutional design and path 
dependence in China. As argued above, this is the case as the effective manifestation of 
structural labor power throughout the Chinese material expansion has been curbed through the 
limits placed on labor organizations and therefore its associational power. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to illustrate the framework from Chapter 4 by surveying labor-related 
institutional change with Chinese characteristics. To do so, we followed the three 
hypothesized channels (path dependence, institutional design and power relations) and their 
seven institutional change drivers. These have followed distinct patterns in accordance with 
conditions not found in liberal democracies. 
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The channel of path dependence is largely tied into the basic power-related feedback loop in 
the Chinese institutional framework. This is the political monopoly of the CCP, which will 
work to prevent any modes of development that could be perceived as a direct threat to the 
Party monopoly. It has curbed the associational power of labor by enabling only the Party-
dependent trade unions and more recently by prosecuting labor rights activists. 
The preponderant channel in China is the deliberate design of institutions through formal 
political channels and it is increasingly shifted towards ideas of a middle-class creation, 
poverty alleviation, high-tech industries and other programs which are compatible with an 
intensive model of aggregate demand, focusing on domestic consumption. 
The historical functioning of the power relations channel in China is a result of the dynamics 
between structural labor power (which has substantially grown over the years, driven by 
export driven material expansion and technological catch-up) and the requirements of the 
extensive export-led model complementary with a low-wage regime. As the structural labor 
power grew and as the increasingly loud worker demands shifted towards distributional 
issues, an important piece of the extensive puzzle went missing as real wages significantly 
increased. This was compatible with an intensive developmental strategy which focused on 
developing domestic markets. 
If these movements continue, the intensive developmental strategy of China will become 
institutionalized as a labor friendly regime. In the long run of several decades, this may well 
spell out the conditions of a high-wage growth with an additionally diminished export 
competitiveness. In this context, the material expansion will certainly give way to a profit 
squeeze leading to both the financial expansion phase of the systemic cycle and the 
diminished structural labor power.  
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 Chapter 8: The three cases and their patterns 
 
Chapter 2 has identified five ways to discuss endogenous institutional change and the three 
predictive channels of path dependence, cyclical power relations and deliberate institutional 
design. These three channels were taken up by chapters 3 and 4 to formulate a framework of 
institutional change and by chapters 5-7 to illustrate the framework through the analysis of 
labor institutional changes in the USA, Germany and China. The two descriptive tools of 
modes of change and evolutionary narratives will be utilized in this chapter to sum up and 
compare the three illustrative chapters. 
In the first section, we will compare the labor institutions of the three cases, the three specific 
patterns of change they exhibited, and the roles played in these patterns by the three channels 
we identified. We will also use Thelen’s notion of the modes of change to attempt to compare 
the three patterns across her criteria. The second section will interpret the institutional 
changes on the national level as portions of the world-system, compare their successfulness 
and use these changes to show the limitations of evolutionary narratives in the case of 
national-level institutions. 
8.1. Shapes of labor institutions; patterns of change 
Having explored the national labor institutions of the USA, Germany and China in the 
previous three chapters, we can now take stock and adopt a comparative stance. The simplest 
way to do so is by observing the relevant data as equilibria and compare the three cases in the 
two static points of 1980 and today via the most recent data. Table 8.1. does so in order to 
compare income inequality, the role played by labor expressed in bargaining coverage and 
union density, the role of household consumption in GDP and labor market regulation 
expressed by EPL indices. 
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Table 8.1. Changes in institutions and social effects 
 
USA  
1980 or 
closest 
year 
USA 
most 
recent 
year 
Germany 
1980 or 
closest 
year 
Germany 
most 
recent 
year 
PRC 
1980 or 
closest 
year 
PRC 
most 
recent 
year 
Household final 
consumption % GDP 
61.3%  68.1% 
(2018) 
58.9%  52.1% 
(2018) 
50.9%  38.7% 
(2018) 
GINI 31.6  38.4 
(2017) 
25.9  29.1 
(2016) 
28.2 41.2 
(2015) 
Bargaining coverage 25%  11.2% 
(2018) 
79%  53.1% 
(2016) 
18.1% 
(2000) 
39.3% 
(2012) 
Union density 22.3%  10.1% 
(2018) 
34.9%  16.5 
(2018) 
58.6%  42.6 
(2013) 
Employment Protection 
Legislation for regular 
employment 
0.26 
(1986) 
0.26 
(2013) 
2.58 
(1985) 
2.68 
(2013) 
- 3.26 
(2012) 
Employment Protection 
Legislation for 
temporary employment 
0.25 
(1986) 
0.25 
(2013) 
5 (1985) 1.13 
(2013) 
- 1.75 
(2013) 
Sources: World Bank, 2019 (Household final consumption); OECD, 2017a (Employment Protection 
indices); Visser, 2019 (Bargaining coverage, Union density); Solt, 2019 (GINI, disposable income) 
We can observe that the USA began the period of interest to us with the most consumption-
led growth model at 61.3% GDP, with (West) Germany fairly close at 58.9% and China at a 
lower position of 50.9% and that their relative demand foci have substantially diverged with 
the USA even more consumption oriented today at 68.1%, but Germany and China 
considerably less so at 52.1% and 38.7% respectively. Inequality data is not as readily 
available and continuous as we would like, and we have used the SWIID database to 
compensate. China and the USA stand out today as representative of very high-income 
inequality with Germany remaining relatively more equal (although gradually moving 
towards greater inequality). Labor organization in terms of union density data is formally 
highest in China77, mid-level in Germany and very low in the USA, with bargaining coverage 
starting high in Germany and relatively low in the USA and China and ending moderately 
high in Germany, somewhat lower (although more than doubled in 12 years) in China and 
very low in the USA. In terms of regulatory protection, the USA has had unchangingly very 
flexible employment laws, Germany has moved from high protection for regular and very 
high for temporary workers to a dualistic structure of high protection for regular and low for 
temporary workers, while China, having enacted modern labor laws in the interim, has 
formally high protection for regular and intermediate protection for temporary workers. Even 
 
77 As we have seen in the previous chapter this data shows membership in the party-led ACTFU, which does not 
organize labor in the same sense as the unions in liberal democracies do.  
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in such cursory comparison, we could surmise that the labor markets showed clear tendencies 
towards liberalization in all three cases, but that this turn to free markets did not happen in a 
uniform manner. While such a static comparison of two equilibria states can be useful, it 
clearly misses the comparison of the processes which lead from one to the other equilibrium.  
This thesis has argued for an in-depth analysis of institutional change, which went far beyond 
such limitations of static comparisons. We have firstly observed specific constellations of 
institutions through the Northian prism which encompasses institutions in their formal, 
informal and avoidable aspects. In the USA, the avoidable aspect is particularly strong, as the 
unions are generally too underpowered to protect the low-wage workers even at the level of 
securing the enforcement of their employment contracts. The collective bargaining practices 
(treated here as informal institutions) are decentralized and slanted in favor of the employers, 
while regulations (formal institutions) are very flexible and free market oriented. In Germany, 
the avoidable aspect is not overly relevant as the formal institutions preserve the high 
protection at least for mainstream employment, while informal institutions (practices of 
collective bargaining) remain relatively centralized with outcomes dependent on the unions, 
which remain strong in manufacture. In China, the avoidable aspect is even more relevant 
than is the case with American labor institutions, as formal institutions are often treated as 
guidelines rather than rules and the collective bargaining practices are only slowly formed due 
to a lack of independent worker representation. 
The changes in these institutions since 1980s also followed distinct patterns – which we 
tracked through the three channels of path dependence, formal political pressures and 
systemic cycle driven power resources. In the USA, the predominant channel was path 
dependence. The labor institutions were free market oriented to begin with and changes in the 
post-1980 period only exacerbated these tendencies. The power resources and systemic cycle 
driven channel could not overcome path dependence and orient the formal and informal 
institutions towards a labor friendly regime as labor had low structural and associational 
power throughout the period of interest to us. The financial expansion only exacerbated this, 
resulting in a dysfunctional developmental strategy that favored the paradoxical combination 
of a domestic consumption-led growth model and a diminishing wage ratio of GDP. Finally, 
the formal political channel is designed to help political minorities resist reforms and the labor 
legislation was kept in a state which provided for a flexible regulation of labor and severely 
constricted the ability of unions to organize labor. The process of labor liberalization in the 
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USA can be broken down into the seven separate drivers of change we identified, and was 
under the influence of: initial institutional conditions of free market oriented coordination; a 
long-term cumulative technological change favoring labor-saving techniques in industrial 
production (diminishing labor structural power); the systemic cycle which has: (a) driven the 
US economy into a financial expansion, (b) substantially expanded the US trade deficit as 
production for its market moved off-shore and has therefore (c) created the conditions for a 
growing superfluity of manufacturing labor and an accompanying decrease of labor union 
density; an extensive developmental strategy which is essentially a supply-side oriented free 
market policy paradigm and finally, an absence of effective transnational conditionality or 
mechanisms of domestic politics geared towards large reforms. 
In Germany, all three channels intertwined to produce the pronounced modern dualism of 
labor institutions. Path dependence worked in favor of labor veto power and the systemic 
cycle-power resources channel bifurcated power on the strong presence of unions (high 
associational power) in the industrial core and weak presence (low associational power) in the 
service sector. This set the stage for the third channel of deliberate institutional design through 
formal politics, which was used by the Schröder government to try to restore market 
efficiency by making labor institutions more flexible. This reform contributed to a move 
towards an extensive developmental strategy and was itself a compromise taking into account 
the strong position of core labor due to the first two channels and the less structurally and 
associationally strong labor on the margins. Breaking it down into seven drivers, the German 
labor liberalization through dualization is a result of: initial institutional conditions of a 
coordinated market economy (including high associational power of labor); long-term 
cumulative technological change favoring labor-saving techniques (diminishing labor 
structural power); the systemic cycle which put Germany in a phase of material expansion 
(increasing labor structural power) and in the context of which a developmental strategy could 
be chosen. This enabled a move from an intensive to an extensive developmental strategy 
coinciding with the introduction of the euro and the intensifying of the eurozone economy 
interaction with Germany - which in turn expanded the trade surplus (increasing labor 
structural power). These changes worked to increase the structural labor power in 
manufacturing, which remained a latent veto player necessitating a design (made possible by 
a political system which enables reforms) of an extensive strategy which circumvented the 
core labor and focused on the marginal labor as a target for flexibilization.  
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Finally, the two channels of path dependence and deliberate institutional design have proven 
crucial in institutional change in China. The channel defining the interactions of the systemic 
cycle and power describes the changes in structural power in labor, and as structural labor 
power has a consistent history of rising in China, the interests of labor were increasingly 
likely to be taken into account. However, as associational power is low due to a Party-led 
labor organization monopoly, labor has very little capacity to directly influence institutional 
change. Path dependence is important in keeping this capacity low as it provides the major 
neutralizer for the rising structural power of labor. The key element of path dependence in 
China in this respect is the position occupied by the Communist Party which strives to 
preserve its de facto political monopoly of power, including the prevention of independent 
labor organization. This allows the third channel to fully articulate, largely as developmental 
strategies, which remain the top-down led preserves of the formal political process led by the 
Party. The institutional changes have been directed towards an extensive developmental 
strategy in most of the post-1980 period but show pronounced tendencies towards an intensive 
shift in recent years. To break down this increase in labor protection into drivers: the specific 
type of a search for higher labor standards is a result of initial structures which favor the one-
party monopoly of power (virtually disabling associational power of labor), long-term 
cumulative technological change favoring labor-saving techniques but a recent history of 
catch-up favoring a continued increase of labor use; the systemic cycle which enabled China 
to undergo a material expansion (increasing labor structural power), an increase in trade 
surplus as a result of labor low cost (increasing labor structural power) and an ongoing move 
from an extensive to an intensive developmental strategy (i.e. opposite to the German move) 
in order to provide an internal market as an alternative. 
Comparing these patterns with modes of change (as discussed in Chapter 2), we can see that 
these two approaches may be somewhat compatible as this strand of literature primarily 
describes how rather than why institutional change takes place. Thelen’s description of the 
change in American labor institutions is displacement, which evokes a clear break with old 
rules – or a deregulation pure and simple – enabled by low veto power of the defenders of old 
institutional arrangements and low discretion in institutional interpretation. The change in 
German labor institutions is discussed as an example of drift or preserving of the old form of 
institutions while also deliberately neglecting the old functions of institutions as the 
environment changes and renders the old form inefficient, while this change is enabled by the 
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high veto power of the defenders of the old arrangements and high levels of discretion in 
institutional interpretation (Thelen and Mahoney, 2009; Thelen, 2012; Thelen, 2014). One 
could argue against these descriptions on several points. Firstly, we could claim that all 
national-level institutional frameworks surely exhibit some signs of several modes of change 
– conforming not to a simple matrix or agent description, but to many overlapping levels of 
agent interactions. In this sense, it is entirely logical that Hacker and Pierson (2010) describe 
US labor institutional change as drift, as they observe the change as taking place at the level 
of formal politics. Secondly, and more specifically, American institutions changed through a 
very long process where a relatively deregulated labor was further deregulated, which in itself 
hardly evokes a clear break. If we accept the view of labor institutions as interconnected and 
ultimately intended to provide the rules for employment and work conditions, then we may 
also have some difficulties in using the simple matrix of agents, political contexts and 
institutional characteristics. The level of discretion in interpreting institutions on the operative 
level in the USA must be high rather than low as showed by the high importance of the 
avoidable aspect of labor institutions. Thirdly, German labor institutions exhibit a number of 
new measures intended to help the most vulnerable, which hardly constitutes deliberate 
neglect which supposedly accompanies institutional drift. However, such arguments could 
easily overshoot. Thelen provides us with a low-resolution cognitive map for comparing 
modes of change on a national level, and in this sense, she succeeded admirably. US labor 
institutions did undergo a clear (although slow and path dependent) pattern of deregulation, 
which enables her to group it under displacement. German labor institutions likewise did 
undergo the dualistic bifurcation of labor institutions, enabling her to focus on the 
continuation of the function of old rules in the industrial core and the lack thereof on the 
margins – and therefore to describe it as drift. While these patterns should not be taken 
literally and should be used with caution, they can help us understand and describe specific, 
national-level institutional change. 
We have tried to increase the useful resolution offered by the modes of change by integrating 
the modes of change with the three channels of change. Table 8.2. summarizes this 
integration. 
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Table 8.2. Integrating modes and channels of change 
 USA Germany China 
Path dependence (C1) Displacement Drift Layering 
Cyclical power relations (C2) Displacement Drift Layering 
Institutional design (C3) Drift Displacement Layering 
 
In the US case we have interpreted the two longer-term channels (path dependence and 
cyclical power relations) as examples of displacement and the shorter-term channel of 
deliberate institutional design as drift. In other words, both the diagnosis of Kathleen Thelen 
(displacement) and Hacker and Pierson (drift) are correct, once placed in their appropriate 
contexts in terms of timeframe and unit of analysis. In the German case the relationship of the 
path dependent channel and the cyclical power-relations channel spelled out drift (with an all-
out liberalization prevented by industrial labor power-bastions enforced both through material 
expansion and path dependence), but the crucial reforms also having been designed and 
enacted (suggesting active displacement and not passive drift at least in the fixed-term portion 
of the labor market). In each chapter, our second channel of institutional change has served to 
illustrate the shifts in power underlining episodes of change in labor markets. Here, the 
systemic cycle has helped us to offer an interpretation of the relationship between structure 
(institutional stability) and agency (institutional entrepreneurship) in the context of changing 
economic flows. With the channels of path dependence and deliberate institutional design 
often providing conflicting tendencies (as we can see in the Thelen-Hacker/Pierson dilemma), 
an important part is played by the political power of interested parties. 
We were left only with the need to interpret the mode of change for labor institutions in 
China. It seems that Thelen’s description of layering best describes the initial period of 
changes we analyzed in Chapter 7. The period of early 1980s to mid-2000s saw China move 
to an extensive developmental strategy with increasingly lax labor regulation and 
incrementally reduced labor rights. The old iron rice bowl was broken, but the system still 
supported the coexistence of insiders (old industrial concentrations) and outsiders 
(particularly migrant labor). The turn to free markets in China in general started through a 
type of localized experimentation typical of layering in the Special Economic Zones. More 
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specific to the labor institutions, the fledgling universal legal order (introduction of a unified 
labor law in 1995) was in many ways seen as a legalization of the lower order of outsider 
workers, as the labor contracts were a step down from the position of the danwei system. This 
layered, dualistic structure of the Chinese labor market persisted and evolved. With the 
outsider migrant labor increasing in importance (and structural power) through a vastly 
effective developmental strategy, it attempted to secure better conditions via collective 
organization and strikes. However, China continues to exhibit an old unchanging layer of 
institutions in which labor representation is a monopoly of the Communist Party (suggesting 
very low levels of associational power). The Party prefers to endow labor with rights in its 
own time and without independent pressures and it has been introducing various new 
measures enabling some basis for labor rights, collective bargaining and dispute settlement 
since the mid-2000s.  
This has created exactly the type of conflict described by Thelen ideal-typically, as the 
increased knowledge of legal basis and use of existing mechanisms strengthened the ability of 
workers to self-organize and enabled a growth of pro-labor legal activists. However, the CCP 
remains a veto player par excellence and it has dealt with the conflict with a crack-down on 
the activists. The fundamental issue remains the question of the continued development of the 
structural power of labor without enabling an independent associational power structure to act 
as an ordered valve. This is essentially the layering conflict in labor institutions with Chinese 
characteristics. If the reforms prove successful and fully turn the Chinese growth model to 
intensive development and combine it with functional collective bargaining, we may in the 
future be in the position to analyze the period after the mid-2000s as a case in institutional 
conversion (as the solutions are devised in a top-down manner and institutions are redefined 
as well as replaced). However, at this juncture, we can still observe the conflict which is a 
long-term companion of layering. 
8.2. Interactions of the systemic cycle and Darwinistic narratives  
This section will first deal with the uses and limits of Darwinistic analogies in connecting 
global and national capitalisms in segment 8.2.1. It will then turn to interpreting our findings 
from the previous three chapters through a systemic cycle perspective in segment 8.2.2. 
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8.2.1. Using Darwinistic analogies in interpreting national-level changes 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, evolutionary analogies are one of five common ways to 
conceptualize institutional change. To function, these analogies need to identify three phases: 
variation, selection and inheritance. The applicability of these three phases in connecting 
national and global capitalism are limited in the modern world, although they have certainly 
existed for most of modernity. We could claim that the historical periods of hegemonic 
transitions offered such examples. Different growth models provide a phase of variation (e.g. 
early entrepreneurship in Britain, nation-state-oriented capitalism in the Netherlands or late 
absolutism in Eastern Europe). A great power war until the end of WWII could be considered 
a definite selection phase of institutions. Here, growth models provide the tax and debt basis 
of financing a war machine (to simplify matters somewhat: Habsburgian v. Dutch, French and 
Swedish in the 17th century; British v. French in the late 18th century and early 19th century 
and German/Austro-Hungarian v. British, Russian, French and American in the first half of 
the 20th century). Wars tended to drag on until the fiscal and organizational capabilities of one 
side is exhausted and the other side assumes the leading position in Europe, extracts war 
reparations, adds more territory or appropriates more colonies. Finally, we could argue for a 
phase of inheritance if a defeated side adopted some institutional elements of the winning 
side. A most recent example would be the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan in WWII, after 
which all three adopted (or were mandated to adopt) more democratic and more liberal-
economic institutional frameworks. However, the advent of nuclear weapons pushed the 
world in a technological direction which would suggest a great power war would result in 
mutual annihilation. This prevents the crucial aspect of direct Darwinism in institutions. There 
is no direct destruction of inefficient institutional forms and this provides one of the possible 
causes for the preservation of socially damaging institutions (e.g. rampant corruption, 
clientelism or predatory politics) as long as they provide net-increases of power resources of 
those who are best positioned to change or stabilize them. As we have seen in chapters 1 and 
3, this also influences the shifts in capital accumulation cycles as it results in our modern and 
historically unprecedented state of radical divergence between economic and military power, 
which is a state favoring the continued global predominance of the US military capacity. This 
creates a notably different picture than could be discerned from the ideal-typical systemic 
cycle in Chart 3.1., which is notably evolutionary in terms of winning institutional solutions 
and developmental strategies (intensive-extensive). In place of sharp distinctions of winners 
and losers in the competition for hegemonic (or central) position, the modern world produces 
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a slow crawl where the lost edge in productivity is punished in the political or military sense 
only with a substantial and increasing delay. It seems that Wallerstein’s understanding of 
hegemonies as brief moments is increasingly relevant with a prolonged following phase of 
losing various elements of dominance. Currently, the US military is still by far the largest, but 
its ability to finance large overseas missions or gather large alliances is diminished, 
suggesting a limited use for military capacity. 
However, there are indirect ways in which the phases of variation, selection and inheritance 
may play a role in national capitalisms. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Steinmo sees ideas as a 
type of variation producing mutations. This falls outside of the scope of the present thesis 
which opted to focus on power, systemic cycle, path dependence and deliberate institutional 
design. If we had focused on ideas, we would likely attempt to explain the genesis of the 
Hartz Commission plan as an attempt to copy the existing flexicurity solutions and the 
obstinance of US and Chinese reforms to outside ideas78. Research based on such an analogy 
could explore the flow of ideas within the epistemic communities and international 
organizations. In the context of policy promoters like the EU, OECD, IMF and the World 
Bank, it would certainly prove relevant in analyzing more vulnerable and smaller states, but 
our research did not point to an important role of transnational conditionality in the three 
selected cases. The evolutionary analogy is more likely to resonate with the present thesis 
through a more subtle and systemic-cycle oriented interpretation of relative successfulness of 
specific institutional sets and changes, to which we now turn. 
8.2.2. Interpreting national changes as elements of the systemic cycle 
World-systemic analysis interprets the world-system as a world-wide division of labor which 
has a developed, industrialized core (exporting manufactured products high in the supply 
chain) and an underdeveloped periphery (exporting primary products). If we are looking for 
indicators of relative world-systemic successfulness, we could do worse than to analyze the 
mutual trade relations of the three economies in question. There are six possible directions of 
trade (US exports into China and Germany, German exports into China and the USA and 
Chinese exports into the USA and Germany), and the latest available data from Harvard 
Economic Complexity Atlas (all for 2016) can help us track their value and composition. The 
 
78 With Barack Obama being denigrated as a European Socialist by his opponents during the drive for the 
Affordable Care Act, and the infamous Chinese Document no. 9 from 2013 which was a CCP internal document 
warning against the dangers of the spread of Western values like universal rights, independent judiciary, free 
press, constitutional democracy etc. (Buckley, 2013). 
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USA runs trade deficits against both Germany (exports are valued at $54.3 billion and imports 
at $118 billion) and China (exports at $120 billion and imports at $429 billion79). Germany 
and China are relatively balanced, with a more moderate advantage of China (German exports 
into China were at $84.9 billion and imports at $100 billion). The composition of these 
exports is consistent with traditional conceptions of patterns of trade between developed 
economies, as all six routes are dominated by exports of machinery and transports – most 
notably so in German exports to China (67.1%), to the US (59.9%) and Chinese exports to 
Germany (53.9%) and somewhat less pronounced in US exports to Germany (41.6%) and 
China (39%) and Chinese exports to the US (33.6%). In principle, all other significant 
categories are also manufactured goods or chemicals. The only exception is US exports to 
China which have a substantial primary goods proportion as 25.2% are food/live animals and 
crude materials (CID, 2018). Taking their mutual trade as representative of competitiveness 
and capacity, it would seem that between the three national capitalism cases, the highest 
position on the global supply chain is occupied by Germany, and the lowest by the US. This is 
a very counter-intuitive conclusion from the point of view of traditional Wallersteinian 
approach to world-systems, which saw the relative positions within the world-system as 
relatively fixed. The original positions of the core-type economic development in the USA 
and the periphery-type in China would be expected to replicate themselves longitudinally. 
However, these conclusions are consistent with the systemic cycle theory of this thesis, which 
built upon Arrighi and Silver. Firstly, the systemic cycle theory conceptualizes the world-
system as dynamic and dependent on various national level strategies. In this 
conceptualization, a successful strategy produces a shift in the relative positions of 
economies. Secondly, the major predictor is the phase of the systemic cycle. The economy 
that was the global leader in production and trade (USA) is predicted to eventually exhaust the 
profitable options in such activities and enter the phase of the financial expansion, which 
brings a form of deindustrialization and conceivably, a slide back down the global supply 
chain. Large economies undergoing a material expansion face a more interesting situation in 
which vastly different institutional pathways are possible. China and Germany are two cases 
which were analyzed in this thesis. Their economies encompass complex solutions which 
spell out their unique positions. We first briefly describe the general puzzles of these two 
 
79 This suggests that the US goods deficit was dominated by its deficit with China in 2016 ($309 billion out of a 
total of $690 billion). 
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economies and then describe the ways in which our approach (i.e. three channels, seven 
drivers) made their institutions comparable to each other and the US framework. 
The Chinese development combined strict control in areas of interest such as capital flows 
with rapid liberalizations in labor markets. This selective, but massive turn to a novel form of 
capitalism was conducted in the context of a completely and persistently closed political 
environment providing us with an oddity in transitional studies. Post-socialist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (much of former Soviet space notwithstanding) have for the most 
part constructed functional democracies. Many former Soviet republics are formally 
democracies, but often sport political elites which dabble in autocratic governing style. 
However, both of these variants accept at least the normative ideal of a liberal democracy, 
which has in Fukuyamesque manner accompanied the economic transition in the vast majority 
of countries undergoing transition in the post-1989 period. China has on the other hand kept 
its de facto one-party system even as the sequential and managed economic liberalization 
attracted capital. Its exports sky-rocketed under a favorable political climate, in which 
political success is connected to the personal involvement with an export increase. An 
independent labor organization is prohibited through a single party-controlled trade union 
umbrella – ACTFU (Clarke, Lee and Li, 2004; Chan and Hui, 2014). Its society grows ever 
more unequal overtaking even the US levels (World Bank, 2018). Following the occidental 
normative perspective, one could expect this structure of asymmetrical freedoms (economic 
freedom/political repression) to collapse either way: either for the prolonged economic growth 
to spill into a growing demand for democracy or for a stifling political regime to slowly 
suffocate the free economic growth80. The relevant scenario from our point of view is the 
 
80 Acemoglu and Robinson think that the closed political top-heavy economic system (extractive institutions) 
must eventually push China into a stifling growth regime (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013: 442 and passim). 
With the standard economic growth models (Solow-Swan) this is not inconceivable. Continuous technological 
break-troughs are necessary for continued high growth rates. However, there are at least two reasons why this 
prognosis seems inapplicable, at least as it concerns innovations. Firstly, Chinese research and development is 
not stagnant in the least. The number of patents applied for each year is growing, and now dwarfs the numbers 
found elsewhere. In 2015, the number of patent applications was almost as high as the combined numbers of the 
USA, Japan and Korea (WIPO, 2016: 12). This suggests that the technological innovation atmosphere may have 
moved substantially away from the catch-up model. Secondly, the standard growth models via Acemoglu and 
Robinson assume a closed economy, with no new technological innovations being developed outside it. This is 
obviously not true, as the global system allows for a free flow of patents. In short, economic growth may be 
measured nationally, but the technological innovations that support it are global, and will presumably continue to 
be global. Therefore, China will not necessarily suffer from a growth slump caused by non-existent technological 
innovations. Even if it would cease to produce worthwhile inventions (which it will most probably not) it would 
still be able to utilize innovations from abroad, except in the event of global wars (which are also not likely to 
occur – see Lučev, 2014b). China may be facing a challenging situation in the Schumpeterian sense of 
innovation, i.e. in creative destruction that Acemoglu and Robinson (2013: 445 and passim) also take issue with. 
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maturation of Chinese economy. This phase of its development has occurred in the context of 
what Arrighi would interpret as a terminal crisis of the US led finance expansion. The reforms 
in China entail several processes: reducing the role of exports in its economy, more expensive 
labor which translates into larger household demand, supply side reforms which must cut 
excess production capacity created under the old extensive development strategy which 
consisted of export-led growth benefiting from very abundant labor and low costs, eventually 
more open capital markets, but a continued closed political system. 
The German way seems to point to organizing the economy through the European Union led 
by Germany itself as the productivity motor. Here we have a vast experiment in levels of 
economic regulation through which the traditional welfare state is deconstructed, and many 
relevant macroeconomic decisions removed from the agenda of individual states. Namely, 
most aspects of social, health, labor and military policies are left to the discretion of the 
individual states. However, the ways in which crisis response is constricted decisively 
influences these areas as most individual responses are prevented or severely restricted (tariff 
protectionism, individual monetary response within the eurozone and active anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy). These constrictions leave only the slow and arduous process of improving 
competitiveness through falling real wages as a crisis response, while the fiscal 
responsibilities of states in all of the recounted “untouched policies” are often cut. The 
member-states are encouraged to increase the competitiveness (e.g. through the Euro+ pact) 
which can under these conditions only mean a liberalization of the labor market (or 
flexicurity, as one form of this process is affectionately named). This is a very roundabout 
way to indirectly ensure the wide-spread pressures towards the German labor solution – i.e. 
extensive developmental strategy. In particular, the German led EU can be interpreted as a 
formation of a new, tighter economic nexus, which indirectly exerts the downward pressure 
on the real wages of its immediate periphery – increasing the competitiveness of European 
exports. This pressure is issued through a form of macroeconomic agenda setting where all 
crisis responses are eliminated, save for the ones pertaining to real wages. The VofC agenda 
enables the location of institutional complementarities, which turn a nominally relatively 
 
The issue is the continued functioning of capitalism if the government persists in choosing winners and losers 
rather than allowing the market to level the playing field. Here, the faith in the continued growth potential of 
unfettered markets (i.e. of Schumpeterian creative destruction) seems normative and hinges on an idealized view 
of free markets. Remarkable Chinese growth and an institutional mix which seems aberrant from the Western 
point of view (as the Acemoglu and Robinson approach shows) must be viewed on its own merits. 
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modest institutional influence of the EU into a substantial force of institutional change in 
crisis circumstances. 
We have used the framework from Chapter 4 to open the three cases to analysis, rather than to 
forgo them to the fog of ostensible exceptionalism. The framework sought to establish the 
theoretical basis for the connection between the systemic cycle and institutional change. To 
do so, it identified three channels of institutional change. The first channel of path dependence 
is a tendency for the initial institutional positions to perpetuate, suggesting that types of 
change are constricted with the institutions already in place. In terms of institutional starting 
positions, Germany is historically a paradigmatic case of the Coordinated Market Economy 
which is a position justified by its traditional welfare state, corporatist institutions, protected 
labor markets and strong unions. However, Germany has more recently undergone changes 
which have resulted in a dualized economy more open to free markets. Here, the entire 
apparatus of the CME is used to protect the core industry workers while the more vulnerable 
groups are left to the market. The USA is a paradigmatic case of an LME and its tendency 
toward liberalization has only been exacerbated in the recent years as no strong labor 
organization exists which could prevent it. Finally, China is an unclear variety of capitalism 
as the VofC framework was intended only to describe developed countries, but its 
institutional tradition points primarily to the strong party at the core with party insiders 
networked across management and union structures. The issue there is the slow and arduous 
process of the influence of associationally weak and structurally strong labor being slowly felt 
in the policy making. Another channel is the deliberate design of institutions under the 
influence of formal political mechanism of transnational conditionality and domestic politics, 
with the latter being able to provide crucial pressure in Germany (compromising with the 
other two) and China (benefiting from path dependence), and often being conspicuously 
absent in labor issues in the USA. 
The crucial interplay occurs in the systemic cycle inspired channel, between the phase of the 
systemic cycle, power relations and developmental strategies. In terms of power resources, we 
have utilized the distinction of associational and structural power of labor. Associational 
power refers to the ability of unions to organize labor. The union density has been falling in 
all the three cases and is the highest in China, significantly lower in Germany and the lowest 
in the USA. However, as the analysis of informal institutions has shown, the highest leverage 
of unions would certainly be found in Germany (even though the power is bifurcated) as the 
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collective bargaining practices are centralized. China, on the other hand, treats its unions as a 
part of the Communist Party and they do not yet have the functions we would expect in the 
West. The structural power refers to bargaining power of labor (and in practice, primarily 
industrial labor), which is primarily derived from its importance to the economy. Structural 
power is influenced by a number of factors and we focused on the phase of the systemic 
cycle, developmental strategy, technological shifts and trade relations. The systemic cycle 
increased structural labor power in China and Germany (as they underwent material 
expansions) and reduced structural labor power in the USA (financial expansion). In this 
context the developmental strategies and trade relations were developed with the successful 
post-2001 extensive strategy of Germany providing a trade surplus and therefore an additional 
increase in structural labor power in industry, and a long-standing extensive strategy doing the 
same for China until challenged in the last decade. An intensive material expansion which is 
currently developing will produce a balanced trade position, if successful, and a trade deficit 
if unsuccessful. Currently, China is still running a comfortable trade surplus, which is helping 
create a divergence of low associational and high structural power.  
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9. Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to provide a theoretical solution to the problem of endogenous institutional 
change by bridging the gap between national and global capitalism. We have argued that the 
systemic cycle theory can be fruitfully used in a multi-theoretical framework which 
encompasses power resource theory, path dependence and formal political channels. The 
conceptual gap this thesis is attempting to resolve is the issue faced by the dominant 
comparative capitalism schemes, which focus on the microeconomic, ideal-typical and 
national and can therefore not explain the relevant change drivers as endogenous. These 
theories rely on exogenous events instead. The central methodological maneuver of this thesis 
was to elevate the unit of analysis to the transnational level in order to capture the many 
drivers of change that occur beyond the limits of a nation-state.  
To do so, we needed to reconstruct a theory which could handle two distinct levels: a global-
level theory of economic change and a national-level theory of institutions. The first element 
needed to be able to explain the variegation of pressures on different geographic locations and 
at different historical points. This in itself is an ambitious task and we found a theory which 
could manage it in the systemic cycle. Chapter 1 has analyzed the systemic cycle and its 
central dilemmas including the overly supply-sided approach and an inability to handle 
notions of institutional variety. Chapter 2 has surveyed institutional thought and pointed out 
the general tendencies, strengths and shortcomings in new institutionalism, including the 
central issue of an under-conceptualized endogenous institutional change. Chapter 3 has 
argued that the deficiencies and strong points of Arrighi and new institutionalism could 
plausibly be compatible and mutually beneficial if they were adequately developed. It 
proceeded to develop the two central regime types in Arrighi through Keynesian notions of 
aggregate demand structures to provide useful categories. In particular, the intensive and 
extensive capitalism is interpreted in terms of developmental strategies in which aggregate 
demand management is focused on exports (extensive) or the generation of internal demand 
(intensive). 
Chapter 4 has offered a framework of institutional change which integrated technological 
change, path dependence, power resources, phases of the systemic cycle, developmental 
strategies, trade relations and deliberate institutional design. These were organized according 
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to the timeframe necessary for the development of processes they entail and ultimately 
grouped into three channels of institutional change: channel 1 – path dependence; channel 2 – 
cyclical power relations and channel 3 – institutional design. Channel 3 pertains to explicit 
reforms dependent on both domestic political processes and international conditionality - 
mechanisms which are themselves well researched in mainstream political science and 
sociology. Channel 1 refers to a more specific concept of path dependence, itself also well 
explored within the confines of historical institutionalism. However, channel 2 provides an 
original concept as it combines the reinterpreted systemic cycle categories (reinterpreted in 
Chapter 3) with power resources and technological changes. This framework has enabled us 
to conceptually transcend three important rifts and therefore supply an improvement in the 
theory of institutional change – firstly, we surpassed the national fetters of institutional 
analysis by embedding developmental strategies and trade relations into a framework dealing 
with national-level institutional change; secondly, we encompassed growth models and 
demand management into a traditionally supply-side oriented analysis and thirdly, we focused 
on power and its many possible manifestations. Specifically, the three channels of change all 
deal with different aspects of power in institutional change: path dependence depends on 
power feed-back mechanisms and manifests as a pressure to perpetuate the existent 
institutional development; cyclical power relations describe the interactions of the 
organizational capacity and structural power resources (i.e. leverage) and institutional design 
designates the most observable aspect of power as decision making. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have applied this framework to the illustrative cases of labor institutions 
in the USA, Germany and China since 1980. While all three institutional sets were subject to 
liberalizations, each displayed a specific dynamic of institutional change and the three 
channels interacted to produce idiosyncratic institutional results. In the USA, all three 
mechanisms reinforce each other gradually pushing towards lower labor power and less labor-
friendly institutions. In Germany, path dependence was exacting pressures towards a 
continued high labor power and a labor-friendly institutional set, while power relations 
produced a dualist formation in which labor power was concentrated in industry. This was 
exploited by the third channel, and a dualist regulatory structure was deliberately constructed 
to achieve greater competitiveness – with liberalization of the labor market largely relegated 
to the low labor power sectors. In China, path dependence primarily preempted the ability of 
labor to organize (very low associational power), while the continued material expansion 
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created substantial hypothetical leverage for labor (increasing structural power). This dilemma 
was resolved through the third channel with a succession of labor-friendly reforms. 
Finally, Chapter 8 has taken stock of the three illustrative chapters in order to compare their 
patterns of change. In terms of modes of change, the existing literature is not uniform in their 
diagnosis as Thelen interpreted the labor liberalization in the USA as displacement, while 
Hacker and Pierson argue for drift. The framework developed here helped us to produce a 
more nuanced and systematic approach to modes of change by using the timeframe hierarchy 
and specific mechanisms of the three channels of change. Both versions of descriptions of the 
mode of change in US labor institutions was found to be sound, but at different levels of 
analysis – with displacement at the level of channels 1 (path dependence) and 2 (cyclical 
power relations) and drift at the level of channel 3 (institutional design). Likewise, we found 
German institutional changes to be a combination of drift (channel 1 and 2) and displacement 
(channel 3), while layering dominates in all three levels in Chinese institutional changes, with 
a possibility of a future development into conversion. 
The end-result is a study which focuses on shifts in power and the connections between 
power, global economic flows and developmental strategies, alongside more familiar themes 
of path dependence and formal politics. Further research might fruitfully expand into 
ideational change or analyze the effects on smaller labor markets, which have necessarily 
eluded us as we focused on three major international economy players. In any event, this 
thesis is an attempt to add to the studies dealing with endogenous institutional change, as one 
of the most obstinate issues in contemporary social sciences. The fundamental maneuver of 
applying systemic cycle theory to institutional change may seem bold. However, if we are 
even to attempt to tackle the obstinate problems, we must surely look for bold solutions. 
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